Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

The accommodation in an LHD for embarked troops, including any air component, is roughly the same that of the ship's company of equivilant ranks except that the troops' mess decks have provisions for weapon stowage which the ship's company doesn't need. It is certainly a lot more comfortable than sleeping in a hutchie in the bush; not to mention that you get showers, toilets you don't have to dig for yourself, and pretty good meals. The aviation briefing facilities and the like, while not up to carrier standard, are still pretty good. After all, the purpose of the"H" part of the description is to support rotary wing operations....

I stand corrected.

I was going off what I was told by the air RAEME deployed for Tiger trials.
The specific conversation was with a senior Artificer who was of the opinion the facilities were insufficient for a permanent assignment of an airgroup.

Then again Air RAEME, have been known to have a chip on their shoulders, like many under appreciated step children.

 

[spoz]

That may be an expectation thing; particularly from a maintenance and support perspectiive the LHD is effectively designed around what an embarked group of helicopters (type agnostic) might be expected to need when embarked for operations for a defined period. That is not likely to be the same as what would and probably should be expected at the shore base of the aircraft. Those without previous experience of embarked operations might therefore be somewhat surprised, and possibly unhappy with, what is available whereas those who do it constantly (ie Navy flights) just take it in their stride.

 

[seaspear]

I can understand that the Canberra class we are discussing operates in conjunction with other ships providing mutual support but should the ship itself also be considered for upgrading its self defence against peer threats ,are the three Phalanx upgrades enough ?

 

[Aussie optimist]

I been following this forum for several years. I have to say over this time reading all your knowledgeable posts, I have come to the opinion that as much as I would love to see the RAN getting back in the carrier game we simply have far too many other priorities.
We simply do not have the money to do everything at once. Also a carrier capability will take a lot of years to come into fruition from an acquisition/training standpoint.
I do believe that as a maritime nation we should eventually seek this capability again, but not at the expense of our core. For me it is something to look at in the realm of 20 year acquisition assuming we don’t find at war in the meantime.
I think expansion in our MFU numbers is the first start, once achieved then look at other things.

 

[spoz]

I can understand that the Canberra class we are discussing operates in conjunction with other ships providing mutual support but should the ship itself also be considered for upgrading its self defence against peer threats ,are the three Phalanx upgrades enough ?

This has been discussed a number of times over the history of this thread and its predecessor.

 

[ADMk2]

I can understand that the Canberra class we are discussing operates in conjunction with other ships providing mutual support but should the ship itself also be considered for upgrading its self defence against peer threats ,are the three Phalanx upgrades enough ?

That was the plan at one point in time, along with Nulka decoy launchers being installed.

There has been a conspicuous lack of progress on this project in the 7 years since this project was approved, aside from the Nulka launchers.

Given a complete lack of comment by defence on the topic, who knows if this is even continuing as a plan?

 

[DDG38]

"HMAS Parramatta returns to Fleet Base East, Sydney NSW following a regional presence deployment." Image Source : ADF Image Library

 

[DDG38]

Now this is an impressive sight !
"Led by the U.S. Navy Nimitz Class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, ships from multiple partner nations sail in formation during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022. Royal Australian Navy Ships Canberra, Supply, Warramunga and Farncomb sailed in formation with 37 ships during Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2022 - HMNZS Aotearoa (A-11), HMCS Winnipeg (FFG-331), HMCS Vancouver (FFG-338), USS Abraham Lincoln (CV-72), USS Essex (LHD-2), USS Fizgerald (DDG-62), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Gridly (DDG-101), USS Sampson (DDG-102), USS William P Lawrence (DDG-110), USS Spruance (DDG-111), USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001), USS Mobile Bay (CG-53), USS Charlo Tte (SSN-766), USS Topeka (SSN-754), USNS Henry J Kaiser (T-AO-187), USNS Washington Chambers (T-AKE-11), USCGC Midgett (WSML-757), USV Nomad, USV Ranger, USV Sea Hawk, USV Sea Hunter, ROSK Marado (LHDS-6112), ROKS MTG (DDG-976), ROKS STG (DDG-991), ROKS SDS (SS-082), BRP Antonio Luna (FFG-151), RSS Intrepid (FFG-69), JS Izumo (DDH-183), JS Takanami (DDG-110), KD Lekir (FSG-26), TNI I GNR (FFGHM-332), ARM Usumacinta (A-412), ARM Juarez (FFG-101), FS Prairal (FF-F731), INS Shivalik (FFG-F48), CNS Lynch (FF-07)." Image Source : ADF Image Library

 

[Stampede]

That was the plan at one point in time, along with Nulka decoy launchers being installed.

There has been a conspicuous lack of progress on this project in the 7 years since this project was approved, aside from the Nulka launchers.

Given a complete lack of comment by defence on the topic, who knows if this is even continuing as a plan?

Just wondering how many Nulka systems are on the Canberra Class.
Certainly their is one forward of the flight deck located near the Typhoon 25 mm on the starboard side.
Is there another located up high on the island structure between the mast structures?.........In line with the ships number


Thanks S

 

[spoz]

Between the flag bins? Certainly looks like it.

 

[SwingShift]

IMHO the RAN LHD‘s are great ships for Australia as a peacetime regional presence, as a contributor for significant multi nation exercises, HADR, and to support an ADF response to a minor regional incursion. I do not support the concept of carriers or light carriers for Australia in the current environment given the draw of people, resources, escort warships that would be required to sail these ships in a hot modern conflict. In a hot conflict to sail even one Australian carrier strike group into harms way would drag the vast majority of our escorts and sailors.

I’m dubious as to whether the LHD’s would leave port in a significant conflict.

For a medium power budget and population base my preference would be planning for more subs and more destroyers and or frigates, increasing availability, coverage and reach, and magazine depth. Able to support allied task groups, keep our sea lanes open, and able to operate alone to harass and complicate an adversaries planners.

Time at sea, survivable staffed and distributed maintenance centres, continuous domestic build to support a workforce and supply chains, sovereign munitions, fuel stores and productions. Much of the unsexy stuff is the critical stuff.

 

[Volkodav]

IMO carriers should be reexamined going forward for one reason alone, the transformational capability potential of the F-35B.

The versatility of shipboard helicopters and now UAVs, as well as UCAVs remain, but it is the game changing effect of, even a small number of, F-35Bs over and above anything the Harrier could offer that changes things the most. For the first time since the 1940s there is a capable, survivable, multirole combat aircraft, that can operate from an affordable platform.

It's not just the airframes performance and combat load, or even the LO, is the sensors, and more importantly, the sensor fusion. I believe it is safe to claim on publically available information, that the F-35 avionic suite, is more capable and versatile than the combat system (if they have one) on any PB, FAC, or corvette, perhaps even some frigates.

Where once a large ASW helo was seen as a substitute for an ASW escort in the screen, now an F-35 could passively, and virtually undetectably, extend the sensor range of a even a very small (RAN sized) task group beyond anything a previously possible without at least a medium, CTOL carrier.

Going forward, looking at the capabilities we will need as the DDGs and LHDs reach their end of life, IMO we would be foolish not to look at the utility and versatility of light carriers. Either three larger ships or five smaller ones, complementing and supporting the Hunters.

At the same time, we need to go back and look at our minor warfare vessel capability. In WWII we relied very heavily on our sloops, corvettes and later, frigates, today we have nothing equivalent.

Steel is cheap and air is free, the main cost is in the ships systems and usually over 50% of cost is in combat systems of those ships that have them. As little as 2 to 3% of overall cost is in the actual ship structure. This is why OPVs make more sense than patrol boats, why corvettes are more sense than FACs, and light/patrol frigates more sensible and efficient than corvettes.

The delta is the combat system, fit a decent combat system to a patrol boat, turning it into an FAC, let alone an OPV to turn it into a corvette, you may as well acquire frigates instead.

Assuming we make the leap and arm the Arafuras, the logical step is to replace them at life of type with more efficient and capable frigates.


Let's recast this in pre WWII terms. Your Aegis ships are you light cruisers and large destroyers, your light/patrol frigates are your sloops, corvettes, frigates/destroyer escorts. Your light carriers are your heavy cruisers/battlecruisers.

 

[StingrayOZ]

IMO carriers should be reexamined going forward for one reason alone, the transformational capability potential of the F-35B.

Carriers are essential to western naval doctrine. US, UK, Italy, Japan, Spain, France, etc. Unfortunately, all major providers of naval weapons systems have carriers and carriers are the keystone to naval capability. The US doesn't have cruisers or battleships anymore, there is minimal effort put into ship based anti-ship missiles and doctrine. We either are live with limited capability or we fund it.

I’m dubious as to whether the LHD’s would leave port in a significant conflict.

AORs will leave port, civilian ships will leave port. The LHD's will be critical in any conceivable conflict. Not sure if we leave all the big ships in port, they will be safe, see raids in Darwin, Sydney and Pearl Harbor. Plenty of other examples in history. Yes, big ship big target. But you can't just hide them, you have already invested billions in their capability.

For a medium power budget and population base my preference would be planning for more subs and more destroyers and or frigates, increasing availability, coverage and reach, and magazine depth.

How many subs? 1? 2? 4? 6? 8? 12? How many available? How big should their magazines be?
How many destroyers? None? one sometimes? 3? 6? 9? 12?
How deep should the vls magazine depth be? 8? 32? 48? 96? 256?
This would make them what? 7000t? 10,000t? 15,000t? 60,000t?
Do we want long range missiles, missiles larger than the US VLS system allows?
Do we want long range ships, so even larger than European or US ships?

By avoiding carriers do we then place impossible demands on escorts and other surface vessels? Do we then outsize our KC-30 fleet to properly try and keep air cover, and base 2 squadrons out of Butterworth of fighters and a full squadron of KC30 there, as well as P8's and E7's?

Do we see aviation becoming less of a thing in the future? Then why is everyone building carriers and aviation ships?

Aviation ships is a huge and broad area. What model would we be looking at and when could be the capability be realized?

 

[John Fedup]

If “stuff” hits the fan over Taiwan, the outcome will say a lot about current naval doctrine. Is naval aviation still viable and how effective are anti missile defences? Can submarines be a determining factor in turning back an invasion fleet? If both sides loose substantial naval assets can the combined industrial capacity of the West be properly utilized to match China’s capacity? None of this will matter if things go nuclear.

 

[SwingShift]

I absolutely agree with Volkodav on the transformational impact of F35B, and agree on the massive and exciting leap forward this could provides a deployed group.

My concern is that for a budget and human resource pool such as ours that putting a single LHD or its future iteration (assuming evolved but not transformational defensive tech evolution) into harms way would require almost all of our available escorts once allowing for vessels in maintenance, transit, working up etc. Leaving none or very few active ships for any other defensive or escort tasking.

For a hostile adversary knowing that essentially all of our available sea might and a reasonable chunk of our aviation assets was at sea would be a major strategic target with an opportunity, albeit not an easy one, to deliver a demoralising blow.

If viewed this way a target such as this would attract the attention and efforts similar to that of the allies to locate and sink Tirpitz and Bismarck during WW2?

The UK has two carriers as we all know and possibly could not provide alone a CSG for a peacetime escort of just one in their tour last year, with a US AB providing air cover.

Hence my original opinion remains unchanged, whilst I love the idea of a couple of light carriers kitted out with F35’s, I do not feel it’s a reasonable expectation that we could protect such a valuable sailing group without too many eggs in one basket.

We also need to ask, what type of engagement would we want to sail such a ship to where Australia needs to provide the centrepiece. Could our efforts not be more practically the escorts above and below the surface if further from home and offering the ability to operate alone or in smaller groups closer to home if needed with air support launched from land.

 

[Volkodav]

People get trapped in the "we have always done things this way", "we have never done it this way", "it's unaffordable" belief / attitudes. The thing is the strategic situation changes, the economy changes, technology changes and needs change, so always doing what we have done, or continue doing what we have done but less of it because of cost priorities.

Defence is at its core risk management, or if you prefer, insurance. The initial risk is what is the likelihood and severity of the consequences of doing nothing, then if you determine you have to do something, you then repeat the process for the preferred options. That doesn't seem to happen anymore unless its determining a way to spend less, reduce numbers etc. say deciding we could risk a decade plus DDG gap, or we could life extend already old APC instead of acquiring modern IFVs.

What's really interesting (and disturbing) is reading the submissions to PM&C (dept Prime Minister and Cabinet) on various defence decisions in the past. For instance, if you applied the reasoning, that ultimately won out against replacing the carrier in 1982, basically all the reasons given no longer apply. Some were outright wrong and proven so, i.e. sonar buoys are much more effective than dunking sonar on helicopters, replacing 10 P-3B Orions with 10 P-3C model aircraft for a total of 20, would provide Australia with a greater level of ASW capability then delivered by the 10Cs, 10Bs, and Seakings. STOVL combat aircraft would never be competitive with land based combat aircraft. The RAN would not need to operate away from land based RAAF aircover. The only option suitable for Australia was a CTOL carrier operating supersonic combat aircraft and that was unaffordable. Oh yeah and guided missiles etc. etc.

F-35B, MH-60R and Merlin/Crowsnest, the much bigger, stronger Australian economy, the growing defence budget, the shiny new P-8As already in service, show that every single reason given for not having carriers has gone. The only thing remaining is other capabilities may be more urgent and have higher priority.

Your most powerful and capable ships will always be strategic targets, whether they are LHDs, destroyers, cruisers, carriers or tarted up OPVs. The thing is, while an armed OPV would be dead meat against an FAC or Corvette, a balanced task force (that we cannot do on our own) on the other hand would require a massive response, well beyond most nations to assemble. A balanced, self supporting task force doesn't need to be a USN carrier battle group, look at the USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). Centred on an LHA or LHD, with an LPD, LSD a CG, a DDG, an FFG and an SSN, they have, since the introduction of the Wasp Class LHD, always been capable of deploying 20 Harriers and now expanded F-35B air groups.

Look at our current fleet and future plans, two LHDs, one LPD, three DDG, eight FFH add F-35B and we could deploy an ESG now. Review numbers and types and we could generate a larger number of strike groups without the amphibs by adding light carriers. Imagine three groups with a light carrier and three hunters and an SSN? Tweak the fleet to five carriers, ten hunters and ten light frigates, ten SSNs. The F-35B, additional Romeos, Crowsnest (or similar), plus the UAV/UCAV options developing will add so much complementary capability that the carrier will enhance the group, not be a drag on it. The air group will increase the defensive and offensive power of the group not reduce it.

That's the thing I don't get, if we don't have carriers our fleet operates without aircover, which makes our ships more vulnerable, and less effective, limiting them either to only operating with allied forces, or not leaving port during high threat situations.

 

[Stampede]

IMHO the RAN LHD‘s are great ships for Australia as a peacetime regional presence, as a contributor for significant multi nation exercises, HADR, and to support an ADF response to a minor regional incursion. I do not support the concept of carriers or light carriers for Australia in the current environment given the draw of people, resources, escort warships that would be required to sail these ships in a hot modern conflict. In a hot conflict to sail even one Australian carrier strike group into harms way would drag the vast majority of our escorts and sailors.

I’m dubious as to whether the LHD’s would leave port in a significant conflict.

For a medium power budget and population base my preference would be planning for more subs and more destroyers and or frigates, increasing availability, coverage and reach, and magazine depth. Able to support allied task groups, keep our sea lanes open, and able to operate alone to harass and complicate an adversaries planners.

Time at sea, survivable staffed and distributed maintenance centres, continuous domestic build to support a workforce and supply chains, sovereign munitions, fuel stores and productions. Much of the unsexy stuff is the critical stuff.

In a hot war Army,Navy and Airforce will employ their assets.
Every operation has risk.
Ideally good intelligence will lead to good choices and you get to choose your battles.
Fighting on your terms and within your realistic capacity would be the ideal script.
The LHD's will therefore go to war.
But as prized assets and suggest targets, they will by necessity be conservatively employed.
In a significant conflict the LHD's will still be vulnerable in port.
We learn't that lesson 80 years ago.

Cheers S

 

[Stampede]

Meh - nothing wrong with that.

I firmly believe that Defence needs to be more public when needed. If there are questions like this that can be answer with unclassified data then they should be. And if we cannot explain it, then perhaps our actions aren't quite right.

Asking such questions and doing such interactions can only make us better. I've said before, but queries and points from these forums have been fed in at high levels - simply because of questions that we haven't been able to answer properly. Keep asking, poking and prodding.

I guess part of my thinking is what is a realistic amphibious load out for a given operation.
In particular an operation independent of a major ally like the US.
Also the necessity to factor in the reality, that with only three amphibious ships,100% availability will always be a challenge.
For HADR and light military contingency's I can understand aviation assets will be modest in number.
Space for stores , vehicles and personnel will be the priority.
Moving up the threat spectrum, I wonder what a realistic mix of aviation / vehicle and stores would look like within a given space.
.................................................................................................................................
I'll paint a scenario and would be interested in some feedback.

The need is to land a force with vehicles and supply's overseas within our region.
We have air cover from the RAAF, but it is at distance. ( We are an Island, everything is shaped by distance)

The politics is cold war today, but potentially hot war tomorrow, We go prepared for the worst case scenario.
We have drawn a line in the sand so are committed to the task at hand.

The challenge is a submarine threat, but limited surface forces or opposition air power.Land forces are modest.

My hypothetical force is from what we have and what I suspect would be available at a moderate level of notice.

Maybe two amphibious ships.
Four frigates / destroyers
A supply ship.

Aviation

My understanding is the aim is to have (8) x MH-60R's for service, which I understand was a typical compliment for the RN off their carriers to provide a meaningful ASW screen 24 / 7.
Logistical support, at least one on the supply ship and each Amphib. (3 )
Suggest at least one operational Chinook for heavy lift, with a spare to provide availability.(2 )
An operational flight of 4 MRH-90 would require at least another 2 for a spare and short term servicing (6)
These would need to be escorted, so suggest a pair of ARH Tigers, which would also need a spare and another for short term servicing (4 )

If the math is correct, that is 23 helicopters.
Realistically, I feel these are very conservative numbers.

With the potential to carry a total of 6 helicopters on the supply ship and frigates, the rest will need to be accommodated on the Amphibs.
HMAS Choules has modest capacity, so maybe two aircraft, leaving the balance carried by the LHD, which would be 15 Aircraft.

So what is this force we wish to land I hear you ask.
Well realistically its whatever we can accommodate within the remaining space.

Hypothetical scenarios are always opens to many "what if's" and debate on creditably re a given situation.

What I'd truly like to be considered re aviation at sea, is what is the driver in an amphibious operation.
Chicken or egg if you like
Is it the space to accommodate the land force or is it the Air Power require to both land, supply and protect that force.

Maybe it's an obvious question, but it reflects my interest and sense of priority in building up our skill set of deploying helicopters to sea in good numbers.


Thanks for reading

Cheers S

 

[Massive]

Looking at the Pacific War, the critical elements were carrier aviation and subs.

The GotD & RAN are going all out on subs though no discussion on carrier aviation.

Not advocating necessarily, rather calling out what was shown to be critical in the Pacific in the last major state-on-state conflict.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Anthony_B_78]

I guess part of my thinking is what is a realistic amphibious load out for a given operation.
In particular an operation independent of a major ally like the US.
Also the necessity to factor in the reality, that with only three amphibious ships,100% availability will always be a challenge.
For HADR and light military contingency's I can understand aviation assets will be modest in number.
Space for stores , vehicles and personnel will be the priority.
Moving up the threat spectrum, I wonder what a realistic mix of aviation / vehicle and stores would look like within a given space.
.................................................................................................................................
I'll paint a scenario and would be interested in some feedback.

The need is to land a force with vehicles and supply's overseas within our region.
We have air cover from the RAAF, but it is at distance. ( We are an Island, everything is shaped by distance)

The politics is cold war today, but potentially hot war tomorrow, We go prepared for the worst case scenario.
We have drawn a line in the sand so are committed to the task at hand.

The challenge is a submarine threat, but limited surface forces or opposition air power.Land forces are modest.

My hypothetical force is from what we have and what I suspect would be available at a moderate level of notice.

Maybe two amphibious ships.
Four frigates / destroyers
A supply ship.

Aviation

My understanding is the aim is to have (8) x MH-60R's for service, which I understand was a typical compliment for the RN off their carriers to provide a meaningful ASW screen 24 / 7.
Logistical support, at least one on the supply ship and each Amphib. (3 )
Suggest at least one operational Chinook for heavy lift, with a spare to provide availability.(2 )
An operational flight of 4 MRH-90 would require at least another 2 for a spare and short term servicing (6)
These would need to be escorted, so suggest a pair of ARH Tigers, which would also need a spare and another for short term servicing (4 )

If the math is correct, that is 23 helicopters.
Realistically, I feel these are very conservative numbers.

With the potential to carry a total of 6 helicopters on the supply ship and frigates, the rest will need to be accommodated on the Amphibs.
HMAS Choules has modest capacity, so maybe two aircraft, leaving the balance carried by the LHD, which would be 15 Aircraft.

So what is this force we wish to land I hear you ask.
Well realistically its whatever we can accommodate within the remaining space.

Hypothetical scenarios are always opens to many "what if's" and debate on creditably re a given situation.

What I'd truly like to be considered re aviation at sea, is what is the driver in an amphibious operation.
Chicken or egg if you like
Is it the space to accommodate the land force or is it the Air Power require to both land, supply and protect that force.

Maybe it's an obvious question, but it reflects my interest and sense of priority in building up our skill set of deploying helicopters to sea in good numbers.


Thanks for reading

Cheers S

You might be interested in this article: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/force-sea-australias-amphibious-capability-update

There's a diagram in there that includes a task force of two amphibious ships - referred to as an Amphibious Ready Unit. I assume the expectation is that this would be one of the Canberras and the Choules (or her successor).

As for aviation, I think you'd be largely on the money - a troop each of MRH-90s, Tigers and Chinooks, according to the same chart, and your numbers make sense. Assuming the LHD that leads this task force has one or two Romeos, then you're looking at 13-14 helicopters, which means, I guess, you'd largely be using the light vehicle deck as hangar space too.

On the Romeos, the stated capability required from 24 aircraft is eight operational flights, but with the additional 12 aircraft being acquired you'd expect that capability would be expanded. And, yeah, one on each of your four escorts, plus your AOR, and, say, two on the Canberra gives you seven - which at two sorties a day each is enough for one in the air at all times, with allowance for some extra sorties to respond to contacts. I cited an article some time ago from the USN that sets a benchmark for 24-hour coverage of nine SH-60 sorties. (I don't think the Choules would permanently embark a helicopter? They did have a hangar added though?)

As for the ground forces, as the diagram shows, you get a Joint Pre-Landing Force, which would be provided by 2RAR. This would be a company group with recon / snipers / small boats, and a couple of rifle platoons. Then you get a battle group HQ with a couple of combat teams, so that could be, for example, a rifle company as one, and a mechanised combat team as the other.

Together with that embarked aviation, and the capabilities your destroyers / frigates offer, it's not a negligible capability for our region.