Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
As someone who partakes in photography themselves, I’d almost certainly put that down, purely, to the effects of light.

I’ve noticed ADF photography editing is seemingly often done either sloppily or on an overly tight schedule - which leads to such issues.

Most problems being fixable with another five minutes of tinkering.
Looks great. Now let's ditch the lot of them and go with SeaRAM instead (sorry gents couldn't resist) ;):p
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The Phalanx located within the building certainly looks a uniform grey colour.
Not the White and grey seen on active ships.
I wonder if this is a new colour scheme for the most resent Phalanx block upgrade, or just the colour of the training unit?
Regards S
I would say it's a training unit. It's certainly not due to sloppy editing (I've been a hobbyist photographer & photoshop user for the past 14 years so I have a solid understanding of image editing techniques) or light. If you download the high resolution version of this photo it's clearly evident the CIWS unit is completely grey. Moving on....
 

Kiwigov

Member
Interesting to note the SMH (14 Feb, by Anthony Galloway) has a long article on the RAN and the implications of Aukus (part of a series on the RAAF and the Army). Notable push from some commentators - Hugh White of ANU in particular - for the RAN to buy as many subs as soon as possible for the defence of Australia, though with zero reference to the fundamental impracticalities of trying to do so (where would the additional crews come from? let alone the parts issues?)
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Interesting to note the SMH (14 Feb, by Anthony Galloway) has a long article on the RAN and the implications of Aukus (part of a series on the RAAF and the Army). Notable push from some commentators - Hugh White of ANU in particular - for the RAN to buy as many subs as soon as possible for the defence of Australia, though with zero reference to the fundamental impracticalities of trying to do so (where would the additional crews come from? let alone the parts issues?)
You misunderstand @Kiwigov . White, the ASPI crew and others just have to pontificate about kit. All that pesky logistics, needs, requirements, and concepts - that's piffle. You don't need to do that thinking.

Just thump the pulpit and submarines/B-21s will appear magically. Be able to operate magically too.
 

Scott Elaurant

Well-Known Member
Interesting to note the SMH (14 Feb, by Anthony Galloway) has a long article on the RAN and the implications of Aukus (part of a series on the RAAF and the Army). Notable push from some commentators - Hugh White of ANU in particular - for the RAN to buy as many subs as soon as possible for the defence of Australia, though with zero reference to the fundamental impracticalities of trying to do so (where would the additional crews come from? let alone the parts issues?)
Agreed. Indeed, where would the subs themselves come from? Is there a high grade submarine construction yard anywhere in the world not already working on contracts right now? I can’t think of one. Is any navy with capable surplus submarines selling them off right now? Again, every navy that can afford to is building new submarines, from Connecticut to Canberra, and all navies in between. China has started off a naval arms race, and everyone is racing to catch up. Even Russia is back to a post cold-war peak, launching 3 SSNs last year with 13 subs under construction. So nobody has spare submarines, except for those so old they are about to be pensioned off.

ASPI has done a lot of analysis to show it is cheaper to buy subs from overseas than build in Australia. This assumes (falsely) that the only objective in local construction was to create jobs, and that the ability to sustain the SSKs locally was not an issue. But worse, it assumed that a country like France, UK or USA was willing to put aside SSN construction for its own navy to build them for Australia. We have seen no evidence of that. With Russia and China re-arming with SSNs, everyone else is following suit.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
You misunderstand @Kiwigov . White, the ASPI crew and others just have to pontificate about kit. All that pesky logistics, needs, requirements, and concepts - that's piffle. You don't need to do that thinking.

Just thump the pulpit and submarines/B-21s will appear magically. Be able to operate magically too.
There are a few Oberon class subs around the place.
National Maritime Museum, Holbrook, Western Port bay.

Surely nothing a lick of paint, grease and some imagination wouldn't fix!

Cheers S :rolleyes:
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
Babcock is to acquire the remaining 50% of its Australian naval sustainment business JV:

"The acquisition will allow Babcock Australasia, one of the Group’s focus countries, to further strengthen the breadth of its support to the Australian Defence Force’s maritime capability and to provide additional capability for Australia’s current and future maritime programs." Article

This is particularly interesting to note in light of comments by Babcock mid-last year:

It would be great to see Australia become a regional hub for building, fitting out or supporting Arrowhead 140 and given the level of interest generated in the region, that is certainly a possibility worth exploring.Article
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I can see why Babcock would be interested.

With Australia's aging fleet of warships, and delays in building their replacements, I imagine the sustainment industry will be booming over the next couple of decades.
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
I can see why Babcock would be interested.

With Australia's aging fleet of warships, and delays in building their replacements, I imagine the sustainment industry will be booming over the next couple of decades.
Babcock's AH140 design could arguably not only allow for earlier retirement of the Anzac fleet and offset schedule risks with Hunter, but also fulfil the role of 'mothership' for MCM and other autonomous systems in place of additional OPVs. Just my thoughts of course.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Babcock's AH140 design could arguably not only allow for earlier retirement of the Anzac fleet and offset schedule risks with Hunter, but also fulfil the role of 'mothership' for MCM and other autonomous systems in place of additional OPVs. Just my thoughts of course.
One thing most folk miss is you pick a vessel and build it straight away. It is also not as easy as simply handing over the plans and saying there you go. Australia will want to use the systems we have in place and this will mean quite a bit of design work ..................... and time. The mothership role will add to that. You will also need to source the systems, machinery and materials to be used in the build (even if you do choose to build a cookie cutter of the T31). This means you may actually end up cutting steel after the Hunters.

Build scheduling and tooling up also is required (critical part analysis has to be conducted to ensure the ship comes together as efficiently as practical and there are no delays waiting for key items). Even with a full set of plans issues will arise when converting from that to the actual steelwork (this was an issue with the DDG). This is the reason that ASC (and BAE) are setting Osbourne as a digital ship yard. I doubt that BAE would be interested in letting Babcock use the infrastructure.

So if Babcock cannot use Osbourne and Henderson is currently busy .... where do you build these ships?

Finally, where does the budget come from?
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Babcock's AH140 design could arguably not only allow for earlier retirement of the Anzac fleet and offset schedule risks with Hunter, but also fulfil the role of 'mothership' for MCM and other autonomous systems in place of additional OPVs. Just my thoughts of course.
What are your thoughts on where to build them, and how to get them built faster than the Hunter program which is already completing prototype blocks?

oldsig

<Edit Apologies @Alexa More or less simultaneously written, but slow to post so I missed your more thorough response>
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
One thing most folk miss is you pick a vessel and build it straight away. It is also not as easy as simply handing over the plans and saying there you go. Australia will want to use the systems we have in place and this will mean quite a bit of design work ..................... and time. The mothership role will add to that. You will also need to source the systems, machinery and materials to be used in the build (even if you do choose to build a cookie cutter of the T31). This means you may actually end up cutting steel after the Hunters.

Build scheduling and tooling up also is required (critical part analysis has to be conducted to ensure the ship comes together as efficiently as practical and there are no delays waiting for key items). Even with a full set of plans issues will arise when converting from that to the actual steelwork (this was an issue with the DDG). This is the reason that ASC (and BAE) are setting Osbourne as a digital ship yard. I doubt that BAE would be interested in letting Babcock use the infrastructure.

So if Babcock cannot use Osbourne and Henderson is currently busy .... where do you build these ships?

Finally, where does the budget come from?
What are your thoughts on where to build them, and how to get them built faster than the Hunter program which is already completing prototype blocks?

oldsig
Babcock's own quote from my earlier post suggests construction of the design in Australia is an area worth exploring for them. I doubt they'd be paying for a sponsored piece and making such a statement if they believed industrial capacity immediately rules it out. Given they already operate in the market, they would realistically be acutely aware of capacity from both a workforce and shipyard industrial perspective.

It's worth noting that Civmec's investments in their Henderson facilities and workforce - which by their own company reports is (among other things) to allow them the capacity to exploit further opportunities in Defence's naval shipbuilding plan.

I think it goes without saying that steel could not be cut earlier than Hunter, but once steel is cut, their modular design allows for a much faster rate of construction as per the schedule of the Type 31 program:

"The first steel is due to be cut for HMS Venturer in September 2021, with all five vessels in service by February 2030." Source

Cost and time involved in the integration of MCM 'toolkits' is something that would remain with any platform given the modular approach.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
So if Babcock cannot use Osbourne and Henderson is currently busy .... where do you build these ships?

Finally, where does the budget come from?
[SARCASM=ON]Easy. First answer, just take back Cockatoo Island and refurbish the facilities there.

Second answer, why the magic money tree of course. It should also be sufficient to refurbish and rebuild Cockatoo to modern standards as well as providing the needed funding for an additional class of naval vessels, the raising of the workforce to build the additional class of vessels, and then the recruitment and training of additional RAN personnel to actually crew said vessels.[/SARCASM]

Realistically, I do see a point in the RAN having an additional class of naval vessel that is somewhere in between the planned OPV's and FFG's and current DDG's in terms of displacement and capabilities. However, there are a number of obstacles which would need to be overcome in order for such a vessel type to enter RAN service.

IMO the most viable path to having something like a replacement FFH and/or a FFBNW 'patrol' frigate would be if the order for Arafura-class OPV's were at some point to get truncated, with the Civmec facilities and workforce getting re-directed to building this hypothetical design.

A number of additional things would of course need to happen as well. Among them being settling on a design and mission/sub-systems which would make the effort worthwhile. For example, the current plans for the Arafura-class OPV have a fitout which is both inadequate for operations in threatened/hostile areas, and almost certainly quite difficult effect significant changes or improvements which would be both expensive, and require significant time in a yard. If modular containerized weapons systems for things like air defence (using ESSM, Sea Ceptor, or something else) were adopted for use aboard a 'patrol' frigate, which would permit the vessel's fitout to be changed to be more appropriate for certain type operations as needed and could be installed in a matter of several days (or less) rather than what would likely require months in a yard, that could be useful.

However, until there is agreement across a number of areas, then really trying to put such ideas forward is wish listing, which there has been IMO entirely too much of lately from some 'think tanks' without any explanations on how things are to be funded, operated, or sustained. All of which are actually required in order for a capability to become viable.
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
IMO the most viable path to having something like a replacement FFH and/or a FFBNW 'patrol' frigate would be if the order for Arafura-class OPV's were at some point to get truncated, with the Civmec facilities and workforce getting re-directed to building this hypothetical design.
Unless the 'patrol frigate' with a much larger crew and higher capital and running costs are to be used as patrol boats enforcing fishing and drug smuggling etc around the coast, the remaining seven Arafura class will be bloody busy covering all that water.

oldsig
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
Unless the 'patrol frigate' with a much larger crew and higher capital and running costs are to be used as patrol boats enforcing fishing and drug smuggling etc around the coast, the remaining seven Arafura class will be bloody busy covering all that water.

oldsig
I can't speak for Todjaeger, but my thinking at least was in relation to the potential follow on ~8 Arafura-derived vessels which are to act as platforms for modular MCM and Hydrographic Survey. The current order of 12 Arafura-Class for OPV operations remaining as is.

The question is whether a large fleet of ~20 small vessels, restricted to only low intensity environments, is the best means of meeting strategic objectives and maintaining regional presence when the MFU fleet size will remain at 11 for at least the next two decades?

Arguably, it would be very hard to justify that being the right path.
 
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