The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Redshift

Active Member
I feel anything less than freezing the line of contact and swapping the gains in Sumy @ Kharkov for the rest of Donbass would be bad for Russia. Imagine giving up the land bridge to Crimea after all the work they spent rebuilding, adding in new rail lines, ect. Plus for future security, that was one of their primary objectives.
Gosh we wouldn't want Russia to lose any money in that they spent they spent REBUILDING what they destroyed that would just be so unjust.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
No agreement made under the duress of occupation and bombing is likely to last forever no matter who signs it.
Well... on a long enough timeline nothing lasts forever, including Russia and Ukraine as countries. So certainly it won't last forever. But a lasting peace for a few decades would be nice.

I feel anything less than freezing the line of contact and swapping the gains in Sumy @ Kharkov for the rest of Donbass would be bad for Russia. Imagine giving up the land bridge to Crimea after all the work they spent rebuilding, adding in new rail lines, ect. Plus for future security, that was one of their primary objectives.
I agree, I would be surprised if Russia was willing to give that up.

Gosh we wouldn't want Russia to lose any money in that they spent they spent REBUILDING what they destroyed that would just be so unjust.
It's not the money. It's the land bridge to Crimea. On a side note the logistics corridor to Crimea isn't something Russia rebuilt, it's something they built essentially from scratch. Of course the need for this corridor stems from Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine likely didn't need much of that infrastructure to begin with.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I believe it was Nikita Khruschev, head of the USSR as a whole (well head of the Communist Party, i.e. GenSec CCCPSU), not of Russia (RSFSR). But I'm honestly a little murky on the legal basis of that particular decision.
For the legal basis this ukrainian document from 1992 (in English) details how it was being done, below excerpt from page 3.

In accordance with paragraphs (a) and (f) of article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by the Act of the USSR of 28 April 1954, ratified the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 19 February 1954 concerning the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR, adopted on the basis of "the joint submission by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR", and made the corresponding amendments to articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the USSR, in accordance with which the Crimean region formed part of the Ukrainian SSR.
Historical and current criticism of the transfer on the Russian side alleges that the above - the bolded part - did not satisfy Article 18 of the Soviet Constitution, which mandated that the "redrawing" of Republics within the Soviet Union had to be approved by (both) the republics concerned. Meaning in their opinion there would have needed to be a separate formal decree by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, not a referal to a supposed approval within a decree issued by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The document linked is a formal declaration of Ukraine to the UN on the matter after the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in 1992 approved an enactment calling for a legal appraisal (in the sense of a review) of the above 1954 constitutional amendment with the explicit aim of "declaring it null and void". I'm not sure whether that appraisal was ever done in Russia subsequently.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
For the legal basis this ukrainian document from 1992 (in English) details how it was being done, below excerpt from page 3.



Historical and current criticism of the transfer on the Russian side alleges that the above - the bolded part - did not satisfy Article 18 of the Soviet Constitution, which mandated that the "redrawing" of Republics within the Soviet Union had to be approved by (both) the republics concerned. Meaning in their opinion there would have needed to be a separate formal decree by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, not a referal to a supposed approval within a decree issued by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The document linked is a formal declaration of Ukraine to the UN on the matter after the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in 1992 approved an enactment calling for a legal appraisal (in the sense of a review) of the above 1954 constitutional amendment with the explicit aim of "declaring it null and void". I'm not sure whether that appraisal was ever done in Russia subsequently.
Interesting link, thanks for sharing. Not sure either, also not sure that it matters a whole lot. The current situation isn't an attempt to reverse Soviet decisions. It's a whole separate war of conquest.
 

crest

Member
Well... on a long enough timeline nothing lasts forever, including Russia and Ukraine as countries. So certainly it won't last forever. But a lasting peace for a few decades would be nice.



I agree, I would be surprised if Russia was willing to give that up.



It's not the money. It's the land bridge to Crimea. On a side note the logistics corridor to Crimea isn't something Russia rebuilt, it's something they built essentially from scratch. Of course the need for this corridor stems from Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine likely didn't need much of that infrastructure to begin with.
I tend to agree tho more surprising to me is the lack of NATO or army/weapon restrictions
As much as I highly doubt Russia would give up it's land bridge I doubt even more they will let Ukraine seriously rearm or become a bastion of Western military strength against them. And if they had to chose between the two (and it doesn't appear they can't have both) I'm guessing they would chose no land bridge over a well armed United Western/Ukrainian on there doorstep. Far as I can tell that was the threat that started this whole thing in the first place, it's not about how many kilometers that threat occupies it's about if that threat is there.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I tend to agree tho more surprising to me is the lack of NATO or army/weapon restrictions
As much as I highly doubt Russia would give up it's land bridge I doubt even more they will let Ukraine seriously rearm or become a bastion of Western military strength against them. And if they had to chose between the two (and it doesn't appear they can't have both) I'm guessing they would chose no land bridge over a well armed United Western/Ukrainian on there doorstep. Far as I can tell that was the threat that started this whole thing in the first place, it's not about how many kilometers that threat occupies it's about if that threat is there.
I think the point that is being missed, these are preconditions for a ceasefire, not peace accords. Peace negotiations are presumably to follow.

Edit: overall, I see probability of Russia voluntarily leaving Kherson or Zaporozhye being exactly zero (probability of being forced out by Ukraine is probably not much higher, what analysts call “very difficult”). The “swap” that Trump had referred to probably involves Kharkiv (and possibly not even the entire occupied area) and Sumy. Whatever little is held in Dnepropetrovsk and Nikolaev regions is likely in that bundle as well.
 
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crest

Member
I think the point that is being missed, these are preconditions for a ceasefire, not peace accords. Peace negotiations are presumably to follow.
You are correct of course it's just surprising that NATO is on the table I guess the army size/weapons is in that regard actually something one would expect to be on the table,as there is alot of details that would need to be ironed out. The idea of how much land and critically where most likely falls into that basket aswell.

Edit also I guess the issue of legality maybe less important for a cease fire then it would be for a actual settlement. Especially if from what I can gather it's not going to be a complete cease fire perhaps just a air cease fire.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I very much doubt NATO is on the table. I don’t know if they can negotiate limitations on military though. I think as long as Russia wiggles out NATO and military cooperation with the US, they would probably be happy. Some limitations on long-range strike capabilities would probably come into play too, I would think.

Further thought on the “swap”… Perhaps, Nikolaev is not in the cards as it is a strategic little piece of land:

IMG_1786.jpeg
 

crest

Member
I very much doubt NATO is on the table. I don’t know if they can negotiate limitations on military though. I think as long as Russia wiggles out NATO and military cooperation with the US, they would probably be happy. Some limitations on long-range strike capabilities would probably come into play too, I would think.

Further thought on the “swap”… Perhaps, Nikolaev is not in the cards as it is a strategic little piece of land:

View attachment 53281
I would be surprised if overall army size wasn't on the table and other things such as foreign troops air defence and as you said long range missiles.
None of those things are uncommon in peace settlements. It's actually quite uncommen for a settlement that leaves two large veteran army's on both sides in a protracted war for what I guess are obvious reasions
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Regardless of how this is presented, this is not a complete capitulation by Ukraine and it still gets to have an opinion, I would think. But we also don’t know the details aside from what has been reported and whether it is factual to begin with.

Also important to keep in mind:
- Ukraine is in ruins and needs to rebuild its energy infrastructure, etc;
- Currently, the entire state’s revenue is spent on the military salaries and the like;
- Their entire budget, aside from military, is fully bankrolled by the allied countries, much if it in loans, and loans from international institutions that have to be repaid;
- People will leave once the martial law is lifted, this is inventible.

Just from the above alone, there is no some grand Ukrainian army to be created once the war stops. Especially without US assistance. Ukraine cannot sustain it, simple as that. The survivability of the country is in question as well.

Also consider that even at current spending and assistance they cannot fully resist Russia. I don’t think there is a meaningful way they can actually threaten Russia post war if they aren’t in NATO and no US cooperation involved.

Edit: To continue the thought, what Zelensky and others in power likely understand is that the end of the war without security guarantees could actually be the beginning of a “peaceful” end of the state.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
A couple of new things. First is the WSJ article. Don’t have access, but here are the briefs:





And a couple of screenshots from the article itself that were posted elsewhere (the second is the highlighted part above, I think):




What is stopping Europe from providing “ironclad security guarantees” to Ukraine? Moreover, what is stopping Europe from providing Ukraine with the EU membership once the hostilities stop and some peace agreement is reached and signed? That, by definition, would provide security guarantees supposedly better than NATO membership where no one is actually obligated to go to war. This was discussed previously by me and others, but here we are again.

What if we move on from the USA providing any guarantees because that is highly unlikely to happen (I would say it ain’t happening) and think of viable alternatives. The problem is that none of it is happening, no NATO, no EU in the foreseeable future, no guarantees because no one is going to directly engage in war with Russia over Ukraine. That’s just the reality of it. So what now?

Russian withdrawal from the occupied areas of Zaporozhye and Kherson regions is not going to happen. I believe this clear as day. Access to the Sea of Azov is not going to be granted under no circumstances (unless forced somehow). Again, clear as day: simple logic suggests that there will be no such trade for the remains of Donbas. That little bit of Mykolaiv region is likely off the table too. That leaves Sumy and Kharkiv. Here is the map from BBC (the first one google gave me to show occupied territories):



The first striking thing, even without thinking of any strategic meanings, one can clearly see that the remaining Donetsk region will not be exchanged for two occupied regions in the south. On the other hand, Kharkiv and Sumy for Donetsk is the reverse of the issue.

But now I remember we are talking about ceasefire for the UA forces leaving Donetsk entirely and this is rather ridiculous because we are not quite at a point where beggars can’t be choosers just yet (and strategic forward thinking is not thing, obviously). So the conclusion is that the war will continue, maybe until the beggars can’t any longer pretend to be able to choose? I am personally still not entirely convinced the Trump-Putin meeting will take place in the first place because the deal that will be hammered out will undoubtedly be rejected by Ukraine with Europe behind their back.

I think the most important take away from this entire thing is the change to “dignified peace” and the acceptance by the European allies of the territories being lost. The latter is suggested here: “[…]territory can be exchanged only in a reciprocal manner-meaning that if Ukraine pulls out of some regions, Russia must withdraw from others.” This had never been spoken outloud previously. Yet, now that there has been acceptance, Putin has a lot less work to do as he now needs to expand this commitment, which is a lot easier than getting to where we are today.

The second thing is this declaration by some EU leaders and the UK after meeting with JD Vance:


We stand ready to support this work diplomatically as well as by upholding our substantive military and financial support to Ukraine, including through the work of the Coalition of the Willing, and by upholding and imposing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation.

Here we (rather they) are with the coalition of the willing again. Hasn’t it been proven several times over that the project is basically dead?

We share the conviction that a diplomatic solution must protect Ukraine’s and Europe’s vital security interests.

We agree that these vital interests include the need for robust and credible security guarantees that enable Ukraine to effectively defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine has the freedom of choice over its own destiny. Meaningful negotiations can only take place in the context of a ceasefire or reduction of hostilities.


I talked about the security guarantees above. It seems that Ukraine had made the choice it was free to make, no? On the meaningful negotiations, these are not going to be about Ukraine per se, but a new European security architecture. There will be no ceasefire either before meaningful negotiations about Ukraine take place, for obvious reasons discussed previously. We have been through a “temporary” reduction of hostilities already. And again, nothing is stopping Europe to protect its security snd other interests.

The path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine.

That’s simply not true. This is exactly how it will be decided, in my opinion. We will basically let Ukraine be beat down into acceptance and not because we are ruthless and don’t care, but because this is the way it is; or we will “manhandle” it to get there before being beat down to it.

We remain committed to the principle that international borders must not be changed by force. The current line of contact should be the starting point of negotiations.[…] We underline our unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

That would be an obvious contradiction.

We continue to stand firmly by the side of Ukraine. We are united as Europeans and determined to jointly promote our interests.

United is rather questionable, especially in the whole European context (something Redshift can probably chime in on). Promoting your interests is not the same as protecting them as declared previously in the same statement. Hence,

And we will continue to cooperate closely with President Trump and with the United States of America, and with President Zelenskyy and the people of Ukraine, for a peace in Ukraine that protects our vital security interests.

Anyway, this is arguably the weakest statement I have yet seen on the subject. In my opinion, this actually shows that Trump has a lot more leverage than (I) previously thought (I discussed it here a month or two ago). The EU and UK tariff negotiations can probably provide a glimpse into this stuff here. It appears that while thinking they are negotiating the protection of European security interests in a bundle of the tariff “deal”, they may have negotiated themselves out of them. Trump is going to take advantage of every weakness and he appears to be doing just that here. Putin is going to do the same.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Only in Kalibrated, certainly not on Suriyak

If, that would be the perfect definition of an advance of opportunity...
 

crest

Member
I'm just speculating here but reciprocal land trade could involve the zap nuclear power plant. I would guess that is a thing the Russians would be willing to exchange as it's value should be considerly higher for Ukraine then Russia. I also agree that Ukraine is very unlikely to accept this deal, and as stated it hasn't capitulated yet. It's also worth noting that zelensky would need to accept a deal he can sell as a win I think anything less would seriously jeopardise his governments hold on power in Ukraine. That may seem academic to us here but truth is if the war continues he remains in power, don't get me wrong I don't think zelensky would choose war solely to remain in power but if it's between a bad deal and losing power he will have personal motivations aswell.

The same goes with Putin to be honest a bad deal for Russia will not be received well, this is a common problom in protracted wars the "sunk cost factor" makes peace harder to achieve if a nation is still capable of resisting.

I'm beginning to think that if we see anything at all (and we might). It will be along the lines of a very limited cease fire perhaps like the energy strikes but expanded? A limited land swap and very temporary freezing of lines in specific regions (a full ceasefire is doubtful for Russia to accept without MAJOR concessions) Trump will definitely be reacting poorly if nothing happens and the u.s does have alot of influence in Ukraine and the eu. The only real thing helping this along is I think the fact trump just needs a deal, I don't even think it matters what it is he will bullshit it as a win.

The problom lies in a how both Ukraine and Russia can sell it as a win because I think they both would rather fight then not win and I say not win because they both are willing to take more losses for a victory at this point. Optics are also a thing neither side I'm guessing is willing to take a deal the other side can sell as a win, not unless they believe they have a bigger win. It sounds stupid but it is a actual thing I mean it's basically what trump is going for here to put the t in perspective. I mean do you think he really doesn't know the relative positions of all the parties here? That the u.s state department has no idea how difficult a cease fire is going to be to achieve? Yet this is happening anyways soly for optics as trump wants a win. Or the Kursk offenceive for that matter. "War is politics by other means" therefore the political aspect needs to be accounted for

Anyways that's why I mentioned the nuclear plant as it's value is different on both sides and therefore a good option. Limited strike options have also been discussed even accepted by both parties in the past so there is room there to negotiate. I also think the previous poster is correct in pointing out that the big news is land swaps appear to be on the table. We may see something but at this point I'm also wondering what are the consequences of nothing how does the trump administration react to a no deal?
I don't know what will happen on Friday but I'm fairly certain that something will happen one way or another.
 
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crest

Member
Making them submit AT THE TIME rarely closes the book on border and territorial disputes in the future.
No deals are eternal but to put in perspective if your in country that isn't at war right now with several other nations its because multiple peace deals are holding, probably some you have won and also some you have lost as a nation
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Only in Kalibrated, certainly not on Suriyak

If, that would be the perfect definition of an advance of opportunity...
Ok these OSINT bloggers are working for free. You have to allow some time for them to process their information and find time to upload. Suriyakmaps shows a similar breakthrough now that's updated. On a side note, the grey part is a penetration by recon elements, not control.


Making them submit AT THE TIME rarely closes the book on border and territorial disputes in the future.
Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't. The territories taken from Germany by force after WWII have stuck. Germany doesn't claim western Poland as its own. On the other hand Japan still disputes the Kuril Islands from Russia. Finland doesn't dispute the results of the Winter War, and Italy isn't trying to reclaim Nice as their own. It's a product of a few factors, one of which is time. The longer you can hold on to a conquered territory, the more accepted it becomes. Another factor is how you handle the locals. Unlike ethnicity, in a capitalist society with it's mass literacy and spread of knowledge, you also have nationality. And nationality is largely a question of self-identification. This is especially relevant for Russia and Ukraine since the population is culturally so close. If Russia were to hold on to their conquests for another 2-3 generations, the population there wouldn't really be Ukrainian anymore, not nationality-wise, and it's likely most major international players would come to see the new status quo as well... a status quo.

I'm just speculating here but reciprocal land trade could involve the zap nuclear power plant. I would guess that is a thing the Russians would be willing to exchange as it's value should be considerly higher for Ukraine then Russia.
I suspect Russia would take the position that the electricity from the plant could be a part of the deal but not the territory itself.
 
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crest

Member
I suspect Russia would take the position that the electricity from the plant could be a part of the deal but not the territory itself.
I suspect your right tho I don't think giving the plant itself back is something that would be off the table. Something like power from the plant for water from the Donbas canal would also solve problems for both nations.
 
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