Countering Chinese Propaganda Points
thats only if China start much aggressively target everybody, i doubt china is that stupid to do that.
1. How would you explain plans/doctrinal discussions on how to attack other littoral islands in the South China Sea (1st island chain) and the Pacific (2nd island chain) that are published in China’s military academies as campaign studies? The development of China’s operational campaign doctrine suggest that the PLA(N) has carefully studied how to create the conditions needed for fighting and winning against other claimants over these small islands and coral reefs.
(a) For example, in the 2006 edition of The Science of Campaigns contains a new type of naval campaign, described as “attacks against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi
), a campaign scenario that appears to be tailored to the South China Sea disputes where China might consider attacking islands and reefs held by other claimants.
(b) The discussion of the campaign is brief, only five pages long. Moreover, most of the discussion highlights the obstacles and challenges that the PLA(N) would face, including the distance from the mainland and difficulties in command, air defense, and logistics support along with the harsh natural environment characterized by typhoons and subsurface obstacles. The emphasis on the difficulties in the discussion of this campaign is noteworthy.
2. China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea is aimed at pushing its own sensor and weapons range so far into the Pacific that it becomes impossible for American forces to touch Chinese positions without risk to its fleet.
(a) US Navy Capt (retd.) James Fanell has estimated that by 2030, the Chinese fleet will have a surface force of over 450 ships and a submarine force of about 110 boats. In his fifth State of the Nation Address (SONA) Duterte says he is inutile and Beijing is in possession of South China Sea: “China has the arms. We do not have it... They are in possession of the property... so what can we do? We have to go to war, and I cannot afford it, I cannot do anything.”
(b) Further, China’s Spratly Island outposts’ offer Beijing decisive information superiority against any challenger in the South China Sea. Their primary purpose is not military power projection and the deployment of weapons, but information power. The Chinese bases’ main contribution is to facilitate substantial command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the South China Sea.
3. Working together with the 2 Chinese carriers, the Type 075 landing helicopter dock (075 LPD) built by the Hudong–Zhonghua Shipbuilding company offer a means of power projection into the South China Sea that solves the problems identified in the 2006 naval campaign design, described as “attacks against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi). At least three of the 075 LPDs are being built. With 8 Type 071 LPDs alone, the PLA(N) would already be able to project a force of more than 2 marine brigades within the 1st island chain, not to mention the other PLA that can be transported by the 60 or so LSTs displacing between 1,000 and 5,000 tons. By 2026, the PLA(N) would have acquired all the naval platforms needed to address prior logistics weaknesses identified and win in the naval campaign scenario against littoral states that was identified in 2006.
4. Certain Indo-Pacific navies, particularly those of Australia, China, Japan, Korea and Singapore—are acquiring or have acquired the types of force projection naval platforms that, taken together, increasingly provide them with what is required to fundamentally transform their fleets and their numbered naval flotilla. In particular, those systems related to precision strike, and above all C4ISR and networking comprise some of the key hardware ingredients essential to implementing a modern revolution in military affairs. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have the potential to significantly affect naval strategy and operations and alter the determinants of critical capabilities for success in modern naval warfare.