Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Richo99]

We only have a dozen Phalanx so we are going to have to buy something else for the future frigate. It wouldn't surprise me if this ended up as a fleet wide replacement of the Mk15 Blk 1B.

I think both the Type 26 and FREMM designs have provision for 2 X CIWS. I guess an argument could also be made for buying additional systems for the OPV.

The Australian Navy currently has three intermediate calibre cannon in service, including the 20 mm Phalanx, the 25 mm Typhoon and the 30 mm cannon on the Huon class MCMVs. Apparently a fourth calibre will be introduced with the new OPVs...likely a 40m gun of some variety. Its pretty obvious to me that there needs to be some rationalisation.

The first step should be the removal of the 30mm guns from the Huon class and replacing them with 25 mm Typhoons.

The second step should be the retirement of the Phalanx as it is totally outclassed by modern anti ship missiles.

As many on this forum have suggested, the Millennium Gun is an obvious contender to replace it, and in my opinion should be installed on the OPVs as well, providing these vessels with a potent close in weapon against both aerial and surface targets.

The opportunity then presents itself for the conversion of the Phalanx into Searam launchers for installation on the LHD and possibly Choules and the Supply class replenishment ships. They could also potentially be mounted on a shipping container for installation as required on the OPVs.

With a Millenium Gun, containerised Searam, rotary UAV, and the further installation of a lightweight anti ship missile (I'm thinking Spike NLOS), plus podsibly APKWS II from the UAV, the OPVs would be a potent little LCS vessel for use in low intensity littoral operations (where no submarine threat exists).

 

[alexsa]

Re the VLS discussion:
I get that the vertical launch profile is preferred, especially for rapid response ordinance.
I get that 'muzzle loading' is implied for these, there is only so much lower deck space available which excludes a logical 'breech loading' solution for a VERTICAL launch cell.
But these AA rounds are typically smaller/lighter, correct? There must be a crane/winch solution somewhere, surely?
What about the longer, and heavier, strike (VLS) cells being mounted at an angle, say eg 45deg? - Harpoon is!
This might facilitate a more practical internal replacement magazine arrangement and allow a more stable 'breech load' solution.

I feel, as I've tried to state previously, that the ability to reload is a substantial force multiplier.
Simplistically, for example the ability to 100% reload your VLS ineffect gives you the combat endurance capability of 2 ships for the price of one.
Surely this would mean an astonishing leap in effectiveness of deployed forces for a navy the size of the RAN.
That would be a doubling of capability of deployed assets.

I feel the only reason no one has bothered to engineer a fix to this so far is purely because contemporary naval ops have had the luxury to not require large ammunition expenditure, or numbers of assets (ships) being tactically required to replace those forced to retire from the AO.

Just sayin.

Sorry .... I have had it with this. Ships roll! It’s a fact of life. Even if the launcher was on an angle this is not going to be simple evolution in a sea way but can be done in fair weather. Missiles do not like being bashed about. SeaCat, and first generation of Seawolf, were hand loaded and for a small missile this could still be fun in weather. RAM can be loaded at sea as the missile can be man handled but the same applies. Drop a $1M missile and folk are going to get pissed,

To put it in context:
1. Mk13 and it siblings could not be reloaded at sea.... for Mk 13 you had a maximum of 40 missiles and no quad packing
2. Your AORs have to be able to store the reloads (so how any should it carry) and be able to transfer them ..... remember that weather thing!!!
3. My41 quad pack allows one Hobart class DDG to carry 32 ESSM BkII (yes we are getting the fire and forget version) and 40 strike length missiles various. Lets face it .... in a combat situation they will not be alone. Even if there is one other vessel (assume it is the ANZAC replacement) and only has 32 cells this could add another 32 ESSM and 24 other strike length missiles.
4. ESSM (block 1 as well) has hacked Mach 2 targets using the SAAB-CEA combination in combat simulations ..... that is friggin impressive ..... and is going to sea on the future frigate (or destroyer)
5. NULKA and other soft kill are effective and the opposition need to know wher you are.
6. The RAN is not getting CAMM ....

I am a fan of more cells and like the idea of SeaRAM but lets face it the SSG will be our forward offensive unit and I don’t see anybody suggesting we resupply torpedoes at sea (which would be a bastard of an evolution and entail considerable risk). I would like to see something better than the 25mm bushmaster but it is still a useful weapon and supported in the current supply chain.

Finally reloading at sea will not necessarily be a force multiply unless your support vessel are with you in the combat zone ..... not always on option.

So in so far as fitting cranes (which take up 6 cells and can only be used within weather limitations), redesigning ships to have multiple gun systems etc etc etc .... can I suggest we all take a breath.

 

[spoz]

Mk13 and it siblings could not be reloaded at sea.... for Mk 13 you had a maximum of 40 missiles and no quad packing

Mk 13 could be reloaded at sea -I’ve done it. But it’s a pain in the a*** and takes a very long time - it’s an unrealistic thing to do in any real world situation. And it can’t handle either SM3 or SM6.

The rest I totally agree with - although each Hobart can carry 32 ESSM and 40 others; not just one. So two DDGs plus a couple of ANZACs = a hell of a lot of engagements.

 

[Boagrius]

Sorry .... I have had it with this. Ships roll! It’s a fact of life. Even if the launcher was on an angle this is not going to be simple evolution in a sea way but can be done in fair weather. Missiles do not like being bashed about. SeaCat, and first generation of Seawolf, were hand loaded and for a small missile this could still be fun in weather. RAM can be loaded at sea as the missile can be man handled but the same applies. Drop a $1M missile and folk are going to get pissed,

To put it in context:
1. Mk13 and it siblings could not be reloaded at sea.... for Mk 13 you had a maximum of 40 missiles and no quad packing
2. Your AORs have to be able to store the reloads (so how any should it carry) and be able to transfer them ..... remember that weather thing!!!
3. My41 quad pack allows one Hobart class DDG to carry 32 ESSM BkII (yes we are getting the fire and forget version) and 40 strike length missiles various. Lets face it .... in a combat situation they will not be alone. Even if there is one other vessel (assume it is the ANZAC replacement) and only has 32 cells this could add another 32 ESSM and 24 other strike length missiles.
4. ESSM (block 1 as well) has hacked Mach 2 targets using the SAAB-CEA combination in combat simulations ..... that is friggin impressive ..... and is going to sea on the future frigate (or destroyer)
5. NULKA and other soft kill are effective and the opposition need to know wher you are.
6. The RAN is not getting CAMM ....

I am a fan of more cells and like the idea of SeaRAM but lets face it the SSG will be our forward offensive unit and I don’t see anybody suggesting we resupply torpedoes at sea (which would be a bastard of an evolution and entail considerable risk). I would like to see something better than the 25mm bushmaster but it is still a useful weapon and supported in the current supply chain.

Finally reloading at sea will not necessarily be a force multiply unless your support vessel are with you in the combat zone ..... not always on option.

So in so far as fitting cranes (which take up 6 cells and can only be used within weather limitations), redesigning ships to have multiple gun systems etc etc etc .... can I suggest we all take a breath.

No doubt we're on track to field a very capable fleet of surface combatants.

I think the thing that potentially gets people carried away is the rather mind boggling expansion we're seeing in both the quality and quantity of Chinese naval/anti-ship assets. A mach 2 AShM may start to look positively pedestrian when many of their missiles are even quicker than that already?

That said I suppose it all boils down to behind-the-scenes modelling of various contingencies and what force structure is deemed to be an appropriate response to the above. Suffice it to say I'm happy not to be an ADF force planner!

 

[StingrayOZ]

I think if the ships needed to be reloaded or re-armed Singapore would be an obvious port. If things do heat up I think we would go from peacetime loadouts, to war time. So there may be other better options than trying to do that at sea. Philippines, Guam and Vietnam are not impossibilities either. Didn't India recently lose a submarine while reloading it? (INS Sindhurakshak (S63) - Wikipedia) portside?.

With bigger missiles you are going to be limited to what you have on hand, so 48 cells worth on the DDG. ESSM, I think there is a better option of a self defence launcher. SeaRAM I think is worthy of being procured, and the Phalanx can be moved onto lower risk platforms, perhaps the AOR, LHD or even the OPV's. If you remove the Phalanx and replace with SeaRAM then upgrading the bushmaster to 30 or 40mm with a coaxial .50, would be a worth while upgrade layers of defence. Putting 3 SeaRAM into the Phalanx pool would be fairly straight forward and really give a larger inner bubble and options.

If we want to keep ignoring Chinese instructions to keep out of the South China Sea, then we will need options.

 

[Todjaeger]

Here is a question which occurred to me. What would provide better 360 degree CIWS gun coverage, a pair of guns mounted fore and aft, or port and starboard?

I am inclined to think coverage would be better with CIWS mounted fore and aft, since that would potentially permit two CIWS to fire at inbound AShM or FAC targeting the port of starboard of a ship where there is a much larger target silhouette. There would of course only be a single CIWS able to be trained on AShM or FAC attacking the bow or stern, but those parts have a much narrower profile.

 

[aussienscale]

Here is a question which occurred to me. What would provide better 360 degree CIWS gun coverage, a pair of guns mounted fore and aft, or port and starboard?

I am inclined to think coverage would be better with CIWS mounted fore and aft, since that would potentially permit two CIWS to fire at inbound AShM or FAC targeting the port of starboard of a ship where there is a much larger target silhouette. There would of course only be a single CIWS able to be trained on AShM or FAC attacking the bow or stern, but those parts have a much narrower profile.

The answer is.....it depends depends on the ship and its design, every type and class of ship have different weapons and sensor arcs. Depending of what you are talking about, the role of the ship etc, there are overlapping arcs, but you also have margins of safety for the ship and crew, it is all a compromise verses a lot of different factors.

There is a fair bit of discussion if you do a search, pretty sure we discussed it on here some time ago with GF and Abe from memory but can't remember what thread it was ?

Cheers

Edit:

Have not read it all but this gives some idea of the issues

Grand Logistics: Warship Weapon And Sensor Arcs

 

[StingrayOZ]

The Italians generally and some others go that way, It seems to make a fair bit of sense. But it usually then can make things tight for other things you might want like a large VLS, helo etc. Somewhere you have to compromise and find balance.

IMO having an expensive shortrange missile system like SeaRAM at the back where it has a wide firing arc is ideal, then your cheaper gun based systems where the arcs are maybe not ideal but you can afford and mount multiple systems.

Going with seaRAM and 2 x 30mm 0r 35mm or super 40mm guns would be a world a difference over a Phalanx and 2 x 25mm. With super 40, you won't have as many rounds, but they will be much smarter and much more devastating and more likely to get a kill. With a .50 bmg you still have something useful for all those other non combat stuff.

It would be great to mount a 76mm behind the 5" or even just a millenium gun, but isn't going to fit.

 

[Todjaeger]

The answer is.....it depends depends on the ship and its design, every type and class of ship have different weapons and sensor arcs. Depending of what you are talking about, the role of the ship etc, there are overlapping arcs, but you also have margins of safety for the ship and crew, it is all a compromise verses a lot of different factors.

There is a fair bit of discussion if you do a search, pretty sure we discussed it on here some time ago with GF and Abe from memory but can't remember what thread it was ?

Cheers

Edit:

Have not read it all but this gives some idea of the issues

Grand Logistics: Warship Weapon And Sensor Arcs

What I was thinking of were RAN frigates and destroyers, and whether it would be better to have a CIWS in the P and W/X positions, or the P1 & S1 positions from the linked page. Of course there would need to be some work done on the fire controls to ensure that a CIWS in the P position does not fire in a vector which passes through the airspace over the VLS in the Hobart-class AWD and/or the Future Frigates at the same time as missiles are being launched.

The OPV is a bit easier, as the gun in the A position covers that arc (and IMO it is unlikely it could be replaced with a large calibre gun easily).

One area of continuing frustration for me is how the RAN seems to be increasing the range of small guns and calibres and therefore the logistical and support burdens, without also increasing the overall capability. I am not too fussed with the idea of the RAN and Army using the same gun calibres, as their respective usage is likely to be quite different. What I do not wish to see is a flotilla of RAN warships with 3-4 different small calibre gun types and associated ammunition sizes between them.

 

[AegisFC]

Here is a question which occurred to me. What would provide better 360 degree CIWS gun coverage, a pair of guns mounted fore and aft, or port and starboard?

I am inclined to think coverage would be better with CIWS mounted fore and aft, since that would potentially permit two CIWS to fire at inbound AShM or FAC targeting the port of starboard of a ship where there is a much larger target silhouette. There would of course only be a single CIWS able to be trained on AShM or FAC attacking the bow or stern, but those parts have a much narrower profile.

Depends on what space you have available and where. On the Tico's they are port and starboard compared to a Burke, but they are much higher up. Everything is a trade off.

 

[swerve]

Not really the problem you seem to be imagining. A cargo ship that is designed to haul a fair displacement in cargo, that gets the hold changed to mount VLS is going to handle differently than designed, since the displacement of VLS is going to be lower than if the holds are full. If one pictures instead a container ship that instead of stacks of containers, has a VLS, both the profile of the vessel and the displacement is going to be different.

That also does not get into the cost, which was another reason why the concept of an arsenal ship has been conceptualized, but never actually developed. The arsenal ship concept with a loadout of ~500 missiles, would cost about USD$900 mil. assuming it was loaded with TacTom's, and that cost is just for the missiles themselves, not the vessel, launch systems, or any of the other system necessities to properly utilize the munitions. To have 100 vessels fitted out like this would be over USD$90 bil. and again this would be just for the missiles themselves.

Then there is the issue that detecting, tracking, and identifying ships has gotten much more advanced from back in WWII. There are radar systems which can gather information to create a radar image of a vessel for identification. E/O systems which can take images of vessels in a broad spectrum, which potentially detect hidden or disguised features, like the VLS cell hatch covers, etc.

Plus if a nation wanted to launch such a large strike, it would invite retaliation from other countries.

Yep. The only (possibly) sensible use of cargo ships as missile carriers I can think of is some containerised launchers on supply ships, or modest-sized freighters, to supplement those on warships, & using the sensors & command & control systems of accompanying warships, not fitting any to the cargo ships. No bloody great bulk carriers or container ships each carrying a medium-sized navy's entire stock of missiles. That scenario makes me think of eggs & baskets.

 

[Stampede]

Here is a question which occurred to me. What would provide better 360 degree CIWS gun coverage, a pair of guns mounted fore and aft, or port and starboard?

I am inclined to think coverage would be better with CIWS mounted fore and aft, since that would potentially permit two CIWS to fire at inbound AShM or FAC targeting the port of starboard of a ship where there is a much larger target silhouette. There would of course only be a single CIWS able to be trained on AShM or FAC attacking the bow or stern, but those parts have a much narrower profile.

Thanks Todjaeger

I like the question and my arm chair Admiral position would be CIWS fore and aft.
For your gun systems they often look like an after thought.
I could be wrong but they appear a nice to have if we can find some room and some extra coin.

"Oh close in weapon system, that would be nice, shall we get one before heading into arms way"

Interested as to how many ships have a dedicated space for such systems built into the design with space and weight factored in together with arcs of fire and all the systems required to make it work.

Sorry it's late and I've got my self importance hat on.

Regards S

 

[Stampede]

What I was thinking of were RAN frigates and destroyers, and whether it would be better to have a CIWS in the P and W/X positions, or the P1 & S1 positions from the linked page. Of course there would need to be some work done on the fire controls to ensure that a CIWS in the P position does not fire in a vector which passes through the airspace over the VLS in the Hobart-class AWD and/or the Future Frigates at the same time as missiles are being launched.

The OPV is a bit easier, as the gun in the A position covers that arc (and IMO it is unlikely it could be replaced with a large calibre gun easily).

One area of continuing frustration for me is how the RAN seems to be increasing the range of small guns and calibres and therefore the logistical and support burdens, without also increasing the overall capability. I am not too fussed with the idea of the RAN and Army using the same gun calibres, as their respective usage is likely to be quite different. What I do not wish to see is a flotilla of RAN warships with 3-4 different small calibre gun types and associated ammunition sizes between them.

Agree, time to rationalise and concentrate on one system / calibre.

Regards S

 

[spoz]

[QUOTE="Stampede, post: 336161, member: 41199]

Interested as to how many ships have a dedicated space for such systems built into the design with space and weight factored in together with arcs of fire and all the systems required to make it work.
S[/QUOTE]

WRT the RAN, the FFGs, DDGs, Choules and the two new AORs. The FFHs did in the original design (as the Kiwis demonstrated) but in ours the space and weight was used for other things. For the LHDs it was allowed for at the design stage but not fully worked up.

 

[pgclift]

I think if the ships needed to be reloaded or re-armed Singapore would be an obvious port. If things do heat up I think we would go from peacetime loadouts, to war time. So there may be other better options than trying to do that at sea. Philippines, Guam and Vietnam are not impossibilities either. Didn't India recently lose a submarine while reloading it? (INS Sindhurakshak (S63) - Wikipedia) portside?.

With bigger missiles you are going to be limited to what you have on hand, so 48 cells worth on the DDG. ESSM, I think there is a better option of a self defence launcher. SeaRAM I think is worthy of being procured, and the Phalanx can be moved onto lower risk platforms, perhaps the AOR, LHD or even the OPV's. If you remove the Phalanx and replace with SeaRAM then upgrading the bushmaster to 30 or 40mm with a coaxial .50, would be a worth while upgrade layers of defence. Putting 3 SeaRAM into the Phalanx pool would be fairly straight forward and really give a larger inner bubble and options.

If we want to keep ignoring Chinese instructions to keep out of the South China Sea, then we will need options.

There’s a question I been wanting to ask for some time regarding the Sea 5000 selection criteria and it was this discussion on the merit of Phalanx vs other CIWS and would be most appropriate capability for the new ships. Let me please preface the following by saying that I’m no technical or any other expert and I have only focussed on 2 selection criteria points.

To begin, the Strategic Directions Section of the1987 Defence White Paper stated: “Australia faced ‘no presently identifiable military threat, except for the remote possibility of global war’.[126] It asserted that no regional country had the ‘capacity, nor the motivation, to sustain high level military operations against Australia’. However, the 1987 Defence White Paper noted that Australia might be vulnerable to a low level campaign of harassment across its large coastline and sea approaches.[127] no threat”

At around the same time of a decision was made to replace the River Class frigates with the Anzac Class. As I understand it, their initial capabilities were modest which lead to comments by the then Defence Science and Personnel Minister, Bronwyn Bishop that they were little more than floating targets (The Age, 3 June 1998).

But with no discernible threat on the horizon time was clearly on the government’s side to upgrade the Anzac’s over the intervening years.

Now 30 years later and on the eve of the Anzac replacement, the world’s strategic situation has (to put it mildly) changed both globally and locally with our neighbourhood having its own challenges regarding the SCS and the ability to conduct freedom of navigation and other future missions.

So in the current environment does the focus shift to capability as opposed to cost?

In the case of the Anzac selection evaluation the balance between the cost and capability equation could have lent towards cost with capability issues addressed in future years as threats developed. But it seems that whichever new frigate is selected we might not have the luxury of being able to upgrade the platform over a prolonged time frame. So does that then change the equation so that capability becomes the determining factor and not cost thereby ensuring that the ships can operate and defend themselves right from the get go?

 

[Joe Black]

Is it a ship or a network? | The Strategist

More opinion on the ASW capability of the Sea 5000 frigates. I can almost detect, from the tone of the article, that the author John Blaxland is barracking for Navantia F-5000. If I read correctly, he is in fact saying that the best ASW platform doesn't really mean its the best way to hunt subs. Modern day sub hunting business involved more networking than individual platform capabilities.

Whilst I agree about the need for networking capability when it comes down to sub hunting, but individual platform's capability which forms one of the nodes in the network is just as important. In this regard, F-5000 is probably the weakest of the 3.

 

[oldsig127]

To begin, the Strategic Directions Section of the1987 Defence White Paper stated: “Australia faced ‘no presently identifiable military threat, except for the remote possibility of global war’.[126] It asserted that no regional country had the ‘capacity, nor the motivation, to sustain high level military operations against Australia’. However, the 1987 Defence White Paper noted that Australia might be vulnerable to a low level campaign of harassment across its large coastline and sea approaches.[127] no threat”

At around the same time of a decision was made to replace the River Class frigates with the Anzac Class. As I understand it, their initial capabilities were modest which lead to comments by the then Defence Science and Personnel Minister, Bronwyn Bishop that they were little more than floating targets (The Age, 3 June 1998).

But with no discernible threat on the horizon time was clearly on the government’s side to upgrade the Anzac’s over the intervening years.

Now 30 years later and on the eve of the Anzac replacement, the world’s strategic situation has (to put it mildly) changed both globally and locally with our neighbourhood having its own challenges regarding the SCS and the ability to conduct freedom of navigation and other future missions.

So in the current environment does the focus shift to capability as opposed to cost?

In the case of the Anzac selection evaluation the balance between the cost and capability equation could have lent towards cost with capability issues addressed in future years as threats developed. But it seems that whichever new frigate is selected we might not have the luxury of being able to upgrade the platform over a prolonged time frame. So does that then change the equation so that capability becomes the determining factor and not cost thereby ensuring that the ships can operate and defend themselves right from the get go?

Leaves out a lot of steps. The 1987 White Paper was about the Hawke Labor government changing to a posture that they felt they could support. I remember it well, because it's when I pulled the pin, largely because it talked big and changed nothing .

There were White papers (in or about) 1994 (fall of the wall), 2000 (East Timor), 2009 (change to Labor again) so two were informed largely by external strategic change and two by internal political change. The most recent can be said to have three characteristics, utter failure of the Rudd 2009 white paper due to internal changes, the change to Liberal party governments plus major strategic shifts everywhere.

The key for me is that *all* of them have to balance capability and cost. Nothing changes in that respect, except that in some situations you can convince the electorate to spend money on bullets rather than bread and circuses. So, in all of them, we have bought systems which were fitted for but not with, or with the capacity to grow as the situation changes. That's not just a strategy to save money - it's a way to avoid buying weapons *now* which fill a spot but for which we have only notional use, and reserving the space and money to buy and install what we actually need when it becomes obvious just what we face - so later, better, or just more appropriate weapons for the task at hand

oldsig

 

[Boagrius]

Do you get the impression this is starting to change though? I get the sense that the ADF have recognised that a net centric approach dictates the development and maintenance of a high level of corporate knowledge in multiple key areas, and that this in turn dictates a need to keep pace with associated tech developments.

The way the ADF has embraced the integration of capabilities across all three services strikes me as quite impressive. A far cry from the identity crisis it seemed to suffer from in the 90s, for example.

 

[ASSAIL]

Is it a ship or a network? | The Strategist

More opinion on the ASW capability of the Sea 5000 frigates. I can almost detect, from the tone of the article, that the author John Blaxland is barracking for Navantia F-5000. If I read correctly, he is in fact saying that the best ASW platform doesn't really mean its the best way to hunt subs. Modern day sub hunting business involved more networking than individual platform capabilities.

Whilst I agree about the need for networking capability when it comes down to sub hunting, but individual platform's capability which forms one of the nodes in the network is just as important. In this regard, F-5000 is probably the weakest of the 3.

Blaxland is absolutely correct and is simply stating a truism in modern ASW.
I don't think he is pushing any one SEA5000 contender over another, that's what you have interpreted from the article because you see it as harmful to the hype surrounding the T26 supposed superiority in ASW, unproven off course.

You have also assumed that the Navantia ship is the weakest ASW platform amongst the bidders but with no substantiating facts.
No one yet knows what the details are of any of the ships, we don't know the networking details, we don't know what the final sensor or weapon outfits are and we don't even know the final propulsion details.

Given the above, the field is wide open but what is patently apparent is that, over time, the individual platforms importance to prosecuting the ASW battle space is not as crucial as it has been in the past and that all the other platform attributes, or lack thereof, will play an important role in the final selection.

 

[Todjaeger]

Is it a ship or a network? | The Strategist

More opinion on the ASW capability of the Sea 5000 frigates. I can almost detect, from the tone of the article, that the author John Blaxland is barracking for Navantia F-5000. If I read correctly, he is in fact saying that the best ASW platform doesn't really mean its the best way to hunt subs. Modern day sub hunting business involved more networking than individual platform capabilities.

Whilst I agree about the need for networking capability when it comes down to sub hunting, but individual platform's capability which forms one of the nodes in the network is just as important. In this regard, F-5000 is probably the weakest of the 3.

My take (and no, I have no experience with ASW or other military/combat operations) is that with the way warfighting is conducted now by advanced nations the specific individual performance of a platform is of less importance than how well that same individual platform fits into and functions as a part of the overall warighting or battle system.

Given the current value and therefore importance in establishing and maintaining informational/SA dominance, then while it is important for a vessel to be an information collector or harvester (via sonar, radar, E/O, etc.), it is of greater importance for the vessel to be a node where information can be collected from external & internal sources, integrated, and disseminated. The 'reach' of both an individual vessel's sensors and weapons are going to be limited, which means a limit to the vessel\s SA and ability to act or take action. By being able to send and receive data with external assets, the SA of both the vessel and external assets can be increased, and the ability for all assets to take action is improved, because assets which would have been able to act but ignorant of the opportunity or need can now be cued by outside harvesters.