Sorry @Volko, my quoting you was more by way of providing a point of agreement-which we do- but spun off into a rant about the tedious repetition of suggestions in this thread that we should arm them up with as many F-35 as can be crammed on board, at *any* cost.
Not for you, but for others,
1. We are never going to attack China with F-35b especially with two ships neither intended for, nor capable of doing it. We may assist someone else by supporting their efforts though not likely with a derisorilly small "air wing".
2. We are never going to charge the outskirts of their domain in troop packed LHDs without proper air support and ditto a comprehensive air defence umbrella, probably provided by others
What we have no idea of *here* is the extent to which Defence and Government has determined we need to, or can, do those things. Maybe they figure that we do one thing well as part of a team, maybe it's still being determined.
I n the meantime they are still working ships, crews, equipment, procedures up to full capacity against objectives not clear to us
And we're busy with rotating fantasy fleets because we have no idea except from a very few inside enough to say nothing.
I hear you.
I confess to getting carried away with future capability but in my defence, government is way too slow on the same.
You should be planning your future force before your current force is in the field, air, on or under the water. Back when the draft Coles report on submarine sustainment was due to be released (2011/12) those in the game were very concerned because we should have been onto detailed design for the Collins replacement, not doing the preliminaries on how to sustain the current fleet.
The RAN as it stands now is the force we determined we needed to intervene in Timor without US assistance in 1999, i.e. a lesson learnt.
The thing is the force we had at the time of Timor, was the rationalised, cost cut force, we had after the peace dividend and defence efficiency reviews and force structure reviews had done their jobs.
That is, it was a downsized version of the fleet the previous government had agreed to following the lessons of the Falklands, Persian Gulf Tanker War, and the Fiji coup(s).
Falklands lessons, every combatant needs a minimum of a rapid reaction point defence missile system and NGS is a good thing to have. Gulf lessons reaffirmed this, adding that helicopter launched anti surface missiles are very very handy. This is where eight ANZACs, the proposed fitment of Penguin to the Seahawks, the dozen corvettes with ESSM, and the Super Sea Sprites came from.
Bill and Ben came from a realisation, post Fiji, that we needed an improved amphibious, including command, capability, in particular, the ability to operate a useful number of helicopters in support of amphibious operations.
So basically the force we had for Timor, was less suitable for the role than the planned but not achieved force. What we have now is the force we needed for Timor, but less the litoral warfare capability once planned.
Our current future force is what we needed for Timor, minus litoral warfare, plus ASW (Hunters/Romeo's) plus SSNs.