I knew the German strategy of World war 2 which was to achieve a breakthrough and encircle the enemy without making a frontline assault. However I am not sure which was the common military tactics used by soviets during world war 2. Does anyone know the common soviet tactic of world war 2.
Soviet war strategy in WW2
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Read up on Operation Barbarossa by the Germans and then on Marshal Georgi Kostantinovich Zhukov's counter offensive operations, in particular, the twin operations Mars and Uranus in the fall of 1942. Operation Mars was the operation codename for the offensive operation part of a strategic offensive operation launched by the Soviet forces. The basic plan of the offensive was to launch multiple, coordinated thrusts from all sides to destroy the invading German Army.
In Operation Mars, 668,000 men and 2,000 tanks, were used. As the offensive failed, another 150,000 men and several hundred tanks were used to reinforce the unsuccessful Operation Mars, which affected the planned follow-up offensive Operation Jupiter, which was not conducted. These two operations formed the centerpiece of Soviet strategic efforts at that time.
In Operation Mars, 668,000 men and 2,000 tanks, were used. As the offensive failed, another 150,000 men and several hundred tanks were used to reinforce the unsuccessful Operation Mars, which affected the planned follow-up offensive Operation Jupiter, which was not conducted. These two operations formed the centerpiece of Soviet strategic efforts at that time.
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Both sides used similar strategy- i.e. the aim was to achieve breakthrought and encircle enemy. Germany used the strategy succesfully in first half of war, but failed later. USSR - contrary. Failed to succesfully use the tactic in the first half of war (although tryed), but mistakes learned from failures allowed succesful operations later.
FutureTank
Banned Member
This is an operational concept, at least in reference to Barbarossa, and not a strategic one.
Strategically the German goal was to defeat the Soviet Government, and cause dissolution of the Soviet Union. This was to be achieved by the destruction of the Red Army, Air Force and Navy in the shortest possible time. In fact the seat of Soviet Government, Moscow, was not even a strategic objective to start with.
The Soviet strategy in the Second World War was different after the commencement of Barbarossa to that before it.
Essentially it was about survival of the the armed forces after full realisation of the scale of defeats was accepted at the end of the first two weeks of the war. A clearer formulation of the strategy only became possible as the German strategic tempo slowed down due to distance and weather.
The first strategic priority for the Stavka became the securing of strategic initiative, i.e. the forcing of the OKH to react to, rather than initiate offensives.
The second strategic priority became the destruction of Axis reserves on the Eastern Front, to which Hitrel obliged during the offensives and counter-offensives at the Kursk Bulge.
The final strategic goal became the destruction of the Wehrmacht.
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FutureTank
Banned Member
In terms of strategic doctrine? In what period, second or third?
chukahleong
New Member
The Soviets implemented several military tactics due to the decisions of Joseph Stalin and Marshal Georgy Zhukov. Zhukov's plan was similar to the Nazis, as in encircling the army or blockading it and forcing it to surrender or attempt a suicidal push out of the encirclement. This tactic worked very well in the later battles after the Battle of Stalingrad, where the German Sixth Army under Field Marshal Paulus was successfully encircled by Zhukov's army and he had to surrender one of the biggest army divisions in the Eastern Front.
Stalin's plan was a total wreck, it achieving success just because the Red Army was the biggest army in the world. Stalin's plan was to constantly push for rapid mobilization in the army and keep on sending wave after wave of his soldiers to combat the Nazis until their men are exhausted. The Battle of Stalingrad witnessed this, when extremely fierce fighting occurred in the buildings and the streets, thanks to Stalin's Draconian Order No. 227, which prohibited any Red Army soldier from surrendering.
Stalin's plan was a total wreck, it achieving success just because the Red Army was the biggest army in the world. Stalin's plan was to constantly push for rapid mobilization in the army and keep on sending wave after wave of his soldiers to combat the Nazis until their men are exhausted. The Battle of Stalingrad witnessed this, when extremely fierce fighting occurred in the buildings and the streets, thanks to Stalin's Draconian Order No. 227, which prohibited any Red Army soldier from surrendering.
EnimaAtTheGates
New Member
They also issued 'scortched earth' policy which is basically burning everything as you're getting pushed back. This leaves the enemy unable to take your resources. But it also stretched the German supply lines.
It's important to remember Stalin really made this a national war. When given the oppurtunity, 2 soldiers killed themselves rather than carrying on fighting in a war they didn't believe in. If they'd have gone back they'd have been killed anyway.
Furthermore, some strategy on Hitler's part - like going for Stalingrade because of the association of Stalin was a reason that gave the Soviets some advantage.
It's important to remember Stalin really made this a national war. When given the oppurtunity, 2 soldiers killed themselves rather than carrying on fighting in a war they didn't believe in. If they'd have gone back they'd have been killed anyway.
Furthermore, some strategy on Hitler's part - like going for Stalingrade because of the association of Stalin was a reason that gave the Soviets some advantage.
Mutatio Nomenis
New Member
The Soviet Strategy was zerg rushing the whole time with a massive redshirt army of reserves.
I can't be so sure if there was any strategy they implemented. What I know is that they took the right flank, Eastern Europe while other members of the Allied forces were at the Western front. There much familiarity of the weather and terrain placed them at great advantage over Hitler's forces.
Whilst it's indeed very true that Soviet numerical superiority of men and equiptment played a big part in their strategy and determined the way they conducted their operational art and tactics, I think it's not accurate to state that they had no strategy and relied solely on numbers. Soviet strategy and operational art was skilfully employed to keep the Germans of balance and after mid-43 the Germans had permanantly lost the iniative. Granted, Land Lease and German comittments on other fronts played a big part.
There are 2 schools of thoughts here, according to a number of German generals like Manstein, Guderian, Mellenthin,etc, if Hitler had given them a free hand to conduct a war of meneuver, they would have blunted the Soviet offensive and perhaps there would have been a stalemate on the Eastern front. Thanks to a number of German memoirs that begun to appear in the 60's, most people share the view that it was only bad strategy that lost the Germans the war and that it was only due to sheer numbers that the Soviets prevailed. Writers like David Glantz who have researched the subject intensively are of the opinion that the outcome was never in doubt, whatever strategy the Germans adopted, the utimate result would have been the same, the Soviets in the very heart of the Reich.
Winter Game
The harsh Soviet winter climate played major ploy in the Soviet victory. The German equipments jammed, their transport route turned marshy and soldiers died of cold climate. The retreating soviets burnt down the villages, factories, farms and livestock so that they were not available to the germans. When the Volga river froze, the German blockade of soviet supply lines was no longer effective as before. The street to street fight in Stalingrad made use of artillery difficult fo the German as the Soviet maintained very close distance to their enemies
The harsh Soviet winter climate played major ploy in the Soviet victory. The German equipments jammed, their transport route turned marshy and soldiers died of cold climate. The retreating soviets burnt down the villages, factories, farms and livestock so that they were not available to the germans. When the Volga river froze, the German blockade of soviet supply lines was no longer effective as before. The street to street fight in Stalingrad made use of artillery difficult fo the German as the Soviet maintained very close distance to their enemies
Beatmaster
New Member
Keep in mind that logistic this war was a nighmare specially during winter times, where the russians could beat the winter (As they are used to the harsh temperatures) Also exploiting the benfits of the terrain and the fortifications of cities and individual houses did serv the russians very well.
No matter how many times the germans did sweep and clean cities there was always a sniper or machinegun nest that created havoc amongst patrolling troops.
Also the russian snipers who specificly targetted high ranking officers did create a mess amongst the german army.
And i agree with the previous posters if the german generals where allowed to fight a mobile war where they can move around to match a sepecific situation including retreat and regroup actions then the russians would have a nightmare to stop the germans.
Numerical the russian did send way more troops and personel/gear thanks to its safe production in the far east, wich the germans at that time did not have anymore.
As the german main production regions where daily bombed by RAF and USAF pilots.
So personally i think that germany would not be able to have a total victory over russia, but if hitlers generals would have more options and support then they would be perfectly able to at least get a good draw and would have gained control of the direct region.
However another major issue was the fact that germany did not have good aircoverage (Only a few planes) mainly because hitler assigned a great deal of assets to the western front and did keep relocating forces from eastern key points to other places, making the germans spread thin and removing their "backbone".
So to my humble opinion by doing so the generals that where present at the russian front must have known that this is a one way ticket to hell, as the russian came down on them in full force, while the germans only did have a small portion of their army commited to the russian front.
Still the deaths on both sides is a horrific number and proves that even with limited supplies the germans did fought like lions while they must have known what awaits them.
And lets not forget that mothernature with its harsh winters did contributed heavy in the losses on both sides.
No matter how many times the germans did sweep and clean cities there was always a sniper or machinegun nest that created havoc amongst patrolling troops.
Also the russian snipers who specificly targetted high ranking officers did create a mess amongst the german army.
And i agree with the previous posters if the german generals where allowed to fight a mobile war where they can move around to match a sepecific situation including retreat and regroup actions then the russians would have a nightmare to stop the germans.
Numerical the russian did send way more troops and personel/gear thanks to its safe production in the far east, wich the germans at that time did not have anymore.
As the german main production regions where daily bombed by RAF and USAF pilots.
So personally i think that germany would not be able to have a total victory over russia, but if hitlers generals would have more options and support then they would be perfectly able to at least get a good draw and would have gained control of the direct region.
However another major issue was the fact that germany did not have good aircoverage (Only a few planes) mainly because hitler assigned a great deal of assets to the western front and did keep relocating forces from eastern key points to other places, making the germans spread thin and removing their "backbone".
So to my humble opinion by doing so the generals that where present at the russian front must have known that this is a one way ticket to hell, as the russian came down on them in full force, while the germans only did have a small portion of their army commited to the russian front.
Still the deaths on both sides is a horrific number and proves that even with limited supplies the germans did fought like lions while they must have known what awaits them.
And lets not forget that mothernature with its harsh winters did contributed heavy in the losses on both sides.
Soviet Doctrine up until the 1970's was to attack over a wide general front until a breakthough occured. Once the hole in the line was there, the Soviet plan called for a maneveur group, later called the OMG (Operational Maneuver Group) and encircle the enemy. Breakthrough units where more heavy infantry with heavy tanks and the manevuer group was built around medium armored units with troop carriers
The Soviets did have a nightmare stopping the Germans. It took two years to do it. Be more specific.
This right here needs some serious support. Given not only the advantage in material production and men, but also the massive improvement in troop cohesion, and the chain of commands ability to carry out orders, the situation was not the same as it was in 1941, and the Germans had no hopes of regaining the strategic initiative following Kursk, regardless of Hitlers orders.
That bolded part is straight up wrong. The majority of the German army were committed to the Eastern Front. Read some serious history books before coming up with garbage like that.
Mark Solonin's The Cask and the Hoops offers excellent analysis of the subject in question, in regards to Soviet defeats of the early war in particular. Chapters from his book are available free, online with authors permission here: Mark Solonin. Historian's personal webpage.June 22 (The Cask and the Hoops)
The important thing to consider is that the key factors behind the inability of the RKKA to fight even a defensive battle, despite advantages in men and especially equipment, the factors responsible for German success, was not the prowess of German generals, or even the professionalism of German soldiers (which Soviet authors like to talk about, and which is really code word for something else). The defeat of the RKKA was the result of the complete lack of desire to fight, and complete inability as well as lack of desire, of the officer corps to lead the troops in combat. The vast majority of the RKKA casualties from the early war surrendered without firing a shot, and the vast majority of armored vehicles, tanks, artillery pieces, were abandoned without a fight.
This is what changed by 1943, and this is what is responsible for the defeat of the German Army following Stalingrad, and later Kursk.
I've always been informed that Russia had two things going for them. One, the weather and two, her people. She allowed Germany to punch in and then drew them in even further allowing the weather to take its toll, and then had counter-offensives, in mass, to destroy the Germans. That was their 'hope' aspect for WWII...their 'prayer' aspect was the western front was to open soon and thusly draw away German Army units. Both seemed to work although the Russians paid a very heavy price in WWII ( something like 20-25 million people )and I think they remember 'The Allies' and have hoped through the years to return the favors. The Cold War was one step in that direction and it costs us all dearly.