The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

The situation on the Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk border area remains unclear. Ukrainian forces penetrated quite deep but also apparently got smashed quite badly in the process. And it seems overall the front line isn't really moving in that area anymore, instead it's attacks and counter-attacks.

 

[John Fedup]

This TWZ article describes the Ukraine’s ban on inexpensive anti-drone munitions. Understandable given the Russian attacks but if excess supplies are available then perhaps the ban is a bargaining chip for getting longer range strike missiles.

Ukrainian Companies Prohibited From Exporting Shahed Interceptor Drones

Waves of Iranian Shahed drone attacks across the Middle East have spurred widespread interest in Ukrainian interceptors.

www.twz.com

 

[personaldesas]

Vladimir Putin enjoys a huge windfall from the Iran war
But the sugar high may not last

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/03/13/vladimir-putin-enjoys-a-huge-windfall-from-the-iran-war?giftId=ZjA0N2I0NmEtN2RkMC00NWM5LWEzMzgtNDUxMmEwOTJmYmUy&utm_campaign=gifted_article

Summary:

The war involving Iran has pushed global oil prices sharply higher after disruption in the Gulf and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which normally handles a large share of the world’s oil trade. Prices for Brent crude have jumped from about $59 per barrel late last year to around $100. This sudden increase has greatly improved the outlook for Russia’s energy sector.

Higher prices make Russian oil much more attractive to buyers such as India and China. Both have increased imports, helping Russia clear a backlog of oil shipments that had been stuck at sea due to sanctions and weak demand. The crisis also weakens Western sanctions, since energy shortages make it harder for governments to enforce stricter limits on Russian exports.

The situation could also deepen energy cooperation between Russia and China. Beijing is increasingly worried about reliance on maritime energy routes through the Gulf, which could make overland gas pipelines from Russia more appealing.

However, the boost for Russia is likely temporary. Its oil industry still faces structural problems: sanctions, lack of investment, damage from Ukrainian strikes on energy facilities, and limited spare production capacity. Analysts estimate Russia has very little ability to increase output and may see production decline gradually in the coming years.

 

[personaldesas]

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/03/13/vladimir-putin-enjoys-a-huge-windfall-from-the-iran-war?giftId=ZjA0N2I0NmEtN2RkMC00NWM5LWEzMzgtNDUxMmEwOTJmYmUy&utm_campaign=gifted_article

Summary:

The war involving Iran has pushed global oil prices sharply higher after disruption in the Gulf and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which normally handles a large share of the world’s oil trade. Prices for Brent crude have jumped from about $59 per barrel late last year to around $100. This sudden increase has greatly improved the outlook for Russia’s energy sector.

Higher prices make Russian oil much more attractive to buyers such as India and China. Both have increased imports, helping Russia clear a backlog of oil shipments that had been stuck at sea due to sanctions and weak demand. The crisis also weakens Western sanctions, since energy shortages make it harder for governments to enforce stricter limits on Russian exports.

The situation could also deepen energy cooperation between Russia and China. Beijing is increasingly worried about reliance on maritime energy routes through the Gulf, which could make overland gas pipelines from Russia more appealing.

However, the boost for Russia is likely temporary. Its oil industry still faces structural problems: sanctions, lack of investment, damage from Ukrainian strikes on energy facilities, and limited spare production capacity. Analysts estimate Russia has very little ability to increase output and may see production decline gradually in the coming years.

View attachment 54481View attachment 54482View attachment 54483View attachment 54484

I do wonder whether there is an economic pain threshold at which the US and/or EU would eventually drop the sanctions altogether.

 

[personaldesas]

This TWZ article describes the Ukraine’s ban on inexpensive anti-drone munitions. Understandable given the Russian attacks but if excess supplies are available then perhaps the ban is a bargaining chip for getting longer range strike missiles.

Ukrainian Companies Prohibited From Exporting Shahed Interceptor Drones

Waves of Iranian Shahed drone attacks across the Middle East have spurred widespread interest in Ukrainian interceptors.

www.twz.com

Seems like there was change of heart:


Article in question:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-13/us-sends-intercept-drones-used-in-ukraine-to-blunt-iran-strikes?taid=69b441c9bee12000015e2998&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&embedded-checkout=true

 

[KipPotapych]

^ Not Ukrainian, but American drones though. Ukraine has no say here.

The US Army has sent 10,000 interceptor drones developed in Ukraine to the Middle East as it looks to repel Iranian attacks without using up high-cost missile defenses, according to US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll.

Driscoll said in an interview that the AI-enabled Merops drones were sent within five days of the start of the US-Israeli operation against Iran on Feb. 28. The Merops drones were developed by Project Eagle, a defense venture backed by former Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt, and then sent to Ukraine in 2024.

The article you cited in the Middle East thread claims (citing Ukrainians) that 800 Patriot interceptors were fired, while Ukraine fired 600 over 4 years. Misleading because Ukraine has also fired some n number of Iris-T as well, along with other systems. Claimed interception rates in both conflicts also speak for themselves.

And again, I highly doubt Patriots are used to shoot down Shaheds on regular basis. According to the article, 887 Iranian missiles were intercepted at the time of writing. More than likely (I would say almost certainly) way more than twice as many interceptors were used to shoot those down. Plenty of videos with multiple missiles fired at an incoming projectile (plenty with all failing to intercept as well). For example:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2032379629319647531

Has anyone seen a video of a Shahed being intercepted using these means? It’s a red herring, in my opinion. Not sure why it is being published all over the place. Does it happen? Sure, I have no doubt. Is it a normal operation? Most certainly not.


As for the UA arms exports, wasn’t it advertised as the next big whale (another red herring, in reality) just a month ago?

Ukraine's weapons exports could reach billions of dollars in 2026

Read more

newsukraine.rbc.ua

 

[personaldesas]

Not Ukrainian, but American drones though. Ukraine has no say here.

You’re correct, thanks for pointing that out

 

[personaldesas]

The article you cited in the Middle East thread claims (citing Ukrainians) that 800 Patriot interceptors were fired, while Ukraine fired 600 over 4 years. Misleading because Ukraine has also fired some n number of Iris-T as well, along with other systems.

This comparison was indeed explicitly about Patriots, not total air-defence usage. Ukraine obviously uses many other systems (IRIS-T, NASAMS, S-300 etc.), but those often fill different roles. Patriots are primarily used against ballistic missiles.

According to the article, 887 Iranian missiles were intercepted at the time of writing. More than likely (I would say almost certainly) way more than twice as many interceptors were used to shoot those down.

That assumption is already built into the article’s estimate. It explicitly models two interceptors per ballistic missile and also shows a higher scenario with three interceptors per missile. That is how it arrives at the range of roughly 1,900–3,000 interceptors fired.

And again, I highly doubt Patriots are used to shoot down Shaheds on regular basis.

The article actually says something very similar. It explicitly states that most drones are shot down by aircraft or cheaper weapons. The estimate assumes only around 5–10% of drones are intercepted by missile-defence systems.

So the argument in the piece isn’t that missile-defence systems are routinely shooting down Shaheds. The point is the scale of ballistic-missile defence and how quickly large salvos can consume expensive interceptors.