Su-57: Judging it by its intended role

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
In reality the only places where said air superiority was anticipated were propaganda and headspaces of... medically interesting individuals, ....
@kinetic I would be very careful about insulting people, some of whom are or may have been posters on here. This kind of conduct is unacceptable and incurs the wrath of the moderators very quickly. Don't let this happen again, or your future on here will be highly suspect.
 

kinetic

New Member
@kinetic I would be very careful about insulting people, some of whom are or may have been posters on here. This kind of conduct is unacceptable and incurs the wrath of the moderators very quickly. Don't let this happen again, or your future on here will be highly suspect.
It wasn't intended as an insult to be begin with, not even sure why are you warning me.

UPD. The thing is, to believe that the air superiority was in fact anticipated one has to be either misinformed, or irrational. The assumption of air superiority did NOT imply that the air superiority will be achieved, it simply meant that if air superiority is not achieved the NATO is unconditionally screwed for the very same reasons which are specified in the quote.

UPD. If you personally have any doubt in validity of ^ claim, feel free to pick the appropriate guidelines to the operational planning, relevant datasheets and do the math. While not exactly simple, it is by no means a rocket science.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
You're cherry-picking examples. Both Ukraine and Saudi Arabia are less than competent operators. Would you expect the same outcome if the US took Saudi Arabia's place? Additionally, while the Houthis have done surprising things with very little, this isn't something that would be fixed if the Saudis were to deploy SAM/SPAAG regiments integrated into their mech formations. Hell they can't integrate their infantry into their APCs, so the level of incompetence here is utterly staggering.
 

kinetic

New Member
You're cherry-picking examples. Both Ukraine and Saudi Arabia are less than competent operators. Would you expect the same outcome if the US took Saudi Arabia's place? Additionally, while the Houthis have done surprising things with very little, this isn't something that would be fixed if the Saudis were to deploy SAM/SPAAG regiments integrated into their mech formations. Hell they can't integrate their infantry into their APCs, so the level of incompetence here is utterly staggering.
I'm not cherry-picking examples. It just so happens that air-centric IADS is incapable to properly handle C-UAS, C-RAM and TBMD tasks, end of story. In Debaltsevo Operation in 2015 the Russians were keeping ~800 tactical reconnaissance drones in the air simultaneously, showering the Ukrainians with about 1000 metric tonnes or artillery & rocket ammunition per day. I'm not even talking about the fact that the drone swarm attacks the Russians are lolnoping in Syria with disturbing regularity would have given the American air defenders the same amount of trouble they gave the Saudis, ultimately producing the same sort of outcome — knocked down Patriot batteries, penetrated defences.

UPD. FYI, a flock of ten(10) drones like Orlan is mathematically expected to find and feed to friendly field artillery up to 300 individual targets per sortie if allowed to operate unchallenged against opponent with no concept of maskirovka. By target i mean tank, IFV, APC, artillery piece, et cetera.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I'm not cherry-picking examples. It just so happens that air-centric IADS is incapable to properly handle C-UAS, C-RAM and TBMD tasks, end of story. In Debaltsevo Operation in 2015 the Russians were keeping ~800 tactical reconnaissance drones in the air simultaneously, showering the Ukrainians with about 1000 metric tonnes or artillery & rocket ammunition per day.
Again, the doctrine is tailored to the threat. The US has faced TBMD threats in conflicts, including ODS, and did handle the threat adequately. An air-centric IADS does not mean 0 GBAD. It means that GBAD plays second fiddle to airborne assets. And I dare say destroying the launchers is better then shooting down the inbounds, which is why the US prioritizes the way it does. Russia, in Syria, is of the same opinion, carrying out surgical strikes initially against those it thought were responsible for launching the drone swarms against Khmeimeem, and eventually launching an entire offensive in northern Hama and southern Idlib, to (among other things) eliminate the staging area for those strikes.

The problem, the consistent problem, with your examples, is that they don't demonstrate what you claim they do.

1) Look at the ORBAT of Ukrainian mech and armored formations. They have GBAD. Not Soviet levels, but well above and beyond what your average western military would have. It clearly didn't save them.

2) The problem is and remains that the Ukrainian military is in shit state, with commanders playing politics, and professional soldiers leaving in disgust and disappointment after serving for far too short a time.

3) They are facing a clearly superior adversary, something that is not the case for NATO as mentioned above.

Look, against an opponent like Ukraine, Russia can do things that are basically unthinkable against opponents like NATO. For example concentrating the hundreds of arty and mortar pieces it used in battles like Izvarino or Debal'tsevo, and the mountains of shells and rockets needed to achieve this. Or taking a painful amount of time to chew through the bottleneck, cutting the road to Artemovsk (eventually giving up on the local militia and using Russian regulars to do it in places like Uglegorsk). All while Ukraine sits patiently, and withdraws portions of their forces, while leaving the rest (to do what?). A competent commander would have either fought the encirclement attempts, or withdrawn the forces. Ukraine did neither. The shitty job their air defense did in that battle certainly contributed to the magnitude of the disaster, but the outcome was predetermined by their own poor decisions. The kind of military that could have proactively maintained control of the airspace against the UAV threat is the kind of military that would not have ended up in that situation to begin with.

I'm not even talking about the fact that the drone swarm attacks the Russians are lolnoping in Syria with disturbing regularity would have given the American air defenders the same amount of trouble they gave the Saudis, ultimately producing the same sort of outcome — knocked down Patriot batteries, penetrated defences.
Here's the difference: a strike like that might have worked against the US once or twice, but the US (unlike the Saudis) would have rapidly taken steps towards dealing with the threat, possibly pickets with anti-drone weapons on likely approach paths, possibly powerful ELINT and EW combos to drop the drones (one of the main ways Russia does it in Khmeimeem by the way), possibly using helos as anti-UAS platforms, and likely, eventually, a dedicated set up to protect bases from UAV swarms.

On a side note, it's currently the case that anti-UAV systems happen to be predominantly GBAD. Is there any reason they have to be? ;)

UPD. FYI, a flock of ten(10) drones like Orlan is mathematically expected to find and feed to friendly field artillery up to 300 individual targets per sortie if allowed to operate unchallenged against opponent with no concept of maskirovka. By target i mean tank, IFV, APC, artillery piece, et cetera.
Assuming there are 300 targets to be found.
 

kinetic

New Member
Again, the doctrine is tailored to the threat.
How many times the United States Military has to find itself irrelevant on the contemporary battlefield to figure out that this is wrong assumption?

The air-centric air defence doctrine is neither effective nor efficient, it is merely convenient just like it always was. This is not a matter of competence or 'doctrines being tailored to the threat', but plain and simple baseline combat resilience of a system against the array of threats it is supposed to combat regardless of who is fielding them, peer power, state-backed murderhobos in Yemen or Syria, or North Koreans.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
How many times the United States Military has to find itself irrelevant on the contemporary battlefield to figure out that this is wrong assumption?
Please provide examples of times the US military has found itself irrelevant in the face of hostile airpower, due to lack of GBAD.

The air-centric air defence doctrine is neither effective nor efficient, it is merely convenient just like it always was. This is not a matter of competence or 'doctrines being tailored to the threat', but plain and simple baseline combat resilience of a system against the array of threats it is supposed to combat regardless of who is fielding them, peer power, state-backed murderhobos in Yemen or Syria, or North Koreans.
You have repeatedly made very strong claims regarding the relative lack of GBAD in NATO countries. When asked to provide evidence in support of those claims all you've done is shown how 1) a country with ample outdated GBAD but incompetent planners and operators (Ukraine) got hit hard by a massively superior opponent and lost, and 2) how a ridiculously incompetent operator with fancy toys is getting slapped around by a motivated and creative opponent who has fewer resources. When I attempt to engage you on the evidence, you dodge and change the subject, ignoring the parts of my response that you don't wish to engage with, and providing less than complete answers to the rest. What you have shown is that GBAD has a place on the modern battlefield, and near cutting edge systems in the hands of competent operators can make a significant difference (Russian IADS in Syria), and that Russia has drastically improved their use of UAVs over the past decade. None of this proves or even adequately backs your claims about NATO IADS, "creative suicide" or the medical problems of those involved in its planning and deployment. Instead you simply restate your original claims in slightly different words.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It wasn't intended as an insult to be begin with, not even sure why are you warning me.

UPD. The thing is, to believe that the air superiority was in fact anticipated one has to be either misinformed, or irrational. The assumption of air superiority did NOT imply that the air superiority will be achieved, it simply meant that if air superiority is not achieved the NATO is unconditionally screwed for the very same reasons which are specified in the quote.

UPD. If you personally have any doubt in validity of ^ claim, feel free to pick the appropriate guidelines to the operational planning, relevant datasheets and do the math. While not exactly simple, it is by no means a rocket science.
@kinetic
It read as an insult and don't try arguing semantics with a Moderator.

This your second and FINAL WARNING.

You are making claims about certain peoples mental and / or intellectual capabilities. In that case EITHER unreservedly apologise; OR provide reputable, verifiable evidence to support those claims. You have 48 hours from the time stamp on this post. This requirement is non negotiable.

Provide reputable, verifiable evidence and links to support the assertions that you make in your posts. That is a requirement on this forum.

Failure to follow these requirements will result in the Moderators taking action.
 
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kinetic

New Member
It read as an insult and don't try arguing semantics with a Moderator.
Okay, it sure seems like we have some kind of gross misunderstanding on our hands. I'm not really sure how to proceed because on the one hand, going into much detail might hopelessly derail the thread, while on the other hand, bringing it to PM means robbing the audience of potentially valuable content no matter that it is only tangentially related to the topic of discussion.

Anyhow, i'm not 100% sure but it seems like you've got an impression that i have nothing better to do than insult people i don't even know for no reason whatsoever. Considering preemptive action on my part was classed as 'arguing semantics' instead of what it actually was, it seems i absolutely must invest some more effort into convincing you otherwise.

Standby for evidence, a couple of hours tops.
 

kinetic

New Member
You are making claims about certain peoples mental and / or intellectual capabilities. In that case EITHER unreservedly apologise; OR provide reputable, verifiable evidence to support those claims. You have 48 hours from the time stamp on this post. This requirement is non negotiable.
For starters, i'd like to unreservedly apologise for this whole shit-show which seems to have been caused by bad choice of words on my part. It happens to the best of us, especially those who learn English by the ear ever since getting acquainted with the basics of the language from reading the Russo-English military phrasebook.

That said, here's the evidence you requested.
Original claim by Cpt. Kevin Zhang: During the mid- and late period of Cold War the NATO has been anticipating to achieve the air superiority on the European theatre of war.
Kinetic's counterclaim: The only places where NATO indeed anticipated to achieve air superiority in that time period without resorting to widespread employment of nuclear weapons are a) propaganda, i.e. specifically tailored misinformation, and b) headspaces of people who couldn't have possibly reached right conclusions even if they are presented with accurate information on the matter.
There are multiple ways to prove my claim. For the sake of simplicity i'll be using the least 'educationally demanding' one, featuring the imprecise employment of the oversimplified method of calculating the necessary amount of means and forces that must be allocated to achieve air superiority on theatre to have a hope to actually succeed in that endevaor.

If the 'verified defence pro' badge of yours indeed means what i think it does, you should undoubtedly know the classic rule of the three. I mean the one that says that to effectively defeat an entrenched enemy force in offensive combat the attacker has to bring at least three times as much military strength to bear against defender. To the surprise of those completely unfamiliar with the theoretical military science behind air defence, the said field of knowledge also has a variant of such a rule.

Here it is:

S (axis X) — Balance of power(strength) in particular place in specific time, friend:foe(свои|пр-к respectively)
Э (axis Y) — Effectiveness of defensive counterair combat operations by defending force
Имеется централизованное управление (red line) — The centralized control is present
Потеря управления, войска ведут самост. БД (violet line) — Centralized control is lost

In air defence the strength is measured in combat aircraft and targetting channels of SAM systems integrated into the system of air & missile defence on theatre(area), where one aircraft = one targetting channel.

For your information, in late 80's the Chief of Air Defence of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany had 2800 channels available to him at any given time, provided by the forces and assets of the Soviet(!) Army(!!) which were stationed in just Germany(!!!) on permanent basis(!!!!). I'd like to hear from anyone willing to dispute my claim by what means precisely the NATO was 'anticipating' to achieve air superiorioty against a foe it didn't have the numbers to effectively combat, because 5500 fixed-wing + 1500 rotary-wing aircraft the NATO had in Europe in that time period(if memory serves) barely sufficed to ensure that land forces of the NATO won't be getting bombed into oblivion by air power of the OWP.

The above-stated facts were pulled from the publications of Professor Y. Bogdanov, PhD in Military Sciences, and Gen. Lt. A. Luzan, PhD in Technical Sciences, ex-Chief Engineer of Air Defence of Army, Russian Armed Forces. The links to original publications in Russian and translations of relevant parts will be provided in the morning, it's 1:30AM, i'm tired as hell and just don't have the energy to look up obscure scientific works and partially translate it into language i barely speak.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Twitter

The reporter is quoting Gen Selva during sworn Congressional testimony.
No offense, but so what? What does the fact that a bomber design from the early 1950's (first flight in 1952) is no longer expected to be able to penetrate a modern IADS employed by peer or near peer-level nations have to do with the Su-57, which is the actual topic of the thread.
 
No offense, but so what? What does the fact that a bomber design from the early 1950's (first flight in 1952) is no longer expected to be able to penetrate a modern IADS employed by peer or near peer-level nations have to do with the Su-57, which is the actual topic of the thread.
Twitter

These quotes from mainstream
 
Twitter


@Spacearrow99 You have been around here long enough to know the rules about:
  • Going off topic
  • Posting without adding commentary
Don't make a habit of it because the Moderators are grumpy about this and you've really annoyed Preceptor. Consider this a warning.

Ngatimozart
 
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Boagrius

Well-Known Member
If the 'verified defence pro' badge of yours indeed means what i think it does, you should undoubtedly know the classic rule of the three. I mean the one that says that to effectively defeat an entrenched enemy force in offensive combat the attacker has to bring at least three times as much military strength to bear against defender. To the surprise of those completely unfamiliar with the theoretical military science behind air defence, the said field of knowledge also has a variant of such a rule.

Here it is:

S (axis X) — Balance of power(strength) in particular place in specific time, friend:foe(свои|пр-к respectively)
Э (axis Y) — Effectiveness of defensive counterair combat operations by defending force
Имеется централизованное управление (red line) — The centralized control is present
Потеря управления, войска ведут самост. БД (violet line) — Centralized control is lost

In air defence the strength is measured in combat aircraft and targetting channels of SAM systems integrated into the system of air & missile defence on theatre(area), where one aircraft = one targetting channel.

For your information, in late 80's the Chief of Air Defence of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany had 2800 channels available to him at any given time, provided by the forces and assets of the Soviet(!) Army(!!) which were stationed in just Germany(!!!) on permanent basis(!!!!). I'd like to hear from anyone willing to dispute my claim by what means precisely the NATO was 'anticipating' to achieve air superiorioty against a foe it didn't have the numbers to effectively combat, because 5500 fixed-wing + 1500 rotary-wing aircraft the NATO had in Europe in that time period(if memory serves) barely sufficed to ensure that land forces of the NATO won't be getting bombed into oblivion by air power of the OWP.
You seem to be assuming that the Soviet forces were the ones on the defending side. AFAIK it was in fact NATO who were anticipating entrenching their position(s) as Soviet armour poured through the Fulda Gap. Changes the math somewhat...

What this has to do with the Su57 I still don't know?
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
You seem to be assuming that the Soviet forces were the ones on the defending side. AFAIK it was in fact NATO who were anticipating entrenching their position(s) as Soviet armour poured through the Fulda Gap. Changes the math somewhat...

What this has to do with the Su57 I still don't know?
Sort of. Soviet forces were to be accompanied by massed anti-air formations on the move, one of the reason why the S-300 (including the V variant) has such a short deployment time. Things like Shilkas/Tunguskas/Strela-10 were incredibly common. Density of Soviet GBAD was beyond insane, especially in Europe. Soviet ground forces would have to go very far, very fast, to end up without significant organic GBAD.
 

kinetic

New Member
You seem to be assuming that the Soviet forces were the ones on the defending side. AFAIK it was in fact NATO who were anticipating entrenching their position(s) as Soviet armour poured through the Fulda Gap. Changes the math somewhat...
It actually doesn't, because air superiority is achieved through effective execution of Defensive AND Offensive Counterair ops, which must be performed simultaneously.

In vastly oversimplified terms, the air superiority is achieved by successfully suppressing enemy air defences(OCA, 3:1) while preventing the enemy from suppressing yours(DCA, 1:3). NATO had the capacity to effectively conduct the DCA and thus deny the Soviets the air superiority, yet it didn't have the capacity to effectively conduct OCA against the Soviet IADS on theatre.

TL;DR: The air was going to be contested, that much was obvious for everyone involved in the matter on both sides. The only reason to why the whole myth of anticipated air superiority even exists is that no one really expected to fight a WW3 without widespread employment of canned sunshine by all sides, which in turn is very uncomfortable truth as that invalidates REFORGER right away with everything this entails.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
For starters, i'd like to unreservedly apologise for this whole shit-show which seems to have been caused by bad choice of words on my part. It happens to the best of us, especially those who learn English by the ear ever since getting acquainted with the basics of the language from reading the Russo-English military phrasebook.

That said, here's the evidence you requested.
Thank you, the Moderators will take this into consideration.
 

kinetic

New Member
Impenetrable defences don't exist, but it has to be mentioned that the current force structure of USAF is lacking the capacity to support a conflict against either Russia or China(see
CSBA | AN AIR FORCE FOR AN ERA OF GREAT POWER
COMPETITION, page 113).

The current capacity of Russian IADS is roughly 3100 channels in active service + MANPADS + Navy + reserves.
 

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
Impenetrable defences don't exist, but it has to be mentioned that the current force structure of USAF is lacking the capacity to support a conflict against either Russia or China(see
CSBA | AN AIR FORCE FOR AN ERA OF GREAT POWER
COMPETITION, page 113).
CSBA | AN AIR FORCE FOR AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION p113 doesn't say the USAF "is lacking the capacity to support a conflict against either Russia or China" it just highlights the vulnerability of current HVAA and proposes a move to a more distributed ISR network..?

https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_AFAIS_Report_v9.pdf
 
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