Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates

Catalina

Active Member
The Mavericks they replace had twice the range...
True but Mavericks entered service in the USAF in the 1970s as an AGM.

UAS and USV Swarms are the pacing maritime threat.

AGR-20F FALCO anti-air missiles entered service in 2024 to counter drones swarms. Our new naval MH-60R Seahawk can carry 28 of them, giving our naval assets a potent and battle proven anti-drone asset.
 
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Catalina

Active Member
If UK are looking at Mk41 integration on the type31does this change the calculation in terms of NZ's decision on preferred vessel? Or does the Mogami lead by a nose due to in service and trans-Tasman interoperability?
Work ongoing to scope Mk41 fit for Type 31 frigates
Trans-Tasman interoperability is a massive drawcard for choosing the Mogamis. As to is production and servicing and upgrading. Australia is building 8 of its 11 ordered Improved Mogami Class frigates in country at its Henderson shipyard. It makes military, economic, and geostrategic sense for our RNZN to likewise field the same frigates that the RAN is deploying and that can be serviced and upgraded just across the Tasman...
 
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kiwipatriot69

Active Member
Trans-Tasman interoperability is a massive drawcard for choosing the Mogamis. As to is production and servicing and upgrading. Australia is building 8 of its 11 ordered Improved Mogami Class frigates in country at its Henderson shipyard. It makes military, economic, and geostrategic sense for our RNZN to likewise field the same frigates that the RAN is deploying and that can be serviced and upgraded just across the Tasman...

Yes. If Australia's shipyards can handle taking 2 to 3 extra frigates on top of a dozen or so planned, plus the submarine build and other projects.Obviously they'll prioritize their own shortfalls over ours.
 

Warhawk

New Member
Collins confirms New Zealand is finalising a decision on two new frigates – either the Japan-designed Australian-manufactured Mogami-class, or the UK’s Type 31 frigates, which she says are cheaper. “If I knew right now what the answer was, I probably still wouldn’t tell you, because we probably want to announce it,” she says. “But no, we haven’t made any decision yet.” Proves NZ are slow learner's 2 frigates is not enough only got look when upgraded frigates in Canada left NZ with no means of patrol and response for month's if true is sad day for NZ.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
A replacement of two for two seems ridiculous considering Navy had a zero frigate offering to government for some time in the early 20s

With just five Seahawks ordered, two ships looks to be the aspiration

Hopefully numbers will evolve come time to order


Cheers S
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Trans-Tasman interoperability is a massive drawcard for choosing the Mogamis. As to is production and servicing and upgrading. Australia is building 8 of its 11 ordered Improved Mogami Class frigates in country at its Henderson shipyard. It makes military, economic, and geostrategic sense for our RNZN to likewise field the same frigates that the RAN is deploying and that can be serviced and upgraded just across the Tasman...
Have the contracts been signed for 11 Mogami's for the RAN?
Last I heard it was not yet signed, none had been ordered as yet, but the Mogami won the contractbwith up to 11 ships to be built.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Have the contracts been signed for 11 Mogami's for the RAN?
Last I heard it was not yet signed, none had been ordered as yet, but the Mogami won the contractbwith up to 11 ships to be built.
Contract signing is supposedly happening at the end of March 2026, with the Japanese Defence Minister reportedly visiting for the occasion.

As there is a Mogami in Sydney harbour right now, it may well be even more imminent. The timing couldn’t be better…
 

kiwi in exile

Well-Known Member
Frigates, flexibility, and the case for a smarter New Zealand fleet febraury Line of Defence.

While Im not against getting new frigates per se, I do agree with the authors sentiment that
The conservative New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and Ministry of Defence remain focused on replacing what we already have, rather than critically assessing what will give New Zealand the greatest flexibility into the future.
and a myopic focus on 'like for like' platform replacement rather than critically evaluating what we need and evolving our capabilities. our leaders have been failing to adapt to changes in the ways war is being fought.
This article gives a good summary of institutional obstacles to achieving this.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Frigates, flexibility, and the case for a smarter New Zealand fleet febraury Line of Defence.

While Im not against getting new frigates per se, I do agree with the authors sentiment that and a myopic focus on 'like for like' platform replacement rather than critically evaluating what we need and evolving our capabilities. our leaders have been failing to adapt to changes in the ways war is being fought.
This article gives a good summary of institutional obstacles to achieving this.
TBH I got about as far into the article as the below quoted comment and stopped;

We should stop asking which frigate to buy and start asking how to build a force designed for a future in which sea battles are fought by drones, writes former New Zealand Army Officer Graeme Doull.
That comment along left me feeling... rather unpersuaded.

Not to cast any sort of aspersions on the author, but I am rather disinclined to believe that a former New Zealand Army officer is going to have specific, keen insights into naval warfare or naval/maritime matters as a result of their Army service. Further, the apparent expectation that sea battles will be fought by drones (presumably alone, as opposed to warships fighting as well as launching, supporting and controlling drones) seems to reflect a rather deep lack of understanding of what naval forces can do, as well as some of what they need to do and why. It might also be a reflection of attempts to apply ideas and lessons taken from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to New Zealand and naval conflicts, despite the very large differences in conditions.

Now admittedly, I have yet to read further into the article, but it does seem like the author is also exhibiting a significant degree of sea blindness by apparently not understanding what naval escorts are for, or that such capabilities are needed to protect shipping to/from NZ via various SLOC in the event of conflict.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
My personal view is that we need to first of all get a clear view of what we need to have to defend NZ and then what is needed to assist with area defence.
All other functions that the Government uses Defence for then follow with reducing levels of priority after the first two.
The current view seems to be murky and clouded with competing self serving demands from the individual servces, without a clear view of what is needed to achieve the above.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Suggesting replacing frigates with LSTs, & expecting them to be capable of ASW & everything else a frigate can do equally well via on-board aviation & containerised modules that could be loaded aboard - while still being so much cheaper that many more of them can be operated.

I'm not convinced.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
My personal view is that we need to first of all get a clear view of what we need to have to defend NZ and then what is needed to assist with area defence.
All other functions that the Government uses Defence for then follow with reducing levels of priority after the first two.
The current view seems to be murky and clouded with competing self serving demands from the individual servces, without a clear view of what is needed to achieve the above.
My personal take is slightly different, in that I also consider area defence, especially of vital SLOC as being just as important to NZ as defence of NZ proper. If one looks at what has been happening for the last couple of weeks in the Mideast, and the resulting negative impact upon world trade and various national economies, one should start to realize just how much of an impact can be felt by threats to distant SLOC, even by nations not actually involved in whatever conflict or issue might be going on.

To give a rather extreme example of what I mean, NZ could massively expand Vote Defence, and then spend billions developing Fortress Aotearoa establishing a network of bases, coastal artillery and missile batteries as well as air defences so that any potential hostile force would Operation Overlord-scale numbers just to have a chance any landing troops upon NZ soil, never mind to establish a beachhead. However, despite however difficult it might be to oppose such NZ defences, NZ could still be effectively neutralized by simply interdicting NZ SLOC, esp ones through which NZ-bound petroleum transits.

Side note: I did end up reading the rest of the article... I very much came away with the impression that the author was talking about a subject that they really did not understand, and also it appeared (at least to me) that the author did not know they did not understand the subject they were writing about. The idea of taking an LST-120 and putting containerized systems aboard to make a multi-role vessel in lieu of a frigate IMO really went a long way in showing the author really does not understand naval and maritime matters. Yes, it could be a good move for NZ to purchase some sort of LST to expand or replace Kiwi sealift capabilities is understandable, esp if going with something that is also going to be in RAN service. However the capabilities they would bring, and the roles they would serve would still require escort from something like a frigate to get into/out or whilst in an area of operations. For that matter, so would merchant shipping that need to transit threatened SLOC.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
My personal view is that we need to first of all get a clear view of what we need to have to defend NZ and then what is needed to assist with area defence.
All other functions that the Government uses Defence for then follow with reducing levels of priority after the first two.
The current view seems to be murky and clouded with competing self serving demands from the individual servces, without a clear view of what is needed to achieve the above.
Agree, and this requires a competent government that will actually act on what is required and sort this "stuff" out. Canada has the same problem albeit things seem to be getting sorted, time will tell. The other issue for NZ and Australia wrt defence (again also applicable to Canada and other allies) is how reliant is the most important ally, the USA? Given the current ME and the US domestic situation, defence planning is definitely more difficult.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Agree, and this requires a competent government that will actually act on what is required and sort this "stuff" out. Canada has the same problem albeit things seem to be getting sorted, time will tell. The other issue for NZ and Australia wrt defence (again also applicable to Canada and other allies) is how reliant is the most important ally, the USA? Given the current ME and the US domestic situation, defence planning is definitely more difficult.
Defence planning more difficult? IMO not really, however done properly it is much more expensive, as not only are more kit and capabilities required, but so too are not only alternate sources for kit, but domestic ones as well.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Defence planning more difficult? IMO not really, however done properly it is much more expensive, as not only are more kit and capabilities required, but so too are not only alternate sources for kit, but domestic ones as well.
Yes, but the planning part also requires a government that realises the uncertainty wrt a key partner, the USA as well as the other obstacles, sourcing, delivery, and quantity of kit.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
To give a rather extreme example of what I mean, NZ could massively expand Vote Defence, and then spend billions developing Fortress Aotearoa establishing a network of bases, coastal artillery and missile batteries as well as air defences so that any potential hostile force would Operation Overlord-scale numbers just to have a chance any landing troops upon NZ soil,
The logistics that are required to mount an opposed invasion of nz is a deterrent on it's own if there is the ability to oppose an attempt. This is not the case at present. The 2000km moat is the first line of defence and while interdicting trade routes etc will cause a significant amount of grief, it will not result in the loss of our freedom and sovereignty. My opinion is that the preservation of the sovereignty of a country is the first requirement because if you lose it everything goes.
In NZ's case being able to contest the air and sea of the said moat is a powerful deterrent, This is something we can't do at present.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
The logistics that are required to mount an opposed invasion of nz is a deterrent on it's own if there is the ability to oppose an attempt. This is not the case at present. The 2000km moat is the first line of defence and while interdicting trade routes etc will cause a significant amount of grief, it will not result in the loss of our freedom and sovereignty. My opinion is that the preservation of the sovereignty of a country is the first requirement because if you lose it everything goes.
In NZ's case being able to contest the air and sea of the said moat is a powerful deterrent, This is something we can't do at present.
IMO in order for there to be a preservation of sovereignty, some ability to maintain and protect vital SLOC is also required. The fuel issue in NZ is a looming, albeit IMO rather silent problem facing NZ given the situation in the Mideast. According to reporting from a variety of sources, NZ has roughly a 52-day or 53-day fuel buffer, but some of that reporting also suggests that the quoted number itself has some problems.

NZ basically imports refined petroleum product, having largely or completely stopped refining at Marsden Point AFAIK. The largest refining sources of refined product for NZ are in Singapore, S. Korea and Japan, all of which are reliant upon deliveries of crude oil from the Persian Gulf. Further, being NZ is an importer of refined product as oppose to crude which gets refined in-country, there is a lag between when petroleum in crude form is shipped from the Gulf, to when it gets to NZ as refined product. From the reporting, the NZ petroleum supply chain itself operates on a roughly 52-day cycle which means that the impact of delays or failures/losses in shipping crude from the Gulf will not become immediately apparent. Refined product shipping to NZ typically takes about three weeks to be delivered. This means that petrol and other refined fuels arriving in NZ now or in the next couple of days likely was delivered to the source refineries by the end of February or very early on this month. Going further back with the numbers (yes, for those who have noticed, I have found keeping track of the timing of things can be very important) the product bound for NZ leaving the refineries in Asia likely shipped from the Gulf as crude about a month before would start to get shipped to NZ after being refined and blended. Or put another way, refined product just getting to NZ now likely was part of crude oil shipments from the Gulf which left at the end of January or very beginning of February.

Where this can start being an obvious issue will likely come around mid-April, when crude deliveries to the refineries could drop depending on how much disruption there has been/is with the flow of tankers from the Gulf. If the flow of crude gets reduced or interrupted, there could be less or even nothing for the refineries to process, and then it would about three weeks after that where NZ might really start to see increases in fuel costs and/or fuel shortages.

OTOH, it is also possible that the gov'ts of S. Korea, Singapore and/or Japan could order the refineries to not release product for shipment to NZ if there is enough concern about potential domestic fuel disruptions if the flow of crude oil becomes seriously limited or even stopped altogether.

Now consider the sovereignty question again, but with the security vignette also including limited fuel stocks available across NZ because NZ has only been able to receive on average a small tanker's worth of refined product per week for the last six months, rather than the roughly three small tankers worth of deliveries needed to keep pace with normal NZ fuel consumption. A patient and calculating adversary could then take advantage of NZ fuel deliveries getting cut and wait until NZ might only have a few days worth of fuel before really starting hostilities, leaving the NZDF and NZGov't as a whole with limited mobility and force endurance due to a lack of available fuel. An adversary that also possesses some form of standoff land attack capability could further exacerbate the problem by launching surprise strikes at fuel receiving and storage facilities in NZ, like those at Marsden Point (currently receives some 40% of all NZ fuel imports) as well as a couple of other receiving/storage facilities around the country.

IMO if NZ's fuel stores get so low that the country only between a few days and two weeks of fuel, that is not a situation where the problem is causing NZ grief, but rather it has become one which threatens NZ's sovereignty due to the sheer amount of disruption a lack of fuel will cause.

EDIT: Additional comment. Some of the info on NZ's petroleum situation came from this Stuff article, but other sources were found here and here.
 
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