Todjaeger
Potstirrer
The point of the barcode was so that it can be scanned, much like QR codes. Otherwise it would not be possible for Nordic countries to Scan da Navy in...
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Can anyone tell me why I am being so slow on the uptake this morning, got the original joke but didn't get it was actually Photo shopped. Here is the original picture curtesy of Military WikiThe point of the barcode was so that it can be scanned, much like QR codes. Otherwise it would not be possible for Nordic countries to Scan da Navy in...
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AndyinOz
Member
@Redlands18 Could have been worse (I am sure I saw this posted on this discussion board before but in the interest of participating and not just forever lurking) like the reporting at Naval News on the 1st of April suggesting some of the proposed names for navy's future underwater endeavour. Leak Reveals First Details Of Australia's New AUKUS Submarine - Naval News I am much like that pre coffee. I am still fond of HMAS Very, HMAS Visible and HMAS Vegemite
As a matter of interest, what does a Norwegian frigate joke have to do with the RAN?
And. yes, the April Fools day from Naval News was commented on at the time.
I suspect this line of posting should probably stop about here before one of the Mods decides to suggest that much more forcibly.
And. yes, the April Fools day from Naval News was commented on at the time.
I suspect this line of posting should probably stop about here before one of the Mods decides to suggest that much more forcibly.
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Part of the issue, at least to me, is that it seems unclear just exactly what your view or concern is.
The Canberra-class LHD was designed as a large and capable vessel with the ability to have different load configurations depending on the perceived needs or desires of the situation. However, the design is not able to fulfill all roles, to all peoples, all the time/at the same time. If an LHD was deployed on an amphib/sealift mission where the ability transport and land a large number of personnel and the vehicles and supplies necessary to support them, it can. What is cannot do though is carry that same number of personnel, supplies, light & heavy vehicles, and then extra (beyond the eight in the hangar and any kept on the flight deck) helicopters. A larger vessel would be required in order for that to happen, like a Wasp-class LHD of the USN which has nearly 50% greater full load displacement, has a draught of ~1 metre more, and is nearly 30 metres longer.
Given how long the USN and USMC have operated amphibious ships and engaged in amphibious assaults, there is a great deal of institutional knowledge on the subject, as well as force structures in place to engage in and support them. The ADF is still in the process of building up such knowledge and the associated force structures as well as having a much smaller force structure to build with or from.
Takao
The Bunker Group
Meh - nothing wrong with that.
I firmly believe that Defence needs to be more public when needed. If there are questions like this that can be answer with unclassified data then they should be. And if we cannot explain it, then perhaps our actions aren't quite right.
Asking such questions and doing such interactions can only make us better. I've said before, but queries and points from these forums have been fed in at high levels - simply because of questions that we haven't been able to answer properly. Keep asking, poking and prodding.
Short answer
Total agree with your statement
"The Canberra-class LHD was designed as a large and capable vessel with the ability to have different load configurations depending on the perceived needs or desires of the situation."
I think the ADF needs to explore the LHD's ability to carry aviation assets to sea in quantity.
Why
Because it gives government and defence many additional options to engage a wide range of scenarios.
Will this take away from the core mission of amphibious lift / assault?
Well probably a bit of yes and no.
But to elaborate would need a longer answer than time currently permits.
Cheers for now .... S
A challenge sometimes not to come across as some boys own "fan boy" on topics of defence.
We all have our pet areas of interest.
For myself, small Aircraft carriers and LHD's have always captured my attention.
I can't claim to be a defence expert, but having followed with interest this area for some four decades you pick up a thing or two.
The small Aircraft carrier bit is the give away as it is obviously biased towards aviation.
The small carrier bit is also the recognition that only so much can be carried and therefore achieved from such a small platform.
The LHD bit is the understanding that flexible platforms can do many things, but it all involves trade offs.
With more time I'll pose some questions.
Cheers S
I too am a fan of small carriers.
While I fully understand that larger carriers are more efficient than small ones and that large, through deck amphibs are more flexible (to achieve this they need to be larger than a carrier embodying the same or even greater aviation capability), there is also the question of cost, not just of acquisition, but also sustainment. It is without a doubt more efficient to have ten large carriers than twenty medium, generating the same number of sorties, if you need to lift and support a battlegroup based around an Infantry battalion, then your lift ship needs to be a minimum size and capability.
The thing is when you are talking a small or small medium navy, then you are never going to be able to afford large numbers of large ships, and even if you can afford a couple of large multirole ships, then you are faced with the dilemma of not having sufficient hulls to sustain the minimum number required to cover likely operational needs. These few large ships then become a target that requires protection, meaning, at any given point, the bulk of out surface force is escorting our two or three large ships that cant look after themselves, but that we also can't afford to lose.
This is when we need to start looking at which capabilities we can distribute among platforms to provide a greater overall capability that will (hopefully) degrade gracefully in the face of losses. This is why the Hunters are getting AEGIS and MK41 / SM-6, on top of their ASW mission, this is why all our majors have Romeos and Harpoon (NSM soon), and 5" guns, we can't afford any of our larger ships to be so specialised that they become a liability outside of their speciality. It would be great if we could have afforded to replace the Perth Class DDGs, Adelaide Class FFGs and ANZAC class FFHs with a dozen or more Flight IIA Burkes, but it would have been unaffordable.
Something that comes to mind is an LPD with AEGIS, CEAFAR, CEC, configured for ABM and Mk-41, an LPDG?. Such a config would be incompatible with extensive flight operations on a light carrier or an LHD but doable on an LPD, it could even lash HIMARS to the deck. Then you have your Hunters with the same (less the HIMARS) plus their ASW role, and the Hobarts. Or the LPDGs could replace the Hobarts and potentially the LHDs, assuming the planned support ships have a significant, complementary amphibious capability. This is a long term vision, not an instant fix, its a replacement of existing types as they come to the end of their lives, or perhaps come due for major upgrades.
This is where the light carriers come in, they replace the aviation capability lost with the LHDs, are designed for fleet operations in support of the Hunters with additional ASW helos but also surveillance aircraft as well, either manned or unmanned. They could even have an AEW capability with CEC, and dream land here, maybe F-35B. They would have the same core SAAB 9LV combat system and at least ESSM Block II and or RAM. They would also be able to operate as many, or more army helicopter than the LHDs, as the RN used to do with the Invincibles to cover Oceans maintenance periods. There are acquired in numbers, i.e. three or more and complement both the surface fleet and the amphib capability.
The final string is the OPVs, or more to the point the modern day DEs (Destroyer Escorts or patrol frigates) the supplement and supersede them. They will be something in the vein of the RN Type 31/32, and Danish Iver Huitfeldt class and Absalon class frigates. This is where the RAN will have their multirole capability. A core 9LV combat system with CEC, a Mk-41 VLS for ESSM but also able to carry other missile types to be used to their best effect by the LPDG or Hunters they are supporting, a Mk-45 5" gun, hangar large enough for two Romeos or a mix of Romeos and UAVs, a flight deck large enough for a Chinook, and a mission deck able to be configured for mine warfare or Amphibious warfare. These ships could be the basis of a modern day Assault transport (APD) as used so effectively by the USN in WWII (this was also the final role of the surviving ships of the famous RAN Scrap Iron Flotilla).
Going forward, we build the Hunters as planned, growing and evolving them, build the new support ships as planned, ensuring they have dock wells and can supplement the LHDs. Select or design a light carrier to introduce new capabilities and supplement the LHDs, then as sufficient become available to take over the entirety of the LHDs aviation role. Design (adapt / dust off US plans) a LPDG to replace the Canberras and Hobarts.
Switch from OPVs to DEs / APDs, cascading the OPVs to Customs and secondary roles.
Anyway (perhaps for good reason) I am not in a senior CAPDEV role, so there is pretty much zero chance of any of this happening.
While I fully understand that larger carriers are more efficient than small ones and that large, through deck amphibs are more flexible (to achieve this they need to be larger than a carrier embodying the same or even greater aviation capability), there is also the question of cost, not just of acquisition, but also sustainment. It is without a doubt more efficient to have ten large carriers than twenty medium, generating the same number of sorties, if you need to lift and support a battlegroup based around an Infantry battalion, then your lift ship needs to be a minimum size and capability.
The thing is when you are talking a small or small medium navy, then you are never going to be able to afford large numbers of large ships, and even if you can afford a couple of large multirole ships, then you are faced with the dilemma of not having sufficient hulls to sustain the minimum number required to cover likely operational needs. These few large ships then become a target that requires protection, meaning, at any given point, the bulk of out surface force is escorting our two or three large ships that cant look after themselves, but that we also can't afford to lose.
This is when we need to start looking at which capabilities we can distribute among platforms to provide a greater overall capability that will (hopefully) degrade gracefully in the face of losses. This is why the Hunters are getting AEGIS and MK41 / SM-6, on top of their ASW mission, this is why all our majors have Romeos and Harpoon (NSM soon), and 5" guns, we can't afford any of our larger ships to be so specialised that they become a liability outside of their speciality. It would be great if we could have afforded to replace the Perth Class DDGs, Adelaide Class FFGs and ANZAC class FFHs with a dozen or more Flight IIA Burkes, but it would have been unaffordable.
Something that comes to mind is an LPD with AEGIS, CEAFAR, CEC, configured for ABM and Mk-41, an LPDG?. Such a config would be incompatible with extensive flight operations on a light carrier or an LHD but doable on an LPD, it could even lash HIMARS to the deck. Then you have your Hunters with the same (less the HIMARS) plus their ASW role, and the Hobarts. Or the LPDGs could replace the Hobarts and potentially the LHDs, assuming the planned support ships have a significant, complementary amphibious capability. This is a long term vision, not an instant fix, its a replacement of existing types as they come to the end of their lives, or perhaps come due for major upgrades.
This is where the light carriers come in, they replace the aviation capability lost with the LHDs, are designed for fleet operations in support of the Hunters with additional ASW helos but also surveillance aircraft as well, either manned or unmanned. They could even have an AEW capability with CEC, and dream land here, maybe F-35B. They would have the same core SAAB 9LV combat system and at least ESSM Block II and or RAM. They would also be able to operate as many, or more army helicopter than the LHDs, as the RN used to do with the Invincibles to cover Oceans maintenance periods. There are acquired in numbers, i.e. three or more and complement both the surface fleet and the amphib capability.
The final string is the OPVs, or more to the point the modern day DEs (Destroyer Escorts or patrol frigates) the supplement and supersede them. They will be something in the vein of the RN Type 31/32, and Danish Iver Huitfeldt class and Absalon class frigates. This is where the RAN will have their multirole capability. A core 9LV combat system with CEC, a Mk-41 VLS for ESSM but also able to carry other missile types to be used to their best effect by the LPDG or Hunters they are supporting, a Mk-45 5" gun, hangar large enough for two Romeos or a mix of Romeos and UAVs, a flight deck large enough for a Chinook, and a mission deck able to be configured for mine warfare or Amphibious warfare. These ships could be the basis of a modern day Assault transport (APD) as used so effectively by the USN in WWII (this was also the final role of the surviving ships of the famous RAN Scrap Iron Flotilla).
Going forward, we build the Hunters as planned, growing and evolving them, build the new support ships as planned, ensuring they have dock wells and can supplement the LHDs. Select or design a light carrier to introduce new capabilities and supplement the LHDs, then as sufficient become available to take over the entirety of the LHDs aviation role. Design (adapt / dust off US plans) a LPDG to replace the Canberras and Hobarts.
Switch from OPVs to DEs / APDs, cascading the OPVs to Customs and secondary roles.
Anyway (perhaps for good reason) I am not in a senior CAPDEV role, so there is pretty much zero chance of any of this happening.
I actually think a thorough discussion concerning aviation and the maritime domain needs to be had, especially the fling wing (rotary wing) component. If I were to narrow the focus further because the naval combat force component is reasonably well established and fit for purpose, but there is always room for improvement. Where I believe some posters see the problem is involves the amphibious capability of the ADF especially its fling wing capability. I see that as both an Army and Navy issue because whilst they both talk joint, there is still some talking past each other. The RAAF aren't involved because there's no 5 star hotels with room service nearby
IMHO what the Army has to do is decide whether it is a continental army or a maritime army. Like the NZ Army and Canadian Army the Australian Army is a product of the British Army and has inherit much of its traditions, customs, institutional thought etc., from its parent. Like the other two armies it is also an expeditionary force having fought all of it's wars on foreign soil (stand fast the emu wars ) many, but not all, far from home. In the Boer War we both scrapped with the Boers in South Africa, then we both went and fought the Turks and Germans during WW1, During WW2 it chased Rommel across the North African desert, until called home to evict the sons of Japan from PNG and other areas close to home. Then along with the Kiwis and Canucks it went and picked a fight with the North Koreans. After that both of us picked a fight in Vietnam and so on. We know that the Defence of Australia strategy isn't workable because once an enemy gains a bridgehead they will be hard to evict. So the best defence for Australia is to keep that enemy as far from the Australian coast as possible.
It is my belief that the Army has to become a maritime army and focus on operation to and from the sea as well as the air. It has to be amphibious by nature and amphibious doesn't mean just insertion by sea, it also means insertion by air so it can mean a force inserted into an enemies hinterland by air, for a period of time, to cause havoc and mayhem before being extracted. You currently have the required assets for that type of operation too. We are facing the distinct possibility of a major great power war in the Pacific and it will be quite similar to the Pacific War of 1941 - 45 because it will revolve around the same geographic features - islands, archipelagos, ports, safe anchorages, airfields, the wide expanse of the Pacific, SLOC, ALOC, infrastructure, and logistics etc. It will be an island campaign, most likely through the archipelagos of the Philippines and Indonesia, plus through Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia. Unlike the Imperial Japanese Empire our friends in Beijing will have planned well and be far better prepared. Modern technology will change things to, however a lot will still remain the same.
Once ashore the army still has to undertake it's usual trade of wreaking righteous retribution upon the enemy before the enemy does unto them, but it's the getting there that they have to change and some of their CONOPS like land based AShW etc. We all know that truck mounted AShM hidden on an island is an ideal A2AD capability, and can be a new tool in the Arty toolbox. It's not so much the equipment at the moment but more the CONOPS and the mindset in the head shed. Sometimes I think that they seem to believe that they are going to be facing 3 or 4 Soviet tank armies rampaging through the Fulda Gap or down the Bruce Highway from Cairns. And that's where I think lies the problem because they are too wedded to the past and are either unable or unwilling to take both the intellectual and structural leap to understand that a change is required and required now. Unfortunately they aren't the only ones.
IMHO what the Army has to do is decide whether it is a continental army or a maritime army. Like the NZ Army and Canadian Army the Australian Army is a product of the British Army and has inherit much of its traditions, customs, institutional thought etc., from its parent. Like the other two armies it is also an expeditionary force having fought all of it's wars on foreign soil (stand fast the emu wars
) many, but not all, far from home. In the Boer War we both scrapped with the Boers in South Africa, then we both went and fought the Turks and Germans during WW1, During WW2 it chased Rommel across the North African desert, until called home to evict the sons of Japan from PNG and other areas close to home. Then along with the Kiwis and Canucks it went and picked a fight with the North Koreans. After that both of us picked a fight in Vietnam and so on. We know that the Defence of Australia strategy isn't workable because once an enemy gains a bridgehead they will be hard to evict. So the best defence for Australia is to keep that enemy as far from the Australian coast as possible.It is my belief that the Army has to become a maritime army and focus on operation to and from the sea as well as the air. It has to be amphibious by nature and amphibious doesn't mean just insertion by sea, it also means insertion by air so it can mean a force inserted into an enemies hinterland by air, for a period of time, to cause havoc and mayhem before being extracted. You currently have the required assets for that type of operation too. We are facing the distinct possibility of a major great power war in the Pacific and it will be quite similar to the Pacific War of 1941 - 45 because it will revolve around the same geographic features - islands, archipelagos, ports, safe anchorages, airfields, the wide expanse of the Pacific, SLOC, ALOC, infrastructure, and logistics etc. It will be an island campaign, most likely through the archipelagos of the Philippines and Indonesia, plus through Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia. Unlike the Imperial Japanese Empire our friends in Beijing will have planned well and be far better prepared. Modern technology will change things to, however a lot will still remain the same.
Once ashore the army still has to undertake it's usual trade of wreaking righteous retribution upon the enemy before the enemy does unto them, but it's the getting there that they have to change and some of their CONOPS like land based AShW etc. We all know that truck mounted AShM hidden on an island is an ideal A2AD capability, and can be a new tool in the Arty toolbox. It's not so much the equipment at the moment but more the CONOPS and the mindset in the head shed. Sometimes I think that they seem to believe that they are going to be facing 3 or 4 Soviet tank armies rampaging through the Fulda Gap or down the Bruce Highway from Cairns. And that's where I think lies the problem because they are too wedded to the past and are either unable or unwilling to take both the intellectual and structural leap to understand that a change is required and required now. Unfortunately they aren't the only ones.
Apparently army aviation elements onboard the LHDs are treated the same as troops, i.e. troop accommodation, squeezing their equipment and stores in where they can. This suggests there are no or somewhat limited permanent aviation support facilities onboard.
Huh. In my day Army Aviation *were* treated the same as the troops. It's why the aren't Air Force. Expectations you know, that at the other end they'll use a bare bones base and sleep in holes besides their steeds.
Still noone here listening to what the Government and ADF have thrashed out as optimum for the now while working towards a future we have *less* information about than them.
Examples. Do we have some genuine expertise here about the effects of a powerfully CEAFAR radar on the island of an LHD on the use of every other item of electronics on ship or aircraft. If not, I'm too old to remember the details but know a lot of old comments and radar types who sill bitch about having to repeatedly move sensors/antenna because if you left the m there, they stopped working or stopped the new bits.
The island on our LHD is structured differently to provide everything needed for a task group command, plus an air ops, plus a big open bit for boaty types to see where they're going. Lose which one of the three?
On what basis? The feeling in your water about the "Chinks" coming? I've wanted for YEARS to see us with fixed wing aviation again, and would love it now, but I'm not just plum *against* it's absence to the extent I'll ignore any other possibility, like, I may be WRONG.
oldsig
I think you missed the entire point of the post you responded to, i.e. that aviation is among the stuff the LHD can carry and operate in a limited capacity, and is not an integral part of the ship. In a nutshell, the LHDs are not carriers.
As to soldiers sleeping rough while on exercise or deployment, which is exactly what army aviation on an LHD is, deploying for an exercise. This is completely different to rocking up to work at your regular base of operations and being told you can't go home, are working and messing out of tents, while others you work side by side with get a shiny new buildings and that this is the new norm.
The LHDs are not carriers, they are a large, very capable and flexible joint capability, but they are not carriers. Whether Australia needs or will ever get carriers again is well above my pay grade, but the LHDs are still not carriers unless major changes are made to their internal layout and operations.
I have never set foot on an LHD but I do know that the junior sailors accommodation on an Armidale is more spacious and comfortable than the COs cabin on a Collins, while the austere accommodation aft on the PBs, is a lower standard than I have seen in decommissioned prisons. When deploying as part of the crew, as aviation would have to do if permanently assigned to an LHD as a permanent air group, their accommodation would have to be improved if only for operational efficiency. Leave it as it is and you will rapidly encounter morale and retention issues.
Again, LHDs are not carriers and what I have posted is examples of why they are not. If we want carriers, they need to be fitted out, crewed and operated as carriers.
I also raised my (highly fanciful) ideas of how we could go about adding carriers to the fleet as a complementary capability. I also suggested possibilities for a more survivable joint amphibious capability, moving the command, capabilities of the LHD into an LPD with cruiser level air defence capability. A big ship full of troops and their equipment, as well as the C3I for most of the operation will always be a very attractive target, so why not use some of their massive volume to add a theatre air and missile defence capability?
Carriers, unlike LHDs and LPHs can rapidly and easily re role from their primary role and deploy army aviation assets, before returning to their usual role.
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Italys Aircrfat carrier Cavour is an interesting compromise.
Initially planned to be a ship with a docking well, the priority was eventually to became aviation.
The hull form ditched the docking well and was designed for speed and endurance.
Interesting enough the hanger still had to accept heavy loads, so this space has the ability to carry up to 24 MBT's at the expense of aircraft.
Loading is via a 70T capacity ramp to a wharf.
Not saying this is for the RAN but interesting what other Navy's do for their own needs.
"Needs" are something the ADF need's to think about.
Cheers S
Sorry @Volko, my quoting you was more by way of providing a point of agreement-which we do- but spun off into a rant about the tedious repetition of suggestions in this thread that we should arm them up with as many F-35 as can be crammed on board, at *any* cost.
Not for you, but for others,
1. We are never going to attack China with F-35b especially with two ships neither intended for, nor capable of doing it. We may assist someone else by supporting their efforts though not likely with a derisorilly small "air wing".
2. We are never going to charge the outskirts of their domain in troop packed LHDs without proper air support and ditto a comprehensive air defence umbrella, probably provided by others
What we have no idea of *here* is the extent to which Defence and Government has determined we need to, or can, do those things. Maybe they figure that we do one thing well as part of a team, maybe it's still being determined.
I n the meantime they are still working ships, crews, equipment, procedures up to full capacity against objectives not clear to us
And we're busy with rotating fantasy fleets because we have no idea except from a very few inside enough to say nothing.
Interestingly the first mention I saw of Australia getting LHDs, was in an article that mentioned and showed a model of Cavour as an option. As we know the Spanish and French options got up, but I also recall NG pushing the San Antonio.
The accommodation in an LHD for embarked troops, including any air component, is roughly the same that of the ship's company of equivilant ranks except that the troops' mess decks have provisions for weapon stowage which the ship's company doesn't need. It is certainly a lot more comfortable than sleeping in a hutchie in the bush; not to mention that you get showers, toilets you don't have to dig for yourself, and pretty good meals. The aviation briefing facilities and the like, while not up to carrier standard, are still pretty good. After all, the purpose of the"H" part of the description is to support rotary wing operations....
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Well the RAN is with the Type 26, a major re-design is underway to suit Australia's needs.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
It would also come down to the number of embarked troops on board too. More comfortable with only 300-400 then the full 1000 would be.
I hear you.
I confess to getting carried away with future capability but in my defence, government is way too slow on the same.
You should be planning your future force before your current force is in the field, air, on or under the water. Back when the draft Coles report on submarine sustainment was due to be released (2011/12) those in the game were very concerned because we should have been onto detailed design for the Collins replacement, not doing the preliminaries on how to sustain the current fleet.
The RAN as it stands now is the force we determined we needed to intervene in Timor without US assistance in 1999, i.e. a lesson learnt.
The thing is the force we had at the time of Timor, was the rationalised, cost cut force, we had after the peace dividend and defence efficiency reviews and force structure reviews had done their jobs.
That is, it was a downsized version of the fleet the previous government had agreed to following the lessons of the Falklands, Persian Gulf Tanker War, and the Fiji coup(s).
Falklands lessons, every combatant needs a minimum of a rapid reaction point defence missile system and NGS is a good thing to have. Gulf lessons reaffirmed this, adding that helicopter launched anti surface missiles are very very handy. This is where eight ANZACs, the proposed fitment of Penguin to the Seahawks, the dozen corvettes with ESSM, and the Super Sea Sprites came from.
Bill and Ben came from a realisation, post Fiji, that we needed an improved amphibious, including command, capability, in particular, the ability to operate a useful number of helicopters in support of amphibious operations.
So basically the force we had for Timor, was less suitable for the role than the planned but not achieved force. What we have now is the force we needed for Timor, but less the litoral warfare capability once planned.
Our current future force is what we needed for Timor, minus litoral warfare, plus ASW (Hunters/Romeo's) plus SSNs.