The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #12,742
I think it's ironic to say that Putin doesn't want to negotiate, and then simultaneously declare that European security is not up for negotiation, when that's the very thing Putin has repeatedly stated he wants to negotiate about. I think these statements are fundamentally dishonest and are about the image the writer wants to project, not about reality. Russia would love to end the war soon, if they could accomplish their goals, but they won't end the war without accomplishing their goals, unless the course of the war itself turns against them. Clearly the collective west is unwilling at this time to provide the kind of inputs that could accomplish that, it isn't even clear that this is possible without a direct entry into the war. So here we are. Europe pretends it's Putin who doesn't want to negotiate, while openly refusing to negotiate on anything but the terms they want to set.
SolarisKenzo
Well-Known Member
I do not agree.
As a european, I never spare european leaders from any criticism when i feel like they deserve it because as a citizen I have not only the right but the duty to do so.
This peace deal, as the High Respresentative said in the first line, is vital.
However, the way Trump and his friend Vladimir Putin are following is profoundly wrong.
An unjust peace, a peace that will let Putin get away with a devastating war that costed hundreds of thousands of lives without paying any price will not last.
Anger is a popular sentiment in Europe, probably only less popular than antiamericanism.
Us and Russia want to humiliate Europe and Ukraine for not being totally cooperative to them, for not doing exactly what they want.
I can't but blame my fellow citizens and my leaders for that, we have chosen years of political-nothing because we were too scared to say anything against the US or Moscow.
However, if Trump and Putin choose the way of humiliation, they will not bring peace in Europe, they will simply stop a war for some time leading to a much worse one in the future.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #12,744
None of this addresses my point. If she had said "We don't want negotiations because Ukraine has nothing to negotiate, with, and anyways there's nothing to negotiate over. Russia can withdraw from the recognized internationally territory of Ukraine or Europe will support Ukraine until victory or until Ukraine itself decides they like the peace deal that's on the table", it would have been a clear, consistent, and honest statement. Instead she's claiming it's Putin that doesn't want to negotiate. A statement that's completely untrue. She doesn't say "Putin's peace deal is unjust, we want a peace based on justice and Putin won't negotiate based on justice". She said "Russia has no intention of ending this war any time soon" and "Putin continues to drag out negotiations and hopes he gets away with it". Her end statement is even sillier. The root cause of the war in fact is Russian imperialism. But the European security architecture has failed to deal with Russian imperialism. So there clearly is an imbalance in European security architecture. It's not imaginary.
I stand by my original assessment. This isn't an honest take on the situation, it's an attempt to put out a certain message that the writer finds convenient. Stating things as they really are would be uncomfortable because it would invite a discussion of European commitments to Ukraine and whether they are even remotely enough to move the needle, in light of a rejection of Putin's peace proposals, and negotiations based on the realities of the war. So instead she pretends it's Putin that won't negotiate.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
What is a just peace?
The entire process has been about trying to convince Trump that Putin is lying (what is he lying about?), doesn’t want to end the war (do they?), and can’t be trusted, while Putin stating his position that hasn’t changed much since the beginning (after he raised the stakes). Everyone declaring a win after every meeting or conversation, the pendulum swings back and so it goes on and so does the war.
In reality, no one but Trump wants this to end until their (near) maximalist goals are accepted and wants to stall the process, as long as they do not alienate Trump. I think Putin cares a lot less about the latter, he just sees Trump as useful in convincing the other side to accept his position precisely because they care very much about that very latter.
The entire process has been about trying to convince Trump that Putin is lying (what is he lying about?), doesn’t want to end the war (do they?), and can’t be trusted, while Putin stating his position that hasn’t changed much since the beginning (after he raised the stakes). Everyone declaring a win after every meeting or conversation, the pendulum swings back and so it goes on and so does the war.
In reality, no one but Trump wants this to end until their (near) maximalist goals are accepted and wants to stall the process, as long as they do not alienate Trump. I think Putin cares a lot less about the latter, he just sees Trump as useful in convincing the other side to accept his position precisely because they care very much about that very latter.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
But (I don’t know if this info is correct as I don’t trust this outlet):
Macron and Merz keep insisting on a ceasefire, but no one else seemed to do so. And good luck with this idea (or he is just trolling):
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
This is confirmed by the RU official statement (in Russian):
МИД России
Комментарий официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой в связи с заявлениями британских официальных лиц по украинскому конфликту (18 августа 2025 года) На фоне продемонстрированного руководством России и США в Анкоридже подлинного стремления к всеобъемлющему, справедливому и...
t.me
This is the correct perspective:
This is a good question (and a fair response) provided Kallas’ statement conveniently cited above:
Funny, though not many are probably familiar with the two individuals cited above, but they are renowned economists asking these questions.
This is just funny:
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
One more post from me, a thought…
A lot of talk about security guarantees. The desire appears to be Article 5 “like” if not NATO membership. A couple of things to note here. One is that there are no obligations for anyone to go to war with anyone if a member is attacked, but to provide assistance as they see fit. Second, there has been a lot of talk, and not only under Trump’s presidency, but for the past few years that Russia will attack NATO members (Baltics or even Poland) and no one will come for help, the US in particular. So if these concerns exist where Russia does not have much strategic interests or means to accomplish the perceived goals and Article 5 does not guarantee “not abandonment” (for instance, the response could be the same as the response to the ongoing Russian invasion), what is stopping Russia accepting these guarantees without the NATO-member troops present in Ukraine? Furthermore, why does the reasoning seem to suggest that Ukraine will be safe if such guarantees are provided? I do not see how the situation would be much different. Probability of anyone going to war with Russia if it decides to invade Ukraine again post settlement is not going to be much higher than it is now, in my opinion, guarantees or not. The expected support should be considered to be what is today and no more.
Another thought… The best security guarantee for Ukraine is its own army and means to defend. They cannot sustainably defend today with the resources they have at their disposal (even against “depleted” Russia, with the majority of forces “poorly” trained). I feel like I already discussed this, perhaps. There is no realistic possibility for them to sustain the current level of military involvement and investment into their MIC post settlement as it is simply unaffordable. And I don’t mean just something they cannot afford, but it is literally impossible. On this note, consider Ukraine prewar (regardless where you think he timeline begins), where it had significantly stronger economy, operating energy infrastructure, population 25% higher and significantly younger, population more willing (or unwilling?), etc, and the level of investment it could afford developing its own capabilities and military. Expecting allies pouring in with billions of dollars/euros is not rational (see the expectations regarding this war as a starting reference and Konrad Muzyka’s interview I cited earlier). Will finish here as I have other things to attend to at the moment.
A lot of talk about security guarantees. The desire appears to be Article 5 “like” if not NATO membership. A couple of things to note here. One is that there are no obligations for anyone to go to war with anyone if a member is attacked, but to provide assistance as they see fit. Second, there has been a lot of talk, and not only under Trump’s presidency, but for the past few years that Russia will attack NATO members (Baltics or even Poland) and no one will come for help, the US in particular. So if these concerns exist where Russia does not have much strategic interests or means to accomplish the perceived goals and Article 5 does not guarantee “not abandonment” (for instance, the response could be the same as the response to the ongoing Russian invasion), what is stopping Russia accepting these guarantees without the NATO-member troops present in Ukraine? Furthermore, why does the reasoning seem to suggest that Ukraine will be safe if such guarantees are provided? I do not see how the situation would be much different. Probability of anyone going to war with Russia if it decides to invade Ukraine again post settlement is not going to be much higher than it is now, in my opinion, guarantees or not. The expected support should be considered to be what is today and no more.
Another thought… The best security guarantee for Ukraine is its own army and means to defend. They cannot sustainably defend today with the resources they have at their disposal (even against “depleted” Russia, with the majority of forces “poorly” trained). I feel like I already discussed this, perhaps. There is no realistic possibility for them to sustain the current level of military involvement and investment into their MIC post settlement as it is simply unaffordable. And I don’t mean just something they cannot afford, but it is literally impossible. On this note, consider Ukraine prewar (regardless where you think he timeline begins), where it had significantly stronger economy, operating energy infrastructure, population 25% higher and significantly younger, population more willing (or unwilling?), etc, and the level of investment it could afford developing its own capabilities and military. Expecting allies pouring in with billions of dollars/euros is not rational (see the expectations regarding this war as a starting reference and Konrad Muzyka’s interview I cited earlier). Will finish here as I have other things to attend to at the moment.
On that ^ note: