Philippines Army Discussions and Updates

ManilaBoy

Banned Member
I'm not sure if there is an existing thread already but did not find one under this section,anyway here is a news article report that the army has just acquired 23 brand new Humvees life support ambulances which is very much needed at the frontline of the conflict areas in the Southern part of the archipelago ...

DEFENSE STUDIES: Military Acquires 23 Humvee Ambulances
 
Last edited:

ManilaBoy

Banned Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #2

STURM

Well-Known Member
Instead of just posting links to news reports, perhaps it would be better and more interesting if you could actually start a discussion related to the Philippine army? Has the Philippine army made any organisational changes of late, what shoulder fired weapons does it use, what armoured units are based in Mindanao, etc, all of which would be much more interesting than just posting links to new reports....

Perhaps you would be able to help me with 2 questions I have -

1. Has the army ever officially released figures on casualties incurred in Mindanao over the past few years?

2. Does the army have a dedicated jungle traning school or is it part of the Special Forces school at Fort Ramon Magsaysay?
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Unfortunately he won't be answering those questions, as he's been warned in the last few days for posting links without any post content, and has previously been banned for ignoring such warnings in the past. So he's done here. Sorry about that Sturm, hopefully someone else will jump in with some discussion.
 

fretburner

Banned Member
Instead of just posting links to news reports, perhaps it would be better and more interesting if you could actually start a discussion related to the Philippine army? Has the Philippine army made any organisational changes of late, what shoulder fired weapons does it use, what armoured units are based in Mindanao, etc, all of which would be much more interesting than just posting links to new reports....

Perhaps you would be able to help me with 2 questions I have -

1. Has the army ever officially released figures on casualties incurred in Mindanao over the past few years?

2. Does the army have a dedicated jungle traning school or is it part of the Special Forces school at Fort Ramon Magsaysay?
The newspapers usually account for the casualties. On whether or not they're 100% accurate, I'm not sure. I haven't seen like an "official" casualty list in the AFP's official websites.

Edit: Here's a very recent example from a major daily: Basilan fighting leaves 17 dead

ZAMBOANGA CITY – The Philippine Army said 12 soldiers and five Abu Sayyaf bandits were killed in separate fighting in Basilan Thursday.

Scout Rangers clashed with Abu Sayyaf bandits in Sumisip, Basilan, on Thursday morning, leaving eight government troops and four rebels dead.


The Scout Rangers I believe are the country's premiere jungle fighting group. Not sure how believable this [ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Scout_Ranger_Regiment"]1st Scout Ranger Regiment - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame], but their main garrison is Camp Tecson in Bulacan which is north of Manila. They probably train there too?

The other unit worth mentioning to is the so-called LRB or Light Reaction Batallion. They're also an elite unite fighting in the jungles as well as urban areas. They're probably the best equipped fighting force in the PH.
 
Last edited:

STURM

Well-Known Member
Ken Conboy's 'South East Asian Special Forces', published by Osprey some years ago has detailed information on a number of Philippine army units. The only recent books in English that I have come across that has some mention on the Philippine army are 'Imperial Grunts' and 'Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts' by Robert Kaplan. In these books, there are sections in which the author describes his visits to U.S. army green beret teams deployed in the south, providing training to the Philippine army and humanitarian asistance to the locals.
 

Filipinas

Banned Member
Army Confirms P2.4 Billion Acquisition of 63,000 Brand New M-4 Automatic Rifles

http://ptvnews.ph/bottom-news-life2...uisition-of-63-000-brand-new-automatic-rifles

Created on Tuesday, 18 March 2014

The Philippine Army (PA) confirmed Tuesday the acquisition of 63,000 brand-new automatic rifles which will be delivered and issued in several batches this year.Lt. Col. Noel Detoyato, Army spokesperson, said that these new rifles are the M-4 which is worth P38,402 each.The entire order is estimated to be worth P2.4 billion.The M-4 is a shorter and lighter variant of the M-16A2 assault rifle. It is a gas-operated, magazine-fed, shoulder-fired weapon with a telescoping stock and 14.5 inch (370 mm) barrel for easy close quarter combat.The rifle fires the .223 caliber, or 5.56-mm NATO round.During the March 16 graduation of the Philippine Military Academy Class of 2014, President Benigno S. Aquino III said that the military will soon be retiring its Vietnam-era automatic rifles with the delivery of 63,000 brand-new rifles. (PNA)
[Mod Edit: Warning issued about converting a number of discussion threads into news ribbons. While we prefer discussions that are linked to sources, the citing of news reports alone is not sufficient. A comment from you (in relation to the news cited), that is at least 3 sentences in length is required, in any future posts by you.

If you can't provide input that is at least 3 sentences in length, not posting is also an option. Many thanks for your attention. There will be no further warnings on this pattern of behaviour.]
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Please refrain from simply copy-pasting entire news articles and turning threads into news ribbons. We expect to see personal input to a user's posts, not just copy-pasted work belonging to someone else. It's against the forum rules to do this.

I know you're new but please don't make a habit of this. Thanks mate.
 

DonGen

New Member
I want to hear from the viewpoint of a filipino muslim, or from mindanaoan, reconfirming when i saw a few military personel praying at the mosque in philippines.

As a muslim, being a soldier goes outside the scope of islam, as nationalism and patriotism are considered vain, to extremes, forbidden, considering philippines is a christian country. So, is it forbidden ?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I want to hear from the viewpoint of a filipino muslim, or from mindanaoan, reconfirming when i saw a few military personel praying at the mosque in philippines.

As a muslim, being a soldier goes outside the scope of islam, as nationalism and patriotism are considered vain, to extremes, forbidden, considering philippines is a christian country. So, is it forbidden ?
Welcome to the forum. I served with a Muslim in the RNZAF back in the 1970s. He was my Warrant Officer and he had been in the air force for about 25 years then retiring a few years later after 30 odd years of very honourable service. Muslims serve today in many armed forces around the world especially in the armed forces of Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran for example, so I suggest that your assertion is wrong.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I want to hear from the viewpoint of a filipino muslim, or from mindanaoan, reconfirming when i saw a few military personel praying at the mosque in philippines.

As a muslim, being a soldier goes outside the scope of islam, as nationalism and patriotism are considered vain, to extremes, forbidden, considering philippines is a christian country. So, is it forbidden ?
My One Star was a muslim, I'm not sure how and what you base your assertions under.

I would however suggest that a theological issue is not within the frame of this forum
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2:

1. Until 2017 with the return of ISIS fighters, the various rebel groups tend hit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in forested areas or set up pre-planned ambushes. AFP units being over-run, an occasional occurrence. In addition, the AFP’s procurement is a sea of incompetence (with islands of competence) and their lack of ability to maintain equipment is noted. This is why from 2002 to 2013, 600 members of the US Special Forces had to provide training for the AFP. This training gig never ends because so little has changed and now the Australians have started to help to build AFP capability. The infantry centric AFP, as jungle warfare experts, do not train for urban warfare. Worse than that, they are not supported by well equipped armoured engineers for their break-in battles because they don't have the equipment (see video below of the type of armoured engineering vehicle the AFP needs but are too short sighted to procure). Even if the US gave the AFP the right equipment, the leadership of the AFP would not have the logistics to effectively use these armoured engineer support vehicles in their concept of operations to maintain tempo. Failure to dictate the tempo means losing the initiative.

2. The various reactive Pinoy administrations need to be reminded on the 7Ps, namely, Proper Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance — with the AFP in an urban environment without the necessary armoured engineer support. Without proper armoured engineer support to clear obstacles, and operating as force that does not even have appropriate basic tools (like smoke grenades) the AFP is unable to manoeuvre in the conduct the break-in battle. The 2017 Battle of Marawi demonstrated numerous equipping shortfalls of their poorly equipped armed forces. Any professional army must dominate the enemy and own the night, but I note that the Pinoys not only don’t own the night, they had to struggle to take out ISIS UAVs (see paragraphs 5 and 6 below). As such, I am glad to see that the Pinoys have started to belatedly address some of these known issues — let me share four updates here.

One, the Philippines has started the procurement process for the acquisition of new mortars for the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC). At the moment, the standard 81mm mortar of the PMC is the American M29 81mm mortar, which is in service with the AFP since the 1960s. The Invitation to Bid (ITB) and states the the bid is for 30 units of 81mm mortars (rather than 120 units) and also includes 40 Ballistic Computers, 8 Forward Observer System sets as part of the project. This would be the first time that the Philippine Marines will have a brand new mortar in decades. If the ITB is successful, the addition of 30 new 81mm mortars, will help improve the fire support capability of the Marine Battalion Landing Teams (MBLT) that will be allocated with these new mortars. The project, called the Mortar Acquisition Project, is among the Horizon 2 Phase Priority Projects under the Revised AFP Modernization Program, as covered by Republic Act 10349. See: Discussing the 81mm Mortar Acquisition Project of the Philippine Navy (Marines) ~ MaxDefense Philippines

Two, the Philippine Army (PA) also received its shipment of Russian-made RPG-7V2 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers in July 2019. This is to replace the remaining M67 90mm recoilless rifles.
  • Quantity: 744 units total plus unspecified quantity of ammunition
  • Modernization Phase: Horizon 1 Phase Priority Project
The Philippine Marines have also launched a Horizon 2 Phase Priority Project for 702 units of RPG launchers, optical sights and more than 22,000 rounds of RPG ammunition are to be acquired with a budget of Php514,800,000.00. This would allow the Philippine Marines to strengthen its marine infantry squads by having such firepower at a low unit level, while replacing the M67 90mm recoilless rifle. Another interesting inclusion (which the PA does not have) is the inclusion of 40 RPG training launchers that fire 7.62x39mm training rounds, plus 21,061 rounds of 7.62x39mm RPG tracer practice ammunition.

Three, Elbit Systems is reported to be in the running to supply 15 M113 Mortar Carriers to the PA. The Cardom 120mm Recoil Mortar System will be mounted on the PA’s M113 armored vehicles. Elbit Systems will also provide conversion 120mm barrels for five Cardom 81mm autonomous recoil mortar systems the Philippine Army ordered in January 2018. See: Philippine Army to Buy Mortar Carries, BMS from Elbit | Israel Defense and Philippine Army Proceeds with M113 Mortar Carrier Project, Signs Contract with Elbit for 120mm Self Propelled Mortars ~ MaxDefense Philippines

Four, the first batch of four Korean amphibious assault vehicles (KAAVs) procured for the PMC arrived in-country, a source from within the Philippine Navy confirmed with Jane’s on 10 May 2019. The PMC has ordered 8 KAAVs, 4 of which are in service with the PMC.​
 
Last edited:

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2:

3. There are similarities in how professional armies attack enemy leaders and key nodes via the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) process. This targeting methodology is utilized by the US Special Operations Forces responsible for some of the most highly-publicized missions. F3EAD is a system that allows the Commander of these forces to anticipate and predict enemy operations, identify, locate, and target enemy forces, and to perform intelligence exploitation and analysis of captured enemy personnel and materiel. Central to the F3EAD process is the functional fusion of operations and intelligence functions throughout the military organization. In F3EAD, commanders establish targeting priorities, the intelligence system provides the direction to the target, and the operations system performs the decisive operations necessary to accomplish the mission. Weapons release, via aircraft or artillery, is the last step of a multi-step intelligence and operational planning process for AFP at the joint force headquarters.

4. Robert H. Scales and Douglas Ollivant have observed that 'Terrorist armies fight smarter and deadlier than ever'. This frightening new age is emerging due to several factors that professional forces fully anticipated and I would recommend reading the article for the four reasons they gave. Beyond the four reasons, at a broad level, the traditional comparative advantage of a professional army, has diminished, relative to terrorist groups.

5. In the 2017 Battle of Marawi, their DND ran out of certain types of ammunition and was fortunate that the US was willing to resupply them at short notice. The AFP also have very limited access to military grade UAVs, encrypted communications and most crucially, night fighting equipment (NFE); indeed, the only forces well equipped with NFE were those from Philippine SOCOMD and MARSOG. This meant the majority of forces were static at night. Lack of proper equipment slowed operational tempo and also resulted in 53 unnecessary AFP deaths in the Battle of Marawi. There were instances where their initial reinforcements were trapped for up to 5 days. For more details see the 2 links and video in paragraph 6 below.

Ken Conboy's 'South East Asian Special Forces', published by Osprey some years ago has detailed information on a number of Philippine army units. The only recent books in English that I have come across that has some mention on the Philippine army are 'Imperial Grunts' and 'Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts' by Robert Kaplan. In these books, there are sections in which the author describes his visits to U.S. army green beret teams deployed in the south, providing training to the Philippine army and humanitarian asistance to the locals.
6. ISIS is trying establish their Caliphate in the Philippines. ASPI has a report, The Marawi crisis—urban conflict and information operations, that examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power information operations. Fundamentally, the Battle of Marawi was a battle by individuals and small teams. While the AFP had access to overwhelming offensive support, armoured fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial surveillance and close air support platforms, the city was not free of terrorists until every building had been deliberately cleared. The AFP describes the approach that it developed for the systematic recovery of the city as ‘SLICE-ing’ (strategise, locate, isolate, constrict and eliminate). It strategised by dividing the city into three sectors, each allocated to the Philippine Marine or Army units with armoured vehicles and artillery attached.
  • The ground work for SLICE was laid in 2017, when the Department of National Defense (DND) upgraded of 44 units of existing M113A2 armored personnel carriers of the Mechanized Infantry Division by equipping them with a new Remote Controlled Weapon Station (RCWS), and converting 5 existing M113A2 APCs to Armored Mortar Carriers. Elbit supplied the Dragon Overhead Remote Controlled Weapon Station (ORCWS) mounted with a 12.7mm heavy machine gun, which proved its worth during the Battle of Marawi in 2017, and in other skirmishes on operations against terrorists groups.
  • The 2017 Battle of Marawi also demonstrated that it takes NFE, a high standard of C3, combat trauma management and interoperability with supporting arms (such as precise joint fires and armoured engineers) to fight and win in the urban environment — sadly things which are lacking for the AFP. Feedback received after training, was that these skills would have reduced the number of casualties.
  • One Company from the AFP’s 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in 3 months. Offensive support came primarily in the form of Close Air Support, intimate support from mortars, and employing 105mm guns in a direct fire role. Despite the extraordinary firepower was employed to enable the seizure of Marawi City, the AFP failed to dominate the avenues of approach (resulting in trapped or isolated initial forces). ‘Murder holes’ were also utilised in stairwells. Knowing the AFP would have to make entry to clear the building, the ISIS snipers would cut a hole through the stair well and sit off some distance. Once the AFP made entry the ISIS sniper would have a clear line of sight of the door way and stairwell entry allowing him to score a centre of mass hit.
  • The AFP failed in gaining mobility in the break in battle, despite its amour and it also failed to surprise the ISIS insurgents — who were prepared to give battle. ISIS sharpshooters utilized ‘murder holes’ with hides overlooking choke points, bridges and obvious avenues of approach with excellent fields of fire, or onto killing zone where AFP would dwell. They would then knock a medium size hole in a wall and then, if possible, knock a smaller hole in the adjacent room. From the adjacent room they would often set up their hide, allowing them to engage from depth with relatively good cover from fire and concealment. ISIS teams regularly flew commercially available UAS to likely counter-sniper locations, to identify the AFP hides. AFP snipers also faced the challenge of fleeting opportunity—exposure time of enemy targets was typically very short, and at short to medium ranges of unknown distance.
  • The ISIS laid siege to Marawi City on 23 May 2017, lasting 153 days and becoming the longest urban war in Philippine history. It took the Philippines at least twice as long as comparable urban battles and attributable to capability shortfalls, and training, which the AFP acknowledged. To make matters worse, AFP platoons had not conducted extensive training in combat trauma management, and their Role 2 and Role 3 equivalent medical facilities were not accustomed to the very high volume of casualties which can be expected during urban fighting—a significant number of which were non-battle injuries.
  • With the help of outside partners such as Australia, Singapore and the US, the AFP sought to address their short comings. SAF's assistance included sending a C-130H to transport humanitarian supplies, use of the SAF's urban training villages for AFP troops, and a detachment of UAVs to enhance ISR.
  • Observers should not try to understand the Marawi operation through a lens of AFP training shortfalls, as it discounts AFP strengths and also risks underestimating both inherent challenges in an urban fight. The AFP was able to conduct last mile delivery of water, food, fuel and ammo to its soldiers to enable them to win the fight.
  • This Australian documentary below explains the Australian train and assist program and why this remains a breeding ground for ISIS. Official death toll for the battle in Marawi stood at 1,131 (919 terrorists and 165 soldiers and policemen) with over 1,000 injured and also took the lives of 47 civilians.

7. In addition, the May 2017 Marawi crisis 'is a failure of government to act based on sound and timely intelligence,' terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna said (See: 'PH failed to detect signs that led to Marawi' – expert). The government had, as early as 2014, prior knowledge of the links between ISIS and extremist groups in Mindanao, but down played it in the media. The military had also been monitoring Isnilon Hapilon, and knew when in 2016 he convened a meeting with other ISIS aligned groups on mainland Mindanao (See: this pdf). In 2016 June Hapilon was appointed Emir in the Philippines. In April 2017, a month before the siege, it was learnt that the military had intelligence suggesting that the terrorist group would dispatch militants. In a speech, Gunaratna pointed out that the Marawi siege is not an intelligence failure, but ‘an operational failure.’ He explained that before the Marawi siege, the Philippine intelligence community had already produced 4 reports on the "build-up" in Marawi.

8. The AFP has started a modernisation process but need to maintain or speed up the tempo for procurement. I wish them good luck, as they will need it.
 
Last edited:

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Philippine Army (PA) will activate a helicopter squadron later this year, with an eventual strength of 4 to 8 helicopters. A blogger has reported that PA aviators are undergoing training in helicopter operations using the Robinson R-44 — for initial helicopter pilot proficiency training. See: A Quick Look at the Philippine Army's planned Procurement of Manned Air Assets ~ MaxDefense Philippines. I wish the PA good luck in their aviation dreams — hope they can raise, train and sustain this unit.

It is also noted that 155mm Self Propelled Howitzer program under the Horizon 2 phase is approved as a G2G project with Israel. The same blogger reports that the PA preferred to acquire the Elbit Systems ATMOS 2000 155mm/39 calibre self propelled howitzer based on budget and commonality with its existing Soltam M-71 155mm/39 calibre towed howitzers. See: 155mm Howitzer, Self Propelled System Acquisition Project of the Philippine Army ~ MaxDefense Philippines. If this 155mm procurement is successful and be of sufficient quantity, it will modernise their artillery concept of operations. In the previous post, I also noted their attempts to procure 120mm mortars, which is particularly important in any future urban fight, which I think is the number 1 priority for both the PA and the Philippine Marine Corp (PMC).

In addition, after 1 more inspection, the PA and the PMC will acquire 2nd hand K136 Kooryong MLRS from Korea in 2019. The PA's interest was confirmed by August 2017 and communicated to its South Korean counterparts. The PA will acquire 18 units for 3 batteries (6 firing units each plus associated support vehicles) and the PMC will acquire 6 units for 1 battery. See: August 2019 News report
 
Last edited:

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Personally am not a fan of the Robinson helo. I would never fly in one myself, because of their safety record with them having a habit of unintended falling out of the sky.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Elbit Systems was declared sole bidder on December 2019 and given the NOA to supply 2 Joint Assault Bridges (a scissor-type bridging system with a gap crossing of 11 to 15 meters) for Philippine Army's Combat Engineering Equipment Lot 1. This Leonardo DRS-IMI Joint Assault Bridge (likely to be using the Leopard 2 platform) Project was awarded to Israel's Elbit Systems. Contract Signing was in January 2020.
  • According to the annual report 2019 of the US DOD, the US Army conducted the Joint Assault Bridge IOT&E at Fort Bliss, Texas, April 2 – 29, 2019. Poor system reliability limited availability of Joint Assault Bridge system (using an M1A1 Abrams chassis with M1A2 heavy suspension) during the IOT&E. The result was insufficient data to determine operational effectiveness. Since the IOT&E, the US Army has focused a tremendous amount of effort to improve the hydraulic system. The U.S. Army is gearing up for a second try at an initial operational test for its new Joint Assault Bridge in June 2020.
  • Can’t understand why the Philippine Army did not simply choose the tried and tested Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) LEGUAN AVLB. The automatic laying and loading system can lay the LEGUAN bridge horizontally in approximately 5 minutes (14-meter bridge) and 6 minutes (26-meter bridge) by a single person inside the vehicle. The low silhouette of the vehicle remains preserved during this procedure.
According to information published on a blogger’s Facebook account on 1 May 2020, the country has released the Notice to Proceed (NTP) for the acquisition of 2 batteries (12 guns) of Elbit Soltam ATMOS 155mm / 52calibre Self-Propelled Howitzers for the Philippine Army. Since the contract states that Elbit Systems should deliver all the products in 24 months of the NTP, this means the Philippine Army should expect delivery of the ATMOS artillery systems before April 2022. See: Philippines will acquire two batteries of Elbit Soltam ATMOS 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers | May 2020 News

Congrats to the Philippine Army, as this acquisition with an approved budget of Php2,388,000,000 (US$ 47.2 million) is a better deal (as it is for the longer ranged 52 calibre guns) than what was reported in Aug 2019 (39 calibre guns).
 
Last edited:
Top