I'm not cherry-picking examples. It just so happens that air-centric IADS is incapable to properly handle C-UAS, C-RAM and TBMD tasks, end of story. In Debaltsevo Operation in 2015 the Russians were keeping ~800 tactical reconnaissance drones in the air simultaneously, showering the Ukrainians with about 1000 metric tonnes or artillery & rocket ammunition per day.
Again, the doctrine is tailored to the threat. The US has faced TBMD threats in conflicts, including ODS, and did handle the threat adequately. An air-centric IADS does not mean 0 GBAD. It means that GBAD plays second fiddle to airborne assets. And I dare say destroying the launchers is better then shooting down the inbounds, which is why the US prioritizes the way it does. Russia, in Syria, is of the same opinion, carrying out surgical strikes initially against those it thought were responsible for launching the drone swarms against Khmeimeem, and eventually launching an entire offensive in northern Hama and southern Idlib, to (among other things) eliminate the staging area for those strikes.
The problem, the consistent problem, with your examples, is that they don't demonstrate what you claim they do.
1) Look at the ORBAT of Ukrainian mech and armored formations. They have GBAD. Not Soviet levels, but well above and beyond what your average western military would have. It clearly didn't save them.
2) The problem is and remains that the Ukrainian military is in shit state, with commanders playing politics, and professional soldiers leaving in disgust and disappointment after serving for far too short a time.
3) They are facing a clearly superior adversary, something that is not the case for NATO as mentioned above.
Look, against an opponent like Ukraine, Russia can do things that are basically unthinkable against opponents like NATO. For example concentrating the hundreds of arty and mortar pieces it used in battles like Izvarino or Debal'tsevo, and the mountains of shells and rockets needed to achieve this. Or taking a painful amount of time to chew through the bottleneck, cutting the road to Artemovsk (eventually giving up on the local militia and using Russian regulars to do it in places like Uglegorsk). All while Ukraine sits patiently, and withdraws portions of their forces, while leaving the rest (to do what?). A competent commander would have either fought the encirclement attempts, or withdrawn the forces. Ukraine did neither. The shitty job their air defense did in that battle certainly contributed to the magnitude of the disaster, but the outcome was predetermined by their own poor decisions. The kind of military that could have proactively maintained control of the airspace against the UAV threat is the kind of military that would not have ended up in that situation to begin with.
I'm not even talking about the fact that the drone swarm attacks the Russians are lolnoping in Syria with disturbing regularity would have given the American air defenders the same amount of trouble they gave the Saudis, ultimately producing the same sort of outcome — knocked down Patriot batteries, penetrated defences.
Here's the difference: a strike like that might have worked against the US once or twice, but the US (unlike the Saudis) would have rapidly taken steps towards dealing with the threat, possibly pickets with anti-drone weapons on likely approach paths, possibly powerful ELINT and EW combos to drop the drones (one of the main ways Russia does it in Khmeimeem by the way), possibly using helos as anti-UAS platforms, and likely, eventually, a dedicated set up to protect bases from UAV swarms.
On a side note, it's currently the case that anti-UAV systems happen to be predominantly GBAD. Is there any reason they have to be?
UPD. FYI, a flock of ten(10) drones like Orlan is mathematically expected to find and feed to friendly field artillery up to 300 individual targets per sortie if allowed to operate unchallenged against opponent with no concept of maskirovka. By target i mean tank, IFV, APC, artillery piece, et cetera.
Assuming there are 300 targets to be found.