South China Sea thoughts?

OPSSG

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Sharing a Singaporean Perspective (Post 2 of 2)
Document: DNI Clapper Assessment of Chinese Militarization, Reclamation in South China Sea

March 8, 2016 - The following is an unclassified Feb. 23, 2016 letter from Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to Sen. John McCain answering questions on Chinese reclamation and militarization of its disputed holdings in the South China Sea.

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Feb. 23, 2016

Dear Chairman McCain:

Thank you for your letter of 29 January 2016 in which you articulated concerns about China’s reclamation activity in the South China Sea and the impact this will have on China’s ability to deploy military capabilities across the area. Unclassified answers to the specific questions contained in your correspondence follow:

Would you assess China has militarized its reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands?

We judge that China has the capability to provide basic self-defense at its Spratly Islands outposts. China has also installed surveillance systems to improve situational awareness and is building airfields and ports that can support military operations. Based on the extent of land reclamation and construction activity, we assess that China has established the necessary infrastructure to project military capabilities in the South China Sea beyond that which is required for point defense of its outposts. These capabilities could include the deployment of modern fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), and coastal defense cruise missiles, as well as increased presence of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) surface combatants and China Coast Guard (CCG) large patrol ships.

Has the United States observed the deployment of People ’s Liberation Army Navy vessels to the ports China has constructed in the Spratly Islands?

PLAN surface combatants have pulled into the three largest outposts: Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs. One PLAN frigate was berthed at Fiery Cross Reef in early December 2015, one PLAN guided-missile frigate was anchored at Subi Reef in late December 2015, and a guided-missile destroyer was anchored at Mischief Reef in early January 2016. In addition to surface combatants, PLAN tank landing ships have been employed widely at the outposts to support the construction efforts. While PLAN and CCG ships have not been permanently based at the Spratly Islands ports, which are still under construction, these facilities will probably have fuel storage and other provisioning facilities once completed.

Has the United States observed People ’s Liberation Army Air Force activity on or near China’s Spratly Islands reclamation?

There has been no People’s Liberation Army Air Force or Naval Air Force aircraft activity on or near the Spratly Islands outpost expansion effort. Several Chinese civil aircraft landed on Fiery Cross Reef in early January 2016. Based on this, we judge that the airfield on Fiery Cross reef is operational and can accommodate all Chinese military aircraft.

Has the United States observed the construction of infrastructure or deployment of capabilities that would enable military-grade early warning, target acquisition, and/or target track radars?

China has installed military radars, most likely air-surveillance/early warning radars, at Cuarteron and Fiery Cross Reefs and a beacon for aircraft direction at Fiery Cross. Additionally, China is employing a combination of solar, wind, and stable base-load generators to power the outposts.

Has the United States observed the construction of infrastructure or deployment of capabilities by China that would enable the deployment of surface-to-air missile systems?

None of the infrastructure developed to date is consistent with the deployment of SAM systems to any of China’s Spratly Islands outposts. However, China’s mobile SAMS are field-deployable and do not require fixed, prepared sites.

Has the United States observed China conducting land reclamation activities in the South China Sea on or after August 5, 2015?

Yes, China continued its land reclamation efforts at Subi and Mischief Reefs after 5 August 2015, based on commercial imagery. Between that date and late October, when reclamation activity ended, China reclaimed more than 100 additional acres of land.

Has the United States observed that China has militarized reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands on or after September 25, 2015?

Although we have not detected the deployment of significant military capabilities at its Spratly Islands outposts, China has constructed facilities to support the deployment of high-end military capabilities, including modern fighter aircraft.

Do you assess China will pursue further reclamation in the South China Sea or East China Sea?

While we have no evidence that China has plans for any significant additional land reclamation at its Spratly Islands claims, there is sufficient reef area at Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs to reclaim more than 1,000 additional acres. We further assess that the underwater features at the four smaller reefs would support additional land reclamation. We do not assess that China will conduct reclamation efforts in the East China Sea.

Do you assess China will seek to militarize its reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands in the 2016-2018 time period?

We assess that China will continue to pursue construction and infrastructure development at its expanded outposts in the South China Sea. Based on the pace and scope of construction at these outposts, China will be able to deploy a range of offensive and defensive military capabilities and support increased PLAN and CCG presence beginning in 2016. Once these facilities are completed by the end of 2016 or early 2017, China will have significant capacity to quickly project substantial offensive military power to the region. China’s continued construction activity and press reporting indicate that Beijing may view the establishment of “defensive” capabilities similar to what some other claimants have installed as consistent with not “militarizing” the dispute. The Intelligence Community continues to monitor these and other critical developments in the region using our full array of collection capabilities to produce analysis with explanatory and predictive power to inform decision makers ahead of emerging trends. Please contact me with any additional questions you might have.

Sincerely,
[SIGNED]

James R. Clapper
20. From an individual member state's perspective, Beijing can be a useful counter-weight to Washington and vice-versa. Even treaty allies with the US in ASEAN (namely Thailand and the Philippines) have different interests, with regards to disputes in the South China Sea. Thailand does not have a maritime dispute with China.

21. Unlike the Philippines and Viet Nam, whose ties with China are strained over disputes in the South China Sea, Thailand and China have exceptionally close ties. This bilateral relationship drew closer back in the late 1970s when Bangkok needed Beijing's military and strategic support to cope with an expansionist Vietnam. The Sino-Thai friendship strengthened when China withdrew its support of the communist movement in Thailand, removing red threats from within and outside of the country. Cordial relations strengthened further in the last decade. Then, when other friends — like the US, UK, Australia and Japan — condemned the 2014 coup, China stated that Thailand should resolve its domestic conflicts peacefully. This reaction was welcomed by many Thais who supported the overthrow of the Shinawatra government, even by unconstitutional means.

22. China and Thailand have since exchanged frequent high-level visits and strengthened and enhanced cooperation in every domain. On a visit last April, the new Thai Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha thanked China for its selfless assistance. Foreign Minister Thanasak Patimaprakorn expressed his love of China and the Chinese foreign minister at ASEAN's Annual Defense Minister's Meeting Plus in 2015. In his opinion, the relationship goes back more than a thousand years, is closer than friendship and more like family. Since 2012, China has been Thailand's largest trade partner. After a Free Trade Agreement was struck in 2003, Thailand-China trade began to significantly increase, along with a widening trade deficit which rose almost three-fold within a year of enactment (from US$428 million to US$1.26 billion). This trade deficit reached US$17 billion in 2015.

23. Thailand and China's military to military relationship is blossoming but starts from a low base. Compared to those with other countries, the ties have room to grow. There is the annual combined special forces exercise, Exercise Strike, and a biannual joint marine exercise, Exercise Blue Strike. The first joint air force exercise, Exercise Falcon Strike, was held in 2015. But this cooperation remains significantly smaller than Thailand's arrangements with other countries. In recent years, Thailand has typically held around 40 training activities per year with the US military forces. Many US-Thai exercises still continue (despite the scale down of Exercise Cobra Gold and suspension of Thailand's participation in the multinational maritime exercise RIMPAC) after the coup.

24. A number of events have conspired to prevent me from posting regularly now and this might remain the case until after 2018. I will also be attending a formal event tonight, and therefore may be too busy to reply.
 
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bdique

Member
OPSSG,

Thank you very much, I greatly appreciate your response. You don't have to elaborate too much - this is already very insightful, and I'm sure many of us here at DT will have much to ponder about regarding developments in the SCS.

Will hope that you can still swing by DT when the occasion presents itself. Cheers!
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't understand why the PRC wants to provoke Indonesia, as they have also done with Malaysia over trifles. There are bigger fish to fry in their SCS gambit, and here they are stirring up extra trouble with 2 countries who have been 'neutrals'.
Obviously China doesn't see a problem escalating the situation and bringing new participants into the fray. Indonesia is one they might well have left alone, as the biggest of the South China nations and claimants and the one the furthest away with fairly minimal overlap.

Obviously China wants to send a message to everyone regardless of who they are.

TBH though, the tactics they used in this situation are not the most aggressive they have used. Perhaps the Chinese thought they were being nice.
Argentina sinks Chinese fishing vessel - CNN.com

I wonder if this will be enough to prompt a move from the neutral position.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Obviously China doesn't see a problem escalating the situation and bringing new participants into the fray. Indonesia is one they might well have left alone, as the biggest of the South China nations and claimants and the one the furthest away with fairly minimal overlap.

Obviously China wants to send a message to everyone regardless of who they are.

TBH though, the tactics they used in this situation are not the most aggressive they have used. Perhaps the Chinese thought they were being nice.
Argentina sinks Chinese fishing vessel - CNN.com

I wonder if this will be enough to prompt a move from the neutral position.
Part of it could very well be the PRC having a completely different understanding of (or regard for...) international and maritime law. With the Argentinian example in mind, that would have been a fishing vessel well away from any Chinese claims. Given that the situation escalated to the point where the vessel was sunk, it seems unlikely that the Chinese fishing vessel was unaware that it was operating in an area claimed by Argentina. It almost seems as though the crew thought maritime law did not apply to them, and/or they could get away with fishing in areas claimed by Argentina.

Now if the vessel was fishing in an area also claimed as part of the EEZ surrounding the Falkland Islands, South Georgia Island, or the South Sandwich Islands, and had a license issued by the appropriate British authority, I could somewhat understand. At this point though, it seems as though the area was solely claimed by Argentina.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sea Shepard has jumped in to the south China seas.

Sea Shepherd wakes the dragon

Given the state of play having new players come into the mix will complicate things.

It almost seems as though the crew thought maritime law did not apply to them, and/or they could get away with fishing in areas claimed by Argentina.
It seems to be that way. With fishing vessels being escorted by Chinese Navy or patrol ships I would assume they feel somewhat protected.
 

ngatimozart

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Verified Defense Pro
Sea Shepard has jumped in to the south China seas.

Sea Shepherd wakes the dragon

Given the state of play having new players come into the mix will complicate things.



It seems to be that way. With fishing vessels being escorted by Chinese Navy or patrol ships I would assume they feel somewhat protected.
Sea Shepherd might end up biting off a bit more than they can chew with the Chinese. Regarding Indonesia and the incident at Natuna Island, I think that the Indonesians will have to take a strong line with the Chinese.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Someone in China hasn't really thought this through. The nine-dash line has now become a symbol of China's status & prestige which must be stuck to at all costs, but the negative consequences of it are starting to show.

The line was first published by the Kuomintang, so the CCP could have ignored it. It is contrary to treaties which China has signed, & insupportable in international law. It could have been quietly dropped, & territorial waters & EEZ claims in the SCS linked to claims to particular islands or islets. But someone high-up decided to make it a major part of China's policy. Doh! It's a quarrel which China can't win. Win on the ground (get tacit acceptance of the line) & China loses the soft war: it creates a permanent source of resentment & enmity in countries which would or could otherwise be friends, such as Indonesia. Back down, & it is humiliated. There is no good outcome for China.
 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Someone in China hasn't really thought this through. The nine-dash line has now become a symbol of China's status & prestige which must be stuck to at all costs, but the negative consequences of it are staring to show.
I definitely think treating the Indonesians like some other claimants is a mistake. China's claims are weakest, Indonesia is one of the more powerful nations in the region (and will become more powerful), and one nation that was kind of choosing what it was going to do and support.

While the SCS nations may not get along, (and sink each others ships) they might all be able to agree China is causing a problem. I don't see them all working together, but It may turn them all to the US and they can all operate with the US.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
While the SCS nations may not get along, (and sink each others ships) they might all be able to agree China is causing a problem. I don't see them all working together, but It may turn them all to the US and they can all operate with the US.
china was trying to get the region to turn against a USN presence

since she's become more bolshie, all she's done is do the opposite

eg. the US has been given access to 5 bases in the phillipines, and the vietnamese are looking at allowing the USN to use their facilities as a forward storage area

there's some delicious irony there.....
 

ngatimozart

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OPSSG

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A Review of Recent Events in the South China Sea (Post 1 of 3)

1. ^Thanks for the update and keeping watch over the thread. Today on 1 April 2016, Bloomberg reports that: "Indonesia will deploy U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets to the Natuna islands to ward off “thieves”, the defense minister said less than two weeks after Chinese coast guard vessels clashed with an Indonesian boat in the area. Aaron Connelly, a research fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, questioned if stationing F-16s in the Natuna area would act as much of a deterrent or be of use combating illegal fishing.

“It looks like a show of force, but it’s a meaningless one,” Aaron Connelly said. “Indonesia has diplomatic cards to play but it doesn’t have military ones. It’s not going to scare away the Chinese military by putting a few F-16s on Natuna. These are items that can’t be reasonably used to survey maritime activities.”​
The Philippines have signed a €100 million contract for two AW159 Wildcat helicopters. The helos are to be delivered in 2018.
2. Finally. Unfortunately their navy has lost their prior anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills - through lack of equipment for over a generation. I pray for their sake that their Wildcat helicopter order will include a dipping sonar. In fact, they don't have the proper consoles on their existing navy ships to conduct ASW. They have a navy that aspires to have the capabilities of a coast guard that conducts leisurely patrols on rare occasions.

3. Due to the infrequency of their naval patrols due to resource limitations relative to areas to patrol, their lawless elements are the biggest threat to navigational safety. There was a recent report on 29 March 2016 that the tugboat Brahma 12 was hijacked by the Abu Sayyaf group while en route to the Philippines from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan (near in Jolo Island in the southern region of the Philippines). According to Philppines news sources, the Indonesian embassy has reportedly established contact with the Abu Sayyaf and is negotiating for the safe release of 10 tugboat crewmen abducted off Tawi-Tawi, a Philippine police intelligence officer said. “The Indonesians are now negotiating for the safe release of their countrymen abducted by the (Abu Sayyaf) while their tugboat was sailing near the waters of Languyan town in Tawi-Tawi,” the Camp Crame-based officer, speaking on condition he not be named.

4. Update 1 - 6 April 2016 - Two Indonesian-flagged vessels, the Brahma 12 (a tugboat) and Anand 12 (a barge), were hijacked by Abu Sayyaf militants in Philippine waters. Tugboat Brahma 12 has been handed over to Philippine authorities. The militant group has contacted the owner of the vessel and demanded a ransom of US$1.08 million by April 8 to free the Indonesian sailors.

5. On 3 April 2016, CNA reported that the Malaysian government is contemplating suspending trade and movements of essential goods from east coast of Sabah to southern Philippines, after four Malaysians were kidnapped by gunmen off the coast of Semporna, in a second tugboat incident within a week. The Sabah police have identified the four Malaysians as brothers Wong Teck Kang and Wong Teck Suu, Johny Lau Jung Hien and Wong Hung Sing. Aged between 21 and 34, they were heading to Tawau to pick up supplies after delivering logs to Manila. However, their tugboat was intercepted by masked gunmen near Ligitan Island just before the nightly curfew, which starts at 7pm. They were taken away in a speed boat into Filipino waters.

6. Update 2 - 6 April 2016 - Sabah is shutting down its eastern international boundaries to cross-border trade as part of measures to prevent further kidnappings in the area. Chief Minister Musa Aman said the decades-old barter trade activity in Sandakan and other east coast towns was to be ceased immediately. This was among seven measures the Sabah Cabinet agreed to at its meeting, following the abduction of four Malaysian sailors from a tugboat in waters near Pulau Ligitan off Semporna last Friday. Other measures include the immediate halt of transhipment trade of petroleum and gas products in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (Esszone), spanning 10 districts from Kudat to Tawau. He said amendments would be made to the 7 p.m. to 5 a.m. sea curfew in seven east coast districts from Beluran to Tawau and details were being worked out by security forces.

7. If the Philippine Navy is not as capable as the Brunei Navy, then it must follow that their naval modernisation efforts thus far is a joke (eg. the two SSVs are being built without proper weapons and air picture radar integration to their non-existent combat management system). This is so sad, it is not even funny.
It remains to be seen how the country would be able to afford submarines because they have no experience of them, so everything would have to be built from scratch.
8. In naval and air power capability terms, the Pinoys have been described as a 'joke' by astute observers and continue to plod along slowly. IMHO, one step forward, two steps back in their modernisation efforts. The Pinoys have a broken procurement system that is not capable of acting rationally or acquiring properly spec-ed equipment in a timely manner.

(i) They are incapable of best value procurement. Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd, abbreviated as GRSE (located in Kolkata, West Bengal) offered to supply the frigates for P15.047 billion, about P950 million lower than the P16 billion approved budget. Hyundai submitted a bid worth P15.744 billion, higher by close to P700 million than the offer of GRSE. It seems, they can only see lowest bid price and are NOT able to understand specs as it relates to capability.

(ii) The fact that they are in post-bid qualification with GRSE (which I believe GRSE will fail) to build two frigates for the Philippines, tells me that their procurement system is not just broken but rather, it is beyond redemption.​

9. As I noted in May 2015:
You seem to favor a strategy that is the least costly, that requires the least political effort on the part of the Americans, and fastest, which translates to the least effective...

While the Philippines tries to position itself as law abiding, the country does not always observe its own laws; and, on occasion, its agents engage in criminal acts of killing foreign nationals, while acting in an official capacity. In a second criminal killing at sea incident, the Philippine coast guard patrol (in Maritime Control Surveillance 3001) shot and killed a Taiwanese fisherman in May 2013. This resulted in Taiwan imposing economic sanctions against Philippines until the Philippine Government issued a formal apology, commenced investigations on the criminal act, compensated the fisherman's family; and the parties reinstated talks over fishing rights in the overlapping EEZ areas. Taiwanese sanctions against the Philippines were only lifted after the Philippines complied with these four conditions.

As CSIS reports: "Philippines, Taiwan engage in coast guard stand-off. The Philippine and Taiwanese coast guards became involved in a stand-off in the Luzon Strait on May 25 when a Philippine Coast Guard vessel interdicted a Taiwanese fishing boat it alleged was fishing in Philippine waters. Philippine authorities attempted to tow the fishing boat to shore but were confronted by a Taiwanese Coast Guard ship, which eventually negotiated the fishing vessel’s release. The Philippines and Taiwan are negotiating a fisheries agreement for waters claimed by both in the Luzon Strait."

Further, as far back as 1999, the Philippine Navy has been ramming and/or sinking Chinese fishing boats (incidents reported on 23 May 1999 and on 20 June 1990). The most recent reported incident of the Philippine Navy ramming a Chinese fishing boat that I know of was on 19 October 2011, which resulted in Manila issuing an apology to the Chinese embassy.

China is still learning, that its gambits in the Spratly Islands do not remotely serve its interests. Diplomacy by the US was working. However, US interests is not served by exaggerating the military threat...

Tough for the Philippines, and there is very, very limited sympathy within ASEAN for a country that chose to disband it's air combat capability in 2005 by budget choice, with a navy that is armed like a coast guard. Beyond the fact that the Philippine Senate voted not to renew the lease to US bases in 1991 (resulting in their closure), we also have to look back to some events in the 2003 to 2004 period for another example of this lack of reliability by the Philippines. On 20 May 2003, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) spoke of "unshakable resolve" in their support for the US in the White House on the 'War on Terror' (after the US invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003). In return, the Bush II Administration provided Philippines with US$1 billion in benefits on the generalised system of preferences, increased quotas on textiles from the Philippines and a US$200 million special line of credit. Unfortunately, James Tyner (2005), writing on "Iraq, Terror and the Philippines will to War", described their approach at page 94:-

(i) as "a member of the Coalition of Opportunists", who tried to capitalize on the Iraqi reconstruction efforts and angle for a piece of the action. Tyner quoted the then Philippines Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo as saying: "We have the names of 1 million workers, from skilled mechanical engineers to crane operators, with passports and are ready to go... But, when it comes to skilled labour, we definitely have the value added..."; and

(ii) fourteen months later, that "unshakable resolve" collapsed. In April 2004 a Filipino was abducted and in July 2004, another Filipino truck driver was abducted. In GMA administration's attempt to get the 2nd Filipino abductee released, Philippines gave in to the demands of the abductors and ordered the withdrawal of the Philippines' 51-strong contingent from Iraq. Subsequently, the GMA administration also banned Filipinos from working in Iraq.​

The above incident clearly demonstrated to the Americans that when the going gets tough, the Philippines get going. Following the short but sharp down turn in the relations with the US (after the withdrawal of the AFP contingent from Iraq), Manila upgraded its relations with Beijing. This included annual defence talks and a visit to China by GMA in September 2004. In return the PRC donated US$1.2 million in heavy engineering equipment to the Philippines (6 bulldozers and 6 motorgraders)...

For details on broader developments in the region, see this June 2015 CSIS study, titled "Southeast Asia's Geopolitical Centrality and the US-Japan Alliance."
For those that are interested, please back-read the thread for prior examples of the crimes committed by law enforcement agents of a self defeating claimant country, the Philippines, even under their own laws.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
A Review of Recent Events in the South China Sea (Post 2 of 3)

10. In 2012, the China took control of Scarborough Shoal after a standoff with the Philippine Navy. The standoff began in April 2012 when the Philippine Navy tried unsucessfuly to arrest Chinese fishermen who were operating in the shoal’s lagoon. After receiving a distress call, two China Marine Surveillance (CMS) vessels arrived on the scene, blocking the entrance to the lagoon and preventing the arrest of the Chinese fishermen. After the fishing boats left the shoal, however, government ships from both sides remained. By the end of May, China had deployed as many as seven CMS and Bureau of Fisheries Administration ships. In early June, the Philippines announced that an agreement had been reached with China for a mutual withdrawal of ships. Although China never publicly confirmed the existence of such an agreement, ships from both sides left in mid June as a typhoon approached the area. Later, however, Chinese ships returned and appear have maintained a permanent presence in the waters around the shoal since then. China had effective control of the shoal and the surrounding waters, thereby altering the status quo in this dispute in its favor.

11. Further, Woody Island, occupied by China since 1956, has undergone a major expansion of its runway and airport facilities, including a new concrete runway measuring 2,920 meters in length. Apart from the air defense systems that were recently uncovered, there is also significant Chinese military activity on other parts of Woody Island. A key feature of the base is its runway, which gives China the ability to send and receive combat aircraft. In November 2015, J-11 fighter jets were reportedly deployed to the base. China’s deployment of missiles and the rotation of J-11 fighters in Woody is a triggering factor that intensifies this security dilemma.

12. Eighty kilometers southwest of Woody, on Duncan Island (seized by China from Viet Nam in 1974) satellite images show landfill that has increased the size of the island by approximately 50 percent since April 2014.

13. Meanwhile the Philippine Navy struggles to resupply the crew at Ayungin Shoal on board the rotting hull of the BRP Sierre Madre – a Philippine naval vessel intentionally grounded on the reef in 1999, four years after China occupied nearby Mischief Reef. This is a logistics battle the Philippine Navy will lose before 2026. It is only a matter of time before the repaired but rotting hull breaks apart from weather and corrosion. If you look at American military aid to the Philippines, you should note what the Americans don't give. No advanced weapons, and no Excess Defense Article (EDA) F-16s (that prior Aquino request for EDA was reported and the American answer to that request was again a firm, NO). As you may already know, the Americans gave them 114 M113s (so as to reduce the incidents of units being over matched in firepower), three 40+ year old coast guard cutters, a research ship, four C-23 aircraft and two C-130Ts, as EDAs. Why should the US provide sophisticated weaponry? Especially when the country cannot even sustain assets.

14. In 2014 Manila briefly halted its construction activities in the South China Sea and urged other claimants to do the same. The Philippines’ move was designed to strengthen its hand before an international tribunal began considering its request for arbitration on the question of China’s nine-dash line, the Philippines’ maritime rights, and the status of certain features within the South China Sea. The tribunal heard Manila’s oral arguments on the question of jurisdiction in July 2015 but has not released a ruling. Further, China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, exercised its right not to accept the jurisdiction of the arbitration hearings at The Hague.

15. Let me provide some context to the latest developments:

One, Strafor has noted in the recent past, US and Japanese security and military connections with Indonesia and Malaysia are underdeveloped. Malaysia and Indonesia want it this way, mainly because neither wants to pick a side and risk jeopardizing its lucrative ties with China or exacerbating tensions in the South China Sea and the region.

Two, China's foreign aid program is now the sixth largest in the world. Only the UK, US, Germany, France and Japan provided more in 2013. This is according to a new paper from the JICA Research Institute estimating China's foreign aid program from 2001 to 2013. Their calculations put China's total official development assistance (ODA) at US$7.1 billion in 2013, with concessional loans, provided by China Eximbank, making up nearly half of the total aid. Economic and state interests are the main reasons why most states would not want to risk their relationship with China to give unqualified support for Vietnam over China's placement of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig in dispute waters. Only those that have poor relations with China, or those trying to counter-balance China are willing to support Vietnam — namely the Philippines, Japan and the US.

Three, as Nancy Wei noted on 21 May 2015:

"Washington’s allies and partners are unlikely to prevail in a one-on-one SCS facedown. Shelving disputes would help break the vicious cycle of the past: provocation upon provocation over sovereignty disputes.

Second, all the other claimants in the SCS dispute are embracing a hedging strategy of relying on Washington for security and on Beijing for economy. They have joined or expressed enthusiasm to participate in the China-sponsored Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, exhibiting a willingness to engage China when interests converge. Jointly developing SCS resources would reinforce the convergence.

Third, there are important global issues between Washington and Beijing to coordinate, including climate change and North Korean nuclear proliferation. "​

Four, as Dr Ng Eng Hean, Singapore's Minister of Defence said in March 2014, "a militarisation of many countries within Asia, of this magnitude, has no historical precedent. This is the larger strategic backdrop against which territorial disputes and incidents should be viewed."​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
A Review of Recent Events in the South China Sea (Post 3 of 3)

China build the artificial island on the atoll they already hold for some time..SCS (South China Sea) islands and atoll is disputed area between Cina, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philipines, and Malaysia. Each of them already control some of the islands/atoll in the area.

Yes, most Asean members that faced disputed with China on SCS did not have military capabilities yet to faced China. But this SCS issue is one of the reasons why most Asean countries in that facing SCS begin considerably increased their military expenditures.

They will not have to build anything militarily that able to defeat China, but they just need to build military capabilities that China found not easy to defeat. China can't afford to lingered much of her military resources to SCS, since it will open vulnerability on other disputed regions facing Japan, Taiwan, India,..let alone inviting US Pacific Fleet on this..

For that China try to limit their potential adversary in SCS. For example, eventhough China shown steern face against Vietnam or Philipines..she took more benign face agaist Indonesia..saying that Indonesia's Natuna islands and its ZEE surounding the Islands is not part of China SCS claim, eventough initially China maps shown some of Indonesian waters surounding Natuna in South China Sea..part of China's claim..

Still it's not hampering Indonesia to continue build and fortified Natuna's Ranai AB to make it able operating for long term their Flankers and Vipers later on.
16. Agreed, with eight additional notes:

One, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are hedgers. They have neither treaty alliances nor ideological allegiances; they possess viable military-to-military ties with both the US and China that may be deepened or reduced as needed; and each has overtly pursued “balanced” political-economic ties with both great powers.

Two, on 15-16 Feburary 2016, US President Barack Obama hosted leaders of the 10 ASEAN countries at Sunnylands (see the joint statement issued and released by the Whitehouse), a secluded 200 acre resort beloved by US presidents since Dwight Eisenhower and the site of the successful 2013 Xi-Obama Summit and Xi-Obama Summit 2.0 in 2015, where China and the US met and agreed on the path forward for how these two very big -- but very different -- countries can continue to get along). At the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit of 2016, Obama would have heard first hand, the different voices of ASEAN concerns and he would also know that Cambodia and Laos (as China constrained states) would be reporting back to China, everything that was said there.

Three, American activities in the South China Sea have not been conducted so as to support Philippine or Vietnamese territorial claims, but to assert a generalized principle of freedom of the seas. Any action to assert or defend their territorial claims will be left, evidently, to the claimants themselves. Any such action taken by a claimant alone would surely be repulsed by China, easily and quickly. Therefore, no such action is likely to occur without concrete prior assurance of American military support. There is no reason to assume that such assurance would ever be forthcoming. If they are paying attention to domestic politics in the United States, China and the rival South China Sea claimants must be aware of how problematic it would be for an American administration to rouse public support for a military confrontation with China over obscure bits of rock and sand in a corner of the world that, to most Americans, is quite remote. Occasional polls register only some low-to-mid-range concern about “China,” mostly about trade. Importantly, no effort is being made by the present administration to prepare the public for trouble in the South China Sea, nor is there any indication that any successor to the Obama administration will do so.

Four, ASEAN is not exactly united on the issues relating to disputes with China over the South China Sea. Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam and Mynmar are China constrained countries, where their security strategy prioritize the central role of China. Cambodia and Laos in particular are beholden to China, as they need China's aid and investments, however, Viet Nam is starting to adopt the strategy of the hedgers.

Five, lately Indonesia, as a middle power in waiting and the world's 16th largest economy, with a GDP of US$878 billion in 2012, and a GDP growth rate 6.2% (it is a middle power in waiting because Indonesia will become the word's 7th largest economy by 2030) has been distracted by domestic events and not able to focus on leading ASEAN, however I note Indonesia's increased spending on defence, since the unveiling of the 'minimum essential force' a few years ago. Further, to demonstrate Indonesian resolve to the Chinese, not only are they willing to make counter productive shows of force, they are willing to sink as many fishing boats (including 134 fishing boats from other ASEAN countries between October 2014 to Feburary 2016), caught fishing in their EEZ. This is of course less conducive to ASEAN unity. Indonesia because of its domestic politics is no longer able or willing to lead ASEAN.

Six, as I noted before, the Malaysians and Vietnamese have adopted a joint submission to the UN on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Please note that the Vietnamese and Malaysian claims over-lap with Philippine EEZ claims. If the Philippines was willing to accept the joint Vietnamese and Malaysian position, ASEAN can work to present a joint position on baselines. But it is precisely the incompetence of Pinoy diplomats and politicians that prevent the emergence such a joint multi-country position.

Seven, historically, Philippines is a house divided with presence of internal insurgents of different ideologies. The southern Philippines lies along a strategic fault line, with its porous borders, weak rule of law, long-standing and unaddressed grievances of Muslim minorities, and high levels of poverty and corruption offering a fertile field for nurturing terrorist groups. With US help it has made progress in combating terrorism within the Philippines but there limits of success in the Philippine COIN fight. In other words, the Philippine Government as a weak state and American pet project is not able to win against non-state actors without external help. If they are not sovereign in its undisputed territory, it follows that there is little or no chance for them to be successful in a contest for their disputed EEZ claims against any other claimant in the South China Sea. China's defence budget and its navy dwarfs that of the Philippines, despite Aquino's half hearted efforts to improve their primitive and dated capabilities. In 2016 China's proposed defence spending of 954 billion yuan (or US$147 billion) is about 59 times that of the Philippines.

Eight, many members of ASEAN, do believe in standing together with the Philippines and Viet Nam. ASEAN members are not neutral, but its another thing entirely to demonstrate open hostility to a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Demonstrating open hostility to China, as permanent member of the UN Security Council is against the national interest of other ASEAN members.​

17. Their coast guard (aka The Philippine Navy) have real problems with raise, train and sustain at an organisational level - their training system for both ships and aircraft is broken. They are without the requisite technical competence to maintain their fleet of aircraft and ships and at an organisational level, and not ready to modernise.

18. As Reuters reported on 8 April 2016: The United States has allocated more than US$120 million in military aid to the Philippines in 2016, the biggest in about 15 years, said a senior Filipino diplomat. Jose Cuisia, Manila's ambassador to Washington, said Manila was also in talks with the United States to acquire a fourth Hamilton-class cutter to strengthen the Philippine capability to patrol the waters. For context, see this 2014 Q&A on the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), prepared by the Pinoys. As the Q&A noted, the EDCA is an agreement between the Philippines and the US which is envisioned to advance the implementation of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

19. IMO, there is nothing mutual in the US-Philippine defense treaty. The bottom-line is this: The Pinoys do not want to pay to fund their own Navy. They want free hand-me-downs from the Americans in the form of EDA transfers of old 45+ year old coast guard cutters.

20. For Rodrigo Duterte, the brutal death squads that have claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people during his tenure as mayor of Davao City in the Philippines’ main southern island of Mindanao are not a problem. They’re a political platform. Further, in the event that Rodrigo Duterte, Mayor of Davo City and presidential candidate front runner wins, he intends to put an end to:

(i) their armed forces modernisation efforts - which is par the course for an advocate for working with the National Democratic Front (NDF). The NDF is a communist front organisation led by the Communist Party of the Philippines and Eastern Mindanao hosts the remnants of the communist insurgency. Millions of pesos are annually lost by businesses due to extortion activities by the Communist Party of Philippines’ armed wing, the NPA. Communist Party founder Jose Maria Sison had expressed a willingness to work with the presumptive Duterte administration. After the election, Sison will reiterate his usual demand for an immediate ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the NPA and at least 3 cabinate positions for his comrades (including the departments of agrarian reform, labor and employment, and social welfare and development); and

(ii) the Philippine experiment with capitalism and democracy. Duterte is not only noted for leftist human rights abuses, he is a presidential candidate that jokes about rape of an Australian in the Philippines, as part of his campaign for president; and later tells the American and Australian Ambassadors that he will downgrade ties with both US and Australia, if he wins because they were offended by his remarks about rape. Duterte has already clashed with the US ambassador, warning him to "shut his mouth" after the diplomat criticized the mayor’s comment he should have been the first in line to rape an Australian missionary who was murdered in the Philippines decades ago. Duterte has demonstrated repeatedly that he has little understanding of the national interests of the Philippines, its complex diplomatic challenges, and its indispensable alliance with the US. This will of course increase the moral hazard of giving aid to the Philippines.​

21. The 71 year old, 7 term Mayor of Davos, was featured on “The Dangers of Duterte Harry,” by The Economist. The New York Times, Washington Post, Time, and CNN have all named him “Asia’s Donald Trump” and he has
pledged bold action. He promised to take on China if the Philippines prevails in an international tribunal over claims in the South China Sea and Beijing doesn’t abide by the decision or open talks. “I will ride a jet ski and plant the Philippine flag there in their port,” Duterte said. Ian Storey, an expert on the South China Sea at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, said that whoever won the election would need to try to mend relations with Beijing—and such efforts would likely be supported by the U.S. A bigger concern, he said, would be if the new Philippine president “flip-flopped on the issue by, for instance, shelving the arbitration ruling and agreeing to joint development of resources on terms favorable to China.” Duterte, a foreign policy novice, has threatened to open direct negotiations with China, a move that would undermine a hardline approach by outgoing Philippine President BS Aquino III.

22. If Duterte wins, the Philippines will have more self inflicted problems than just lack of modernisation or chronic corruption. The locals do not go to war because the Philippine Government fails to deliver infrastructure and services. They may complain, but they generally do not as a first resort take up arms. The locals fight and support the NPA because they see their government as a threat. The issue to me is less delivery of development than delivery of justice, and local governments are not part of the solution, they are the core of the problem. The NPA typically flourishes in places where local governance is dominated by powerful families controlling political dynasties. These families typically dominate all political, judicial, and economic life and operate above the law. They are abusive, exploitive, and oppressive, frequently operating their own private armies. These private armies are a glorified name for gangs of armed thugs and they co-opt the state security forces through shared profits from illegal business. Infrastructure and service delivery is not a bad thing, but for me the key element in reducing the influence of the NPA is a concerted effort to bring local governing elites within the rule of law. The Philippine Government has failed to prosecute the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings is the official response to the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre in which a “private army” financed by the powerful Ampatuan family killed 58 people including more than 30 media workers. Almost six years later, the case is in effective judicial limbo, with no successful prosecutions and a total of 87 suspects still at large. IMHO, local elites like the Duterte family will resist any attempts at reform as they rely on impunity to sustain their power. As long as these elites like the Dutertes remain above the law the NPA will be able to cast itself as the only alternative to their dominance.

23. The Philippine Government under President BS Aqunio III is actually lucky that the leadership of the NPA and its assorted splinter factions is generally incompetent, obsessed with infighting and absorbed in their anachronistic mantras and incomprehensible rhetoric. A capable opponent could make matters much more difficult for the government. The NPA has declined as much due to its own ineptitude as to anything the government has done to fight it.

24. After years of inaction, in April 2016, the Philippines' Department of Justice has started an investigation on the alleged unexplained killings perpetrated by the Davao death squad and the supposed involvement of presidential candidate Duterte in the group. Philippine voters have long been attracted to strongman-style leaders. Ferdinand Marcos, who was elected president in 1965 and later ruled the country as a dictator, campaigned as a World War II hero and as someone, who “killed a man and advertised the fact.” More recently, Joseph Estrada, who was president from 1998 to 2001, was an action-film star. Philippine politics is no stranger to controversial characters and the firebrand Duterte is one of its most divisive, alarming leftist with his advocacy of extrajudicial killings as a deterrent against rampant crime and illegal drugs. With the Philippine track record of electing corrupt despots like Ferdinand Marcos and Joseph Estrada to power, I am certain of their country's ability to repeatedly make bad choices at the ballot box.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Providing Context to News on the South China Sea (Post 1 of 3)

1. Context matters and let me set the context in with two related points. One, as a sign of how much things have changed and will have to change in geo-strategic terms, to meet the challenge of the rise of China, countries like Viet Nam and the US, who were once at war are now trying to grow their ties. In March 2016, US Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Scott Swift and Lt. General John Toolan, the head of Marine Corps Forces Pacific are in Vietnam to explore ways to bring naval forces together. The commanding generals will be visiting Viet Nam from March 17-19, during which they will meet Rear Admiral Pham Hoai Nam, the Commander of the Vietnam People’s Navy, as well as senior officials in the cities of Hanoi and Hai Phong. Two, as Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (President of Indonesia from 2004 to 2014) said in a speech that he delivered to ASPI’s ‘Defence White Paper: from the page to reality’ on Friday 8 April 2016:

"In today’s world, we are faced with a number of strategic unknowns. The unknowns include the outcome of the US elections, arguably the most consequential elections in terms of its impact on international affairs. And there are other unknowns: what will happen in the efforts to roll back ISIS; whether or not terrorism will intensify on global scale; what will happen to the migrants crisis in Europe; what will happen to US-China relations; whether Arab Spring countries will hold or fall; and how much further will China keep pushing its gains in the South China Sea.

In facing these unknowns, we always hope for the best, but we need to also prepare for the worst. Especially considering the international community seems to be frequently caught off-guard by where and when the next incidents will come.

From Australia to Indonesia, China to India, Japan to The Philippines, we see many nations undergoing simultaneous military modernizations—some more ambitious than others. I do not call it an arms race, because that’s not what it is. But what worries me is this: in general, the rise of armaments has not been coupled with the rise of strategic trust. Indeed, the rise of armaments has been marked by the reduction of strategic trust."​

They are also considering acquiring an unspecified number of submarines. This maybe an idea of President BS Aquino III who steps down this June.
2. Unless the Philippines increase their defence budget by more than 6.5% a year, until it is double of their 2016 defence budget (or 11 to 12 years of continuous and compounding increases in their defence budget, across two administrations), otherwise it is just more bullsh!t from Pinoy politicians for the current news cycle; to be promptly forgotten in the next 6 years (or in the span of one administration).

(i) Operating submarines require a level of technical competence and resource commitment never before seen in the Philippine Navy, since the closure of American bases (which demonstrated the Philippine Senate's inability to fund their armed forces despite constant pork barrel protestations otherwise).

(ii) The incompetent BS Aquino III, as a President, is not just incompetent, his team cannot even execute existing drawer plans. Let me list 7 illustrations of AFP intelligence or leadership failures dating back to 2011 in the Philippines below:-

(1) In October 2011, a special forces unit of 40 Philippines soldiers were overrun in Al-Barka, Basilan with 19 killed. Several AFP officers were subjected to court martial for their role in that debacle. The AFP officers convicted included:-

- Col. Aminkadra Undug, the former commander of the Special Forces Regiment Battalion, who was found guilty of “imprudence without inappropriate clearance from higher headquarters and violation of the chain of command” when he allowed the military scuba diving course students in actual operations on 18 October 2011; and

- Col. Leonardo Peña, the former commander of the 4th Special Forces Battalion who was found guilty of “conduct prejudicial to good military order and discipline.”​

(2) In July 2013, bandits of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) of isolated stretches of the Cotabato-General Santos Highway.

(3) On 7 July 2013, local police arrested a military intelligence operative for extortion from a town official in the province of Zamboanga Sibugay, an official. Zamboanga Peninsula police spokesman Chief Inspector Ariel Huesca identified the arrested soldier as Sergeant Francisco Mabanag, Jr. of the intelligence security group. Siay municipal treasurer Susan Bayawa reported to the police that she received death threat through mobile phone call and text messages from an unidentified person. Bayawa’s refusal has prompted Mabanag to travel to Siay town and meet her purposely to pick up the money, which led to his arrest.

(4) On 5 August 2013, a car bomb was set off in in Cotabato. It was the second bombing to hit Mindanao in 10 days - a month after the United States, Australia and Canada warned its diplomatic staff against travelling to Cotabato and two other southern cities on Mindanao — Zamboanga and Davao — over fresh threats of terrorism.

(5) On 9 September 2013, the Moro National Liberation Front forces attacked Zamboanga City in southern Philippines, taking hostages and using them as shield. This was incredible, as rebel forces held a city of 800,000 hostage in the fighting that dragged on and on. The crisis committee was a heavy mix of national and local figures — notably Secretary Manuel "Mar" Roxas II and Mayor Isabella "Beng" Climaco-Salazar — with very different views on how to proceed. For details from an American perspective, see Chapter 7 of this Rand report from April 2016, Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 by Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, Gillian S. Oak.

(6) The failure to deliver timely aid after Typhoon Haiyan, in November 2013, where their armed forces was not sufficiently prepared, in facing the scale of calamity inflicted by the storm. In this case, the Philippines needed extensive external help from the US (for details see: Operation Damayan), Japan, South Korea, China and the rest of the international community (this serves as an excellent case study of the incompetence of President BS Aquino III).

(7) The cycles of Pinoy failure to learn and having their elite police or army units, trained and equipped by the Americans, yet again overrun or suffering significant casualties in ambushes by domestic rebel groups.
- 44 members of their Special Action Force were wiped-out at the Mamasapano Massacre, which took place on 25 January 2015.

- 15 members of 'C' company, 44th Infantry Battalion (accompanied by the 4th Special Forces Battalion and supported by armoured vehicles), were killed when they were ambushed. The contact started when an armoured vehicle hit a land mine, followed by a 10 hour battle against a hundred Abu Sayyaf fighters (with over 50 troops wounded) at Sitio Bayoko, Barangay Baguindan, Basilan province on 10 April 2016.​
It is without doubt their soldiers can fight, but leadership and planning seems to be so lacking at the national level. This chronic institutional incompetence, at the leadership level, across multiple units that repeats the same cycles of failure - the phrase 'lions led by sheep' come to mind. Not only that, President BS Aquino III has an inability to understand the 7Ps (or Proper Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance) and a demonstrated inability to understand defence matters (see my prior three part post from July 2013 in this thread - part 1 to part 3).​

3. By the way, the current Philippine defence budget is just too small to acquire more than poorly armed SSVs and OPVs (that they choose to call patrol frigates). Investing in submarines, requires shore based support, infrastructure and training facilities - all of which are not present in the Philippines. The AFP also do not have proper anti-ship missiles on land or at sea, even (where the Shore based Missile Defense System which was realigned in 2015 upon recommendation of Irriberri for more helmets). And the Philippine Navy is not even on track to be a missile equipped navy capable of anti-surface warfare against a proper navy (when compared against Brunei's proud little Navy).
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Providing Context to News on the South China Sea (Post 2 of 3)

4. Agreed. Currently, the Pinoys operate PF-15 and PF-16, transferred from the US Coast Guard in August 2011 and May 2012. They struggle to raise and train qualified sailors for Boutwell, a third EDA vessel that was decommissioned 2016 and sold to the Philippines, this year.

5. Unless all other claimant countries unite and learn to work together, US flag waving, while reassuring does not help ASEAN countries, like Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, advance their disputed EEZ claims. It is also important to note that even amongst ASEAN countries, not all recognise the claims of the others. As Singapore's Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen said at the Committee Of Supply Debate 2016 in Parliament on Friday 8 April 2016:

Asia's Security is in Flux

"Even as we ask Singaporeans to prepare ourselves to deal with extremist threats, let me just say we must be mindful of the trajectory of state-to-state relations surrounding us. So, as members have pointed out, the disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea are increasing. They are symptomatic of a more powerful dynamic of strategic rivalry and rising nationalism. This state of flux, different from post-World War Two and the Cold War is creating tension. This dynamic will stress existing military cooperation and alliances, international agreements or laws, even the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Let me give a few examples to illustrate what I mean.

On a regular basis, Japanese fighter jets scramble in response to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) military aircraft that enter Japan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The PLA planes are flying into disputed airspace around the Diao Yu/Senkaku Islands. So the Japanese would have to respond and they scrambled. It is a common occurrence.

Let me give you a second example. The largest overlap in the South China Sea claims is between Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone and China's "nine dash line". You would recall that just two years ago, Vietnamese and Chinese vessels clashed over an oil rig in the South China Sea. You would remember that in Vietnam they held protests and burned down foreign-owned factories, meaning to target Chinese-owned factories. Unfortunately, some Taiwanese factories also got burnt. . Just recently, the Vietnamese coast guard seized a Chinese oil tanker allegedly operating in Vietnam's waters. For the first time ever, if you have not noticed, a Japanese submarine arrived in Cam Ranh International Port, Vietnam last month.

An example close to home: the Indonesian Government has also taken a hard-line stance against illegal fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zones. Since Indonesian President Joko Widodo took office in 2014, Indonesia has confiscated and destroyed approximately 150 foreign fishing boats. Just last month, there was a standoff between the Chinese coast guard and an Indonesian patrol vessel. In addition to a diplomatic protest, Indonesia has since announced plans to deploy fighter jets to the Natuna Islands. Supposedly as a show of strength, military ships of the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI) are used to blow up these merchant vessels. This is not the most cost-effective solution. Military munitions cost more, but as a show of strength, they will use the TNI to blow up the vessels.

So as we observe these incidents occurring at an increasing regularity, we have to remember that they occur against the backdrop of Asia's highest military spending ever. In fact, collectively, Asia has spent more on its defence than Europe, in absolute dollars, since 2012; we have exceeded Europe. Rising nationalism and improving economies have fuelled many Asian countries to spend larger and larger sums to modernise their militaries. In itself this is not wrong, but with more capable militaries, miscalculations or missteps can precipitate serious tensions and even physical conflicts."​

6. The US Navy's recent Freedom of Navigation (FON) Operations does not clarify the issue of the right to military passage through another country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and has been conducted against not only China but also against excessive claims of coastal states like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Although the US makes matters worse in this debate by not ratifying UNCLOS, the US Government asserts that it follows and abides by the rules of the treaty. There is a difference in interpretation in the right to military passage. The US claims that every nation has the right to military passage through another country's EEZ, whereas (and I note a few related points below):

(i) China claims that the coastal state reserves the right to evict a foreign military ship from its EEZ. The reason that the US does not specify freedom of military navigation is because most nations in Asia are on the same page as China, including Indonesia, India and Viet Nam.

(ii) Many nations, including Viet Nam and India, using various language, reserve the right to regulate the activities of foreign military ships within EEZs. For example, India, while signing UNCLOS, made the declaration: 'The Government of the Republic of India understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives without the consent of the coastal State'.

(iii) On the one hand, 8 April 2016 the Wall Street Journel reports that Defense Secretary Ash Carter has scrubbed a planned visit this month to Beijing amid rising tensions between the US and China over the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Carter, who publicly accepted an invitation from Beijing in November, was to travel there during a trip to Asia this month. But the government in Beijing was informed several weeks ago that Mr. Carter’s trip would not include a stop there, according to US officials.

(iv) On the other hand, the US Defense Secretary Ash Carter is walking a fine line (as Breaking Defense also reports on 8 April 2016 - from another angle, other US policy considerations at play). On the one hand, his military subordinates — especially Adm. Harry Harris, chief of Pacific Command (PACOM) — want the US to step up challenges to China. On the other hand, President Obama’s top aides on the staff of the National Security Council want to keep the South China Sea issue quiet so the White House, presumably so the US can cooperate with China on a host of other issues: trade, climate change, Iran, North Korea. How far has the contention gone?
- An article in an April 2016 Navy Times said that “National Security Adviser Susan Rice imposed a gag order on military leaders” ahead of last week’s visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping to Washington.

- “Friction between PACOM and the White House has been evident for quite some time, since the CNN reporter flew in a P-8 over the South China Sea and Adm. Harris called China’s artificial islands a ‘Great Wall of Sand,'” said Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). “For the White House, this is one issue and part of a larger US-China relationship. For PACOM, it is front and center.”

- Some friction between the military commander in theater and civilian policymakers in DC is to be expected, said a former aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. “The back and forth, the friction if you will, is normal,” said Bryan Clark, now with the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments. “But what’s been different [is] the lengths that they’ve gone to keep things calm on the military or security side.”​

(v) After a customary a two-week congressional notification period, U.S. officials have released the first year of funds for the five-year, US$425 million dollar Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), which involves five main ASEAN states – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – along with Singapore, Brunei and Taiwan, and aims to improve the ability of these countries to address a range of maritime challenges.

(vi) China has a constantly expanding force of Russian made and locally designed fighter jets, surface-to-air ballistic missiles (SAMs), cruise missiles, mobile electronic warfare devices including unmanned aerial vehicles, and such sophisticated counteroffensive weapons as guidance-scrambling anti-radiation missiles. These when deployed to China's reclaimed islands combine to make China’s airborne military threat to claimant states in the South China Sea a major concern. Especially when compared to Viet Nam and the Philippines, with regard to their quantitatively inferior forces.

(vii) It should also be noted that China is pushing the fishermen farther from shore. China provides fuel subsidies, with higher rates for bigger boats and journeys to the Spratlys. The Hainan government heavily subsidises the construction of larger, steel-hulled trawlers, and an expensive satellite system was provided virtually free of charge to about 50,000 vessels. With it, Chinese fishing crews can send emergency signals to coast guard ships with their exact location if they run into trouble. Chinese fishermen said the government often organises trips to the Spratlys, with coast guard vessels in attendance, especially when tensions are high. "When our country needs us, we will go without a second thought to defend our rights."​

7. Meeting on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in Washington on 31 March 2016, Xi and Obama agreed to step up cooperation to ensure nuclear security worldwide and to do more on cybersecurity. They also agreed to continue to work on a bilateral investment treaty, China’s assistant foreign minister, Zheng Zeguang, told a news briefing. But Zheng made clear that China and the United States remained at odds over the contested South China Sea, where Beijing’s broad territorial claims have riled its neighbors. Xi told Obama that he hoped Washington would “strictly” abide by its commitment not to take a position on sovereignty issues and instead play a constructive role to maintain peace and stability, Zheng said. “The hope is that all parties will correctly view and handle the South China Sea and adopt an objective and impartial attitude … particularly countries outside this region,” he said.

8. As Kim Beazly, the recently returned Australian Ambassador to the US and former Defence Minister of Australia noted in a Q&A:

Q:Are Sino–US relations the biggest challenge for the 21st century?

Even though there’s been harsh words said about the South China Sea and Chinese cyber issues, fundamentally the American leadership understands it needs to get on with China—and the Chinese likewise understand this. The most important bilateral discussion that takes place in the world today is the annual US–China Strategic & Economic Dialogue. And both countries are arriving at lots of conclusions on force separation agreements and investment agreements and they’re beginning to do cyber. So they’re trying to resolve their differences. There is, of course, on China’s part an underlying suspicion that the US wants to pursue an adversarial containment strategy with them, which is something we of course don’t want the US to do. But the US is frustrated by that Chinese interpretation; they think that the Chinese aren’t looking hard enough at themselves on the issues that they’re creating with these large claims in the South China Sea.

Q: What role should Australia play in the South China Sea?

Well, I think it should be what it’s always been. We’ve had intensive surveillance activities over the South China Sea since the 1970’s and we ought to keep doing it. I think that we should uphold the global rules based order and should fly and sail wherever international law permits us to fly or sail. In terms of maintaining that position, we should probably keep doing what we would normally do. We don’t often send ships to the South China Sea but we send aircraft there all the time and those aircraft ought to be able to fly in the zone in accordance with international law.​

9. Thanks to China's assertiveness and island building in the South China Sea, the Japan Self Defense Force's outreach to expand military-to-military engagements, exercises and talks throughout the Asia-Pacific region, has been well received by many members of ASEAN. Moreover, following Prime Minster Shinto Abe's success in relaxing defense export rules, Japan is providing used aircraft and ships to the Philippines and Vietnam, and is aggressively trying to sell submarines to Australia. Although China predictably complains, Japan's military outreach is generally well received in the region, with Australia, Vietnam, India, Philippines and others welcoming Japanese security cooperation.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Attention all and directed at no one in particular.

Please note that any failure to observe the Forum Rules or writing factually deficient posts that defy logic, will attract the attention of the Moderating Team and result in swift bans. To avoid writing factually deficient posts, read the entire thread (all 14 pages) for the geo-politics of the region before posting.

Reading the thread, will enable new members to find out why certain members were banned (some banned permanently, and some for banned only for a year). See also this prior impromptu test, to enforce standards.

Further, any off-topic discussions, not relating to the South China Sea may be deleted or moved. Kindly also note that the next post in this thread by any new member (with less than 50 posts) that is a one-liner will receive an immediate ban.

As a general rule, more facts (supported by links) and less opinion only posts, please. If factually deficient posts predominate, this thread will also be closed.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Some developments in this area.

SOUTH CHINA SEA WATCH: China alarms 2 other Asian nations
The Associated Press
April 11, 2016

Tensions in the South China Sea are rising, pitting China against smaller and weaker neighbors who all lay claim to islands, coral reefs and lagoons in waters rich in fish and potential gas and oil reserves. China's recent construction of artificial islands complete with airstrips and radar stations, and U.S. patrols challenging Beijing's vast territorial claims, have caused concern that the strategically important waters could become a flashpoint.

A look at some of the most recent key developments:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/south-china-sea-watch-china-alarms-2-other-063117923.html

Chinese fighter jets seen on contested South China Sea island, evidence of Beijing's latest bold move

Chinese fighter jets seen on contested South China Sea island, evidence of Beijing's latest bold move | Fox News


And Indonesia has learn from the past, to stay passive was a bad choice.
Specially after whats happen last month, when one of Indonesia's patrol ships intercepted a Chinese fishing vessel on March 19 off the Natuna Islands, which was protected by a Chinese Coast Guard ship, i think it is the right decision.
Indonesia's Pertamina Plans To Develop South China Sea Border Areas
by Reuters

|
Wilda Asmarini & Fergus Jensen
|
Tuesday, April 12, 2016


Reuters

JAKARTA, April 12 (Reuters) - Energy company Pertamina plans to explore for oil and gas in areas close to Indonesia's maritime border in the South China Sea to assert the country's territorial rights, the upstream director of the state-owned company said.

"The government needs to have activities around the borders and one of Pertamina's strategies is to support this," Syamsu Alam told Reuters in an interview on Monday.

He said Indonesia had lost sovereignty over two disputed islands in the past because it was not developing those areas.

"So, like the South China Sea and the borders in North Kalimantan, we need to have some activities there," he said.

China claims 90 percent of the South China Sea, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas, with overlapping claims from Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.

Its reclamation of rocky outcrops and development of infrastructure there has caused alarm around the region.

- See more at: http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/....hcafBP8h.dpuf
 

cdxbow

Well-Known Member
With escalating provocations from the PRC and increasing reactions from the neighbours I can't help feeling we are on the slippery slope to conflict in the SCS. There have been lots of recent articles about how the US and allies 'should' be doing. The two links I have posted covert the diplomatic and would could be called the 'escalatory'. This article from DefenceOne talks about the need to turn down the heat in the SCS How to Turn The Heat Down in the South China Sea - Defense One, while this one talks about the US turning up the heat This Is How America Can Make China Pay a Price in the South China Sea | The National Interest Blog

I read these and none of the measures suggested convince me they are likely to work. Neither the diplomatic or the escalatory. The US & allies have been forced onto a reactive, defensive and ultimately ineffective position. The second article contains the following:

"If China is bent on changing the status-quo in Asia, why should America respects its so-called core interests? If Beijing won’t respect Washington’s interests, two can play such a game — with Beijing once again being forced to play defense."

The author then suggests a few things, including selling more advanced weapons to Taiwan. I'm not convinced that any of the suggestions would make the PRC even pause, but it did get me thinking, what diplomatic issues matter the most to the PRC. Taiwan was the one that came to mind, and if the US recognised Taiwan or at least threatened to might at least get the PRC to stop and think about their current stategy. Inflammatory certainly, but at least it would signal the US displeasure and shake things up a bit.

Also Taiwan deserves to be recognised as a nation, it has been forged in 'blood & fire' and has developed it's own unique Taiwanese identity. Most of the world only don't recognise Taiwan simply to appease the PRC and keep doing business.

Whatever the US does, it needs to do something differently, if it is to protect the principle of the sea as a global commons with rights of free passage, because fundamentally PRC actions would seem to be an attack on that principle.
 

bdique

Member
Selling weapons to Taiwan - you could do it if you want to slam the door shut on diplomatic relations with China. Not a good thing when China is one of the few nations able to influence DPRK, or when your economies are that intricately intertwined, for example. There is a lot of nuance involved; in this case, you can't just play hardball and expect to everything to turn out in your favour.

On to the selling of weapons in general, especially to the SCS claimant states. My thoughts: maybe, maybe it might work if there is a NATO-type alliance in South East Asia, where nations can be assured that the weapons and capabilities that they are acquiring will not someday be used against each other. However, presently I am not confident of that happening. OPSSG has spoken quite a lot about how ASEAN nations are still fairly incapable of consensus on common issues. Just think about which nations in ASEAN are friendlier with China, and which ones are friendlier with the US. The rifts go deeper, when you look at the individual histories of the various nations.

So giving arms to everyone? It might be a great idea if ASEAN somehow becomes a NATO of the South East. Otherwise...(and I'll admit I'm more than a little paranoid here) this very action might be the catalyst for ASEAN to implode. In that sense, I'm more than a little glad that China's just playing the 'soft power' card for now.
 
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