Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[oldsig127]

Well, it looks like Chief of Navy is finally fed up with the ceaseless inaccurate nonsense being reported by News Limited

The article published in the Australian today, Thursday 19 December 2019, is misleading and incorrect.

Aside from entirely misinformed comments regarding the Future Submarine Program, I am particularly disappointed with the statement that our sailors are reluctant to sail in the Collins class submarine.

Incorrect media reporting | Defence News

About time, though no-one has pulled the rug out from under Gottliebson for his many misrepresentations of the costs of providing relevant equipment including this week

oldsig

 

[Milne Bay]

Well, it looks like Chief of Navy is finally fed up with the ceaseless inaccurate nonsense being reported by News Limited



Incorrect media reporting | Defence News

About time, though no-one has pulled the rug out from under Gottliebson for his many misrepresentations of the costs of providing relevant equipment including this week

oldsig

Yes enough is enough.
For years now, mindless parrots in the media have simply chanted the mantra that Collins is a lemon.
No fact checking, no source verification, simply reprint what someone else has said - even if that someone was yourself!
This reduces what used to be called journalism to simply gossip and hearsay.
Now there might have been a period when Navy was happy to have capability under-rated so that potential foes may take the Collins less seriously, but I am glad that Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN Chief of Navy Australia has written what he has.
Our submariners deserve more respect
MB

 

[Volkodav]

Yes enough is enough.
For years now, mindless parrots in the media have simply chanted the mantra that Collins is a lemon.
No fact checking, no source verification, simply reprint what someone else has said - even if that someone was yourself!
This reduces what used to be called journalism to simply gossip and hearsay.
Now there might have been a period when Navy was happy to have capability under-rated so that potential foes may take the Collins less seriously, but I am glad that Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN Chief of Navy Australia has written what he has.
Our submariners deserve more respect
MB

Many are getting sick of the constant negativity on the Collins, I responded to the story when posted on LinkedIn as have many others and for once the opinionated armchair experts are in the minority.

 

[ngatimozart]

The ANI have posted some of the winners essays from their essay competition. I've picked two that I believe are very pertinent to the ongoing discussions on here. There is a third one as well but I'm having a think about that one.

This essay is by Sub Lt Theo Squires RAN, and he discusses commerce raiding. Modern thought is that such stratagem has been relegated to the dust of history, but S/LT Squires begs to differ and argues that it is just as relevant today as it was 200 years ago. I tend to agree with him, and he provides some very modern examples of commerce raiding that have occurred in the last few years. It is well worth the read and I would thoroughly recommend it.

The Past, Present and Future of Maritime Trade Warfare – The Australian Naval Institute

The second essay is by Dr John Nash, and he uses the example of the Athenian defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War to discuss the future of the RAN. Athens was a naval power and Sparta a land power. However, Sparta had with Persia funding managed to build up a navy and after the Athenians had overreached themselves in Sicily and their navy destroyed after the Three Battles of the Great Harbour of Syracuse by a newly building Syracusian navy, the Spartans eventually defeating Athens winning the war. What Dr Nash argues is that even though the Peloponnesian War was 2,500 years ago, Australia needs to learn the sessions from the Athenian naval defeat and apply them to the RAN because they still apply today. It is well worth the read and I would thoroughly recommend it.

Maritime lessons from the Peloponnesian War – The Australian Naval Institute

 

[buffy9]

The ANI have posted some of the winners essays from their essay competition. I've picked two that I believe are very pertinent to the ongoing discussions on here. There is a third one as well but I'm having a think about that one.

This essay is by Sub Lt Theo Squires RAN, and he discusses commerce raiding. Modern thought is that such stratagem has been relegated to the dust of history, but S/LT Squires begs to differ and argues that it is just as relevant today as it was 200 years ago. I tend to agree with him, and he provides some very modern examples of commerce raiding that have occurred in the last few years. It is well worth the read and I would thoroughly recommend it.

The Past, Present and Future of Maritime Trade Warfare – The Australian Naval Institute

The second essay is by Dr John Nash, and he uses the example of the Athenian defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War to discuss the future of the RAN. Athens was a naval power and Sparta a land power. However, Sparta had with Persia funding managed to build up a navy and after the Athenians had overreached themselves in Sicily and their navy destroyed after the Three Battles of the Great Harbour of Syracuse by a newly building Syracusian navy, the Spartans eventually defeating Athens winning the war. What Dr Nash argues is that even though the Peloponnesian War was 2,500 years ago, Australia needs to learn the sessions from the Athenian naval defeat and apply them to the RAN because they still apply today. It is well worth the read and I would thoroughly recommend it.

Maritime lessons from the Peloponnesian War – The Australian Naval Institute

Theo Squires' essay is very well written, I only wished he went as in depth into limited commerce warfare and non-war as he did with unrestricted warfare as these can arguably be considered the most contemporary forms of conducting commerce warfare. A lot has certainly changed since World War I and World War II though many of the examples he gives can easily occur today in an altered manner. Whilst auxiliary ships operating undetected may be less of a risk today due to the advancement of technology in sensors and sensor-fusion, the ability for nuclear submarines to conduct similar operations undetected by geo-spatial or even SIGINT means is certainly a threat. The use of submarine launched ASCM/HWT and dispersed sensors (satellites, drones, publically available maritime traffic trackers, etc) could certainly target commerce over a particularly large area. The risk presented to Indian focused shipping commerce by Chinese submarine assets operating in the region (i.e. another potential clash), is of particular note as these can potentially pre-position themselves beyond the straits and remain undetected for months at a time.

I'm inclined to agree that globalised trade has certainly changed the dynamic, increasing the risk associated with conducting such commerce warfare as the loss of key partners could cause more trouble than it is worth. This is particularly true in the vicinity of the major markets around China, South Korea and Japan as these countries are key nodes in the wider globalised economy, increasing the need to conduct limited commerce warfare in order to avoid unintended consequences (i.e. Japan sinking ships destined for South Korea and further damaging ties between the two partners). However "counter-blockade" tactics could be conducted, as demonstrated in the isolated instance of Grace 1 as it sought to indicate it was heading for alternative destinations. I think conducting commerce warfare anywhere around the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea or the East China is a dangerous game that has a serious amount of risks for any kind of commerce raiding. Whether it will happen in this region is another story, outside my understanding of things.

All that said it is definitely not a thing of the past in regards to the wider world. The ability for a submarine to destroy far more assets than it's own worth is what has led to it's rise. The ability for submarines (particularly conventional ones) to pre-position themselves on narrow, strategic straits whereby they can target key force elements or shipping is also a serious capability that shapes the thinking of any enemy. Nothing against the SEA countries, but a lack of highly advanced submarines (almost always German designs of well known capability) exposes them to the hard power influence of other powers with more advanced and larger submarine forces - largely due to the risk such assets can pose to it's own commerce. Impacts on tourism due to perceived threat or the targeting of key export/import shipping could deal a severe human/economic/political blow to any of these powers, thereby shaping their planning on whether they can consider standing up to a power with a significant submarine force that is capable of generating such effects. The sheer geo-strategic effect of a large and capable submarine force is not to be underestimated - noting that time the USS Ohio, USS Florida and USS Michigan (all Ohio-class SSGN - not counting any US SSN or allied SSK/SSN) all surfaced across the Indo-Pacific. Whilst these possessed primarily land attack capabilities, the ability of such a large and capable fleet to target commerce alternatively is certainly a powerful planning factor for any country - particularly for China.

In 2010, the U.S. Navy Surfaced Three Missiles Subs as a Warning to China

US submarines emerge in show of military might

I haven't read through Dr. Nash's report yet, but I will once I have time to mull over it.

 

[ngatimozart]

The ANI have released 4 highly commended essays from their recent essay competition. All are well worth taking the time to read and having a good think about.

Tactics are for losers – The Australian Naval Institute

Trial by Fire – The Australian Naval Institute

Building Sea Power on Values – The Australian Naval Institute

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, Iranian asymmetric doctrine, and Russian corvettes – The Australian Naval Institute I like this one because it's left field and thinking out of the square. It's definitely not something that should be disregarded because it doesn't fit the current CONOPS or ORBAT. It has potential.

Finally, Hugh White has burst into print again, and whilst most of us have disagreed with his latest writings, I think that this one is worthwhile having a read of and a think about because he does raise some valid points. We may not like them, but as every boy scout was taught, "be prepared" and both Australia (& NZ) should not just presume that the US will come to our aid for ever in a day for time immemorial. We presumed that with pomland and look what happened when Japan went on the warpath. Why Australia cannot rely on the US – The Australian Naval Institute

 

[Massive]

Finally, Hugh White has burst into print again, and whilst most of us have disagreed with his latest writings, I think that this one is worthwhile having a read of and a think about because he does raise some valid points. We may not like them, but as every boy scout was taught, "be prepared" and both Australia (& NZ) should not just presume that the US will come to our aid for ever in a day for time immemorial. We presumed that with pomland and look what happened when Japan went on the warpath.

I have a lot of sympathy for Professor White in that he is asking that Australia have a strategy, and that that strategy should be independent continental defence.

However, I do not agree with the force structure Professor White proposes to reflect this strategic stance.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Brucedog]

Regarding any additional LHD for the RAN,

I know they are a great asset, but,

Is the Army happy with troop and equipment capacity of the individual ships?

If not, how much bigger would be enogh?
Is a simple stretch of the existing design enough or would something more complex required?
Would we design out the ski jump? And gain extra landing spot?

 

[ngatimozart]

Regarding any additional LHD for the RAN,

I know they are a great asset, but,

Is the Army happy with troop and equipment capacity of the individual ships?

If not, how much bigger would be enough?
Is a simple stretch of the existing design enough or would something more complex required?
Would we design out the ski jump? And gain extra landing spot?

G'day @Brucedog, welcome to the forum. We look forward to your contributions to the conversations. Please take the time to familiarise yourself with the rules.

I would presume that the army had quite an amount of input during the planning and design phase, because they are the customer.

I would think that going anything larger carries some inherent risks, especially in the modern world where anti ship missiles are numerous, accurate and lethal. For example what does the RAN currently have in its inventory to protect the LHDs from the PRC DF-21 ballistic anti ship missile? What about the various supersonic AShM that are operational? Yes the ship would be escorted by FFGs and DDGs but Chinese tactics are to take out the escorts then go after the phat ships. Then there are the costs of operating a larger ship such as larger crew requirements etc., and personnel are usually the most expensive part. That's my 1 cents worth.

 

[Brucedog]

Thanks for the welcome.

I understand their vulnerability and that we don't have enough high end escorts for a hot war with the PRC.

I was more trying to find out how the ADF and army in particular have advanced in their use of the ships.
They've had time to get experience, iron out any wrinkles and find out if what they envisaged has worked out or they have had to change their plans.

 

[Takao]

The LHDs are a brilliant joint asset - I can't think of any service member who doesn't think they are worth their weight in gold.

We always need more sea lift (gosh - the Allies in 1945 needed more sea lift; the US in 1952 in Korea needed more!) but simply making a bigger LHD has two potential issues - it'll cost more (which may still be cost effective, but what do you give up?) and where do you keep it? They are the largest warships we've had, too much bigger is going to be a struggle to base in Sydney or Perth.

A third one has significant RAN and ARA benefits, but the RAN isn't keen on it as it'll take crew from the Hunter/Hobart ships. When faced with the constant problem of what do you give up, the RAN is not prepared to give up the crew from its front line combatants. Which is understandable. That doesn't begin to consider the running costs and the like.

For the ARA a third LHD - or more accurately, what a third LHD can give - is essential. The ARG cannot lift a Brigade in one hit - and yet a Brigade is the unit of action for the Land Force. You can argue that the ARG will seize the foothold - but then it has to hold for at least 8 days (four days steaming from beach -> SPOE -> beach) which in today's world is not possible. For the Land Force to have a chance of achieving it's mission, the Brigade needs to be put ashore as soon as possible.

The answer to this lies in almost every landing to date - additional civilian shipping and dedicated landing craft lift. A standing contract for sea lift capability that fills the delta between the Brigade and the ARG (+ a % fudge) and a ship that can carry 8 - 10 landing craft (a'la LCM-1E or LCM-8 replacement) would mean the entire Brigade can be landed quickly and the ARG can reduce the number of waves. It's also relatively cheap - a standing contract costs much less than a ship or crew and the Army can use the landing craft as they do now. Critically, it'll also enable the RAN assets to get back to the SPOE quicker - and do other missions.

 

[Todjaeger]

The LHDs are a brilliant joint asset - I can't think of any service member who doesn't think they are worth their weight in gold.

We always need more sea lift (gosh - the Allies in 1945 needed more sea lift; the US in 1952 in Korea needed more!) but simply making a bigger LHD has two potential issues - it'll cost more (which may still be cost effective, but what do you give up?) and where do you keep it? They are the largest warships we've had, too much bigger is going to be a struggle to base in Sydney or Perth.

A third one has significant RAN and ARA benefits, but the RAN isn't keen on it as it'll take crew from the Hunter/Hobart ships. When faced with the constant problem of what do you give up, the RAN is not prepared to give up the crew from its front line combatants. Which is understandable. That doesn't begin to consider the running costs and the like.

For the ARA a third LHD - or more accurately, what a third LHD can give - is essential. The ARG cannot lift a Brigade in one hit - and yet a Brigade is the unit of action for the Land Force. You can argue that the ARG will seize the foothold - but then it has to hold for at least 8 days (four days steaming from beach -> SPOE -> beach) which in today's world is not possible. For the Land Force to have a chance of achieving it's mission, the Brigade needs to be put ashore as soon as possible.

The answer to this lies in almost every landing to date - additional civilian shipping and dedicated landing craft lift. A standing contract for sea lift capability that fills the delta between the Brigade and the ARG (+ a % fudge) and a ship that can carry 8 - 10 landing craft (a'la LCM-1E or LCM-8 replacement) would mean the entire Brigade can be landed quickly and the ARG can reduce the number of waves. It's also relatively cheap - a standing contract costs much less than a ship or crew and the Army can use the landing craft as they do now. Critically, it'll also enable the RAN assets to get back to the SPOE quicker - and do other missions.

I have two questions which arise from the above. The first is, does the Australian merchant marine possess sufficient/appropriate shipping to meet such a need from the ADF, and/or be able to fulfill a standing contract for sealift? The second is, would a replacement (of some sort) for the decommissioned Balikpapan-class LCH be able to potentially ease the sealift burden to any sizable degree?

 

[Takao]

No. Our Merchant Marine can't do it. I'm hoping @ASSAIL might provide some comments/specifics, but from what I've seen, to move what the ARG Can't requires foreign flagged ships. I know that there is at least one study going into see if Defence can work with other departments to reinvigorate the thing, but seeing as that requires the involvement of organisations that the Federal Government finds ... anathematic, it's unlikely to go anywhere.

There is a split about the use and feasibility of the LCH replacement. I confess I am on the side that it's not worth investing in. There has become, as there always is in peacetime, a belief that many small is better than few large, but the LCH is defenceless against so much. That's ok in the 1980s / 90s, but in a world where non-State organisations have the capabilities of a State, it becomes less feasible. You have to plan on escorting all our landing ships - and it's hard to imagine a Hunter or Hobart tagging along with an LCH. Now - if the LCH can keep up with the range and speed of an ARG, that's a different beast. Even then though, it can't carry the self-defence a proper ship can - posing more of a load on the escorts. There is also how much the LCH replacement can carry - if you are moving about half of a mech Brigade, that's a lot of LCHs...

There are some good arguments that in a peace-time or low-contested environment (think, support to PNG drought relief or Timor-Leste in 1999) the LCH can take the load off the LHD / LSD / civilian sea-lift - and that's true. But I tend to think that these missions are 'easy', and while part of our remit, kit that can do these missions normally can't do the high end stuff. The reverse isn't true. A civilian contract or proper RAN amphibs offers the ability to do both high and low end (in fact, the latter can do low end even better often, because an LHD is a low threat but serious demonstration as to Australia's commitment).

 

[seaspear]

Thirty years ago there were approxiamately 100 hundred ships registered in Australia , now its down to 14 , Foreign registered ships avoid safety and wages that are due to Australian registered vessels ,also transporting goods and services by trucks on the roads can be cheaper but there are arguments that trucking companies dont pay apprproiate compensation for the road usage wear and tear of roads ,strategically it may make sense to develop a Australian martime resource ,but it as always comes down to money and the suspicions of the present government that that such a development would only be to protect merchant unions

 

[Brucedog]

I knew this site was a great find. (I'm still working my way through the backlog). So many aspects to consider.

How much more uplift do we need for a Brigade? What would be the best platform, LHD, LSD, LPD, LST?

Could Australia set up an RFA style organisation to reduce manning and costs? Or do our unions make it impossible?
Is something in the Daman LST120 size a possible LCH replacement? Might be a little slow to operate with an ARG? Would 6 be enough if they were suitable? They would also be very handy among the islands in a HADR role.

 

[ASSAIL]

No. Our Merchant Marine can't do it. I'm hoping @ASSAIL might provide some comments/specifics, but from what I've seen, to move what the ARG Can't requires foreign flagged ships. I know that there is at least one study going into see if Defence can work with other departments to reinvigorate the thing, but seeing as that requires the involvement of organisations that the Federal Government finds ... anathematic, it's unlikely to go anywhere.

There is a split about the use and feasibility of the LCH replacement. I confess I am on the side that it's not worth investing in. There has become, as there always is in peacetime, a belief that many small is better than few large, but the LCH is defenceless against so much. That's ok in the 1980s / 90s, but in a world where non-State organisations have the capabilities of a State, it becomes less feasible. You have to plan on escorting all our landing ships - and it's hard to imagine a Hunter or Hobart tagging along with an LCH. Now - if the LCH can keep up with the range and speed of an ARG, that's a different beast. Even then though, it can't carry the self-defence a proper ship can - posing more of a load on the escorts. There is also how much the LCH replacement can carry - if you are moving about half of a mech Brigade, that's a lot of LCHs...

There are some good arguments that in a peace-time or low-contested environment (think, support to PNG drought relief or Timor-Leste in 1999) the LCH can take the load off the LHD / LSD / civilian sea-lift - and that's true. But I tend to think that these missions are 'easy', and while part of our remit, kit that can do these missions normally can't do the high end stuff. The reverse isn't true. A civilian contract or proper RAN amphibs offers the ability to do both high and low end (in fact, the latter can do low end even better often, because an LHD is a low threat but serious demonstration as to Australia's commitment).

There are a number of small barge companies servicing remote communities on the northern coast but by for the biggest, and the biggest fleet owner in Australia, is Seaswift.
Fleet Archives - SEA SWIFT
They also provide a small ship service up to the Torres Str from Cairns (there are pics of their fleet at the link)
However, they are generally slow 8-12kts range and they’re desperately needed to continue to supply the needs of the remote coastal communities who generally have no road access and definitely none in the wet season.
During the ET crisis one of the large VB Perkins (sold to Seaswift) barges ran between Dili continuously during the early period.
All these may be useful in our immediate region but anything further away than say 3 day steam at 8kts (600nms) would be a challenge.

 

[Todjaeger]

Could Australia set up an RFA style organisation to reduce manning and costs? Or do our unions make it impossible? Is something in the Daman LST120 size a possible LCH replacement? Might be a little slow to operate with an ARG? Would 6 be enough if they were suitable? They would also be very handy among the islands in a HADR role.

I had asked a somewhat similar question some time ago (a few years back IIRC) and the basic gist of it was that yes, Australia could setup a RFA-type organization, but it would also require changes be made to existing Australian laws and regulations, as well as new ones be enacted. These changes are required (again, IIRC) due to the need for oversight of the vessels since they would not be proper naval vessels, nor would they really be civilian/commercial merchantmen.

@alexsa could most likely shed more light on the requirements for such an organization to be established in Australia.

Personally, I was thinking of a less exact replacement for the LCH, and was considering something more like a Bacolod City-class logistics support vessel, though I suppose vessels of this size would be more like a direct replacement for HMAS Tobruk.

 

[alexsa]

I had asked a somewhat similar question some time ago (a few years back IIRC) and the basic gist of it was that yes, Australia could setup a RFA-type organization, but it would also require changes be made to existing Australian laws and regulations, as well as new ones be enacted. These changes are required (again, IIRC) due to the need for oversight of the vessels since they would not be proper naval vessels, nor would they really be civilian/commercial merchantmen.

@alexsa could most likely shed more light on the requirements for such an organization to be established in Australia.
Personally, I was thinking of a less exact replacement for the LCH, and was considering something more like a Bacolod City-class logistics support vessel, though I suppose vessels of this size would be more like a direct replacement for HMAS Tobruk.

The original AOR HMAS Supply was supposed to be the first vessel of the new RAFA after WWII, however, manning issues meant that she was operated as the Tide Austral by the RFA before being commissioned as a warship.

The RFA are under the jurisdiction of the MCA as commercial vessels but there are processes and regulations/legislation in place to facilitate combat operations. Where is it determined the vessel are to go in harms way the normal commercial rules cease to apply for that period of time. The vessels are maintained in full commercial survey and certification. The USNS is much the same.

Australia could do this and has two vessels as ‘Naval Auxillaries’ and two non commissioned Cape Class patrol boats. DoD tend to tie themselves in knots trying to have other vessel move in and out of the Auxillary mode. It is a bit of a shambles and if the vessel does not comply with relevant conventions then switching back becomes difficult.

So it could be done but at the moment there is no mature system in place ..... and it is needed of this were to be be done.

The union issue is separate but civilian seafarers are currently employed on the ADV Ocean Protector so that does not appear to be a game stopper. Again the RFA and USNS have their own Civilian seafarers directly employed and civilian qualified. Under the RFA process these conform to civil quals.

The appropriate legislation/regulations, processes and vessel management systems are all critical to making this work. We have none of those at the moment.

There would be some sense in the AOR’s, LSD(A) and support vessels all being under a RAFA.

 

[Volkodav]

Part of the solution could be a modern APD, i.e. fast assault transport. In WWII these ships were converted from WWI type flush deck destroyers and modified Destroyer Escorts (US for frigates). Modern equivalents would be the Danish Absalon class support ship at the high end and a modified OPV or corvette at the lower end, but perhaps with a docking well for an LCU as well as a multi mission deck.

USN LCU have a similar capacity to our now retired LCH, but are designed to fit in the docking wells of big amphibs. Jumping on the USN LCU replacement program could be an option.

As for LSV type options, why not let the army (or even army reserve) operate them? They have similar heavy vehicle capacity to Tobruk, but much lower crewing requirements and operational costs, while also being ideal for HADR and logistics.

Then there are various options for larger logistics and amphib ships. Japanese and Singaporean takes on LSTs are interesting. One with a through flight deck / vehicle deck and docking well, but no separate hangar, the other resembling a mini LPD. At the larger end there are the USN style seabase and prepositoning ships or the expensive multi role ships such as the Dutch Karel Dorman.

As for defending these assets, some could have fully networked organic systems making them contributors to overall task force defence. The other option that appears to have potential is lashing army systems to the deck and letting them help defend their transport. It would be a no brainer to ensure the new army AD systems integrate with the task force capabilities.

 

[thatsamguy]

I see that ADF is sending HMAS Choules, MV Sycamore, 1x Chinook, 2x Black Hawks, 1x MRH-90 and 2x C27J's down to East Gippsland to assist. Best wishes and luck to all involved.

1. Does anyone know if HMAS Choules is the currently designated HADR vessel? Or have they accelerated her readiness?
2. As an aviation training vessel, how would we expect MV Sycamore to be used? (it's certainly of a decent size) What is she fitted with to be of best use?

Ref: https://www.theage.com.au/national/...victoria-counts-the-cost-20191231-p53nyi.html