South China Sea thoughts?

[STURM]

Malaysia as a sovereign country with legitimate security concerns did not need a pretext to “justify” anything.... Why would it? For one; when Dr.M was in charge he had the final say in everything and no justification was necessary or needed for any arms purchases. Secondly those deals you mentioned were part of an ongoing - if belated and somewhat limited - process to progressively improve the MAF’s ability to defend the country against external threats. That was during a period when the MAF had emerged from a period (lasting several decades) when its focus (unlike Singapore) was on internal not external security.

In comparison to other countries which spent much more and focused much more attention to their armed forces; those deals you mentioned were actually quite modest and did not significantly improve the MAF’s overall capability; as such they needed no justification; not to Malaysian public, nor to any neighbouring country. It’s not as if D.M had decided to buy 12 SSKs or a dozen squadron’s worth of fighters; (something superfluous to the MAF’s needs and something it would have issues sustaining); which he would have gotten away with if he had so decided.

 

[OPSSG]

Casus Belli or 'occasion for war': Pedra Branca is one of the 3 redlines not to be crossed — Part 3

In comparison to other countries which spent much more and focused much more attention to their armed forces; those deals you mentioned were actually quite modest and did not significantly improve the MAF’s overall capability; as such they needed no justification; not to Malaysian public, nor to any neighbouring country. It’s not as if Dr.M had decided to buy 12 SSKs or a dozen squadron’s worth of fighters; (something superfluous to the MAF’s needs and something it would have issues sustaining); which he would have gotten away with if he had so decided.

8. Thank you for your coherent response on local Malaysian politics and its dynamics that I have much to learn from. But I note that Dr Balakrishnan also warned that foreign countries, including Singapore’s neighbours, should not take for granted the “consistency or predictability” in its response to international disputes — Singaporean patience must have limits (with Dr M as PM from July 1981 to October 2003 and again from May 2018 to March 2020), given the intent of those like Dr M to provoke and poke the sleeping Merlion, called the SAF. The key factor for the SAF and the Security and Intelligence Division is to decide when to escalate the level of violence; and it must be at the time of Singapore’s choosing. For reference, I refer the reader to the Cod Wars. These episodes when taken together, make clear that issues of maritime governance and maritime disputes can spark inter-state conflict even among friendly nations.

(a) If the Malaysian Government decides to escalate matters in Singaporean waters (as claimed by us) and shoot back after they are rammed in 2023 to 2025, the SAF will be able to fully employ our 16 H225Ms, 40 F-15SGs, 6 A330 MRTTs, 4 Endurance class vessels and 2 Type 218SGs along with 2 Archer class boats, for the desired effect to achieve our national security goals that include securing Singapore’s national interests via use of calibrated violence and esclation dominance. From 2026 to 2036, more capabilities will slowly come online (such as, the 12 F-35Bs and the 6 MRCVs, that will serve as motherships, as platforms, to engage in coercion). Only when the second F-35B squadron stands up, can the RSAF start to retire Singapore’s block 52, F-16Ds.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1409661445298552833

(b) One initial goal is to ram the intruding Malaysian vessels so hard (and so often and much), that they are forced to fire upon Singapore vessels or sink. After the 2018 round of disputes, the SAF is now reluctantly willing to suffer total constructive loss of multiple vessels to achieve our goal once ramming starts. The SAF has studied all the episodes of the Cod Wars between Iceland and Britain. In particular, the Second and Third Cod Wars were more intense and more violent, with multiple incidents of Icelandic coast guard vessels firing at or near British trawlers and many incidents of ramming by Royal Navy warships, British tugboats, and Icelandic coast guard vessels. The early retirement of Singapore’s Fearless class, enables the Singapore Navy to hold in reserve 7 retired vessels that can be re-activated as the Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels for ramming and firing at Malaysian vessels.​

(c) Given Singapore’s current preparedness to initiate cyber warfare actions (along with calibrated actions closely related to economic coercion), the Malaysian Government will have difficulty in keeping the lights on in cities — as one of many deniable follow-on actions, to achieve a secondary goal. IMO, the SAF wants to create via phase zero planning and actions — a calibrated reminder that all naval and air base bases, the sewage system, all power plants and the national power grid, in East and West Malaysia are legitimate and deniable targets, should the level of violence or conflict needs to be controlled and continued after multiple episodes of ramming.​

9. Some takeaways from the Cod Wars stand out.

​

First, smaller nations can successfully contest maritime disputes below the threshold of war, over a long period. Forcing Malaysian vessels to operate in specific, tightly controlled zones enable Singapore’s ultimate goal of the extension of our territorial waters claim.​

​

Second, a critical part of the conflict was the asymmetry in will. A much smaller nation, simply has more willpower. Australia, China, Japan and the US would do well to remember the Cod Wars as tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific where maritime boundaries are central to several ongoing disputes. The Singapore Navy’s fists can be a hand of peace — Malaysians need to choose the type of relationship the country has with its neighbour’s police coast guard and navy.​

10. I am writing these series of posts because I value the peace Singapore has with Malaysia as both countries are members of the FPDA. I am telling Malaysians in certain terms that the predictability of the past — is gone — and for good reasons — please do not miscalculate the SAF’s need to demonstrate resolve in the equation. As the Singapore Navy grows, it has a vested organisational interest in communicating to our public it’s role in securing our SLOCs and territorial waters — the shipbuilding plan for the MRCVs and JMMS addresses a range of naval operations for the Merlion from troubled peace to hot war.

11. Keep in mind that the RSAF placed an initial order of 12 F-15SG but ended up with a fleet of 40 — due to the need for escalation dominance, against a bigger neighbour, in a troubled peace scenario. IMO, in the event of the sinking of a Malaysian ship by Singapore, due to a maritime dispute, will not lead to war. As an example, North Korea’s Northern Limit Line attacks on South Korea’s naval vessels, did not result in war. Likewise, the sinking or loss of a Malaysian ship will not lead to war.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

I think both Malaysia and Singapore will do anything to prevent escalation. The price of a full scale war is too high for a couple of rocks, and it will devastate the economies of both countries. It will maybe even have a negative effect on the economy of the surrounding countries.

Besides that Malaysia only has two modern frigates at the moment and the Gowind class program isnt going very smoothly. Also their amphibious transport capabilities is very limited.

Btw, is it already sure that Singapore ordered the 8 F-35B on option? I thought they want to evaluate the first 4 F-35Bs first.

 

[OPSSG]

Casus Belli or 'occasion for war': Pedra Branca is one of the 3 redlines not to be crossed — Part 4

Btw, is it already sure that Singapore ordered the 8 F-35B on option? I thought they want to evaluate the first 4 F-35Bs first.

12. Singapore placed an order for 4, with the option for 8 more F-35Bs. The slated delivery for the first 4 is 2026. The official line — with the erratic Trump in power — is to test and evaluate, when the real position is different — as the goal is to use these fighters for SEAD. The smallest logical force structure to conduct any SEAD mission is to place an order 4 F-35Bs and to exercise the RSAF’s option for 4 to 8 more, within a short time from the order (likely to be within 2 years of initial order). IMO, this option will be exercised before the first delivery of the 1st F-35B in 2026.

I think both Malaysia and Singapore will do anything to prevent escalation. The price of a full scale war is too high for a couple of rocks, and it will devastate the economies of both countries. It will maybe even have a negative effect on the economy of the surrounding countries.

13. That will not be true by the dry season of 2025 onwards. By then, Singapore need not execute a forward defence plan in the event of shooting at sea incident. Therefore, the country’s navy can take some risks to demonstrate resolve — as failure to take such risk will create a vicious cycle of Malaysian aggression. It is certain the the Malaysians miscalculated in Oct 2018, and there is a strong desire to impose costs on them.

14. No matter how unreasonable Dr M was, the Merlion needed to avoid a fight against a country that is 475 times bigger than Singapore in 1991; but thanks to 30 years of effort, areas of domestic weakness like self sufficiency in water, is being systematically removed due to unrelenting investments to bring about real change.

​

(a) The latest round of maritime territorial dispute arose in Oct 2018 when Malaysia unilaterally extended the territorial boundary at Johor Bahru Port, encroaching into Singaporean-claimed waters at Tuas Port. The claim extends beyond the maritime border Malaysia unilaterally declared and reinstated in 1979 and 1999 respectively, marking the first time in almost 20 years that either side has attempted to shift the boundary.​

​

(b) In all honesty, prior to 2018, I had expected that the period of troubled peace between the two countries was behind us for good. But evidently, I was wrong.​

15. The Merlion’s initial response to the maritime dispute over Tuas port was two-fold. On the diplomatic front, Singaporean leaders called for negotiations to resolve escalating tensions and end Malaysian provocation. Singapore sees the problem as Dr M-specific, with the younger and more ethnically diverse members of the Malaysian Cabinet believed to hold more conciliatory views towards the island-state. On the military front, Singapore’s Defence Minister warned the Malaysian vessels parked in the disputed territories to leave. Meanwhile, the SAF declared week-long military exercises across the island-state and mobilised its regular and reserve forces.

16. Dispute avoidance was needed by the Merlion in 1991 but that scenario is no longer true for a maritime dispute with Malaysia over Pedra Branca — given the Merlion’s energy and water independence by 2025 (as a key milestone to the end of the water agreements in 2061). Therefore, Singapore through enactment of conscription legislation in March 1967 and decades of consistent tri-service military modernisation efforts enables the SAF to have escalation dominance over the Malaysia Navy, if shooting occurs (that does not lead to a land war), for a few additional reasons, as follows:

​

One, the Iron Dome’s demonstrated capability to intercept large salvos, along with drastically improved relations with Indonesia (as the country’s largest investor) has reduced the threat of artillery and rocket attacks on Singapore by our immediate neighbours.​

​

Two, with air superiority achievable by the RSAF in a few days from the start of shooting and a more advanced navy, the creation of the new Special Operations Command Centre (SOCC) in 2019 is a game changer in providing military options. This means that during periods of active hostility, the SOCC is able to conduct surgical strikes or boarding operations in both Singapore and Malaysia, on land or at sea, due to the country’s ability to collect, analyse, fuse and make sense of mission essential information.​

​

Three, the completion of SLNG’s 4th tank in 2018, with plans for the 5th tank on hold, this means even if the supply of natural gas from Malaysia is cut-off, Singapore does not need to continue to buy Malaysian natural gas. Only 2 of the 4 tanks are used for domestic regas.​

​

Four, the CORVID-19 pandemic stress tested Singapore’s food security plans that came out with flying colours. Singapore can protect and import our food supply by sea (and as long as Indonesia is not hostile), Malaysia as a source of food, water and energy can be replaced (as per the country’s plans from 1991).​

​

Five, the 2025 opening of Tuas Nexus and the Feb 2021 opening of Keppel Marina East Desalination Plant (as Singapore's first large-scale desalination plant capable of treating both seawater from the Singapore Straits and freshwater from Marina Barrage), removes the need for Johore’s untreated water.​

​

(i) The NEA and PUB, have announced the construction of Tuas Nexus has begun, and it is set to be completed in phases from 2025 onwards. The co-location of two mega facilities – the Tuas Water Reclamation Plant (Tuas WRP) and the Integrated Waste Management Facility (IWMF) – will forge a sustainable Singapore by optimising land use and maximising energy, water and resource recovery. When completed, Tuas Nexus will not only be energy self-sufficient, it will also contribute to increasing NEWater supply over time from 2025 onwards (to meet a further 15% of all water needs).​

​

(ii) During the dry season (usually Apr to Jul), there are five NEWater plants supplying up to 40% of Singapore's current water needs. By 2060, NEWater is expected to meet up to 55% of Singapore’s future water demand. As it is ultra-clean, NEWater is used mainly for industrial and air-con cooling purposes at wafer fabrication plants, industrial estates and commercial buildings — it is also delivered to industrial customers via a dedicated pipe network.​

​

(iii) Since 2011, Singapore’s water catchment area has increased from 1/2 to 2/3 of the land surface with the completion of the Marina, Punggol and Serangoon Reservoirs. This makes Singapore one of the few countries in the world to harvest urban stormwater, from 17 reservoirs, 32 rivers and 8,000 kilometres of drains and canals, on a large scale for potable consumption. In 2021, urban rainwater and imported water from Johore meet 50% to 60% of Singapore’s water needs for about 9 to 10 months a year.​

​

(iv) For about 8.5 to 9.5 months of a year, the Keppel Marina East Desalination Plant uses less energy to treat rainwater run-off from the Marina Barrage (instead of sea water). This brings about three benefits: a cheaper source of water supply, flood control during the Monsoon season and a venue for lifestyle attraction — this greatly reduces our dependence on Malaysian’s untreated water; with the concurrent building of more desalination and NEWater plants, a cut-off of water supply from Malaysia will more adversely affect Johor Bahru than Singapore (during the Apr to Jul dry season) — as they lose the supply of cheap treated water from Singapore when they are water stressed.​

​

Six, to reduce the likelihood of a water war prior to 2061, Singapore has water from 4 different sources:​

​

(i) water from local catchments;​

​

(ii) imported water from Johore (up to 2061, when the water agreement expires);​

​

(iii) NEWater (high-grade reclaimed water for industrial use or 40% of Singapore's current water usage) and desalinated water; and​

​

(iv) desalination plants will be able to meet 15% to 25% of Singapore’s water needs during the 2 month dry season (around June).​

 

[STURM]

The price of a full scale war is too high for a couple of rocks, and it will devastate the economies of both countries. It will maybe even have a negative effect on the economy of the surrounding countries.

A full scale war between 2 ASEAN members will have long term detrimental consequences; not only for both the countries but the region as a whole. This is true irrespective of whichever side achieves its political and military goals in the short term.

 

[hauritz]

As a result of China's push into the South China Sea most countries in the region are now arming to the teeth. A number of these nations have been butting heads for years, so now they have a little more military muscle to back them up the whole region may become a little more unstable.

Of course ultimately that would be another win for China.

 

[STURM]

Maybe but I doubt it. Granted some countries take defence more seriously than others but the chances of greater instability arsing as a result of countries being better equipped is unlikely.

There are various unresolved overlapping disputes amongst various ASEAN states but an actual conflict is highly unlikely for a number of reasons. Not that there hasn’t been border clashes between ASEAN states (the Thai/Cambodia clash a few years ago; the Thai/Myanmar clash early this century and the Thai/Laos clash in the 1980’s) but these eventually fizzled out. Countries are highly cognisant of the fact that winning wars (at least in the short term) may be easy but winning the peace (to use a cliche) or what comes after is a completely different thing.

There is a lot of back channel diplomacy within ASEAN. Certain countries may say or do things for domestic consumption whilst informing a neighbour that there’s nothing to be worried about. Short border incidents can easily happen but for incidents of this type to actually erupt in full scale protracted war; takes concerted and determined effort. Unless of course a country is determined to go to war.

 

[STURM]

Besides that Malaysia only has two modern frigates at the moment and the Gowind class program isnt going very smoothly. Also their amphibious transport capabilities is very limited.

Work is expected to resume again on the delayed LCS (Gowind) programme. Indeed the RMN’s amphib capabilities are somewhat limited but note that the intention is not really to improve its amphibious capabilities per see but it’s sea lift capability; in other words the ability to move men and material from Point A to B (to ports and harbours): as opposed to a contested amphibious assault or landing on a beachhead.

The country’s main threat perceptions at the moment are centred on the Spratlys (which is taking up a lot of resources) and in Sabah where a lot of attention and resources have been placed in preventing a reoccurrence of 2013; as well as preventing further attempts by kidnap gangs based in the Taiwan-Tawi area to land in Sabah.

The good news is that the raising of new units and placing of assets in Sabah: as part of ESSCOM which was intended to deal with non state threats; also improves the ability of the MAF to deal with possible state threats. Prior to this the large land mass of Sabah and Sarawak was the responsibility of a sole lightly equipped division.

Amidst all the mention on the Spratlys in recent years; the RMN has actually been active in the area since the 1980’s when the first reefs were physically occupied. The only difference is that the main worry then for Malaysia was Vietnam and the Philippines. The presence of Chinese ships in the EEZ were rare; so was mention of the Spratlys in the international press.

 

[OPSSG]

Casus Belli or 'occasion for war': Pedra Branca is one of the 3 redlines not to be crossed — Part 5

The country’s main threat perceptions at the moment are centred on the Spratlys (which is taking up a lot of resources) and in Sabah where a lot of attention and resources have been placed in preventing a reoccurrence of 2013; as well as preventing further attempts by kidnap gangs based in the Taiwan-Tawi area to land in Sabah.

The good news is that the raising of new units and placing of assets in Sabah: as part of ESSCOM which was intended to deal with non state threats; also improves the ability of the MAF to deal with possible state threats. Prior to this the large land mass of Sabah and Sarawak was the responsibility of a sole lightly equipped division.

16. With regard to ASEAN Navies exercising in the South China Sea, the Singapore Navy has been conducting on an annual basis Exercise Pelican with Brunei, which enhances the maritime security of the region. In Jul 2020, Commanding Officer of KDB Darulehsan, CDR Haji Edy Jofren bin PDP DP Haji Abd Jalil said:

​

"The RBN and RSN have a special relationship that has developed from our commitment and participation in Exercise Pelican since its establishment in 1979. It is indeed an important avenue for enhancing interoperability, capacity building and most importantly forging ties and friendships amongst RBN and RSN personnel at all levels."​

Perhaps the same can be done with the Malaysian Navy via Exercise Malapura (a bilateral maritime exercise) off the coast of Sabah, if your country’s politicians can be persuaded that cooperation is better than needless confrontation.

17. Despite the fact that Malaysia has established the Defence Intelligence Application Division (Bahagian Aplikasi Perisikan Pertahanan – BAPP) to provide ESSCOM with data and imagery from satellite reconnaissance on Southern Philippines and the South China Sea, the Singapore Navy is certainly able and willing to provide some logistics and additional ISR support for Malaysian ESSCOM troops in relation to coalition type of naval operations to help improve security in Sabah; in a manner similar to CTF 151 deployments to the Gulf of Aden (to deter both cross border kidnap for ransom gangs and the Philippines from making further claims on Sabah), should the need arise. This offer was also made around the 2013 period when bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia was much better.

 

[STURM]

For the Malaysians the ability to rapidly reinforce Sabah and Sarawak has been a priority for decades and is why a lot of stuff like artillery and AFVs have to be “air transportable”. Also a reason why the RMAF has long operated a fleet of 14-15 C-130Hs; although quite often it’s been found to be much cheaper and practical to utilise commercial air transport to lift things.

Things now have changed however; the troop presence in Sabah has been significantly increased; more bases constructed and other things. As such though there is still a need to rapidly reinforce East Malaysia should a need arise; the MAF presence there has significantly increased since 2013 and will continue to do so in the coming years.

New surface radars along Sabah’s east coast as well the deployment of UASs and the presence of the MMEA and Marine Police have significantly improved the ability to safeguard and monitor the coast. The problem of course is still the number of assets in place in relation to the sheer size of the area.

 

[STURM]

if your country’s politicians can be persuaded that cooperation is better than needless confrontation.

I won’t get into specifics from a Malaysian perspective as they are always two sides to a story and nobody holds a monopoly on truth or righteousness (even if they’re absolutely convinced they do); plus the fact that it can lead to a rabbit hole which achieves nothing but since the early 2000’s MAF/SAF cooperation has not been affected by political issues.

In addition to bilateral land and sea exercises; there is SAR one. The RMN has also trained alongside the RSN in various multilateral exercises including the sub rescue exercise. As part of the FPDA there are SAF staff attached permanently to HQIADS; joint exercises and cross landings by RMAF and RSAF aircraft during exercises. SAF personnel have also attended Haigate the Staff College, the Defence University and the Peacekeeping Centre. RMAF aircraft have also been regular attendees at Asian Aerospace; as have RMN ships at IMDEX.

On a non military basis there are other forms of security cooperation. Mas Selamat was handed over after he escaped from a Singaporean facility and made it to JB and a Singaporean national who fled Singapore for a violent crime some years ago was handed back. Those are merely the cases I’m aware of.

 

[OPSSG]

Casus Belli or 'occasion for war': Pedra Branca is one of the 3 redlines not to be crossed — Part 6

18. With the U.S.-China rivalry in Southeast Asia intensifying in recent years, the South China Sea has become a significant arena for strategic competition between the two great powers. As tensions over territorial disputes continue to destabilize the region, geopolitics has become more complex.

​

(a) The presence of the PLA in disputed areas of the South China Sea has created operational challenges for ASEAN, the US, and US allies and partners. Given that any instability in the region caused by Sino-U.S. rivalry will negatively affect ASEAN countries, defense diplomacy with both China and the US is crucial for managing defense relations and cooperation.​

​

(b) Despite the above, the Singapore Navy (as the leading ASEAN Navy and partner with the US Navy), will continue to seek win-win cooperative outcomes with the Royal Malaysian Navy and the TNI AL, respectively, if domestic political imperatives do not get in the way of bilateral cooperation. In the case of Malaysia, to augment ISR gaps in BAPP satellite and ESSCOM radar coverage for real time operations in Sabah.​

The price of a full scale war is too high for a couple of rocks, and it will devastate the economies of both countries. It will maybe even have a negative effect on the economy of the surrounding countries.

19. I hope that going forward, intelligence cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore will continue to improve. In Nov 2020, a cooperation agreement in the operation of the Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF) to strengthen military and defense diplomacy related to the issue of terrorism through information exchange was signed with Indonesia. CTIF which consists of 10 countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, United States, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand, Vietnam and Thailand) has been manned by representatives from the armed forces of these member countries.

20. IMHO, months before war/hostilities in the South China Sea, the goal for any Foreign Intelligence Organisation is to cause so much deniable trouble in Malaysia (that cannot be easily traced back to it’s source), such that having a Malaysian vessel sink in disputed waters of the South China Sea is no longer headline news. Let me list just 3 poor examples of deniable trouble that causes the public to mis-trust the Malaysian Government, just a little more, that may or may not be initiated by a foreign power:

​

(a) During the dry season of 2025 onwards, under cyber attack, the SCADA controlling sewage pumps (eg. Cyber attack on the Shire of Maroochy) causes raw sewage to overflow into a Malaysian river, causing water rationing in 1 or 2 states.​

​

(b) While the Malaysian police are transporting 1 of the 1,281 inmates on death row (held in 26 detention facilities), a group of these inmates escape with armed help, causing a huge man hunt — due to an influx of stolen or smuggled weapons flooding the black market in KL.​

​

(c) A kidnap for ransom gang goes active in Sabah, just as the ‘Royal Army of Sulu’ suddenly find access to cheap illegal weapons, resulting in ESSCOM needing reinforcements.​

​

21. If starting a war is not the goal (plan A) — there are many actions that an adversary can take actions below the threshold for war — as Singapore discovered when the Army’s Terrex vehicles were detained in HK.

22. If there are examples of deniable trouble occurring in 10 to 11 of the 13 Malaysian states or Singapore (plan A), the headline of a sunk Malaysian or Singaporean vessel due to ramming will not cause much outrage.

23. When the level of trust for the Malaysian government falls — 2 to 3 months after all these troubles start — it is then the correct time to re-use the strategies learnt from the Cod Wars and apply it to the aggrieved party’s advantage, as part of Phase Zero planning.

24. If starting a war is the goal (plan B), then sparking racial riots in Malaysia, starting with the Indian community there, would be a faster route to sow mistrust by a Foreign Intelligence Organisation — once riots start, economic moves come next, as part of Phase Zero planning.

​

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

The Shaanxi KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft carries a fixed dorsal radome containing three AESA radar arrays for 360 degree coverage, and it seems to have a 470 km range against fighter sized targets.

Thats quite impressive if you look at this map.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1418888695965306880

 

[OPSSG]

The Shaanxi KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft carries a fixed dorsal radome containing three AESA radar arrays for 360 degree coverage, and it seems to have a 470 km range against fighter sized targets.

1. Soon, when a TNI AU fighter takes off from any Indonesian air base or airport near the South China Sea, the PLAAF and PLA(N) will know the fighter’s trajectory from the moment wheels lift off, as it conducts an intercept to assert a Chinese ADIZ. Likewise, the JASDF is aware of PLAAF fighters at lift off from any Chinese air base, as they intercept them over Japanese ADIZ. This means a continuous radar track of TNI AU fighters taking off around the South China Sea unless Indonesia acquires the ability to engage in broadband jamming of Chinese AWACS from up to 470 km away.

2. No matter what fighter the TNI AU buys (as a token air force, like the Malaysians), be it the Boeing F-15EX or the Dassault Rafale, they will be out numbered by Chinese fighters, who will always be vectored by Shaanxi KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, towards the rear of a TNI AU fighter, giving the Chinese a tactical advantage.

​

(a) Even if by miracle, a superb Indonesian fighter pilot can shake-off the radar lock, the Chinese wing man will acquire radar lock; which means Indonesian air intercepts depend on Chinese kindness not to shoot your fighters down.​

​

(b) In contrast, air intercepts by Australian or Singaporean fighters will have both AWAC (6 x E-7A Wedgetails and 4 x G550 AEWs) and tanker support (7x KC-30A and 6x A330MRTT) — that have trained to fight under FPDA auspices — to ensure our American made fighters intercept the enemy from the rear sector.​

​

(c) The two air forces are able to fight as a network centric joint-force supported by Growlers and other specialist aircraft or fighters with jamming pods (that are more powerful than self defence jammers), should the need arise.​

3. This is why I watch Prabowo’s strutting around in Europe to pressure the Americans for a ‘better deal’ with dismay — pretty sure he is not serious about buying Typhoons. Indonesia also tries to play countries off each other to obtain the best bargain. That not only includes attractive pricing, but also part payment in commodities as well as a commitment from the seller to undertake some of the manufacturing in Indonesia to boost the country’s embryonic defence industry. But there are also drawbacks to Indonesia’s strategy that includes a system integration nightmare from this mix and match approach to weapons platforms purchases.

​

(a) If any shooting occurs over the South China Sea, only the American fighter manufacturers can lean on the American military industrial complex (the American MIC) to speed up delivery of US made weapons (like air-to-air missiles or anti-ship missiles to the TNI AU), on a sufficient scale to deter China.​

​

(b) I wish the TNI AU good luck in screaming to the French for faster delivery of missiles on a scale that will make a difference to Chinese calculations. And even if the French do speed up, is it enough to make a difference?​

​

(c) India for example had their delivery of 5 Dassault Rafale speeded up but it made no difference to the PLA (as it is within their scenario calculations, when the Chinese decided to kill Indian troops at their border).​

​

(d) Both Australia and Singapore buy significantly more French weapons that Indonesia ever will and yet, both have not selected a French fighter — for good reason.​

4. The scale of the American MIC help they can elect to provide to Indonesia is not to be under-estimated. The ability to acquire the resources and weapons to put-up a real (but potentially losing) fight, in a relatively short time of 14 to 32 days (from crisis to completion of delivery) is important. This was demonstrated over 32 days in Operation Nickel Grass, which broke the will of the Arab armies to continue the fight. Operation Nickel Grass is the least celebrated airlifts in history, where an armada of American Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft carried war materiel over vast distances into the midst of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. MAC airlifters-went in harm’s way, vulnerable to attack from fighters, as they carved a demanding track across the Mediterranean, to deliver weapons of war, in a war zone.

5. IMO, the threat of direct or indirect American or Japanese intervention, given their geo-political weight, are events that will deter the Chinese from further escalation in the South China Sea, should any shooting start. This is why I am a fan of the Japanese offer co-operate with Indonesia on joint defence projects that could include Japan's 30FFM-class frigate.

Edit: Point 6 edited to reflect StingrayOz input.

6. Both the Australians and Singaporeans operating as tertiary air forces and having advanced navies, with destroyers and frigates, capable of warfare in 3 dimensions (namely, anti-air, surface and ASW), to some extent are reliant on American MIC support. This why Singapore’s missile inventory, of a few hundreds of missiles, is so low during peacetime. I estimate that our larger air combat arms can survive between 30+ to 60+ days (before we run out and go screaming to Uncle Sam for help). In contrast, I suspect that the TNI AU will run out of missiles on day 1. Not only do Australia and Singapore have 10 to 20 times more of air-to-air missile stocks than Indonesia, as F-35 operators, we have the ability to defend our AWACS and kill theirs, should the need arise.

 

[Ananda]

Kelanjutan investasi smelter Tsingshan belum pasti

Freeport Indonesia memastikan tidak akan melanjutkan rencana kerja sama dengan Tsingshan usai tak mencapai kata sepakat

industri.kontan.co.id

I put this on this thread, eventough it's not related to SCS directly. However indirectly it shown the effect of Political conundrum that more and more spill out to regular commercial deal, in SEA region.

Indonesia actually since nearly the end of SBY era, already put regulations that aim to reduce toward ending export of Raw Minerals. In sense all mining company has to invest or work with Partners to build smelters. This already push some of the mining companies toward business decision corner, and sometimes it can create diplomatic problem. Chinese companies, on the other hand see this as opportunity. Many of them try to bring their own smelter capacities, and put it in Indonesia, to gain access toward the minerals.

They see it chances if the existing mining companies then balk down from Indonesia, due their reluctance to invest in smellter. Then they can move in to buy them out. The other way around, if the mining companies want to keep their Indonesian mining rights, they can offer them partnership on building smelters. Either way they can get preference access to the minerals.

Smelters is low margin business. Just like many Infrastructure business. That's why many mining companies reluctance to go to this business. Most that want to invest in smelters actualy also has down line business to support their smelters.

However China does not alone to see this chances. South Korean and Japan also see it. Moreover I suspect both Seoul and Tokyo also see this, to cut Chinese move on gaining control on mineral market in the region. Afterall ROK and Japanese companies also the big end users of the minerals.

Now Freeport Mcmoran as US mining company already control Giant deposit of Copper and Gold in Papua since early Soeharto era. They definetely will not give it up. However they also don't want to invest alone in the smelter business. Thus the Chinese Tsingshan come to them to open partnership on Smelter with Tsingshan as majority holder.

As the article shown, Freeport now backdown on the partnership and choose Japanese Chiyoda instead as partner. It can be this is only a commercial issue. Perhaps Freeport find Chiyoda agreement more interested. However I sense political consideration influence this.

The Tsingshan partnership is actualy cost lower than Chiyoda ones. Also Chiyoda wants to build the smelter in East Java (in Industrial Complex that Japanese Investors build). While Tsingshan will build it in Halmahera Island, much closer to West Papua, thus reduce the tranportation costs.

Perhaps there's commercial details that Freeport find more agreable with Chiyoda. However I sense political pressure from US can be a factor for Freeport chose to go with Japanese partner. Can this shown more of the patern politics increasing their push toward commercials transactions ?

Is this going to be the next patern ? Will the business world has to choose, whose going to be the business transaction partner is ?

Just something to think of.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Both the Australians and Singaporeans operating as tertiary air forces and having advanced navies, with destroyers and frigates, capable of warfare in 3 dimensions (namely, anti-air, surface and ASW), to some extent are reliant on American MIC support. This why our missile inventory, of a few hundreds of missiles, is so low during peacetime. I estimate that our larger air combat arms can survive between 30+ to 50+ days (before we run out and go screaming to Uncle Sam for help). In contrast, I suspect that the TNI AU will run out of missiles on day 1. Not only do Australia and Singapore have 10 times more of air-to-air missile stocks than Indonesia, as F-35 operators, we have the ability to defend our AWACS and kill theirs, should the need arise

On this.

Australia is talking a lot about missiles.

Australia should be stockpiling missiles instead of making them | The Strategist

The Australian government needs to explain why making guided missiles domestically is better than simply importing and holding a stock of them big enough for war. Until it does, we must wonder whether its policy ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cracking-missile-matrix

It seems likely we will have a mix of local production and stock pile.

Australia has a significant stockpile.

Raytheon secures US$768m AMRAAM contract

Raytheon Missile Systems has secured a US$768 million (A$1. 1 billion) non-competitive fixed-price incentive (firm) contract for Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Production Lot 33.

www.defenceconnect.com.au

RAAF cleared for $1.2 billion AMRAAM purchase - Australian Defence Magazine - $1.6billion for 450 AIM-120D
Australia – AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles | Defense Security Cooperation Agency 120 AIM-120C

Reverse engineering Australia's FMS requests | The Strategist

On 31 May, yet another Australian FMS purchase approval was listed on the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) website. This new sale is for ‘up to eighty (80) Standard Missiles, SM-2 Block IIIB’, as ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Australia To Acquire AIM 9X-2 Sidewinder Missiles Through FMS Sale ~350
More AIM-9X AAMs for the RAAF | ADBR ~50

While exact numbers of operational missiles aren't known, its significant, and been made larger recently. Australia is also famous for hording older equipment and munitions, there is no shortage of storage.

I don't know about Singapore, but Australia used to have significant sway in Washington, and would likely make a strong case to be "high on the list" for resupply. The American military industrial production machine is impressive, and the US has eye wateringly large stockpiles, and an economy that can adapt.

If the higher band of FMS is to be believed, then Australia would have a significant stockpile of Aim9 and AIM120. Possibly 500 of AIM9 and Possibly ~1000 Aim120. Backed up with several thousand SMD, and all the other stuff like harpoons, SM-2, ESSM, LRASM, JASSM, JDAM etc.

While no stockpile is limitless, that is a heck of a lot of firing at Chinese Fighters and bombers, ships and land targets. Assuming some of those hit airframes, that is going to be a significant chunk of anything flying around within our zone.

Indonesia has been famous for fleetingly small stockpiles of munitions and logistics spares. Having operational fighters armed, on day one seems like a big ask. Sourcing from Europe also, hmm, the Europeans typically have small stockpiles and slow rates of production.

Between Singapore and Australia, its a significant refueling fleet and surveillance fleet, backed by other assets like JORN.

Indonesia striking deals on its own, is futile. It will never be able to grow enough capability quick enough to meet the coming threats. China isn't some small upstart, bumbling its own journey with similar issues to Indonesia. When they come they will dominate.

Indonesia still seems to choose a path that makes it difficult for it to form any deeper alliances.

https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/prabowo-set-to-complicate-the-australia-indonesia-relationship/

 

[STURM]

Indonesia has been famous for fleetingly small stockpiles of munitions and logistics spares.

That is because of threat perceptions and actual operational requirements. Like most regional countries Indonesia for a long period simply did not foresee or plan for the possibility that it would be engaged in a high intensity protracted conflict with a state actor - in sharp contrast to other countries. Another reason was the amount of cash it devoted to external defence in relation to what it devoted to internal security (its main security concern for a considerable period) and national development efforts.

Now if its threat perceptions really have changed; then it has to stockpile on the needed consumables: whether ordnance, spares or fuel. It also have to ensure it has an adequate ready pool of aircrews and support personnel. We can go even further and say that It Indonesia (like other countries) also has to factor in the possibility of attacks on its bases by IRBMs and cruise missiles; as well as cyber and electronic attack.

 

[Ananda]

The only times Indonesian Military have large stock piles of ammo including missiles, were in early 60's. We know at that time where Sorkarno policies focus were. So what @STURM says has a point there.

However at this moment, there're also other issue that 'Politically' still seems occupied defense planners in Indonesia:
1. Sustain budget for ammunitions including missiles,
2. Which suppliers that 'politically' more dependable.

INDONESIA/UNITED STATES : Indonesian defence minister appoints Qatar defense lobbyist in Washington to speed up defence deals - 29/06/2021 - Intelligence Online

Consultant Christopher Ott, who represents the Qatari defence conglomerate Barzan in Washington, has been hired to facilitate US defence sales to Jakarta, whose position has become strategic in the - 6/29/2021

www.intelligenceonline.com

Prabowo's as far as I know is the first defense minister that see the need for sustain lobbyst in DC. Many on Indonesian media or forums see it as part to lobby congress for green lights on F-15EX. However my self see it as part of Prabowo's and Jokowi's administration effort to gain acces on sustain and dependable defense items supply from Washington.

Rumours saying that when Indonesian minister of everything Luhut comes to Washington and get audiences with Trump, he also found that practically many in Congress didn't get enough exposures in Indonesia. Mostly related on commercials deals, but not on defense need, and geopolitical possition. Thus when Prabowo's told the need to increase lobbying effort on geopolitical and defense issues, the administrations support it.

I have a friend from my school that now work with IMF. He said many lobbyst in Washington knows more on Indonesian business and Investment situations, then what Indonesian geopolitical possition. This's not surprising, since Soeharto downfall, Indonesian administrations are more interested to enhance business and investment opportunities, rathen then defense with Washington.

French and MBDA got better tractions then US suppliers in the mind of Jakarta's defense planners, due to experiences after the time Soeharto fall and East Timor debacles. French is the first Western suppliers that resume their supply and support to TNI. It take SBY relations with Bush and then Obama to create back continues supply from Washington.

I think the defense planners knows well that Frenchie and Euro items are more expensive and take more times to acquire. However they also still have in their mind, Frenchie are more politically neutral to Indonesia as defense suppliers. So, in my opinion how far Indonesia will relied later on with US supplies, depends on the result of lobbying in Washinton.

Indonesia need US not just on Trade and Investment sides, but also on defense and Geopolitical support. That's been cleared even with this administrations. This clearly resulting on practically no defense contracts being put with China and Russia under Prabowo's MinDef so far. That's why so far Indonesia does not want to test CAATSA. The defense items that come from China and Russia now, practically come from what ever small contracts implementing by last term MinDef.

However Prabowo's clearly put massage to Washington that he wants advance missiles, state of the art UAV, AEW planes, etc. If he can not get it from Washington, he will go to Frenchie and other Euro suppliers.

On the other hand, I really doubt he can get budget to get both Frenchie and US fighters and missiles. There're signs that shown some TNI-AU wish list from US can get cut, if Prabowo's still adamant to get Frenchie stuff. US knows this, that's why they still push for F-16 family. Altough base on Boeing own statement they are shown potential deals with Indonesia 'advance' aerospace defense items.

With what Prabowo's signed with Parly, Frenchie (like Japan) also offering to help build capabilities on Indonesian defense Industry. I really see Frenchie and other Euro suppliers still stay as substantial Indonesian defense chain. Can Indonesia afford to have US items too after that? Well that's the billion dollar questions.

Add:
On more cynical side, defense planners like to deal with Euro suppliers as it's easier to get 'side projects' with them. We know what happen in India. Off course it is much easier for 'side projects' with Rosoboron and Chinese suppliers. That's why many defense 'analyst' are screaming when Indonesia cave in to CAATSA . The 'Finance' people on the other hand like to work with US, as it's more 'straight forward'.

 

[STURM]

Ananda,

Would you agree that the decision to diversify its suppliers and not to be over dependent on anyone supplier is driven by the arms embargo put into place following East Timor?

Of late have there been any concerns raised in the local or defence press by commenters (politicians, military. academics, etc) about the TNI’s large logistical/support footprint resulting from the policy of buying from various suppliers stuff which has little or no commonality?

 

[Ananda]

Would you agree that the decision to diversify its suppliers and not to be over dependent on anyone supplier is driven by the arms embargo put into place following East Timor?

@STURM definetely. Just as I have put in my post, and Indonesian threads, the diversification thinking still has strong set within MinDef planners and Political circles due the situation after East Timor. It's also why Frenchie has more positive preferences on that circles, due to Frenchie more neutral stance after East Timor debacles.

At the same time, there are also strong proponents on some sections of TNI and MinDef (especialy with younger more technical thinking) segments to have smaller and less complex logistical foot prints, for better operational.

Those two thinkings are having strong supports (as we can see in media, local forums and officials statements). That's why I said in Indonesian threads, the problem now how to find balance on that.

My cynical point of view (especialy for those who wants to diversified with Russian and Chinese suppliers/vendors), are shown by some political circles (that) agents are Politically connected to them. However so far after Indonesia not want to 'test' CAATSA, they have tone down a bit.

The game now is how far they can balance between Euro and US vendors, within the budget. That's why Korean and Japan coming in also.
For Air Force, I have mentioned many times how TNI-AU love their US fighters. They have mentioned many times in media how US assets is much easiers to maintain.

That's why Prabowo's hired lobbyst in DC. He has to get confirmation on how politically dependable US defense Items supply in future will be. This to ensure the diversification factions can be handle. At same time, I guess the lobbyst also being use to convince US political circles on Indonesian Geopolitical position.