South China Sea thoughts?

Redrighthand

New Member
I decided to start another thread, because the October thread on this subject was, erm, strange.

That said, there's relatively recent developments that haven't been discussed here.

According to the blog Foxtrot Alpha, China has been placing military assets on their new "islands", and a US fleet including the carrier USS John C. Stennis, and 7th Fleet command ship USS Blueridge is currently excercising a Freedom of Navigation through the region. Is this likely to get tense (if it's not already)?
FA is suggesting that US sea bases may be a solution, but that seems awfully heavy handed to me. Then again, what China is doing with those new bases is even more so, and it's not like the Philipines or Indonesia are likely to be able to do much about it. I suspect RAN assets will be exercising up there before long, if they're not already.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I decided to start another thread, because the October thread on this subject was, erm, strange.

That said, there's relatively recent developments that haven't been discussed here.

According to the blog Foxtrot Alpha, China has been placing military assets on their new "islands", and a US fleet including the carrier USS John C. Stennis, and 7th Fleet command ship USS Blueridge is currently excercising a Freedom of Navigation through the region. Is this likely to get tense (if it's not already)?
FA is suggesting that US sea bases may be a solution, but that seems awfully heavy handed to me. Then again, what China is doing with those new bases is even more so, and it's not like the Philipines or Indonesia are likely to be able to do much about it. I suspect RAN assets will be exercising up there before long, if they're not already.
I've been following the South China Sea situation for a while. In my opinion Foxtrot Alpha is OK however having said that, it is not bad as a basic intro if you are willing to look further.

Off the top of my head, there are definitely SAM installations on some of the reclaimed surface features. There have been unconfirmed reports (I think on FA) that Chinese fighter aircraft are being based there. The militarisation of reclaimed or manufactured islands in marine areas that China does not have a legal right to under the UNCLOS to which China is a signatory, and the energetic Chinese enforcement of dubious legal claims, has increased the level of tension in the area. It is also increasing the tension by militarising the artificial islands it has created. It is an attempt to enclose and nationalise international waters, indeed significant international trade routes to which it has no right under international law.

It is how the international community reacts to this that will be the determinant regarding the level that the tensions will rise to. If the international community decides upon appeasement then China will only be encouraged. The other end of the spectrum is the final option when all other diplomacy has failed. So in my humble opinion what is needed is strong affirmative deterrence and diplomatic action short of war. That's how you stop a bully. Unfortunately the pollies having the intestinal fortitude, charisma, skills and strength of character for such an undertaking are very rare indeed.

The US building bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea would have to be at the request and accedence of the majority of the other nations in the region. They would also have to be built in EEZs to have legal and diplomatic credence. It wouldn't be under a UN mandate because China and Russia would veto such a mandate in the Security Council. China would react vociferously to this ramping up its reaction. They would not be amused.

The real question for Australia (and New Zealand) is does it have a dog in that fight? The answer really depends upon your world view and how insular ones thinking can be. Considering that a large amount of Australia's SLOC transit the SCS and it has a significant level of trade with that region, yes you most definitely do have a dog in that fight. You would be very foolish not to, but then we are talking about pollies. It would IMHO be astute of Australia to undertake FON missions through the area just as other nations should in order to show China that what it is doing is not acceptable.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
China build the artificial island on the atoll they already hold for some time..SCS (South China Sea) islands and atoll is disputed area between Cina, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philipines, and Malaysia. Each of them already control some of the islands/atoll in the area.

Yes, most Asean members that faced disputed with China on SCS did not have military capabilities yet to faced China. But this SCS issue is one of the reasons why most Asean countries in that facing SCS begin considerably increased their military expenditures.

They will not have to build anything militarily that able to defeat China, but they just need to build military capabilities that China found not easy to defeat. China can't afford to lingered much of her military resources to SCS, since it will open vulnerability on other disputed regions facing Japan, Taiwan, India,..let alone inviting US Pacific Fleet on this..

For that China try to limit their potential adversary in SCS. For example, eventhough China shown steern face against Vietnam or Philipines..she took more benign face agaist Indonesia..saying that Indonesia's Natuna islands and its ZEE surounding the Islands is not part of China SCS claim, eventough initially China maps shown some of Indonesian waters surounding Natuna in South China Sea..part of China's claim..

Still it's not hampering Indonesia to continue build and fortified Natuna's Ranai AB to make it able operating for long term their Flankers and Vipers later on.

Despited what some analysts especially western already see SCS as potential tinder box waiting to exploded..much on the region see the military build up from each claimant means the SCS will be a 'stale mate' since neither of claimants can afford to make this area too hot to handle..
 

Redrighthand

New Member
I've been following the South China Sea situation for a while. In my opinion Foxtrot Alpha is OK however having said that, it is not bad as a basic intro if you are willing to look further.
<snipped>
It would IMHO be astute of Australia to undertake FON missions through the area just as other nations should in order to show China that what it is doing is not acceptable.
Thanks for your thoughts. I've found FA to be as you said - like Wikipedia, a good place to start, or get a quick overview. I really like it for the fan footage stuff, too.

I agree with your last comments. China can not be allowed to get away with claiming sovereignty over international waters in this fashion, and I do hope that our Government does step in with FON demonstrations as soon as is practicable. I also hope they're giving the ambassador a stern message about it, too. Perhaps something good can come of our ties to Indonesia, by getting them to press the matter, also. We'll see.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It would IMHO be astute of Australia to undertake FON missions through the area just as other nations should in order to show China that what it is doing is not acceptable.
RAN and RAAF have done over 30 in the last 12 months

its just not advertised

numbers of FON events only came up after Govt commented in an IV. Otherwise it probably wouldn't have been "socialised"
 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Perhaps something good can come of our ties to Indonesia, by getting them to press the matter, also. We'll see.
We did better than that. We sent our foreign minister over there to tell them directly. Then we announced a very well funded white paper and the PM made direct comments to China about the scs. I would say Australia is doing all it can at the moment.

However, things aren't going well. People are becoming skeptical of diplomacy having any effect.

China really believes that no one will oppose them when it comes down to it. It doesn't believe the US nor countries like Australia will venture into war over the islands. China believes its claims are absolutely critical for its existence.

As for Indonesia, the PRC tend to leave them alone and the Indonesians are tending to leave the PRC alone. I wouldn't expect a lot to happen from them unless Australia and Indonesia reach a new level of friendship very quickly. This is pretty serious stuff. Even long time friendlies will be tested. Countries with already strong ties are finding ways to strengthen them. Australia and Japan. US and Japan, US and other claimants. Japan and other regional powers.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
We did better than that. We sent our foreign minister over there to tell them directly. Then we announced a very well funded white paper and the PM made direct comments to China about the scs. I would say Australia is doing all it can at the moment.

However, things aren't going well. People are becoming skeptical of diplomacy having any effect.

China really believes that no one will oppose them when it comes down to it. It doesn't believe the US nor countries like Australia will venture into war over the islands. China believes its claims are absolutely critical for its existence.

As for Indonesia, the PRC tend to leave them alone and the Indonesians are tending to leave the PRC alone. I wouldn't expect a lot to happen from them unless Australia and Indonesia reach a new level of friendship very quickly. This is pretty serious stuff. Even long time friendlies will be tested. Countries with already strong ties are finding ways to strengthen them. Australia and Japan. US and Japan, US and other claimants. Japan and other regional powers.
One of the very real potential dangers, is for China to continue to assume that other nations are going to fail to take action at some point.

Given the importance of the SLOC through the SCS, not just for China but a very large portion of the world population, at some point the question might end up being decided via armed conflict. Not including nations on the sub-continent of India or those nations further west, there are over ~2 bil. people residing in countries with a stake in the outcome. This includes countries with claims to EEZ in the SCS, as well as countries that lack such claims, but have significant trade past through the SLOC via the SCS.

Right now, the situation is such that many of the regional nations are unable to offer significant resistance, and the situation has not escalated to direct action, but it is a continued flashpoint, which might very well spark an arms build up within the region.

What almost seems to be the case, is that while China feels control of the SCS is essential to Chinese security, a large number of other countries seem to feel that a single nation having control of the SCS and as a result those SLOC's, is a threat to their respective nations' national security.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The irony for china is that she was trying to use the wedge that the US was an interloper in the PACRIM and had no "right" to be there - she was hoping that the regionals would become parochial and start to turn against the US presence

what she's successfully managed to do is to have all those regional nations reconnecting or reaffirming their relationships with the US - seeking more training, seeking assistance, seeking technology, wanting US platforms, seeking to co-operate more regularly etc...

China has successfully managed to trigger a virtual cohort who see China as the threat through her reclamation actions, and that the USN is necessary to counter that threat as they can't do anything on their own.

The US isn't seen as a belligerent - China is
 
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bdique

Member
One of the very real potential dangers, is for China to continue to assume that other nations are going to fail to take action at some point.

Given the importance of the SLOC through the SCS, not just for China but a very large portion of the world population, at some point the question might end up being decided via armed conflict. Not including nations on the sub-continent of India or those nations further west, there are over ~2 bil. people residing in countries with a stake in the outcome. This includes countries with claims to EEZ in the SCS, as well as countries that lack such claims, but have significant trade past through the SLOC via the SCS.

Right now, the situation is such that many of the regional nations are unable to offer significant resistance, and the situation has not escalated to direct action, but it is a continued flashpoint, which might very well spark an arms build up within the region.

What almost seems to be the case, is that while China feels control of the SCS is essential to Chinese security, a large number of other countries seem to feel that a single nation having control of the SCS and as a result those SLOC's, is a threat to their respective nations' national security.
Personally, I'd think that China has done their calculations, assessed which nations are likely to react and in what measure...and probably felt confident to go ahead. If anything, the arming and militarisation of the islands imply to me that China does expect a response, and that a military one is not unlikely.

The issue of trade is no easy one to address. Many of the regional countries have significant economic ties to China. How do you raise your unhappiness to China, yet avoid triggering an exodus of Chinese investments from your nation? And that's not touching on the issue of the SLOCs that run through the SCS, which you rightly mention, have a huge impact should they be closed by force. Personally, I think the big concern is that the islands could be used as bases for military assets to sustain a blockade right in the middle of international waters, shutting down the SCS to all forms of maritime traffic, possibly even air traffic too.

So you are right to say that having a single nation control the SCS is a threat to national security, but what makes it doubly egregious is that this is happening in international waters. Enter the FON missions...
 

swerve

Super Moderator
The irony for china is that she was trying to use the wedge that the US was an interloper in the PACRIM and had no "right" to be there - she was hoping that the regionals would become parochial and start to turn against the US presence

what she's successfully managed to do is to have all those regional nations reconnecting or reaffirming their relationships with the US - seeking more training, seeking assistance, seeking technology, wanting US platforms, seeking to co-operate more regularly etc...

China has successfully managed to trigger a virtual cohort who see China as the threat through her reclamation actions, and that the USN is necessary to counter that threat as they can't do anything on their own.

The US isn't seen as a belligerent - China is
The parable of the north wind & the sun . . . . :D
 

Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
One of the very real potential dangers, is for China to continue to assume that other nations are going to fail to take action at some point.

Given the importance of the SLOC through the SCS, not just for China but a very large portion of the world population, at some point the question might end up being decided via armed conflict. Not including nations on the sub-continent of India or those nations further west, there are over ~2 bil. people residing in countries with a stake in the outcome. This includes countries with claims to EEZ in the SCS, as well as countries that lack such claims, but have significant trade past through the SLOC via the SCS.

Right now, the situation is such that many of the regional nations are unable to offer significant resistance, and the situation has not escalated to direct action, but it is a continued flashpoint, which might very well spark an arms build up within the region.

What almost seems to be the case, is that while China feels control of the SCS is essential to Chinese security, a large number of other countries seem to feel that a single nation having control of the SCS and as a result those SLOC's, is a threat to their respective nations' national security.
I agree with you both.

A couple thoughts.

-This has been slowly escalating for over 18 months now. Incidents from PRC coast guard vessels ramming Vietnamese and Phillipine vessels, to water cannon exchanges with the Japanese have been growing.

- Agreed that this is having a concrete effect on regional Alliances.
- US/Japanese military relations are growing stronger, as is the Japanese military.
- US/Phillipine is the same
-even US Vietnamese relations are warming
-US/Singapore are growing stronger ties
-Australia is increasing budgets, adding P8s, new modern Destoyers, Subs, F35s
-India is awakening and looking the the SCS and has ask for EMALS technology

The US may not need more Island bases, they have 11 carriers and regional Allies.
The USN is progressing toward a more "Sea Control" offensive, Distributed lethality style of warfare. The USN is also moving fixed assets out of the first island chain providing a deeper defense as far as Gaum and Australia.

New Tech like the LRASM, SM-6 ASHM, RailGuns, the Virginia Class all should ideally allow the USN and its allies to continue a strong deterrent.

That all said, deterrence through strong alliances will be the best IMO,

If deterrence should ultimately fail, those island are small fixed targets ripe for TLAMs and could be relatively easily and quickly be rendered ineffective without the need for and land forces.
 

Redrighthand

New Member
We did better than that. We sent our foreign minister over there to tell them directly. Then we announced a very well funded white paper and the PM made direct comments to China about the scs. I would say Australia is doing all it can at the moment.

However, things aren't going well. People are becoming skeptical of diplomacy having any effect.

China really believes that no one will oppose them when it comes down to it. It doesn't believe the US nor countries like Australia will venture into war over the islands. China believes its claims are absolutely critical for its existence.
I fear you're right. Julie Bishop's (the Australian Foreign Minister) visit to China did bring up concerns, but the timing was awkward - given that the news of the missile systems only came up during her visit. That said, there seems to be very little from Australia since then on the subject - and I feel we could be stronger on the issue. Would it make a difference? Maybe not. China has us over a barrel, economically, anyway, and they know it.
Last week, the Age reported Filipino fisherman complaining that China is denying them access to some of their traditional fishing grounds. Not much said about official responses, however.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I fear you're right. Julie Bishop's (the Australian Foreign Minister) visit to China did bring up concerns, but the timing was awkward - given that the news of the missile systems only came up during her visit. That said, there seems to be very little from Australia since then on the subject - and I feel we could be stronger on the issue. Would it make a difference? Maybe not. China has us over a barrel, economically, anyway, and they know it.
I would say Bishops visit was quite timely. I would say Australia has said and more importantly done what is needed. In fact if anything, there isn't a whole lot more left in our bags of tricks. If everyone was doing what Australia was there would be a whole lot more pressure on China.

I also wouldn't underestimate Australia's role in this. We have wedged ourselves right into the middle of it. Australia is quite likely to play a critical part in what ever develops in the SCS. For a smaller power, we are into it up to our eyeballs.It is quite possible we may be the one that leads the smaller players in this, particularly if we have a plan.

China has outrightly said Australia has no guts (global times). It wouldn't be the first time that someone has underestimate the resolve of a small to middle power.

Even western countries like the UK and the US have under estimated Australia's resolve during tense situations.So I'm not really surprised what China is saying, or what they honestly believe.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
I decided to start another thread, because the October thread on this subject was, erm, strange.
It was locked, as any discussion on the South China Sea seems to attract strange people who are not regular participants of this forum. However, we have fixed it by merging the more sensible of these posts into this thread. Thank you for the reminder to re-open the discussion here.

This thread will only remain open if it is not infested by nationalistic trolls.
That said, there's relatively recent developments that haven't been discussed here.
Yes, but China has been growing it's now unified coast guard and navy at a rate that cannot be matched by other claimant countries like Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Viet Nam.
According to the blog Foxtrot Alpha, China has been placing military assets on their new "islands", and a US fleet including the carrier USS John C. Stennis, and 7th Fleet command ship USS Blueridge is currently exercising a Freedom of Navigation through the region. Is this likely to get tense (if it's not already)?
The US and China have signed up to CUES, to manage naval encounters; and US has again extended an invite to China for RIMPAC 2016, as part of the confidence building moves between these great powers.

Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Command, told a Washington audience in January 2016 that China’s intentions “remain clouded.” He highlighted the South China Sea land-reclamation projects that threaten to alter the balance of power in the region.

“There are five countries involved in land-reclamation projects in the last 40 years” in the South China Sea, Harris told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “and we have called on all of them to stop.”

China’s efforts, he pointed out, “far outstrip all the others.” Harris put up a chart showing that together, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan have reclaimed 215 acres of land over the past 40 years, while China has reclaimed more than 3,000 acres in the past 18 months.

“If they are to build out all their reef projects, they will control all of the South China Sea militarily with the exception of the US,” Harris warned.

Harris visited China in early November, days after the US destroyer Lassen conducted a freedom of navigation passage near Subi Reef, now a reclaimed island built by the Chinese in the South China Sea. Harris described his meetings with top Chinese naval and military leaders as “a pretty interesting exchange."

“We talked about opportunities to decrease tensions between US and Chinese forces in the region,” Harris said, but noted “they are pretty rigid in their view of the ownership of islands in the South China Sea and the resources that can be gained from them. I made clear my personal view that those islands do not belong to China, and that their actions in the region are increasing tensions and are provocative.” Altogether, he said, “they act in ways I think a great power should not.”
FA is suggesting that US sea bases may be a solution, but that seems awfully heavy handed to me.
This is unfortunate if this is seen as heavy handed because it is not (and logical from their existing tool kit). As the US is not a claimant to disputed territory in the South China Sea, it should not take sides but this does not mean it can afford to do nothing, as American resolve is being watched by all parties. There is some basis to say that the other claimants are not exactly angels. I would rather describe some of these acts to give some favour to unarticulated regional concerns.
Then again, what China is doing with those new bases is even more so, and it's not like the Philippines or Indonesia are likely to be able to do much about it.
As this 2012 article explains, Indonesia does not consider itself as a disputed claimant by other ASEAN countries in the South China Sea (which is why it has offered to mediate or manage the disputes). Thanks to agreements with ASEAN neighbours, it has relatively established maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. There is no active dispute between Indonesia and China over the Natuna Islands, unless China raises it as an issue in future. However, as the 2012 article notes, this has not been clarified by China through an exchange of notes. The Natuna Islands is right at the Southern tip of the South China Sea, and there is some basis for Indonesia's views. Just in case, Indonesia has the second largest defence budget in ASEAN and aspires realistically to raise this budget a bit more in future.

And I agree that the Philippines is not able to get it's house in order, in any way, shape or form. It is a pity but pity can only go so far for a country that spends far too little on defence.
The dominant media view on the issue mostly looks at things from a non Chinese perspective...

It's too simplistic to convey the impression that China is the bad guy and that the other, weaker and smaller claimants, along with the U.S. are the good guys. We may not agree with what China is doing but like others, it has legitimate reasons for doing what it's doing and there is some elements of truth when China screams of double standards and hypocrisy on the part of the U.S. We can only hope that diplomacy will eventually lead to a solution to this dispute.
For some background on the region, see this link, for the three findings on strategies used and four trends.
I suspect RAN assets will be exercising up there before long, if they're not already.
As gf0012-aust has noted, they are and have conducted their own FON exercises. I believe there will be more fireworks at the 15th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue will take place on 3–5 June 2016, as the US is very proficient in information warfare at international forums and can expect more moves by them this year.
 
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weaponwh

Member
Last week, the Age reported Filipino fisherman complaining that China is denying them access to some of their traditional fishing grounds. Not much said about official responses, however.
I belief PH intentionally/unintentionally hit the shoal near by to boost their claim like they did in 97. the PRC later tow the stuck ship and close off nearby areas.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
A 15 Year Perspective on Developments in the South China Sea (Post 1 of 2)

The 7th Fleet latest visit to the region is being turned into a high profile event:

South China Sea patrolled by U.S. aircraft carrier - CNNPolitics.com

Some Chinese vessels spotted nearby. China blames the island militarisation on the US Naval presence in the region. Classic chicken blaming the egg situation.
1. With a few easy victories under its belt (see post below on China's recent activities) and China inflicting significant pain to the Philippines and Viet Nam (while treating Brunei and Malaysia quite differently to ensure that the claimants do not unite), China's foreign minister took a hard line on 8 March 2016 on China's claims to virtually all the South China Sea, saying Beijing will not permit other nations to infringe on what it considers its sovereign rights in the strategically vital area.

2. Wang Yi, speaking to reporters at an annual news conference in Beijing, said another nation's claim to freedom of navigation in the region didn't give it the right to do whatever it wants - an apparent reference to the United States, which has sent naval ships past reefs where China has engaged in island-building. "The South China Sea has been subject to colonial invasion and illegal occupation and now some people are trying to stir up waves, while some others are showing off forces," Wang said. "However, like the tide that comes and goes, none of these attempts will have any impact. History will prove who is merely the guest and who is the real host."

3. On the same day, it was also reported that General Lori Robinson, Commander of the US Pacific Air Forces, said in Canberra that with China's "militarisation" of the South China Sea, the US and its partners had to "maintain a credible combat power". She said China's military build-up raised the risk of "miscalculation" in which conflict is sparked by some unexpected incident.

4. And she echoed fellow senior US military figures in urging other countries, including Australia, to continue flying and sailing through the South China Sea in the face of China's growing military presence such as the stationing of surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets. To strengthen military ties, US bombers – including possibly supersonic B-1 strike bombers – and aerial refuelling tankers would regularly rotate through northern Australia rather than conducting exercises on an ad hoc basis.

5. Australian Defence Minister Marise Payne said the talks were part of the Force Posture Initiative begun by former prime minister Julia Gillard and finalised by Tony Abbott. She confirmed it would "result in increased rotations of US Air Force elements through northern Australia".
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
A 15 Year Perspective on Developments in the South China Sea (Post 2 of 2)

I belief PH intentionally/unintentionally hit the shoal near by to boost their claim like they did in 97. the PRC later tow the stuck ship and close off nearby areas.
6. Last month, China also took control over Jackson Atoll, according to sources in the Philippines. An unclassified February 2016 letter from the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senator John McCain, offers a broad assessment of China’s land reclamation activities and military capabilities in the South China Sea.

The letter, first published by USNI News, notes that by early 2017 China will “have significant capacity to quickly project substantial offensive military power to the region.” It also states that China will continue to pursue construction and infrastructure developments on the islands it occupies in the South China Sea.

“China has established the necessary infrastructure to project military capabilities in the South China Sea beyond that which is required for point defense of its outposts,” the letter reads.“These capabilities could include the deployment of modern fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), and coastal defense cruise missiles, as well as increased presence of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) surface combatants and China Coast Guard (CCG) large patrol ships.” The letter assesses that the airfield on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands is already operational and can accommodate all types of Chinese military aircraft. China has also installed military radars in the Spratly Islands, although there is no evidence of the deployment of SAMS to any of China’s Spratly outposts. “However, China’s mobile SAMS are field-deployable and do not require fixed, prepared sites,” according to the letter.​

7. Therefore, I would say that China has achieved its goals in round 1 (in the period from 2012 to 2016) with regard to its prior deployment oil rig in disputed waters off Viet Nam. China's highly effective use of 'white ships', as strategy to manage its maritime disputes with its South China Sea neighbours and current round of island building in the South China Sea, results in a win for China without the need to fire a single shot.
My view - this is turning into a self fulfilling prophecy.

5 years ago there was a prevailing perspective that this would get ugly 2025-2030 - i think quite a few would be advancing that to 2020-2025 now

1 year after the more positive assessment (2030) the chinese ramped up their posturing in region

Its basically gone to custard since 2010
8. Coupled with the December 2015 deployment of US P-8 Poseidon to Singapore, the number of US military assets proximate to the South China Sea is increasing incrementally. This will hopefully reduce the chance of miscalculation by one party until round 3 in the 2022 to 2026 time frame, when new naval and air power capabilities will be introduced by both the US and China. By that time, the US Marines, USAF and the USN would be well on their way in recapitalising their forward deployed fighter (F-35A/B/C), tanker (KC-46A), long endurance MQ-4C Triton and maritime patrol aircraft (P-8A) fleets. Likewise the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, the ROKAF, the RAAF and the RSAF would have started operating F-35s at that time, over and above an increased pace for developments in maritime domain awareness.

9. Beyond the respective FPDA navies providing an enduring naval presence, the recent additions and announced plans for the RAAF (Super Hornets, the addition of 12 Growlers, Wedgetails, 7 A330 MRTTs, the upcoming acquisition of P-8As, along with the MQ-4C Triton combo for maritime domain awareness and so on) and RSAF (an increase of the number of F-15SGs to 40, G550 AEWs, Fokker-50 MPAs, along with the Heron-1 UAVs for maritime domain awareness and upcoming acquisition of 6 A330 MRTTs, and so on) the combat power available in theatre and force multipliers of these two air forces to boost to the capabilities of the FPDA, to be superior in any fight for control of the air, in preparation of the upcoming round 2 in the 2017 to 2021 time frame (who have the option of operating out of air bases in Butterworth or Singapore). This will be of interim comfort to a budget constrained RMAF, who have limited ability to make new air power related acquisitions in the next few years.
 
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bdique

Member
OPSSG,

Always great to hear your insights on this matter, especially in framing the developments in phases. It adds clarity to the understanding of future developments.

I'm just wondering about the Chinese ability to hold their 'gains' as all players enter the 'second phase.' I know this is a little speculative but, do you think they will start to overtly increase military deployments in the region? Or will China just stay the same course (more white ship deployments, more reef expansion works, increased efforts to sustain bilateral instead of multilateral ties with regional nations) but with increased intensity?
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sharing a Singaporean Perspective (Post 1 of 2)

Always great to hear your insights on this matter, especially in framing the developments in phases. It adds clarity to the understanding of future developments.
1. In 2014, the size of the Chinese economy reached about US$10.4 trillion, while the US economy stood at US$17.4 trillion in GDP. Some have estimated that the Chinese economy is just 40% smaller than the US when measured at market exchange rates. While China’s growth has slowed considerably compared to the 10% annual growth rates of the past few decades, it is still expected to maintain a significant growth advantage over advanced industrial economies. Consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that China will grow at an annual rate of 4.6% between now and 2050, while the US will grow by 2.4% a year. This means that China's defence and coastguard budgets will have room to grow in the next decade.

2. The rest of this post is just a casual observation of current developments. Please take what I say about China with a pinch of salt.

I'm just wondering about the Chinese ability to hold their 'gains' as all players enter the 'second phase.'
3. Absolutely. They will consolidate their gains and use it as a basis to push for more, at the right time. The right time is when the other party makes a wrong move. It is clear that China has a plan. And they execute it, when the time is ripe.

I know this is a little speculative but, do you think they will start to overtly increase military deployments in the region?
4. Does it matter? China will do what they want on islands or rocks they have actual control of. No one is willing to go to war to stop China. Some in the Philippines believe that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) or suing China will cure all their self inflicted ills; when correctly understood the EDCA is just a band-aid. In fact, no matter how loud the noise the Philippines (as a country incapable of defending itself) and Viet Nam (ruled by a communist party, one party state) make at regional meetings and events about Chinese actions, they don't dare to fire the first shot. While there is sympathy, this noise is the sound of defeat. They are unable to change the facts on the ground. For details, see the 23 Feb. 2016 letter from the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to US Senator John McCain answering questions on Chinese reclamation and militarization of its disputed holdings in the South China Sea (quoted in full in the next post below).

5. From my vantage point, both the US (with long standing and strong security related ties with a number of ASEAN countries) and China (with strong economic ties with ASEAN and as a rising global economic power in its own right) are resident powers in the South China Sea, and that is not in dispute. They are both members of ADMM Plus. Both have legitimate and respective roles to play in the region. As smaller countries, the goal of individual member states of ASEAN cannot be to oppose US or China's soft power initiatives. As this extract of The StraitsTimes from Nov 2015 noted:
The Straits Times said:
Nov 2015 - ...Days after he shared his views on the South China Sea with Beijing, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reiterated Singapore's stance on the territorial dispute to leaders from the United States and the Philippines.

In meetings with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Philippine President Benigno Aquino, Mr Lee stressed that while Singapore did not have a claim on the disputed waters, it had an interest in preserving peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the area.

He again called for "moderation and restraint" from all the claimants, and for Asean to be at the heart of the discussions.

"The dispute should be resolved through negotiations and in accordance with international law. In this regard, Asean can play an effective and moderating role, without taking any sides," said a statement from the Prime Minister's Office...

Mr Lee also met his Japanese counterpart Yoshihiko Noda, who called for more tie-ups between Singapore and Japanese firms in infrastructural development and investment in the region. Both men also welcomed the launch of negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which brings Asean and its six dialogue partners together, at the Asean Summit in November.

The US and the Philippines are among the more outspoken voices in the increasingly heated dispute over the South China Sea, where China faces competing claims from Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei.

Mr Lee just concluded a six-day trip in China on Friday, saying that China understood Singapore's position on the dispute and that it was not at odds with China's....
However, some of the less astute regional and American politicians with short time horizons think that polarization is a choice. Some ASEAN member states think that being on one-side is a win (eg. Cambodia and Laos, who are firmly Chinese client states under China's sphere of influence and the Philippines, who become a US client state, without the ability to think for themselves - as they are beholden to their foreign pay masters). In June 2015, President BS Aquino III of the Philippines likened present-day China to Nazi Germany, in a disgraceful speech made in Japan by the Philippine head of state. Resorting to name calling over disputed maritime claims, at a head of state level in a speech in Japan is at the very least impolitic. It is little wonder then that Sino-Philippines relations will remain poor for the duration of BS Aqunio's next two months, when his term of office ends.

6. The reality is not about binary choices. There should not be a false dichotomy between doing nothing or standing with fellow frontline ASEAN states. In certain cases, the actions of our ASEAN neighbours may not be defendable and they have to bear the conseqences of their irrational choices.

7. Just picking a side is so wrong (for any ASEAN member state that is not a US ally by treaty), at so many levels. From my perspective, having to choose a side, in the period from 2016 to 2021, means we all lose. Classic examples of ASEAN states who have hedged their bets by drawing closer to the US (but have not chosen a side) include Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

8. By way of background, in May 2013, the crew of Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessel, PCG-BFAR MCS-3001 (a 115.45 ton vessel and over 30m in length) killed an unarmed Taiwanese citizen by firing over 50 rounds at a smaller Taiwanese fishing boat (a 15.15 ton vessel at 14.7m in length), in a fisheries law enforcement incident. Not sure what the Philippines was thinking when they chose to initiate the May 2013 Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident. In that incident, rogue BFAR fisheries enforcement killed a Taiwanese fisherman in violation of their rules of engagement. This eventually led to Taiwan imposing sanctions. As Philippines was in the wrong, no other country wanted to be tainted by the incident. Consequently, it showed China that no country would stand with the Philippines, when they were guilty of wrong doing. The facts were simple, these individual BFAR agents were wholly at fault, and criminal in conduct. They even tried to doctor evidence of the video recorded and the death was avoidable, if they had been more restrained in their escalation procedures for the use of force. In lieu of proper crisis management, the incompetent BS Aqunio government refused to apologise in a timely manner and do the right thing (aka. compensate the fisherman's family), when their BFAR agents were in the wrong. Since the Philippine side inflamed the situation by being unprincipled in its conduct, the correct way forward for Taiwan was the application of increased sanctions until all 4 of the Taiwanese demands were met, including that the Philippines and Taiwan negotiate a fisheries agreement for waters claimed by both in the Luzon Strait (to which the Philippines had walked away from unilaterally earlier, prior to the incident).

9. Further, as far back as 1999, the Philippine Navy has been ramming and/or sinking Chinese fishing boats (incidents reported on 23 May 1999 and on 20 June 1990). The most recent reported incident of the Philippine Navy ramming a Chinese fishing boat that I know of was on 19 October 2011, which resulted in Manila issuing an apology to the Chinese embassy.

10. While l am concerned about law enforcement officials in claimant states engaging in criminal behaviour, I am equally concerned that the destiny of the South China Sea does not become a Chinese lakeside destination for China (with one dominant power that calls all the shots). If China's goals are moderate, they will win. If China's goals are slightly less than moderate but freedom of navigation for trade is not impeded, they will still win. With One Belt, One Road (一带一路) and the creation of AIIB (亚洲基础设施投资银行), rolled out with breath taking speed, China as the second largest economy in the world is showing the world its ability to lead. It also cannot be denied that China's pattern of behaviour with regard to using non-tariff trade sanctions against the Philippines in some sectors as a tool of coercive diplomacy has resulted in caution by the smaller regional players. It tells ASEAN members that the China-ASEAN free trade agreement only works, if they follow Beijing's lead. Which is why, ASEAN members are now even more welcoming of US and comforted by the presence of forward deployed US military forces in Asia.

11. If China starts shooting they lose.

12. Shooting is something China does not intend on doing (as the Philippines had to learn the hard way). They don't need to. All their goals are achieved without firing a single shot. So I am sure they will not initiate a shooting incident in 2016, as the PLAN has recently signed up to CUES. This is why I am not concerned about further developments in 2016, but there will be some new developments by May 2016, which will provide colour to the 15th annual IISS dialogue to be held in Singapore (or better known as the Shangri-la Dialogue 2016).

Or will China just stay the same course (more white ship deployments, more reef expansion works, increased efforts to sustain bilateral instead of multilateral ties with regional nations) but with increased intensity?
13. I have a view that I prefer not to articulate - other than to say that you should take note of:
(i) the fact that Singapore's defence budget has increased, in response to an urgent need to recapitalise certain categories of ageing defence assets - such as the retirement or upcoming end of life of the following:
(a) the last F-5 squadron that stood down in Sept 2015 (replaced with a 2nd squadron of F-15SGs),

(b) the 4 KC-135R (to be replaced with six A-330 MRTT),

(c) the Searcher UAVs (replaced with the Heron-1 and Hermes 450 UAVs),

(d) the older suite of air defence radars, including the FPS-117A (replaced by the ELM-2084 Multi Mission Radar, the existing Giraffe AMB, the SHIKRA radar and the future Ticom 55 aerostat); which will provide a extremely high resolution air picture for Singapore's air defenders,

(e) the older ground based air defence missiles, like I-Hawk missiles (replaced with the Spyder air defence missile firing units and the ASTER 30),

(f) the fleet of V-200s (replaced with the Protected Response Vehicle),

(g) old AEVs, ARVs and VLBs like the M728 AEVs (replaced with the AEV, known as the Pionierpanzer 3 Kodiak), the old ARVs (replaced with the Buffel Armoured Recovery Vehicle), and the old M60 based VLBs (replaced with the Biber Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridge),

(h) old land-rover vehicles (replaced with the URO VAMTAC and the Ford 550 ambulances),

(i) older sat com 3 tonner (replaced with the MAN 5 Ton Very Small Aperture SAT Comm),

(j) the two Super Puma squadrons (to be replaced with a new aircraft type),

(k) the replacement for the AMX-13S1 and so on (too lazy to list further).​

The 2016 defence budget of SGD13.97 billion (USD10.2 billion) is an increase of 6.4% over 2015. The rate of growth is the fastest seen in the country since 2011 with increases having averaged around 3.5% annually over the past five years. The 2016 budget will also see defence expenditure increase as a proportion of GDP for the second consecutive year; and

(ii) the three key changes taking place with the Singapore Navy, as new platforms, with new operational concepts are introduced, namely:

Firstly, eight new and very well armed Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs), being built locally in Singapore to replace eleven Fearless Class vessels. The LMVs will carry a baseline complement of 23, expandable to a maximum of 61. The reduction in manning is being achieved through the use of advanced sense-making and decision support systems, increased levels of automation, and improvement in operational methods through design and equipment selection.

Secondly, the two Type-218SGs, replacing the last two Challenger class submarines. IHS Janes has reported on the size and some indicative vectors on the capability of the two new Type-218SGs, being built by TKMS at Kiel, starting June 2015, here. The first two of the Type-218SGs are to be delivered by 2020. There will be a follow-on Type-218SG order, so that we can retire our final two Swedish built AIP boats in service.

Thirdly, a new Joint Multi-Mission Ship (JMMS) a new amphibious capability to project air power with a mini-LHD for the Singapore Navy. Speaking to the media ahead of SAF Day on 1 July 2014, Singapore's Minister of Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen said Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines underlined the need for a JMMS:

"A larger JMMS would be able to carry more helicopters or have more helicopters operating. When we responded to Typhoon Haiyan...basically, the typhoon was so devastating that comms and communication were knocked out. There was no centralised ability for command and control of the airspace. In that context, a ship like the JMMS would have been very useful."​

However, the centre should not simply respond when a crisis hits, he said. Instead, it should build networks – similar to United Nations agencies and voluntary welfare organisations – and pre-position them so that countries know where these resources are. Learning from its previous HADR missions, the SAF realised the value of having larger naval vessels which could act as springboards for extended helicopter operations, said Dr Ng.​

14. While the Endurance Class have served the SAF well, a larger JMMS that would have greater capacity and greater range to respond. There will also be some equipping changes for last mile delivery by the Singapore Army, which I would assume means having a more capable watercraft than the existing LARC V. On 17 March 2016, RSS Endurance will be the first foreign warship to call at Viet Nam's newly inaugurated Cam Ranh International Port, at their invitation. Such port calls reflect warm ties and reinforce Singapore's support for freedom of navigation.

15. With regard to your question, I would rather let ASEAN ministers have their say on growing ADMM cooperation (along with ASEAN resolve to grow security ties demonstrated yet again, in May 2016), at the right time. I will point it out when they do so (if I happen to do a drive by to DT at that time).

16. From where I am standing, 2022 to 2026 (round 3), will be a period where a miscalculation by one party can more likely occur. During that time, we will look back at 2016 and realise how calm it was in 2016 (round 1), where China was just getting started and still in first gear. And it is clear that Brunei and Malaysia as claimant states have started what we call "phase zero planning", respectively, so as to have a response plan for a range of contingencies relating to conflict arising from the South China Sea.

17. Malaysia's Defence Minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, is scheduled to meet Australian Defence Minister Marise Payne in late March 2016 to discuss China's placement of military equipment on disputed islands, in a sign that Malaysia is considering a tougher stand against Beijing, its largest trading partner. "If the reports we've received from various sources regarding the build-up and placement of military assets in the Spratlys are true – this forces us in a pushback against China," Mr Hishammuddin said, adding he would also hold talks with the Philippines and Vietnam. Malaysia has in the past shied away from taking a confrontational stand against China over the disputed waters, balancing its foreign policy against its relationship with Beijing.

18. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is also planning to visit Australia in May for discussions that will seek to forge a series of new agreements between the two countries, including a deal to enhance defence cooperation. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and her Singapore counterpart, Vivian Balakrishnan, declared after the 9th Joint Singapore-Australia Ministeral Meeting (for the ministries of Trade & Industry, Defence and Foreign Affairs) in Sydney in March 2016 that both countries are committed to the rights of states to conduct freedom of navigation and airspace of the South China Sea. "That's what Australia has done in the past and what we'll continue to do," Ms Bishop told reporters. Dr Balakrishnan said though Singapore was a tiny city state, its trade was three times its GDP, and hence security of passage through the South China Sea was "essential". "So we totally subscribe to the concept of freedom of navigation and over-flight and we would highlight the South China Sea as important for both Australia and Singapore..."

19. Of particular interest to me is how Malaysia is leveraging on existing FPDA military to military relationships to demonstrate in a low key manner Malaysian resolve in round 2. More importantly, the FPDA has an intelligence sharing arrangement that keeps the five countries updated on developments in the South China Sea.
 
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