RAN Discussions on SSNs only

[Boagrius]

As has been said already - an Australian ICBM capability would be fraught with issues - the nuclear ambiguity, the lack of national capacity to build them, the fact that they would have to overfly Indonesian/Malaysian airspace en route to their targets, the disproportionate cost to deliver a basic conventional warhead... the list goes on.

I'd submit that if we were to be looking down "that path" a better option would be to pursue the IRCPS hypersonic weapon (alongside the NGLAW Tomahawk successor) from a fleet of VPM equipped Virginia Blk V+ subs, or - failing that - look into the American LRHW. That at least removes the nuclear ambiguity and solves the development problem (MOTS). It also gives you a weapon that is likely to be even more difficult to intercept thanks to the low flight profile and maneuvering potential of its hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

 

[StingrayOZ]

In case of the former a few Australian SSNs will not deter a Chinese carrier group even if the U.S or U.K agrees to lease two or three SSNs to Australia immediately. Just the PLA-Navy's South China fleet is larger than the combined fleet of Australia, NZ, India and Indonesia. And they have Asia's most extensive anti submarine warfare capability.

The idea isn't for Australia to match China 1 to 1 in sea power. There is no alliance between AU, NZ, India, Indonesia.

In case of the latter, Australia will need SSBNs and SSGNs capable of firing long range cruise and ballistic missiles.

No. The US and others have that capability well in hand.
The aim here isn't to create a separate global power the mirrors the Chinese (or US) power, and across all spectrums.
Australia isn't building 66 submarines. It isn't acquiring SSBNs.

The SSN's won't be operating independently of the US SSN's. They will be part of a cohesive group, working cooperatively, along with UK SSNs. This isnt new or unusual. Australia has long cooperated with the US with sub ops.

 

[ngatimozart]

An ICBM does not necessarily have to be armed with a nuclear warhead. The Prompt Global Strike (PGS) effort of the U.S military intends to strike a target anywhere in the world with an ICBM armed with a conventional warhead.

If the intention is to simply keep the PLA-Navy away from Australian territorial waters then Australian F-18F Super Hornet armed with AGM-84 is more than enough.

So instead of an ICBM, what's the other cost effective option of striking China? Australian SSNs will at best be armed with 1000 miles ranged Tomahawk cruise missiles.

For that observe the current military stand off between China and India. India has deployed at best a few dozen rockets and missiles. But this deployment itself has forced the Chinese to negotiate and even back off.

Homegrown solutions has come a cropper. That explains why they had to purchase S-400 from Russia and is now planning to develop a missile warning system using Russian expertise.

Unlike Australia, India is a nuclear weapons capable nation, so its ICBM are nuclear tipped. That's what has given the CCP pause for thought. Also the Indians have both ground and submarine launched ICBM. An Australian conventional ICBM is not that much of a strategic deterrent. The warhead isn't big enough to cause significant damage compared to a nuclear warhead. Secondly such silos can be eradicated in a first strike with nuclear warheads. That's their vulnerability. So you have a lot of treasure sunk into a hole in the ground, that you can't move and which has a good probability of being destroyed before it can be used. Not a good use of Defence money.

 

[StingrayOZ]

India's nuclear capability is aimed firmly at Pakistan. Which has their capability aimed firmly at India. While these could target elsewhere, that would upset the balance, India could shift its priority to China, however, China and India know that such a conflict would not be winnable and make life more difficult as they would be weaker against their secondary threats.

Australia has no natural enemy. China isn't trying to start a war with Australia. Australia is not the main game. It alone, is not a counterpoint to China. Its 28 million people, 5000 km away. In terms of Chinese military and political priorities it is quite low.

China nuking Australia makes literally no sense. Firstly they don't have enough nuclear weapons to target multiple nations as an independent strike. They never pursued a US or Soviet style stockpile. You will get a full retaliation from the US and/or UK (as part of a much larger global strike). Yet it will both have minimal impact on Australia and almost no impact on western manufacturing, technology etc. The US will be stronger than ever and China will be sent back to the stone age. While Chinese and Russian relations are generally satisfactory, no way does anyone believe Russia would follow China into what ever crazy self destructive nuclear conflict they would get into in this hypothetical situations.

Australia's submarines aren't going to singularly tear apart China and launch massive mainland attacks. Even if we had 24 of them. The US is always going to be the premier submarine power globally. China has what 6 SSNs? Australia just needs to keep any Chinese projected power in check.

What it does is make any attack, skirmish, grey zone pressure, stupidly costly. It also deters CCP hostile actions. The answer to the question "well what are you going to do about it" has been answered. Australia will have survival and capable platforms if a high intensity conflict breaks out. No matter where the US sits politically, Australia will have platforms in the area and can project power into the area. Taking pot shots at Australian interests could be answered in kind immediately. Countries can align and associate with Australia knowing its capable and has its own capabilities.

Probably more annoyingly for China it rewards Australia for their brave stance against China. A big chair at the big table. SSN capabilities. Input into US strategy and positioning. US and UK technology.

China is seen as ineffective and powerless at least in regards to Australia. On going power crisis in China and their inability to even find other sources of resources outside Australia.

 

[ASSAIL]

Threat emanating from what PLA-Navy carrier groups? PLA- Rocket Force?

In case of the former a few Australian SSNs will not deter a Chinese carrier group even if the U.S or U.K agrees to lease two or three SSNs to Australia immediately. Just the PLA-Navy's South China fleet is larger than the combined fleet of Australia, NZ, India and Indonesia. And they have Asia's most extensive anti submarine warfare capability.

The most effective counter to an expanding PLA-N is precisely a moderate number of submarines both SSK and SSN.
Every planned manoeuvre, every force deployment and every individual ship transit they undertake must assume a submarine threat exists.
They must plan proportionate counter measures, deploy more escorts, seek support from ASW aviation, all of which increases time and effort even though they have no idea where our boats are deployed.
The very threat of an enemy sub can cause more risky operations, like ventures beyond the SE Asian archipelago to be assessed as “too much pain for too little gain”.
In future the RAN cannot hope to deploy more than 4 or 5 submarines at any one time but those boats will be capable of delivering a totally disproportionate counter, more than any other weapon in our arsenal and they do this without expending a single shot.
Finally your talk about the ASW competence of the PLA-N. No doubt it’s improving however to date our submarines have operated close to and within Chinese ships and waters with a degree of confidence that they will not be detected.

Finally a lesson from history.
In WW2 the Kreigsmarine started with 57 small submarines (this number naturally grew to a final 1160 odd) and their growth in numbers was halting at best by opposition from Admiral Raeder but this reasonably small force almost brought Great Britain to her knees and had they been able to grow faster and had better aviation support things might have been very different.
I only use this example of how a navy, that could in no way match the might of the allies surface fleet, could almost defeat them by using very crude and basic submersibles. About 900 German subs were sunk but half of those were sunk by aircraft while they were surfaced. If they were able to stay submerged I believe the whole scenario of the Battle of the Atlantic could have been different.
As you may guess, I fear submarines and this made my naval career as an ASWO thoroughly “Ernest”

 

[alexsa]

The most effective counter to an expanding PLA-N is precisely a moderate number of submarines both SSK and SSN.
Every planned manoeuvre, every force deployment and every individual ship transit they undertake must assume a submarine threat exists.
They must plan proportionate counter measures, deploy more escorts, seek support from ASW aviation, all of which increases time and effort even though they have no idea where our boats are deployed.
The very threat of an enemy sub threat can cause more risky operations, like ventures beyond the SE Asian archipelago to be assessed as “too much pain for too little gain”.
In future the RAN cannot hope to deploy more than 4 or 5 submarines at any one time but those boats will be capable of delivering a totally disproportionate counter, more than any other weapon in our arsenal and they do this without expending a single shot.
Finally your talk about the ASW competence of the PLA-N. No doubt it’s improving however to date our submarines have operated close to and within Chinese ships and waters with a degree of confidence that they will not be detected.

Finally a lesson from history.
In WW2 the Kreigsmarine started with 57 small submarines (this number naturally grew to a final 1160 odd) and their growth in numbers was halting at best by opposition from Admiral Raeder but this reasonably small force almost brought Great Britain to her knees and had they been able to grow faster and had better aviation support things might have been very different.
I only use this example of how a navy, that could in no way match the might of the allies surface fleet, could almost defeat them by using very crude and basic submersibles. About 900 German subs were sunk but half of those were sunk by aircraft while they were surfaced. If they were able to stay submerged I believe the whole scenario of the Battle of the Atlantic could have been different.
As you may guess, I fear submarines and this made my naval career as an ASWO thoroughly “Ernest”

Agree .... and as an added benefit an SSN is advantageous to the effectiveness of a task group. There is nothing like a task group to attract a submarine and nothing like a capable escort of an SSN and capable and quiet ASW ships to make the life of the tracking submarine hell.

I have experienced the T22's in their day and they were uncomfortably capable in exercises (yes O boats) having an SSN prowling about would have been even more unpleasant.

 

[ddxx]

In regards to the crew size of the Virginia Class, it would be interesting to know what the core crew requirement of the class is, and what scope is available for some level of crew reduction through automation. I'd imagine a portion of the crew would likely be for training purposes given the size of the USN fleet and rate of boat production?

The USN does tend to crew their platforms quite heavily compared to other navies. As an example their planned Constellation Class FFG based on the FREMM has a total crew of 200, where as the Italian and French FREMM both operate with a total crew ranging from 123 to 156.

 

[spoz]

Because the USN has a totally different maintenance and manning philosophy to those countries. USN ships routinely deploy for months at a time away from base support; Italian and French ships don't.

 

[Todjaeger]

The USN does tend to crew their platforms quite heavily compared to other navies. As an example their planned Constellation Class FFG based on the FREMM has a total crew of 200, where as the Italian and French FREMM both operate with a total crew ranging from 123 to 156.

A better comparison example would be the USN crew complement for a Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG with 15 officers and 190 enlisted not including 6 officers and 15 enlisted for the embarked helicopters. The RAN crew complement for an Adelaide-class FFG (RAN's name for the OHP frigate) not including aircrew was 184 including 15 officers. This suggests that the USN's crewing philosophy (and damage control IIRC) calls for 21 extra crew for the exact same class of ship, built in the same shipyards and kitted out the same way.

 

[ngatimozart]

The most effective counter to an expanding PLA-N is precisely a moderate number of submarines both SSK and SSN.
Every planned manoeuvre, every force deployment and every individual ship transit they undertake must assume a submarine threat exists.
They must plan proportionate counter measures, deploy more escorts, seek support from ASW aviation, all of which increases time and effort even though they have no idea where our boats are deployed.
The very threat of an enemy sub can cause more risky operations, like ventures beyond the SE Asian archipelago to be assessed as “too much pain for too little gain”.
In future the RAN cannot hope to deploy more than 4 or 5 submarines at any one time but those boats will be capable of delivering a totally disproportionate counter, more than any other weapon in our arsenal and they do this without expending a single shot.
Finally your talk about the ASW competence of the PLA-N. No doubt it’s improving however to date our submarines have operated close to and within Chinese ships and waters with a degree of confidence that they will not be detected.

Finally a lesson from history.
In WW2 the Kreigsmarine started with 57 small submarines (this number naturally grew to a final 1160 odd) and their growth in numbers was halting at best by opposition from Admiral Raeder but this reasonably small force almost brought Great Britain to her knees and had they been able to grow faster and had better aviation support things might have been very different.
I only use this example of how a navy, that could in no way match the might of the allies surface fleet, could almost defeat them by using very crude and basic submersibles. About 900 German subs were sunk but half of those were sunk by aircraft while they were surfaced. If they were able to stay submerged I believe the whole scenario of the Battle of the Atlantic could have been different.
As you may guess, I fear submarines and this made my naval career as an ASWO thoroughly “Ernest”

I believe that the biggest hindrance to a Kreigsmarine U Boat victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was Adm Dönitz's insistence on the U Boats doing an ET and phoning home so often. He wasn't to know about Ultra, but he should've been aware of DF. As you will know, the biggest advantage in ASW is intell because that gives you a possible start point. That's what Dönitz was doing each time one of his U Boats did its ET it gave the RN a location for each boat as it phoned home enabling them to determine where the boats and the threats were.

IMHO if Dönitz had instead instructed his boat CO's only to ET in extraordinary circumstances, the Battle of the Atlantic may have been different. The allies probably still would have won it but the cost may have been a lot higher.

 

[aussienscale]

A better comparison example would be the USN crew complement for a Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG with 15 officers and 190 enlisted not including 6 officers and 15 enlisted for the embarked helicopters. The RAN crew complement for an Adelaide-class FFG (RAN's name for the OHP frigate) not including aircrew was 184 including 15 officers. This suggests that the USN's crewing philosophy (and damage control IIRC) calls for 21 extra crew for the exact same class of ship, built in the same shipyards and kitted out the same way.

Correct, the USN have very different approaches to DC, Fire Fighting and NBCD with dedicated personnel for key roles.

 

[ddxx]

Correct, the USN have very different approaches to DC, Fire Fighting and NBCD with dedicated personnel for key roles.

Brilliant, thanks for everyone’s insight on this. Bringing it back to the Virginia Class context, does this result in potential changes to what the core crew requirement would be for a RAN variant?

 

[Todjaeger]

Brilliant, thanks for everyone’s insight on this. Bringing it back to the Virginia Class context, does this result in potential changes to what the core crew requirement would be for a RAN variant?

The answer is most likely, "yes," but how large a change in numbers is frankly not something we would know since currently only the USN operates Virginia-class SSN's. I would not be surprised if 10% or more of a USN vessel's crew is for dedicated damage control teams aboard conventional vessels. Having heard interesting things about some of the exercises carried out aboard USN SSN's, I would not be at all surprised if there were also crew in additional dedicated roles.

 

[ddxx]

The answer is most likely, "yes," but how large a change in numbers is frankly not something we would know since currently only the USN operates Virginia-class SSN's. I would not be surprised if 10% or more of a USN vessel's crew is for dedicated damage control teams aboard conventional vessels. Having heard interesting things about some of the exercises carried out aboard USN SSN's, I would not be at all surprised if there were also crew in additional dedicated roles.

Thanks for your reply, I guess what I’m trying to understand is what the true gap in core crew numbers is between the Astute and Virginia SSNs from the information that is known. It’s clearly more complex than taking the published figure from both classes on face value and subtracting one from the other as many commentators do.

There’s a lot of noise around stating Astute is the only option due to crew numbers, which seems to be an incredible oversimplification of capability procurement. Alongside greatly underestimating the time and risk involved in both combat and weapons system integration, the objectives of the 2020 Strategic Update, and the substantial investment in long range strike and hypersonic weapons in partnership with the US.

 

[MilitaryIndustrialComplex]

Brilliant, thanks for everyone’s insight on this. Bringing it back to the Virginia Class context, does this result in potential changes to what the core crew requirement would be for a RAN variant?

Previously submariners in several countries accepted a submarine and then began training onboard. Now, the crew members are trained during the construction and trials. This new method was introduced with the intention of accelerating the beginning of the combat duty of new nuclear submarines. So maybe the U.S and U.K will allow Australian submariners to train on SSNs/SSBNs that are current being built in their country.

Australian submariners who will operate Australia's SSNs will have to undergo training in the U.S or U.K. For instance Nuclear submarines require large reduction gears and a robust cooling system to maintain safe operation of the reactor. So submariners who have previously operated SSKs will have to be trained on how to carry out these operations.

 

[aussienscale]

Previously submariners in several countries accepted a submarine and then began training onboard. Now, the crew members are trained during the construction and trials. This new method was introduced with the intention of accelerating the beginning of the combat duty of new nuclear submarines. So maybe the U.S and U.K will allow Australian submariners to train on SSNs/SSBNs that are current being built in their country.

Australian submariners who will operate Australia's SSNs will have to undergo training in the U.S or U.K. For instance Nuclear submarines require large reduction gears and a robust cooling system to maintain safe operation of the reactor. So submariners who have previously operated SSKs will have to be trained on how to carry out these operations.

Which is great for the majority of the crew, the problem lies with qualified command and engineering personnel and structure in the nuclear department, that takes time, and a lot of it !

Approx 10 years to become a qualified nuclear engineer, and then the command structure, to become a fully qualified CO takes time.

Those things can't be rushed, and neither the UK or US has them hanging from tree's waiting to be poached by Australia, this is a long long process, no way around it.

 

[Julian 82]

One point to keep in mind is that we do not have to follow the US route for training SSN COs. The Royal Navy has two separate streams (command and nuke engineer). Unlike the US navy (which is a hangover from the Rickover days) you don’t need to be a nuke engineer before you can drive SSNs in the Royal Navy. Obviously we still need yo train the engineers to run the reactors but the future COs don’t need to also be nuke engineers.

 

[aussienscale]

One point to keep in mind is that we do not have to follow the US route for training SSN COs. The Royal Navy has two separate streams (command and nuke engineer). Unlike the US navy (which is a hangover from the Rickover days) you don’t need to be a nuke engineer before you can drive SSNs in the Royal Navy. Obviously we still need yo train the engineers to run the reactors but the future COs don’t need to also be nuke engineers.

That will depend on a few things, which submarine we end up with, what reactor, and what the US, being the owner of the tech, put in place as their requirements for us to have access to and operate them. No quick way around it either way, this is a long haul project

Even the UK's Perisher course is not really quick nor a push over

Cheers

 

[Redlands18]

I believe that the biggest hindrance to a Kreigsmarine U Boat victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was Adm Dönitz's insistence on the U Boats doing an ET and phoning home so often. He wasn't to know about Ultra, but he should've been aware of DF. As you will know, the biggest advantage in ASW is intell because that gives you a possible start point. That's what Dönitz was doing each time one of his U Boats did its ET it gave the RN a location for each boat as it phoned home enabling them to determine where the boats and the threats were.

IMHO if Dönitz had instead instructed his boat CO's only to ET in extraordinary circumstances, the Battle of the Atlantic may have been different. The allies probably still would have won it but the cost may have been a lot higher.

Mid 1943 when the Allies finally had enough CVEs and Maritime Patrol Aircraft to cover the entire North Atlantic air Space was basically when the U-Boat threat ended.

 

[ASSAIL]

Mid 1943 when the Allies finally had enough CVEs and Maritime Patrol Aircraft to cover the entire North Atlantic air Space was basically when the U-Boat threat ended.

True but the point I was making was that the Liberators, Catalinas, Sunderlands and the aircraft on the CVEs nearly all sunk U Boats whilst they were surfaced, the allies didn’t have the underwater search capability we have now and had the UBoats been able to remain submerged as modern boats can the outcome could have been very different.
There are many other significant factors determining the outcome of the battle but I was really commentating on the capabilities, or lack of, of the boats of the era.