The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter overlander
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t68
Well-Known Member
Was under the impression that was always the intended secondary role, from memory they had room for 300 odd spots, which could be increased depending on the level of air staff on board. I also remember many years ago they were saying the internal walkways where wide to accomadate a full combat outfitted Marine.
But it does highlight the fact that the RM need a proper LHD.
250 spots actually, but has been built with modifications in mind.
They do need a proper LHD, shame a deal was never thought of (Though most likely not even in the realm of reality) for the UK to build a carrier for Oz and Oz to build 2 x LHD's for the UK (Would have allowed 4 x LHD production run in Oz).
I do think the media have dramatized this a bit which is odd because normally they are so fair and factual
. I'd imagine it is still likely to be used as a carrier, But rather then having that extra surge capability used for fixed wing assets use it more towards helo's with the appropriate crew quarters assigned to extra marines.Redlands18
Well-Known Member
All we done to the LHDs in Australia is fit the island and fit Australian specific gear. The hulls where built in Spain so why would you bring them all the way down here? What does Australia need a 65,000 ton Aircraft Carrier we can't man with either personal or provide aviation assets for?
The issue of an Australian Carrier has been done to death on this forum, there are 100s of pages in the RAN and other threads covering this.
I don't see this as a huge issue. One ship will primary be tasks as a pure carrier and the other as an amphibious ship. Both can operate the same aircraft, they are the same size, one can fill in for the other specialist until it becomes available. They will share an air wing rather than have one each.250 spots actually, but has been built with modifications in mind.
They do need a proper LHD, shame a deal was never thought of (Though most likely not even in the realm of reality) for the UK to build a carrier for Oz and Oz to build 2 x LHD's for the UK (Would have allowed 4 x LHD production run in Oz).
I do think the media have dramatized this a bit which is odd because normally they are so fair and factual
Eventually if a LHD is procured, it could be returned to a carrier and additional aircraft acquired. Considering they were talking about selling her off, converting her to be more of an amphib seems like a pretty mild compromise.
t68
Well-Known Member
Pity AusGov didn't hand them another envolope like Choules, our ARG could have comprised of 1x CVF. 2x LHD leavening Choules for sealift duties
Capability is planned, reviewed planned and reviewed again over years and decades. Just going to the "shop" to get an attack carrier is fantasy island, why a CVF, it's nicer to have a CVN surely.
All posts on this forum, particularly a single service thread, need to remain within the bounds of reasonable possibility, we live in a real world constrained by money and manpower so surely a suggestion such as this is wasting everyone's time.
Just saying, no offence intended.
t68
Well-Known Member
I don't think manning issues in the long run are that big a hurdle for the RAN, planning would of caused some headaches at the time but I don't think they would be insurmountable, aircraft selection was a matter of adjusting the the model of JSF for a short period swapping A's for B's late in the production run then replacing the last remaining aircraft with A's. It was a small window of opportunity from all reports just like Choules was, the day John Howard moved us to an LHD it moved the ADF into a true expeditionary capable force without all the pieces to the puzzle
One also has to remember Choules was only purchased at that time because of financial problems in the UK, if not for that then the RAN was up the creek without a paddle with Bill & Ben. There are a lot of short coming's within the RAN's concept of an ARG fleet air defence/ASW and CAS role and sustaiment issues, one which CVF would have partly addressed along with additional space for the troops in place of Choules. If I remember correctly JP2048 ph4c was not originally intended to be enacted till after the LHD had arrived.and the only reason that the UK continued with the CVF was the enormous penalty clauses in the contract if they could have stopped or had an offer to buy I think they would have taken it, but as I said it was only ever a small window of opportunity.
https://www.tenders.gov.au/?event=p...dvertUUID=0F0D27AF-CC4A-64F3-696AC7864838524D
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t68
Well-Known Member
I imagine the capabilty would have been planned reviewed planned and reviewed again when a small opportunity presents itself, it not secret the CN Russ Shalders wanted an aircraft carrier for which he even compromised on with a third LHD for it, he saw the need but could not convince those with the purse strings to fund it.
Diffrence here was we where already at the shop and they were building a capabilty that we could have not have picked up otherwise as it was the shop in question was in financial difficulty and was likely to sell the crown jewels if it could get away with it. Wasn't fantasy island just pure simplistic limited time opportunity.
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Exactly - there is NO appetite for a fixed wing carrier in the RAN
I'd reinforce the fact that its not good form to pollute the RN thread with other country chat, we need to stay in our lanes and post comment where its approp rather than hijack, even if by accident
British Shipbuilding
I recently read about HMS Scott having received a short period of maintenance at Gibdock.
Something, I am hugely in favour of as believe the flexibility Gibraltar allows us in defence as often understated.
In reading the article I saw she was built at Appledore as was several recent Irish OPV. Additionally, i have read about the new polar survey ship that is being built in Birkenhead.
I understand the 5 OPV's are being built on the Clyde to maintain skills. However, in terms of shipbuilding capacity would it not be better to perhaps build the more 'basic' vessels (OPV, survey vessels) at your appledores, birkenhead, harland and wolf? (Dont know if they still have the capability?) rather than commit every effort to a BAE dominated Clyde.
Or if just a couple were built at say appledore to maintain some level of competition on price or speed of build even!
Im perhaps naive on this, but wondered what your views were on it, with your knowledge of industry/capacity?
Sellers
I recently read about HMS Scott having received a short period of maintenance at Gibdock.
Something, I am hugely in favour of as believe the flexibility Gibraltar allows us in defence as often understated.
In reading the article I saw she was built at Appledore as was several recent Irish OPV. Additionally, i have read about the new polar survey ship that is being built in Birkenhead.
I understand the 5 OPV's are being built on the Clyde to maintain skills. However, in terms of shipbuilding capacity would it not be better to perhaps build the more 'basic' vessels (OPV, survey vessels) at your appledores, birkenhead, harland and wolf? (Dont know if they still have the capability?) rather than commit every effort to a BAE dominated Clyde.
Or if just a couple were built at say appledore to maintain some level of competition on price or speed of build even!
Im perhaps naive on this, but wondered what your views were on it, with your knowledge of industry/capacity?
Sellers
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40 deg south
Well-Known Member
UK Extends Work on Anti-Submarine Frigate Program
More speculation on when T26 production will finally begin. I'm not knowledgeable enough to comment, but others may be.
More speculation on when T26 production will finally begin. I'm not knowledgeable enough to comment, but others may be.
CdnDefWriter
New Member
30 Mar 2016 - savetheroyalnavy
Why the Royal Navy has just been cut by another 2 ships
There has been no official announcement but in early 2016 the surface fleet was effectively reduced by a further two ships.
HMS Dauntless, in commission for just 6 years has been reduced to harbour training ship status and unlikely to go to sea for some time. Dauntless has suffered the most from the propulsion defects that have plagued the Type 45s. A cure will be found and she should eventually resume a full operational role, although it is unclear when this may be. The MoD is still considering proposals for rectifying the Type 45 propulsion but it will require major work, almost certainly involving cutting open the hull and the insertion of at least one new generator set and this will not happen before 2019.
HMS Lancaster has been put into “mothballs”, or in MoD double-speak, “extended readiness”. She is being stripped of stores for use by active ships and laid up in the basin in Portsmouth where ships have traditionally awaited disposal. This is not to say Lancaster will never go to sea again. Her official out of service date is listed as 2024 and she remains in commission. She may be refitted and see further service after a few years laid up. Alternatively she may go the way of several RN vessels that languished in extended readiness for years before a final trip to a Turkish scrapyard. Lancaster is one of the older Type 23s, she had a £17.9M ‘mid-life’ refit in 2011-12 but does not carry the Type 2087 towed array sonar or the Artisan radar the rest of the class have received.
Reducing the status of these 2 vessels was not a cut mandated by government, rather a wise, if difficult decision taken by the RN leadership in the face of a manpower crisis. The 2015 SDSR supposedly promised an end to cuts but this reduction is not a result of recent policy. This is the legacy from years of commitments mismatched with inadequate resources, over-stretching the service. Both ships could possibly have been keep operational but there is such a shortage of people, that it could only be done at the expense of breaking promises. Keeping ships alongside obviously saves money but lack of suitably qualified & experienced technical senior rates is the bigger immediate problem.
Trading a temporary weakening of frontline strength for a reduction in stress on a service with shaky morale may prove to be a prudent decision in the long-term.
Retaining the best people has to be a priority, particularly at a time when the new aircraft carriers are building up their ship’s companies. If appropriate levels of manpower cannot be generated and retained, then the great plans for the fleet of the 2020s lack credibility. Overworking engineers and shuffling them around the fleet to cover gaps is ultimately counter-productive if they leave in droves for better-paid opportunities in the civilian sector with stable working hours. As comments on manpower posts on this site indicate, there is a great deal of resentment and anger amongst some ratings due to past broken promises and too much time deployed. By mothballing these ships some of that can be alleviated, this measure alone is by no means a panacea but there are lots of other personnel retention initiatives in hand. Unfortunately beyond RN control, less attractive armed forces pensions and another inadequate pay rise of just 1% are hardly helping matters. It should also be noted that stress on submarine manpower is similar. The commitment to the continuous at sea deterrent and the small fleet of attack boats leaves the submarine service even fewer options than surface fleet has for relieving pressure.
Not altogether unexpected for the initial (? - can't recall off hand) Type 45 HMS Dauntless, but maybe the 'extended readiness' status of Type 23 HMS Lancaster has a silver lining?
Could the RN not move both the quad-canister Harpoon launchers from Lancaster to the 5th remaining T45 that did not receive one, thus leaving all operational T45 equipped with Harpoon.
Or would this make too much logical sense lol.
Why the Royal Navy has just been cut by another 2 ships
There has been no official announcement but in early 2016 the surface fleet was effectively reduced by a further two ships.
HMS Dauntless, in commission for just 6 years has been reduced to harbour training ship status and unlikely to go to sea for some time. Dauntless has suffered the most from the propulsion defects that have plagued the Type 45s. A cure will be found and she should eventually resume a full operational role, although it is unclear when this may be. The MoD is still considering proposals for rectifying the Type 45 propulsion but it will require major work, almost certainly involving cutting open the hull and the insertion of at least one new generator set and this will not happen before 2019.
HMS Lancaster has been put into “mothballs”, or in MoD double-speak, “extended readiness”. She is being stripped of stores for use by active ships and laid up in the basin in Portsmouth where ships have traditionally awaited disposal. This is not to say Lancaster will never go to sea again. Her official out of service date is listed as 2024 and she remains in commission. She may be refitted and see further service after a few years laid up. Alternatively she may go the way of several RN vessels that languished in extended readiness for years before a final trip to a Turkish scrapyard. Lancaster is one of the older Type 23s, she had a £17.9M ‘mid-life’ refit in 2011-12 but does not carry the Type 2087 towed array sonar or the Artisan radar the rest of the class have received.
Reducing the status of these 2 vessels was not a cut mandated by government, rather a wise, if difficult decision taken by the RN leadership in the face of a manpower crisis. The 2015 SDSR supposedly promised an end to cuts but this reduction is not a result of recent policy. This is the legacy from years of commitments mismatched with inadequate resources, over-stretching the service. Both ships could possibly have been keep operational but there is such a shortage of people, that it could only be done at the expense of breaking promises. Keeping ships alongside obviously saves money but lack of suitably qualified & experienced technical senior rates is the bigger immediate problem.
Trading a temporary weakening of frontline strength for a reduction in stress on a service with shaky morale may prove to be a prudent decision in the long-term.
Retaining the best people has to be a priority, particularly at a time when the new aircraft carriers are building up their ship’s companies. If appropriate levels of manpower cannot be generated and retained, then the great plans for the fleet of the 2020s lack credibility. Overworking engineers and shuffling them around the fleet to cover gaps is ultimately counter-productive if they leave in droves for better-paid opportunities in the civilian sector with stable working hours. As comments on manpower posts on this site indicate, there is a great deal of resentment and anger amongst some ratings due to past broken promises and too much time deployed. By mothballing these ships some of that can be alleviated, this measure alone is by no means a panacea but there are lots of other personnel retention initiatives in hand. Unfortunately beyond RN control, less attractive armed forces pensions and another inadequate pay rise of just 1% are hardly helping matters. It should also be noted that stress on submarine manpower is similar. The commitment to the continuous at sea deterrent and the small fleet of attack boats leaves the submarine service even fewer options than surface fleet has for relieving pressure.
Not altogether unexpected for the initial (? - can't recall off hand) Type 45 HMS Dauntless, but maybe the 'extended readiness' status of Type 23 HMS Lancaster has a silver lining?
Could the RN not move both the quad-canister Harpoon launchers from Lancaster to the 5th remaining T45 that did not receive one, thus leaving all operational T45 equipped with Harpoon.
Or would this make too much logical sense lol.
Not altogether unexpected for the initial (? - can't recall off hand) Type 45 HMS Dauntless, but maybe the 'extended readiness' status of Type 23 HMS Lancaster has a silver lining?
Could the RN not move both the quad-canister Harpoon launchers from Lancaster to the 5th remaining T45 that did not receive one, thus leaving all operational T45 equipped with Harpoon.
Or would this make too much logical sense lol.
To the untrained eye, that option might look practical, but when UK PLC doesn't have the budget available to support the activity of removing the kit & reinstalling it on the other ship, let alone having sufficient personnel to run both ships, it makes neither practical or economical sense.
The main reason these x2 ships are being put to their new roles is mainly down to lack of boots on the ground.
It is that simple, so why attempt to man & run a ship when you're actually making budget savings by not moving the equipment & not manning the x2 ships?
This action actually allows the RN the 'wiggle-room' to spend money on recruitment/training & support activities such as maintaining equipment / ships on operational duty, as having x2 ships less means that the rest will have to cover the work.
SA
At the risk of making a political judgement what appears to be happening with the RN at the moment appears similar to what I saw the tail end of in the RAN prior to the GFC.
Following major reorganisation of the RANs support and engineering functions as part of government efficiency drives (they called it fixing the teeth to tail ratio) many technical and support roles became untenable due to increased workloads, insufficient manning worsening as more than planned qualified and experienced mid level personnel left for the private sector. This left the RAN with a shortage of people who could actually do the work needed to keep ships at sea and an excess of the junior unqualified and inexperienced people who were not capable of doing the work, as well as senior people who were no longer in a position to do the hands on job.
What is going on in the RN appears to be very similar to this, as does the governments response to the problems their cuts caused. Instead of investing in increasing crew sizes to get more trainees to sea and experienced through working with the remaining qualified sailors, the government has instead opted to lay up ships and save more money. In Australia this included a deliberate attack on the opposition blaming them for technical issues rather than taking it on the chin for their own personnel issues. Considering the number of Australian political ex pats rumoured to be working in the UK it would not surprise me at all if the UK government was getting advice from the same DFs who saw the RAN in such a poor state.
CdnDefWriter
New Member
Umm, I think you totally misread what I said.
I know that's why they have put both ships at 'extended readiness'.
Plus of course T45 propulsion issue
I meant a different ship other than HMS Dauntless (actually 2nd ship in class) for Harpoon installation.
Per various sites:
The Harpoon missile is to be fitted to four of the six ships. HMS Duncan is to be the first.
With my suggestion it would be all 5 Operational Type 45 that are fit for deployment. Just need minor funds to switch the Harpoon platform from [anomolous] T23, that missed major programmes but already mid-life refitted, to T45.
Cheers
Umm, I think you totally misread what I said.
I know that's why they have put both ships at 'extended readiness'.
Plus of course T45 propulsion issue
I meant a different ship other than HMS Dauntless (actually 2nd ship in class) for Harpoon installation.
I'm sorry, I haven't missed your point. You suggested moving the quad pack from Lancaster to another T45, and as I've explained, while it sounds practical, it's not economically viable.
It's not quite 'plug-&-play' and there's a serious amount of re-engineering of the internals of a T45 to make it fit (System is IPMD not FBNW ). That aside, not every FF/DD that the RN has needs it fitted, as Harpoon is a finite resource.
SA
CdnDefWriter
New Member
I get what u mean tho .... How is it not viable for a 5th T45?Ur probably right about the Harpoon & Phalanx, as has been discussed elsewhere in this thread (round about post #1,000). The Guns are coming straight from the MSI Factory, & it's the T-23's that are being brought up to T-45 standard..
IPMD & FBNW are similar, but not the same. FBNW, means that it's just a case of getting the kit & fitting, as the cabling / services & seat / mount are all present. Great for a Falklands style, get the ship ready to fight ASAP, routine. Just rob it / take it from stores & fit it. Job done !
IPMD is basically space provision. Design calculations take into account that room will be required on cable runs, spare spaces & capability to absorb the extra load are "built in" to fuse panels, physical space is allocated to take equipment, but lots of work would still need done, so no quick fit / fix.
Too true ! ANYONE I've spoken to whose in the Navy, or been onboard the ship during her periods at sea, can't praise the ship enough.
SA
The Eng work and design calc's are already figured out from the 4 other T45s they have fitted or will be fitting the Harpoon sets (confirmed: HMS Duncan; Daring & Diamond as 3 of 4 T45 (out of 6) selected so far) from decom T22 Batch 3s.
So if HMS Lancaster is unlikely to deploy much before decom, how is it economically viable to Not utilize a duplicate Harpoon system that otherwise is just wasted sitting in harbour?
It makes no sense Not to utilize it and put it on the 5th deplorable T45. Even the MoD bean counters surely realize this?
And hopefully the New First Sea Lord Adm Sir Philip Jones would also realize and push for this.
Maybe not quickest transfer, but T45s will be in service for quite a while of the foreseeable future.
Just sayin from lay mans point of view.
Otherwise a pure waste of an on-hand resource.
And leaves potential for all Harpoon-equipped ships: hopefully 12 T23 & 5 T45 to be upgraded to Harpoon Mk II w\ land attk capability as our Cdn Navy Halifax class are currently undergoing and have demonstrated with successful attack of practice land target.