South China Sea thoughts?

[Sandhi Yudha]

On this.

Australia is talking a lot about missiles.

Australia should be stockpiling missiles instead of making them | The Strategist

The Australian government needs to explain why making guided missiles domestically is better than simply importing and holding a stock of them big enough for war. Until it does, we must wonder whether its policy ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cracking-missile-matrix

It seems likely we will have a mix of local production and stock pile.

Australia has a significant stockpile.

Raytheon secures US$768m AMRAAM contract

Raytheon Missile Systems has secured a US$768 million (A$1. 1 billion) non-competitive fixed-price incentive (firm) contract for Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Production Lot 33.

www.defenceconnect.com.au

RAAF cleared for $1.2 billion AMRAAM purchase - Australian Defence Magazine - $1.6billion for 450 AIM-120D
Australia – AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles | Defense Security Cooperation Agency 120 AIM-120C

Reverse engineering Australia's FMS requests | The Strategist

On 31 May, yet another Australian FMS purchase approval was listed on the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) website. This new sale is for ‘up to eighty (80) Standard Missiles, SM-2 Block IIIB’, as ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Australia To Acquire AIM 9X-2 Sidewinder Missiles Through FMS Sale ~350
More AIM-9X AAMs for the RAAF | ADBR ~50

While exact numbers of operational missiles aren't known, its significant, and been made larger recently. Australia is also famous for hording older equipment and munitions, there is no shortage of storage.

I don't know about Singapore, but Australia used to have significant sway in Washington, and would likely make a strong case to be "high on the list" for resupply. The American military industrial production machine is impressive, and the US has eye wateringly large stockpiles, and an economy that can adapt.

If the higher band of FMS is to be believed, then Australia would have a significant stockpile of Aim9 and AIM120. Possibly 500 of AIM9 and Possibly ~1000 Aim120. Backed up with several thousand SMD, and all the other stuff like harpoons, SM-2, ESSM, LRASM, JASSM, JDAM etc.

While no stockpile is limitless, that is a heck of a lot of firing at Chinese Fighters and bombers, ships and land targets. Assuming some of those hit airframes, that is going to be a significant chunk of anything flying around within our zone.

Indonesia has been famous for fleetingly small stockpiles of munitions and logistics spares. Having operational fighters armed, on day one seems like a big ask. Sourcing from Europe also, hmm, the Europeans typically have small stockpiles and slow rates of production.

Between Singapore and Australia, its a significant refueling fleet and surveillance fleet, backed by other assets like JORN.

Indonesia striking deals on its own, is futile. It will never be able to grow enough capability quick enough to meet the coming threats. China isn't some small upstart, bumbling its own journey with similar issues to Indonesia. When they come they will dominate.

Indonesia still seems to choose a path that makes it difficult for it to form any deeper alliances.

Prabowo Set to Complicate the Australia-Indonesia Relationship

Its sadly a policy for decades to have a ridiculous small amount of missiles. Like Sturm already said, it is because of threat perceptions and actual operational requirements. I hope they will change this policy soon, but looking to recent developments like the acquisition of 25.000 advanced assault rifles for some kind of reserve unit, it will take a lot of time until we will see a change in the way of thinking of some high officials.

Kelanjutan investasi smelter Tsingshan belum pasti

Freeport Indonesia memastikan tidak akan melanjutkan rencana kerja sama dengan Tsingshan usai tak mencapai kata sepakat

industri.kontan.co.id

I put this on this thread, eventough it's not related to SCS directly. However indirectly it shown the effect of Political conundrum that more and more spill out to regular commercial deal, in SEA region.

Indonesia actually since nearly the end of SBY era, already put regulations that aim to reduce toward ending export of Raw Minerals. In sense all mining company has to invest or work with Partners to build smelters. This already push some of the mining companies toward business decision corner, and sometimes it can create diplomatic problem. Chinese companies, on the other hand see this as opportunity. Many of them try to bring their own smelter capacities, and put it in Indonesia, to gain access toward the minerals.

They see it chances if the existing mining companies then balk down from Indonesia, due their reluctance to invest in smellter. Then they can move in to buy them out. The other way around, if the mining companies want to keep their Indonesian mining rights, they can offer them partnership on building smelters. Either way they can get preference access to the minerals.

Smelters is low margin business. Just like many Infrastructure business. That's why many mining companies reluctance to go to this business. Most that want to invest in smelters actualy also has down line business to support their smelters.

However China does not alone to see this chances. South Korean and Japan also see it. Moreover I suspect both Seoul and Tokyo also see this, to cut Chinese move on gaining control on mineral market in the region. Afterall ROK and Japanese companies also the big end users of the minerals.

Now Freeport Mcmoran as US mining company already control Giant deposit of Copper and Gold in Papua since early Soeharto era. They definetely will not give it up. However they also don't want to invest alone in the smelter business. Thus the Chinese Tsingshan come to them to open partnership on Smelter with Tsingshan as majority holder.

As the article shown, Freeport now backdown on the partnership and choose Japanese Chiyoda instead as partner. It can be this is only a commercial issue. Perhaps Freeport find Chiyoda agreement more interested. However I sense political consideration influence this.

The Tsingshan partnership is actualy cost lower than Chiyoda ones. Also Chiyoda wants to build the smelter in East Java (in Industrial Complex that Japanese Investors build). While Tsingshan will build it in Halmahera Island, much closer to West Papua, thus reduce the tranportation costs.

Perhaps there's commercial details that Freeport find more agreable with Chiyoda. However I sense political pressure from US can be a factor for Freeport chose to go with Japanese partner. Can this shown more of the patern politics increasing their push toward commercials transactions ?

Is this going to be the next patern ? Will the business world has to choose, whose going to be the business transaction partner is ?

Just something to think of.

There are plans to open a large gold mine on the Island of Sangihe, an island between Sulawesi and Mindanao from the Philippines. The foreign company that will get 70% shares of it is from Canada, i expect the other 30% will be in Indonesian hands and not chinese, maybe you can confirm that. In this video

The battle for Indonesia's Gold Island

There are fears that a mine will threaten Sangihe island's ancient forests and local water supply.

www.bbc.com

they dont tell the details, but will a smelter be build also, or will the soil be transported to elsewhere?

 

[STURM]

I don't know about Singapore, but Australia used to have significant sway in Washington, and would likely make a strong case to be "high on the list" for resupply.

I guess it also depends on how it fits in with American interests. In that a particular friendly country might not have a very close defence relationship with the U.S. or may not be an ally per see but in times of emergency it would be in American interests to rapidly provide the said country with reloads stockpiled in Guam or Okinawa.

 

[t68]

I guess it also depends on how it fits in with American interests. In that a particular friendly country might not have a very close defence relationship with the U.S. or may not be an ally per see but in times of emergency it would be in American interests to rapidly provide the said country with reloads stockpiled in Guam or Okinawa.

I am not sure if I read it on hear or somewhere else, but I do remember reading sometime ago that the US was in talks with the AUGov on building or expanding our EO stores capacities to stockpile EO in case of need for both AU/US forces, this was sometime ago no idea what ever came of it


China Australia tensions: US military plans to stockpile weapons in Northern Territory (9news.com.au)

seems its back on the agenda too

 

[Ananda]

they dont tell the details, but will a smelter be build also, or will the soil be transported to elsewhere?

I already see that Video few days ago. As a Banker that have chances on financing few mining company down in my career, I just don't know how you are going to make environment friendly mining operation. Perhaps the Canadian has their tricks.

However considering the giant copper and gold mines that Freeport has in Papua, doing Gold Mining especially in relatively smaller island like Sangihe, will involved striping the ground. It's impossible in my opinion the talk on keeping the forest untouched.

As for Smelter, If Freeport Smelter already operational (I heard before it's only for copper, but the latest one with Chiyoda rumours also for Gold), then they can send it there. Or they can send it to Antam facilities.

The law open the possibility for smaller mining operators not building their own Smelter. They can contract it to others, as long as the Smelter in Indonesia. This as the law basically forbid to export raw minerals. It has to be process as bar in Indonesia.

 

[STURM]

t68,

Yes it would make sense for there to be a ammo stockpile in Australia rather than relying totally on having stock’s rapidly flown in from elsewhere.

Back in the late 1980’s the Americans, with contributions from Malaysia, Singapore and others, had an ammo stockpile in Thailand for use by the Thais in case the Vietnamese ventured westwards from Cambodia.

 

[aviation_enthus]

If you really want to go back in time, what has actually changed since World War 2?

If you look at SE Asia only:
- Singapore is still a significant “fortress” in the Malay peninsula/straits
- Australia is a relatively strong military force, albeit without significant “force projection” capability
- Indonesia has a large army but mainly focuses on internal security. I’d argue the Dutch East Indies was relatively similar in terms of military power at the time
- Malaysia has some useful forces but I’d imagine they would be defeated reasonably quickly. Again reasonably similar to the British forces pre WW2.
- Vietnam would be a reasonable enemy, however their air and naval assets wouldn’t pose a big threat to a major power
- the Philippines would also expect to face a similar fate to World War 2 (quick defeat)
- PNG/Samoa/Vanuatu/Fiji all have little to no military force.

Geography certainly hasn’t changed. A war starting in the South China Sea would quickly spread. I’d argue a similar pattern of conflict to World War 2 would follow purely due to the need to find defensive boundaries to hold off the US Navy etc.

Looking to Northern Asia, the picture is very different. South Korea certainly didn’t exist as a military force. Japan is still significant but the Chinese are now the dominant force.

My point is, unlike Europe or Northern Asia, SE Asia still looks very similar to 1940 in terms of relative military strength and economic power (VS the major regional power).

If we could all find a way to train and work together better, having RSAF or RAAF tankers and AWACS supporting fighter coverage out of Malaysia and Indonesia, combined naval task forces, Army units allocated overlapping areas of defence, etc, we (as a group) could put up a good fight.

However I’d argue the current state of politics means we are likely to fall individually. Whether that just means increasing influence in domestic politics or actual military conflict, only time will tell!

 

[John Fedup]

SK and Japan can put up significant opposition to the PRC in conjunction with the US and other allies. Vietnam doesn’t exactly like the PRC and China knows full well how formidable their ground forces are. I agree, a united front is essential in any confrontation with the PCR.

 

[ngatimozart]

@aviation_enthus Agree so we could be back to an island camping fighting our way back through Indonesia and the Philippines, possibly the Solomon Islands etc. We've done it once before so we know that we can do it again.

However the technology is far more advanced and we cannot hide our forces in the deep blue Pacific, like we did during WW2, striking out of nowhere with the element of surprise. So whilst geography hasn't changed, much else has and that has to be factored in, because the PRC strategists will have studied the WW2 Pacific campaign in great detail.

 

[STURM]

SK and Japan can put up significant opposition to the PRC in conjunction with the US and other allies.

Having a few select allies which have advanced military capabilities is certainly a major plus point for the U.S. For China however I would argue that despite not having allies and having to shoulder the whole effort by itself; not having allies is an advantage. It doesn’t have to provide support to anyone; doesn’t have to coordinate ops and take into account certain limitations of certain allies; and doesn’t have to consult political stuff with allies.

Vietnam doesn’t exactly like the PCR and China knows full well how formidable their ground forces are.

Yes the Vietnamese will certainly put up a stiff and determined fight but it isn’t 1979 anymore. In a full scale war where all gloves (save the nuke option) are off; the Chinese have sheer weight of numbers plus technology on their side. The Chinese can also resort to various measures which will make it almost impossible for the Vietnamese to counter. Being literally next door to China also doesn’t help matters for Vietnam. Like everyone else; Vietnam would need external help.

 

[STURM]

However the technology is far more advanced

Another key difference is that China is one of the world’s largest economies, has a large and advanced industrial base and is a nuclear power (it would be the U.S’s first actual wartime opponent which can effectively hit U.S. solid beyond a couple of raids). I’m also convinced that China is more than capable of springing a few nasty surprises and that unfortunately; a swift or eventual victory - despite whatever advantages the U.S and others possess - isn’t a forgone conclusion and we shouldn’t assume it will be.

Like the case with Japan and Germany though; China’s Achilles heal is oil and its access to international shipping lanes can be easily interdicted. A question is also how far it will back off in the event of a conventional military defeat; prestige and face is paramount.

 

[aviation_enthus]

@aviation_enthus Agree so we could be back to an island camping fighting our way back through Indonesia and the Philippines, possibly the Solomon Islands etc. We've done it once before so we know that we can do it again.

However the technology is far more advanced and we cannot hide our forces in the deep blue Pacific, like we did during WW2, striking out of nowhere with the element of surprise. So whilst geography hasn't changed, much else has and that has to be factored in, because the PRC strategists will have studied the WW2 Pacific campaign in great detail.

Yes much has changed since WW2, after all, no war is the same as the last one!

My point was only related to geography, the defensive lines available to choose from don’t really change. But “how” they achieve it will be different.

For example I wouldn’t be surprised if China used a strong push with soft power to effectively create “Vichy France” type governments in the smaller countries in Asia. You could argue the application of debt trap diplomacy is already a step in this direction.

 

[STURM]

If you look at SE Asia only:

Something else which has changed is that China - unlike Japan - doesn’t seek territory; doesn’t have to physically occupy a single regional country. It merely has to control the sea lanes and other things to achieve its aims.

For example I wouldn’t be surprised if China used a strong push with soft power to effectively create “Vichy France” type governments in the smaller countries in Asia. You could argue the application of debt trap diplomacy is already a step in this direction.

In this day and age “Vichy” type governments per see might not be entirely feasible or even needed. What we have a certain countries who are overly friendly or reliant on Chinese largesse which doesn’t however put them in the “Vichy” category. China seeks alliances via soft but effective power and so far it has been relatively successful.

As you said the “debt trap” is a factor; as is the fact that nearly everyone’s economy these days are tied to China’s in one way or the other; either in direct trade or investments.

 

[OPSSG]

Gap between Austin’s concept and ground reality — Part 1

1. The US Navy secretary is the final service secretary the Biden administration needs approved. After months in the office, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, has two in the bag and one more to go, for key appointments in the DoD, so I am not sure how serious the Americans are with regard to a rising China.

(i) Frank Kendall confirmed as Air Force secretary;​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1420547399974539266

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(ii) Christine Wormuth confirmed as Army Secretary; and​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1400074730191863810

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(iii) the Senate Armed Services Committee has advanced President Biden's nominee to lead the Navy, Carlos Del Toro. This paves the way for a vote on the Senate floor for his appointment.​

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2. If confirmed, Del Toro would lead the U.S. Navy at a time when naval power is expected to be at the forefront of U.S. competition with China. At his confirmation hearing, Del Toro pledged to be "exclusively" focused on China. "It's incredibly important to defend Taiwan in every way possible," Del Toro told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It takes a holistic view of our national commitment to Taiwan. We should be focused on providing Taiwan with as much self-defensive measures as humanly possible. "And if confirmed to the Navy, I am going to be exclusively focused on the China threat and exclusively focused in moving our maritime strategy forward in order to protect Taiwan and all of our national security interests in the Indo-Pacific theater," he added.

3. Del Toro will have to address eroding morale and the apparent drift from operational professionalism detailed in “A Report on the Fighting Culture of the United States Navy Surface Fleet.” The key here is taking early actions that demonstrate a commitment to holding senior officers accountable for executing their missions effectively. You would think it is slam dunk for the US Navy to get more funds but wait, the US Army has a plan to steal the US Navy’s lunch money at the cafeteria. Christine Wormuth writes:

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“The Army is now a leader in new technology… From Army Futures Command to the Cross Functional Teams to the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office… the Army is prototyping and experimenting with new capabilities and concepts.​

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The Army is at the forefront of developing and fielding new technology in counter-UAS, directed energy, hypersonic weapons, next generation Assured-Positioning, Navigation and Timing devices, pushing software coding to the edge, and in many other areas.​

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The Army can be relied upon to engage with our allies, foster partnerships, establish integrated deterrence, and set conditions for success prior to or while engaging in conflict. Deterrence requires boots on the ground and the DoD must be present to succeed in crises.”​

4. Not only does the US Navy have a morale problem, it has an obsession with technology to the overall detriment of maintaining its existing fleet well and its budget troubles prevent it from building more. Consider the example of the Ford vs Nimitz carriers. The Nimitz design is perfectly capable. Whereas the Ford class carrier, despite all the upgrades and its slightly smaller crew offers only a marginal increase in combat effectiveness over the Nimitz, by way of increased sorties it can launch, if it’s systems work correctly. More importantly, Ford does so at twice the price tag. The Ford is modernization for the sake of modernization and not for the sake of real enhanced combat effectiveness.

5. No progress has been made toward the goal of a 355 ship navy under Biden. As others have noted, ships have an average life of about 35 years. Replacement is 8 to 9 ships a year. Expansion of the force over a 10-year period requires about 70 ships above replacement quantity or 7 ships a year. Total annual ship acquisition for the next 10 years should be about 15 ships. Average procurement recently has been about 8 ships. At this rate, force expansion for the US Navy is impossible.

6. Del Toro testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee along with four other Pentagon nominees – Kathleen Miller, the nominee to serve as Pentagon comptroller, Mara Karlin, the administration’s nominee to serve as the assistant secretary for strategy, plans, and capabilities, and former House Rep. Gil Cisneros (D-Calif.), the nominee to serve as the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness. Michael Connor, the nominee for the Army’s assistant secretary for civil works, also testified as part of his nomination process.

 

[OPSSG]

Gap between Austin’s concept and ground reality — Part 2

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1420774362060259332

7. Secretary Austin and Assistant Secretary Ratner had a productive trip to Singapore and Vietnam. The last stop of the trip, on the 70th anniversary of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is a waste of everyone's time. Is it really US-Philippines reset 2.0?

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(a) The proud Pinoys will see this as a US-Philippines reset 2.0. I see it as a waste of America’s time. There is nothing mutual in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines — in part because the Pinoys have zero commitment to fighting along side American troops in Iraq or Afghanistan (when compared to the commitment shown by Australia, Malaysia, UK, NZ, or Singapore in our work in Afghanistan), zero fighters, zero submarines and zero anti-ship missile armed frigates.​

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(b) President Duterte (as a Chinese minion of Southeast Asia) and the Philippines Armed Forces (AFP):​

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(i) mis-label their Korean made corvettes and call them frigates (FFNW is the norm in the Philippine Coast Guard that is wrongly called a navy); and​

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(ii) have an Air Force that is all air but no force — as a country without any true multi-role fighters. The TWG of their Air Force claim to have selected the Saab JAS 39 Gripen, but I see no news on an order. As bullshit specialists, they claim to want to buy fighters, when they are really looking at getting more freebies from the American money tree. Shake and money falls seems to be the attitude.​

8. Philippine-US talks at the Secretary of defense level on possible VFA modification (to avoid its termination initiated and paused by President Duterte) begins in earnest as the U.S. Defense Secretary Llyod Austin arrives for a pit-stop in Manila to sell the idea of a US Pacific Defense Initiative (PDI) to benefit the AFP. In a short while, President Duterte will announce that the VFA is no longer cancelled but that is not real news, as the AFP badly needs freebies from the Americans. IMHO, PDI is the key to understanding how the Americans (under Biden), will approach relevant partners in ASEAN. The relevant partners in ASEAN are Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia (in that order of importance), with the Philippines as a side show.

(a) Secretary Austin and Assistant Secretary Ratner have my respect for trying to fix the hand they are given, on the last and least important stop of their 3 leg tour of Southeast Asia (namely, Singapore, Hanoi and Manila) — it is significant that there is no attempt to make a stop in Jakarta, who is the leader of ASEAN — the significance of which, I will explain in another post, much later.​

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(b) The PDI has five subject areas that INDOPACOM is concentrating on:​

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(i) Force Design and Posture;​

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(ii) Exercises, Experimentation, and Innovation;​

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(iii) Joint Force Lethality;​

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(iv) Logistics (in a contested logistics environment) and Security Enablers (for legitimacy when deployed, along with 28 key technologies or weapons to enhance survivability in theatre); and​

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(v) Strengthen Allies and Partners.​

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(c) Even sensible ASEAN members have given up on the Pinoys, but the Americans and Japanese are still trying by paying for ships and aircraft for useless Chinese minions like Duterte. With adults in charge in the White House, DoD and the State Department, American diplomatic moves as detailed in the Fullerton Lecture (on 27 July 2021) are not to be underestimated. As Biden is so fond of saying, America is back — which means ASEAN can play a role in the days ahead.​

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

China has warned the UK's Carrier Strike Group, led by the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth not to carry out any improper and colonial acts as it enters the contested South China Sea.

"The PLA Navy will use the UK's Carrier Strike Group's presence in the South China Sea "as a chance for practice and for studying the UK's latest warships up close", according to the 100% neutral and objective Global Times.

China warns UK as carrier strike group approaches

A fleet of British ships is currently sailing through the South China Sea en route to Japan.

www.bbc.com

 

[Ananda]

China has warned the UK's Carrier Strike Group, led by the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth not to carry out any improper and colonial acts as it enters the contested South China Sea.

Well they have to come up with some kind of Statement. I'm going to bet they will be done shadowing from their destroyers and air assets. They have to sell to their domestic constituency, that they can control SCS, and QE task force being allowed to pass through, only to PRC gracious nature toward SCS sea line.

 

[OPSSG]

The strange Chinese reaction to the British carrier strike group -- Part 1

China has warned the UK's Carrier Strike Group, led by the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth not to carry out any improper and colonial acts as it enters the contested South China Sea.

1. Chinese nonsense, as I see it, the British carrier strike group can’t engage in improper and colonial acts — real coalition ROEs developed from years of at sea deployments in high threat locations (like the Straits of Hormuz), don’t allow or provide for this sort of unprofessional naval behaviour — unlike the PLA who are famed for clubbing Indian soldiers to death, at their disputed border region.

2. This Indo-Pacific tour is a great training opportunity for the 8 F-35Bs of the Royal Air Force’s 617 Squadron to learn from VMFA 211 and regain sea-legs (that was lost in the carrier holiday).

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(a) Unlike useless minions like Duterte, this naval deployment will practice Joint Force Lethality, under the multi-year US Pacific Defense Initiative (PDI) that involves the Royal Navy, the US Navy and US Marines in the Indo-Pacific. The coalition’s ability to project power includes an Astute-class SSN and shown sustainment concepts under a contested logistics environment (via Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s logistics ships Fort Victoria and Tidespring) in an exercise that stretches from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and up to the Sea of Japan. This is a classic demonstration of blue water naval power.​

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(b) As an enemy of the PLA(N), the JMSDF and JASDF in developing their F-35B STOVL CONOPS for sea control (within the 1st island chain), will be very interested in getting British input (based on their lesson learnt in the Falkland Islands campaign). The UK Ministry of Defense describes as the Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) capability, and Crowsnest (on AEW Merlins) are central when it is combined with the sensors on the 18 F-35Bs.​

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(c) In the later part of this CEPP cruise, “ships from the Carrier Strike Group will participate in Exercise Bersama Lima to mark the 50th anniversary of the Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA) between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom,” which means it has legitimacy to operate in these waters at the invitation of Malaysia and Singapore, whose national interests are aligned with this joint force training.​

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(d) By 2026, 3 of the 5 FPDA powers will operate F-35s, A-330 MRTTs, MPAs and AWACS. The presence of tertiary air forces exercising in the disputed region of the South China Sea will have an intended deterrence effect — a fact that I noted, years ago and repeat today.​

3. The Indo-Pacific CEPP deployment also provides a unique chance for the U.S. Marines and sailors to work with their British counterparts aboard an allied country’s ship on Queen Elizabeth’s maiden deployment. The UK led CEPP force is really a NATO like type of ‘plug and play’, naval task force as part of Exercises, Experimentation, and Innovation under PDI.

4. Because the CEPP deployment includes 18 fighters and ships from 5 services and 3 countries, its role in conducting exercises with friendly littoral forces will help to Strengthen Allies and Partners. The allied CEPP forces deployed on this tour are, as follows:

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(a) 10 F-35Bs of the US Marines of VMFA 211 and American destroyer USS The Sullivans; and​

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(b) Dutch ship HNLMS Evertsen also make up the formation.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

China has warned the UK's Carrier Strike Group, led by the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth not to carry out any improper and colonial acts as it enters the contested South China Sea.

Note that we've now moved on from "don't do that thing" to "you can do that thing, but don't do some other thing we won't specify".

I know these sorts of statements are for domestic consumption, but it just makes China look weak on the international stage. They don't want CSG21 anywhere near the area, but the UK (and friends) called their bluff knowing China isn't going to do jack shit about it. Shadowing the group is to be expected, not feared.

The more they set red lines that can't be crossed and people cross them, the less likely others are to do what they want.

 

[STURM]

I know these sorts of statements are for domestic consumption, but it just makes China look weak on the international stage.

It does indeed. It’s a reflection of how China is still finding its way about as a new global power; hasn’t got rid of its insecurities and how to go about certain things.

The more they set red lines that can't be crossed and people cross them, the less likely others are to do what they want.

Well there are certain “red lines” (how I detest this cliche) which others won’t cross unless they really have to because they know that it will result in Chinese retaliation but it doesn’t help if one side keeps introducing new ‘red lines”
.
In line with its status as a new power; one which is - supposedly - confident with itself; China should have kept silent about the QE deployment and only make a statement if absolutely necessary.

Also makes me wonder; how much of these official statements are for public consumption and how much actually in line with the leaderships’s mindset and insecurities?

 

[OPSSG]

The strange Chinese reaction to the British carrier strike group -- Part 2

I know these sorts of statements are for domestic consumption, but it just makes China look weak on the international stage....

The more they set red lines that can't be crossed and people cross them, the less likely others are to do what they want.

5. Agreed. I also cannot imagine Western forces having Chinese ROEs or behaving like Chinese idiots who use lasers to interfere with Australian helicopter operations in a routine RAN exercise. It's lonely at the top for the world's largest navy by tonnage. The Chinese are not ten feet tall, and I still see:

(a) the JMSDF, with their huge fleet of mine sweepers and large SSKs, as Asia's most capable navy; and​

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(b) the importance of the PLA(N) keeping the neutral or maritime protector gang from joining the potential adversaries. Keeping in mind that Singapore, Thailand and Germany, as countries, are hard-core, geo-political realists (with leaders who think that way). Geo-political realists tend to want choice by strategic action -- Germany's Leopard 2SG and Type 281SG sale to Singapore provides not only security but also preserves choice at multiple levels, for both parties, if the push to choose comes.​

...but it doesn’t help if one side keeps introducing new ‘red lines”. In line with its status as a new power; one which is confident with itself; China should have kept silent about the QE deployment and only make a statement if absolutely necessary.

6. Chinese Wolf warriors and the Global Times, are collectively, a self inflicted wound of the PRC. This is why the PLA(N), despite its huge size and global reach, has only few friends like the North Korean and Pakistani Navies; but plenty of:

(i) neutrals, like the Korean, the Singaporean, the Thai and German Navies (as maritime protectors);​

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(ii) potential adversaries, like the Royal Navy, the Indian Navy, the RAN, the RMN, and the TNI AL (who may potentially threaten to quarantine Chinese commercial shipping, if any hostilities are initiated by the PLA(N) against other partner navies); or​

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(iii) core enemies, like the JMSDF or the Taiwanese Navy.​