Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter icelord
- Start date
- Status
They now have an industry component agreement.
Arguably it was the most critical point of tension in the whole program. Now that is out of the way things can move forward.
It is significant how much local capability had eroded since Collins.
We couldn't build a local Collins ground up if we wanted to. Think how many small and medium engineering and naval firms have gone bust since the late 80's. Many long lead items were manufactured together or in batches. A lot of entities died when the last of the work dried up and the AUD went to the moon and industry left in droves (2000, for lots of reasons).
Again Japan is not interested in manufacturing Subs for Australia. They have their own sub program, and they are trying to increase sub production capability. Tony Abbott wanted something that didn't exist. US, UK and France are all pretty much in the same position. We would need to fund a completely new production line at a greenfield site, (which again they don't want, they don't understand why we want them to take on the risk, rather than on ourselves). The fact we don't want to do it locally means no one else will do it.
So again, we have to build it here. The French sub has the capability. There are very little concerns about capability. It was always the build program that was going to be the issue.
Arguably it was the most critical point of tension in the whole program. Now that is out of the way things can move forward.
It is significant how much local capability had eroded since Collins.
We couldn't build a local Collins ground up if we wanted to. Think how many small and medium engineering and naval firms have gone bust since the late 80's. Many long lead items were manufactured together or in batches. A lot of entities died when the last of the work dried up and the AUD went to the moon and industry left in droves (2000, for lots of reasons).
Again Japan is not interested in manufacturing Subs for Australia. They have their own sub program, and they are trying to increase sub production capability. Tony Abbott wanted something that didn't exist. US, UK and France are all pretty much in the same position. We would need to fund a completely new production line at a greenfield site, (which again they don't want, they don't understand why we want them to take on the risk, rather than on ourselves). The fact we don't want to do it locally means no one else will do it.
So again, we have to build it here. The French sub has the capability. There are very little concerns about capability. It was always the build program that was going to be the issue.
Stingray, I found your comments about Japan not being interested in building subs for Australia bemusing.
There were multiple reports of the their disappointment all over the media, and their PM even demanded an explanation. Japan wants explanation on failed submarine bid, Abbott confident partnership will stay strong - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
As for transit speed not being fast enough, I’m sure that could have been addressed , just changing nuclear power with conventional power. This French contract was originally $50 billion and is now at what $80 billion?!!
Takao
The Bunker Group
It's the same number.
The $50 b was in constant (ie, 2016 (?) dollars), the $80 b is in out-turned (ie, 2016+2017+2018+2019+...+2033). We haven't explained it well (and beyond 'it sounds better', which is silly) I have no idea why we started using constant - it was always going to complicate matters.
But - you can't hit the French, the Navy or the Government with that stick.
Japan was politically interested in the submarine contract. It made sense politically. Australia was a strong country that could project power, had significant US influence and would make an excellent ally, beyond any relationship with the US. A military project like that would keep the countries bonded, strongly.
Japan was industrially not-interested in the submarine contract. Another Japanese production line? Which company would get that and take on that risk? Australia is a demanding customer, and the amount of changes became, very significant. Japan was also stunned how open Australia was on the submarine program and build.
Diplomatically the Japanese were openly disappointed. IMO the Japanese should have been informed they weren't in the running so they could have gracefully exited by strategic withdrawal. Of course that wasn't possible in the way that Australia operates, and no one was going to do that. Tony wasn't in the chair and Malcom, well Malcom wasn't going to interfere with the process.
Tony Abbott wrote personally to Shinzo Abe after Japan lost Australia's $50 billion subs deal
Tony Abbott has written a personal letter to Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe following Australia’s surprise decision to award its submarine contract to French firm DCNS. As prime minister, Abbott openly supported Japan building a replacement fleet of submarines for Australia but was pushed...
www.businessinsider.com.au
Australia’s Submarine Purchase: an Unnecessary Snub to Japan - Australian Institute of International Affairs
With Australia’s recent decision on submarine design, the flawed regional politics tainted a technically right outcome. Choosing the French bidder has significant implications, particularly for […]
www.internationalaffairs.org.au
Why Japan Lost the Bid to Build Australia’s New Subs
How did the onetime frontrunner fail in its bid to build Australia’s next-generation submarine?
thediplomat.com
Sure things could be adjusted, and no one is not acknowledging Japans capability and abilities. But this was their first Rodeo.
IMO both France and Japan (politics) probably didn't realize (or in Frances case, care) how much local content would become an issue and one they would be in the middle of. Japan industrially knew and became very less enthused. TBH a whole submarine build is probably the wrong project to start a friendship on. Way to stressful. A great way to two friends to become enemies is to go into business together.
Japan and Australia will and are sharing tech on submarines. This is a two way thing. Not long after the Australian sub selection. Japan investigated and is looking at technologies like photonic masts and other areas Japan was found to be "traditional". Japan may also want to operate their subs differently and give them added capabilities, Australia would be a great nation to partner with on those kind of ideas.
The sub project is huge. As a very senior scientist said at a conference I was at "Its bigger than the NBN". Someone yelled back "the NBN has had blow outs of billions" at which he retorted "its still going to be bigger than the NBN."
It seems to me to be the same approach the ADF/RAAF took with APA and the F-35 - ignore them.
the main reason is that it is difficult to reason with a fanatic. You can’t discuss very much because of the classified nature of the program. As a result the strategy is not to respond at all, or at most provide infrequent, simple statements.This stops ‘feeding the troll’ or denies the argument the oxygen it needs to keep burning.
Actually there has been a bit of change of tone from some media outlets since the deal on local content was announced. Mr Sheridan did a good job on Peta Credlin and other articles such as this
It's full steam ahead for Australia's submarine construction project - by Gregor Ferguson | Australian Manufacturing Forum
are starting to come out. These are a sensible discourse on the need for a large vessels that debunks much of the noise. Sadly if you read the Collins Class Submarine story you will see Australia went through precisely the same thing when this boat was being considered.
The Collins Class Submarine Story, Steel, Spies and Spin by Peter Yule | 9780521868945 | Booktopia
Hopefully with 12 boats and a continuous build programme we will not find ourselves repeating history ................ again. If you look at the process of purchasing the Oberon's, and even the 1925 O Class preceding them, it is clear we did not learn much previously.
Another surprisingly rational piece from the Oz (sourced via Defence paid account) about the sub program and an important take on the costings debate :
"Short of nuclear subs, we won't do better than these
The Australian Thursday 4th March 2021 at 12:00am
Australia's 12 French Naval Group submarines are on budget and on time, according to the Australian National Audit Office.
But wait! There's more. Far from experiencing a cost blowout, there have been cost savings in the past 12 months. This is confirmed by comparing the 2020-21 defence portfolio additional estimates with the 2019-20 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook.
The French subs have been subject to the most hysterical, fact-free campaign of demonisation that I've seen for any major defence project. The government has failed appallingly in broadcasting a consistent narrative on subs. As much as any nation in the world, Australia needs submarines. Because of our geography they have to be long range.
The best long-range subs are nuclear-powered but there is no prospect at all, none, that we could get nuclear subs without a nuclear industry. No country that has nuclear subs does not have some nuclear industry. You need hundreds of nuclear-qualified engineers and technicians to run them, elaborate nuclear facilities to sustain them and an established, bipartisan political consensus. I support nuclear energy. I wrote my first column advocating it more than 40 years ago. But we cannot wait until we win the nuclear debate before we get new subs.
The costs of the French subs are reasonable, indeed inevitable. They have not blown out. Before the competitive evaluation process chose the French and we decided on a fleet of 12 subs and that we would build them in Australia, Defence officials told a Senate estimates committee the total cost of the project might be around $50bn in out-turned dollars.
The difference between constant price and out-turned dollars is critical in all the confusion.
Cutting metal for the subs is due to begin in 2023. The first boat will be fully approved for service in 2034. The last will be commissioned in the early 2050s.
Out-turned dollars is a concept that takes account of inflation, currency valuations and the like over the time span under consideration. So a 2016 figure of $50bn is calculated as about $90bn in out-turned dollars by the 2050s. The constant slide between these different types of dollars has led to much of the confusion.
The government announced the program in early 2016. By then we knew it was 12 subs, regionally superior in performance and range, built entirely in Australia as the heart of a new naval shipbuilding industry. Naturally, that's expensive.
The cost estimate for this was $50bn in 2016 constant dollars. That is still the estimate today. Costs have not risen since then. Everything you have heard to the effect that there have been cost blowouts is simply wrong.
The figure of 2016 $50bn constant translates into $90bn outturned. The drop in costs I mentioned at the start comes from $89.7bn in out-turned dollars in MYEFO to $88.5bn in the 2020-21 additional portfolio estimates. So that's nearly $1.5bn we've saved.
In fact, it must surely be more than that. In May the Finance Department said the costs estimate had risen from $80bn to $90bn in out-turned dollars because of currency movements. At that time, the Aussie dollar was worth US64c and 58 euro cents. Now the Aussie is worth US80c and 65 euro cents. So you can be just about sure that the cost has fallen further by billions of dollars.
In reality, these out-turned figures are entirely notional. Who knows what a dollar will be worth in 2050? There is a lifetime operations and sustainment cost for the subs of some $145bn in outturned dollars. Add that to $90bn out-turned dollars for construction and you get an eye-watering $235bn. But if the last boat is commissioned in 2050 it will stay in operation until the 2080s.
That means we are making cost estimates over a longer period than between the Boer War and the Beatles. That's nuts, entirely meaningless, pure gobbledygook. Yet it is used as an argument against the subs. There is simply no way we can produce a regionally superior sub, built in Australia, much cheaper than we are now. The competitive evaluation process thought all bidders - French, German and Japanese - would end up costing comparable amounts. So would any alternative. There is no off-the-shelf sub that does what Australia needs. That means there has to be a new design.
A huge part of the cost goes not to the submarine manufacturer but to Lockheed Martin, which will provide the magnificent US combat system. Buying that, integrating it into a new sub and making it work will cost many billions of dollars, no matter which sub we build.
Building in Australia also costs. But there are four compelling reasons for building here.
In such a complex, peoplecentric system as a sub, you can maintain it much better if you build it yourself. Second, we saw even in COVID that international supply chains are fragile. We need to be able to build and sustain our most important defence gear ourselves, where possible. Third, it's the heart of a new industry. And perhaps most important, with huge defence programs, if you don't spend most of the dollars in Australia you risk having insufficient political weight to keep the program going. Governments searching for money endlessly postpone such projects.
This is what happened to the subs under the Rudd and Gillard governments. The previous Labor government is the real villain of our subs troubles. Six years of doing absolutely nothing of consequence about subs under Labor put us so far behind.
And there are no short cuts. The government is examining a Swedish alternative to Naval Group. This is probably designed to keep the French honest. If we pull out now and start all over again the government completely humiliates itself, massively dislocates industry and demonstrates that six years of Coalition government have been as worthless and costly as six years of Labor. And we will wait even more years.
We are about to sign the next work phase contract with the French, so this is the last off-ramp. We should avoid it.
That's not to say the French can't be difficult. But Naval Group is one of the most powerful submarine building companies in the world. As Admiral James Goldrick puts it, subs are the “apex predators of maritime conflict”. They are our most important military capability, our only real offensive capability. The program should give us the world's best conventional submarines - unless we destroy it with hopeless politics, uninformed comment, narrative inattention and government dilatoriness."
"Short of nuclear subs, we won't do better than these
The Australian Thursday 4th March 2021 at 12:00am
Australia's 12 French Naval Group submarines are on budget and on time, according to the Australian National Audit Office.
But wait! There's more. Far from experiencing a cost blowout, there have been cost savings in the past 12 months. This is confirmed by comparing the 2020-21 defence portfolio additional estimates with the 2019-20 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook.
The French subs have been subject to the most hysterical, fact-free campaign of demonisation that I've seen for any major defence project. The government has failed appallingly in broadcasting a consistent narrative on subs. As much as any nation in the world, Australia needs submarines. Because of our geography they have to be long range.
The best long-range subs are nuclear-powered but there is no prospect at all, none, that we could get nuclear subs without a nuclear industry. No country that has nuclear subs does not have some nuclear industry. You need hundreds of nuclear-qualified engineers and technicians to run them, elaborate nuclear facilities to sustain them and an established, bipartisan political consensus. I support nuclear energy. I wrote my first column advocating it more than 40 years ago. But we cannot wait until we win the nuclear debate before we get new subs.
The costs of the French subs are reasonable, indeed inevitable. They have not blown out. Before the competitive evaluation process chose the French and we decided on a fleet of 12 subs and that we would build them in Australia, Defence officials told a Senate estimates committee the total cost of the project might be around $50bn in out-turned dollars.
The difference between constant price and out-turned dollars is critical in all the confusion.
Cutting metal for the subs is due to begin in 2023. The first boat will be fully approved for service in 2034. The last will be commissioned in the early 2050s.
Out-turned dollars is a concept that takes account of inflation, currency valuations and the like over the time span under consideration. So a 2016 figure of $50bn is calculated as about $90bn in out-turned dollars by the 2050s. The constant slide between these different types of dollars has led to much of the confusion.
The government announced the program in early 2016. By then we knew it was 12 subs, regionally superior in performance and range, built entirely in Australia as the heart of a new naval shipbuilding industry. Naturally, that's expensive.
The cost estimate for this was $50bn in 2016 constant dollars. That is still the estimate today. Costs have not risen since then. Everything you have heard to the effect that there have been cost blowouts is simply wrong.
The figure of 2016 $50bn constant translates into $90bn outturned. The drop in costs I mentioned at the start comes from $89.7bn in out-turned dollars in MYEFO to $88.5bn in the 2020-21 additional portfolio estimates. So that's nearly $1.5bn we've saved.
In fact, it must surely be more than that. In May the Finance Department said the costs estimate had risen from $80bn to $90bn in out-turned dollars because of currency movements. At that time, the Aussie dollar was worth US64c and 58 euro cents. Now the Aussie is worth US80c and 65 euro cents. So you can be just about sure that the cost has fallen further by billions of dollars.
In reality, these out-turned figures are entirely notional. Who knows what a dollar will be worth in 2050? There is a lifetime operations and sustainment cost for the subs of some $145bn in outturned dollars. Add that to $90bn out-turned dollars for construction and you get an eye-watering $235bn. But if the last boat is commissioned in 2050 it will stay in operation until the 2080s.
That means we are making cost estimates over a longer period than between the Boer War and the Beatles. That's nuts, entirely meaningless, pure gobbledygook. Yet it is used as an argument against the subs. There is simply no way we can produce a regionally superior sub, built in Australia, much cheaper than we are now. The competitive evaluation process thought all bidders - French, German and Japanese - would end up costing comparable amounts. So would any alternative. There is no off-the-shelf sub that does what Australia needs. That means there has to be a new design.
A huge part of the cost goes not to the submarine manufacturer but to Lockheed Martin, which will provide the magnificent US combat system. Buying that, integrating it into a new sub and making it work will cost many billions of dollars, no matter which sub we build.
Building in Australia also costs. But there are four compelling reasons for building here.
In such a complex, peoplecentric system as a sub, you can maintain it much better if you build it yourself. Second, we saw even in COVID that international supply chains are fragile. We need to be able to build and sustain our most important defence gear ourselves, where possible. Third, it's the heart of a new industry. And perhaps most important, with huge defence programs, if you don't spend most of the dollars in Australia you risk having insufficient political weight to keep the program going. Governments searching for money endlessly postpone such projects.
This is what happened to the subs under the Rudd and Gillard governments. The previous Labor government is the real villain of our subs troubles. Six years of doing absolutely nothing of consequence about subs under Labor put us so far behind.
And there are no short cuts. The government is examining a Swedish alternative to Naval Group. This is probably designed to keep the French honest. If we pull out now and start all over again the government completely humiliates itself, massively dislocates industry and demonstrates that six years of Coalition government have been as worthless and costly as six years of Labor. And we will wait even more years.
We are about to sign the next work phase contract with the French, so this is the last off-ramp. We should avoid it.
That's not to say the French can't be difficult. But Naval Group is one of the most powerful submarine building companies in the world. As Admiral James Goldrick puts it, subs are the “apex predators of maritime conflict”. They are our most important military capability, our only real offensive capability. The program should give us the world's best conventional submarines - unless we destroy it with hopeless politics, uninformed comment, narrative inattention and government dilatoriness."
Pusser Tas
New Member
Hi DDG38,
A very good article
A very good article
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
That was actually the first i had heard of the RAN operating 1925 O Class Subs before they were transferred to the RN in 1931, thanks for the info.
The Loss of HMS Oxley 1939 - Naval Historical Society of Australia
With kind permission of the Submarine Association of Australia magazine ‘In Depth’ HMS Oxley was the first British submarine casualty of the War and the circumstances of her loss were
www.navyhistory.org.au
Article by Greg Sheridan, their Foreign Affairs editor, and in my estimation one of the few opinion writers in News Ltd outletsin Australia who deserves to be called a journalist. He's not a diamond hard centrist applying a resolutely and precisely balanced view, but he *is* only a soft conservative voice with the balls to call out nonsense from either extreme of politics.
On submarines he initially supported the Soryu option but strictly on geopolitical lines and said as much. He's since written more and more positively and his opinion pieces have contained more understanding of Defence realities and less of political fantasies like those of Abbot. Better yet, he is willing to point out that the finance editor (Gottliebson) has no clothes.
Sheridan is a proper journalist. The world needs more of them on both sides of political reporting who are willing to change their opinion when their information changes.
oldsig
3rd OPV taking shape (Image source ADF Image Library link):
"Secretary of the Department of Defence Mr Greg Moriarty, and Head of Maritime Systems Rear Admiral Wendy Malcolm CSC, RAN, officially opened the Off-Shore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Enterprise Office at Henderson shipyard in Western Australia on 4 March 2021. The OPV Enterprise Office is a joint effort between industry and the Commonwealth that will oversee the Arafura Class vessels from construction through transition and into service. Following the opening, the Secretary of Defence, Rear Admiral Malcolm and attendees were taken on a tour of the facility to view the construction of ‘Pilbara’, the third of twelve OPVs to be constructed to replace the Armidale Class Patrol Boats."
"Secretary of the Department of Defence Mr Greg Moriarty, and Head of Maritime Systems Rear Admiral Wendy Malcolm CSC, RAN, officially opened the Off-Shore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Enterprise Office at Henderson shipyard in Western Australia on 4 March 2021. The OPV Enterprise Office is a joint effort between industry and the Commonwealth that will oversee the Arafura Class vessels from construction through transition and into service. Following the opening, the Secretary of Defence, Rear Admiral Malcolm and attendees were taken on a tour of the facility to view the construction of ‘Pilbara’, the third of twelve OPVs to be constructed to replace the Armidale Class Patrol Boats."
Crikey, they are getting into them aren't they.
Number three hull already.
What is scheduled for this yard when the Arafuras are finished?
MB
Mine countermeasure and hydro vessels surely? It's what we've been told for a couple of years now.
oldsig
Yes, I had forgotten that.
Apparently the MCM will be based on a variant of the Arafura class. Perhaps larger - as is the OPV90
I wonder how many?
MB
Will be interesting what the MCM / Hydro version is based.
Just the Standard Arafura OPV 80 with some add on SEA chests of goodies specific to the task.
The same vessel with integrated systems for the above tasks, or in fact a larger modified vessel like the OPV 90.
It's pure speculation at this point, but I do await the development within this area with interest.
A recent article in the Navy magazine certainly stressed the need for a robust MCM capability and had concerns that a total of eight vessels in this realm would be insufficient. While an increase in numbers could be called for across all platforms within the services maybe platform adaptability will help.
The Arafura Class are touted as a flexible platform to perform a range of missions as is; therefore it will be interesting to see what actually can be achieved with this vessel across a broad range of missions within the standard fit out of weapons and systems the ship has when entering service.
First vessel hopefully commissioned at the end of the year so we will start to see what this new capability brings to the RAN.
Regards S
Still want to mount a 16" cannon up front and a F35B on the flight deck
There were plans to build 20 OCVs to replace the patrol boat, hydrographic and MCMs and it looks like that might be the number they eventually end up with. It looks like they will be based on the Arafura class but whether it is an entirely suitable design is another question. When I look at something like the Dutch/Belgium MCM mothership concept I see a ship which is almost twice the displacement of the Arafura.
Interesting to look at the different build process between ASC and CIVMEC. ASC built two mega blocks and joined them while CIVMEC are combining blocks into the hull directly. No wrong or right in this but it appears that ASC are working on the large block process that will underpin the Hunter build.
It’s down to the size of the assembly hall that was available to ASC to use for the first two; it was one used for DDG super blocks and is only long enough to fit half the hull, although wide enough to fit the halves more or less side by side. The two large assembly halls that will be used for the HCF were not complete, and therefore not available
The new build halls at both Obsorne and Henderson are just massive.
Osborne 190m x 90 m x 50m high
Henderson Civmec/Foracs hall is130mx 40m x 70m 187m x ~120m x 70m (in the centre bay)
How big is the older ASC Osborne hall? Half the length of the new B11 one? It was sized around Collins class ~ 100m.
So much more floor space for production. Look at all the steel fabrication space. Woohee.. Once production steps up they should really get some rhythm going.
Henderson is a bit smaller. They have some optimizations for smaller ships, the assembly hall has side preparation areas and there is a specific capability where you can drive a whole OPV through a "carwash" type paint facility.
IMO a 80-90m vessel would be a good size for MCM. High levels of automation such as shown on the Dutch/Belgium mcm would be attractive. I like the way its configured.
However, it seems very likely they will be built off the Arafura OPV80 class hull. This will bring the build up to 20, which is pretty much the original OCV number. By churning out ships based off the same hull and configuration, costs should be significantly reduced. I am a big fan of decent sized production runs. Not ordering just 2 or 3 ships, but ~20. Thus allowing the design and construction to both be optimized and support systems to find efficiencies.
Osborne 190m x 90 m x 50m high
Henderson Civmec/Foracs hall is
How big is the older ASC Osborne hall? Half the length of the new B11 one? It was sized around Collins class ~ 100m.
So much more floor space for production. Look at all the steel fabrication space. Woohee.. Once production steps up they should really get some rhythm going.
Henderson is a bit smaller. They have some optimizations for smaller ships, the assembly hall has side preparation areas and there is a specific capability where you can drive a whole OPV through a "carwash" type paint facility.
IMO a 80-90m vessel would be a good size for MCM. High levels of automation such as shown on the Dutch/Belgium mcm would be attractive. I like the way its configured.
However, it seems very likely they will be built off the Arafura OPV80 class hull. This will bring the build up to 20, which is pretty much the original OCV number. By churning out ships based off the same hull and configuration, costs should be significantly reduced. I am a big fan of decent sized production runs. Not ordering just 2 or 3 ships, but ~20. Thus allowing the design and construction to both be optimized and support systems to find efficiencies.
Last edited:
- Status