NZDF General discussion thread

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Talking of the 'Russians' I recall reading a (Kiwi) 'old-salts' personal blog several years ago and he had a picture of a former Soviet era fishing trawler (IIRC raised on a slipway?) with a modified hull containing torpedo tubes. I haven't been able to locate it again since but did anyone also see it and if so can they re-link to it?

Asking to find out what was the context to the photo (eg where was it taken and did it have any relevance to us in the South Pacific ... but also to highlight a potential 'disruptor' threat to us in the so-called 'benign' South Pacific ... particularly as we have a new aspiring world power in our 'wider backyard' with the largest fishing fleets in the world, which (stealthily) could potentially disrupt commercial shipping well away from the frontlines in a future conflict (or at least tie up allied resources looking for them).

If we fast-forward to today, imagine the increased 'disruptor' possibilities those disguised fishing vessels could have for NZ in the wider Pacific in the form of small concealed 'bolt-on type' anti-shipping missiles (even 2-4 per vessel would still be lethal), jamming equipment and/or UAV's or small unmanned copter sized reconnaissance assets allowing them increased surveillance range etc.

(As an aside I would like consideration for future OPV replacements to have space and weight reserved for a suitable close in weapon system to protect against shorter-range surface threats that are likely to pop up in their operating environment eg CWIS or SeaRAM or Millenium gun etc, plus in addition perhaps one, or two, LM/MBDA ExLS 3-Cell Standalone Seaceptor launchers (which can also do anti-surface) ... granted, no point over-arming an OPV so it becomes a Corvette so let's not, however I think it would be short-sighted to NOT have some form of increased self-defence for the OPV's to deal with these 'new' threats (which are likely to be common around the wider Pacific) now that the potential 'threat level' will be somewhat higher by the time they are built. Upgrade the 25mm main gun to 57mm (or 76mm) and also provide additional anti-air defence against any small unmanned copter type aircraft etc. Add counter measures (anti-ship missile, anti-torpedo etc) and NZ could have some cost-effective patrol vessels that would be alot more survivable than the current ones that are not). Anyway perhaps this is more RNZN discussion in relation to future OPV's (and the S-OPV?)).
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Talking of the 'Russians' I recall reading a (Kiwi) 'old-salts' personal blog several years ago and he had a picture of a former Soviet era fishing trawler (IIRC raised on a slipway?) with a modified hull containing torpedo tubes. I haven't been able to locate it again since but did anyone also see it and if so can they re-link to it?

Asking to find out what was the context to the photo (eg where was it taken and did it have any relevance to us in the South Pacific ... but also to highlight a potential 'disruptor' threat to us in the so-called 'benign' South Pacific ... particularly as we have a new aspiring world power in our 'wider backyard' with the largest fishing fleets in the world, which (stealthily) could potentially disrupt commercial shipping well away from the frontlines in a future conflict (or at least tie up allied resources looking for them).

If we fast-forward to today, imagine the increased 'disruptor' possibilities those disguised fishing vessels could have for NZ in the wider Pacific in the form of small concealed 'bolt-on type' anti-shipping missiles (even 2-4 per vessel would still be lethal), jamming equipment and/or UAV's or small unmanned copter sized reconnaissance assets allowing them increased surveillance range etc.

(As an aside I would like consideration for future OPV replacements to have space and weight reserved for a suitable close in weapon system to protect against shorter-range surface threats that are likely to pop up in their operating environment eg CWIS or SeaRAM or Millenium gun etc, plus in addition perhaps one, or two, LM/MBDA ExLS 3-Cell Standalone Seaceptor launchers (which can also do anti-surface) ... granted, no point over-arming an OPV so it becomes a Corvette so let's not, however I think it would be short-sighted to NOT have some form of increased self-defence for the OPV's to deal with these 'new' threats (which are likely to be common around the wider Pacific) now that the potential 'threat level' will be somewhat higher by the time they are built. Upgrade the 25mm main gun to 57mm (or 76mm) and also provide additional anti-air defence against any small unmanned copter type aircraft etc. Add counter measures (anti-ship missile, anti-torpedo etc) and NZ could have some cost-effective patrol vessels that would be alot more survivable than the current ones that are not). Anyway perhaps this is more RNZN discussion in relation to future OPV's (and the S-OPV?)).
The first thing which came to my mind was the question of whether it was a Soviet-era fishing trawler, or was it actually a Soviet-era "fishing trawler" a la surveillance vessel. I could easily see the USSR deploying a number of claimed "fishing vessels" which also had extra acoustic gear, and/or the ability to leave unpleasant surprises behind...

On a related note, IIRC the PRC Coast Guard has apparently now been authorized to fire upon foreign vessels. This could easily lead to more confrontations if a PRC fishing fleet is escorted by Coast Guard as it intrudes into the EEZ or fishing grounds of another nation. Or if a Coast Guard vessel encounters a foreign ship operating in an area the PRC claims whether that claims is legitimate or recognized.
 

Nighthawk.NZ

Well-Known Member
The first thing which came to my mind was the question of whether it was a Soviet-era fishing trawler, or was it actually a Soviet-era "fishing trawler" a la surveillance vessel. I could easily see the USSR deploying a number of claimed "fishing vessels" which also had extra acoustic gear, and/or the ability to leave unpleasant surprises behind...
I have a photograph or two of a Soviet-era fishing trawler that didn't really do a lot of fishing and was a la surveillance vessel. It had more surveillance radars and satellite links than we had... blah blah blah... not only that they shadowed us on our patrol lol
 
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KiwiRob

Well-Known Member
Talking of the 'Russians' I recall reading a (Kiwi) 'old-salts' personal blog several years ago and he had a picture of a former Soviet era fishing trawler (IIRC raised on a slipway?) with a modified hull containing torpedo tubes. I haven't been able to locate it again since but did anyone also see it and if so can they re-link to it?
Google Torpedo Trawler, turns out it not actually a trawler, but can find that out for yourself.

The USN built a similar vessel the Cape Flattery class torpedo trial ships.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Talking of the 'Russians' I recall reading a (Kiwi) 'old-salts' personal blog several years ago and he had a picture of a former Soviet era fishing trawler (IIRC raised on a slipway?) with a modified hull containing torpedo tubes. I haven't been able to locate it again since but did anyone also see it and if so can they re-link to it?

Asking to find out what was the context to the photo (eg where was it taken and did it have any relevance to us in the South Pacific ... but also to highlight a potential 'disruptor' threat to us in the so-called 'benign' South Pacific ... particularly as we have a new aspiring world power in our 'wider backyard' with the largest fishing fleets in the world, which (stealthily) could potentially disrupt commercial shipping well away from the frontlines in a future conflict (or at least tie up allied resources looking for them).

If we fast-forward to today, imagine the increased 'disruptor' possibilities those disguised fishing vessels could have for NZ in the wider Pacific in the form of small concealed 'bolt-on type' anti-shipping missiles (even 2-4 per vessel would still be lethal), jamming equipment and/or UAV's or small unmanned copter sized reconnaissance assets allowing them increased surveillance range etc.

(As an aside I would like consideration for future OPV replacements to have space and weight reserved for a suitable close in weapon system to protect against shorter-range surface threats that are likely to pop up in their operating environment eg CWIS or SeaRAM or Millenium gun etc, plus in addition perhaps one, or two, LM/MBDA ExLS 3-Cell Standalone Seaceptor launchers (which can also do anti-surface) ... granted, no point over-arming an OPV so it becomes a Corvette so let's not, however I think it would be short-sighted to NOT have some form of increased self-defence for the OPV's to deal with these 'new' threats (which are likely to be common around the wider Pacific) now that the potential 'threat level' will be somewhat higher by the time they are built. Upgrade the 25mm main gun to 57mm (or 76mm) and also provide additional anti-air defence against any small unmanned copter type aircraft etc. Add counter measures (anti-ship missile, anti-torpedo etc) and NZ could have some cost-effective patrol vessels that would be alot more survivable than the current ones that are not). Anyway perhaps this is more RNZN discussion in relation to future OPV's (and the S-OPV?)).
Your armed OPV problem could be easily fixed by replacing the OPVs with corvettes in about 3,000 - 3,500 tonne range. IIRC the USN Constellation Class will be mounting a new 57 mm gun with good modern AAA programmable ammo, so that would possibly be the way to go, and a Millennium gun or similar mounted on hangar. 8 or 16 Mk 41 VLS cells could be fitted with ExLS cells and AShM in cannister launchers. CODAD power plant etc. The range should be about 7,000 nm or greater. The hanger should be able to house a 11 tonne medium helo and a UAV. That's just a suggestion, but it would certainly be able to handle most stroppy PRC FFVs and militia ships that will be making their presence felt in and around the EEZs of the Realm of NZ.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
@ Tod - yes, "fishing trawler" with inverted commas. :)

@ KiwiRob - thanks, found a great link/write-up as a result (not sure if it was the same vessel/photo as I seem to recall it wasn't so clear as those in the search results, but very helpful as it showed the concept).

Your armed OPV problem could be easily fixed by replacing the OPVs with corvettes in about 3,000 - 3,500 tonne range. IIRC the USN Constellation Class will be mounting a new 57 mm gun with good modern AAA programmable ammo, so that would possibly be the way to go, and a Millennium gun or similar mounted on hangar. 8 or 16 Mk 41 VLS cells could be fitted with ExLS cells and AShM in cannister launchers. CODAD power plant etc. The range should be about 7,000 nm or greater. The hanger should be able to house a 11 tonne medium helo and a UAV. That's just a suggestion, but it would certainly be able to handle most stroppy PRC FFVs and militia ships that will be making their presence felt in and around the EEZs of the Realm of NZ.
Sounds most ideal as a Corvette and a much useful potential addition to the fleet ... but I was thinking for EEZ and border protection and surveillance, less "combat capable" OPV's probably are still needed, as they are not designed to go into harms way (plus to keep costs down and to give more hull numbers).

To me an ideal RNZN post 2030 would be like-for-like Frigate replacements (i.e. with ASW Frigates, certainly not something lesser like Corvettes, or "patrol" Frigates eg Type 31), so at least two (if not ideally a third or more).

But I'd like to see alot more OPV's (upgraded) for local and regional area patrolling, surveillance and intelligence gathering (West/South/East Pacific and Southern Ocean areas etc). OPV's aren't designed to go into harms way (that's what the Frigates are for) as they lack the required capabilities (and design), but they need much better self-defence systems than at present, as their tasks could include them getting close and keeping an eye on these so-called "fishing fleets" or fishing vessels defended by eg PRC Coast Guard or other disguised vessels, which could pack a punch. (Should anything serious arise, that's where NZDF or allied combat assets come into the picture eg P-8 with stand-off weaponry or Naval Combat Forces etc).

Ideally the future OPV's could also have provision to carry unmanned autonomous underwater vehicles when required (to assess what's lurking underneath accompanying these fishing fleets etc)? So these OPV's are also intelligence gathering "spy ships" in some regards.

Ultimately if we could keep costs down perhaps we could afford 4-6 or more (and as others have suggested, base a couple locally in the Pacific), to give us more hulls, because as the above maps show, we actually do have a very wide area to look after but not much in the way of physical resources!
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
@ Tod - yes, "fishing trawler" with inverted commas. :)

@ KiwiRob - thanks, found a great link/write-up as a result (not sure if it was the same vessel/photo as I seem to recall it wasn't so clear as those in the search results, but very helpful as it showed the concept).



Sounds most ideal as a Corvette and a much useful potential addition to the fleet ... but I was thinking for EEZ and border protection and surveillance, less "combat capable" OPV's probably are still needed, as they are not designed to go into harms way (plus to keep costs down and to give more hull numbers).

To me an ideal RNZN post 2030 would be like-for-like Frigate replacements (i.e. with ASW Frigates, certainly not something lesser like Corvettes, or "patrol" Frigates eg Type 31), so at least two (if not ideally a third or more).

But I'd like to see alot more OPV's (upgraded) for local and regional area patrolling, surveillance and intelligence gathering (West/South/East Pacific and Southern Ocean areas etc). OPV's aren't designed to go into harms way (that's what the Frigates are for) as they lack the required capabilities (and design), but they need much better self-defence systems than at present, as their tasks could include them getting close and keeping an eye on these so-called "fishing fleets" or fishing vessels defended by eg PRC Coast Guard or other disguised vessels, which could pack a punch. (Should anything serious arise, that's where NZDF or allied combat assets come into the picture eg P-8 with stand-off weaponry or Naval Combat Forces etc).

Ideally the future OPV's could also have provision to carry unmanned autonomous underwater vehicles when required (to assess what's lurking underneath accompanying these fishing fleets etc)? So these OPV's are also intelligence gathering "spy ships" in some regards.

Ultimately if we could keep costs down perhaps we could afford 4-6 or more (and as others have suggested, base a couple locally in the Pacific), to give us more hulls, because as the above maps show, we actually do have a very wide area to look after but not much in the way of physical resources!
The thing is Recce, I don't believe that we have the luxury of time to wait until post 2030 in order to replace the ANZAC ffrigates and upgrade NZDF capabilities. By then it will probably be 10 years to late. We have to be quite careful with cost cutting - it is three decades of that which has placed us in the position we are now. I would suggest that we be smarter about our acquisitions and obtain more bang for buck or VfM by a bit of thinking outside the square. Secondly the government is going to have to increase annual NZDF operational expenditure significantly, AND it's going to have to invest at least a further $10 billion to the already $20 billion in capital expenditure. Finally it really needs to exempt Defence & NZDF from Treasury's capital charge root / claw back / tax.
 

Gracie1234

Well-Known Member
Does anyone have news on when the new white paper will be done, i thought there was a briefing to be delivered in May and then the white paper to be done next year.
That should provide some more guidance on where we should be heading, i do not like when they set out to do these activities and set a finance limit at the start.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Does anyone have news on when the new white paper will be done, i thought there was a briefing to be delivered in May and then the white paper to be done next year.
That should provide some more guidance on where we should be heading, i do not like when they set out to do these activities and set a finance limit at the start.
The BIM is all that we have to go on at the moment. No announcements have been made. The finance limit currently set is for the current DCP. Any financial decisions after the next DWP will be informed by that DWP and set out in the subsequent DC.
 

Nighthawk.NZ

Well-Known Member
To me an ideal RNZN post 2030 would be like-for-like Frigate replacements (i.e. with ASW Frigates, certainly not something lesser like Corvettes, or "patrol" Frigates eg Type 31), so at least two (if not ideally a third or more).
Technically that is all our ANZAC's are... General Purpose Patrol Frigates??? So saying like for like but not wanting a patrol frigate is well...
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Grippen Naval or F-16V is also a somewhat reasonable choice, though there is the problem that it is not LO, but then Germany does not think this is a problem with the Superbug and EF, also France does not think this is an issue either. If only NZ is allowed to buy from the Rusians the PAK-FA is also worth taking a look and has 2 engines.
1. Your post is so full of BS, I don’t even know where to begin. NZ, if the country’s politicians ever decide to buy a fighter platform, it will more likely be an aircraft type that a FVEY/FPDA partner operates.
(a) NZDF will have to ask for secondment of a few instructor pilots (for 5 to 6 years) — most likely to be an Australian instructor or two. When you suggest a Russian platform, are NZDF bases going to host Russian instructor pilots? Loose talk of PAK-FA, is just BS on stilts.​
(b) IMO, Saab JAS 39 Gripen doesn’t have the range required, and I would favour a type with conforma fuel tanks and with a modern naval strike missile integrated, along with the ability to accept Australian inventory of air-to-air missiles — in this respect the F-18E block 3 (and F-16V), are strong candidates.​

To go somewhat out of the box, would something like Japan's Asahi class destroyer be out of the question? The RNZN can call it a heavy frigate instead of a destroyer, it costs US$900 million per ship(about the same as a Hunter class), has 32 VLS, AESA radar, towed sonar array, and 8 SSMs, and carries a SH-60 helicopter. It is somewhat lighter than the Hunter class at 6800 tons full load, and like NZ, Japan also has a very large EEZ to patrol, so range should not be an issue.
Enough with the numerous posts without logical reasoning; especially when you talk like a fan boy.

2. The JMSDF has a naval force construct that is well supported by a fleet of submarines (that are SSN hunters), numerous ASW aircraft (i.e. a MPA fleet larger than most air forces), fixed wing fighters dedicated to maritime strike and ISR that you know that the NZDF can’t dream of. Go read AirPower 101 before posting more rubbish — please do your homework before talking. Before you talk about platforms, ask:

Q1: How does the proposed new platform fit into NZDF’s system and CONOPS?​

Q2: What are the JMSDF CONOPS with regard to their use of frigates in relation to their 4 Escort Flotillas?​

Q3: Did you know that Japan has its own 30DX frigate design?​

3. Japan makes fantastic warships with export potential (but has thus far not exported them and for good reason). The Japanese face fierce competition to export any and it will not be easy for the Japanese to overcome their inertia. From a platform centric perspective, JS Kumano (FFM-2), a 130 m long 30DX frigate (5,500 ton) with 16x Mk41 VLS cells is in the water, is a more likely candidate. Only a fan boy would suggest buying a 151 m long, 6,800 ton Asahi class destroyer, with 32x Mk41 VLS cells, for the Royal NZ Navy. A platform centric discussion is fun but it would better informed if you give due regard to CONOPS.

4. Each of the JMSDF’s Escort Flotillas are a powerful task force that is designed to work together with the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, within the 1st island chain — which are more powerful than the combined navies of many countries, NZ or Singapore included. To deter aggression, the JMSDF will take actions that include:

(i) degrading enemy search and targeting operations to enable use of fewer Japanese defensive weapons and require larger enemy attack salvos, removing the option for aggressors to conduct small-scale attacks against JMSDF forces;​
(ii) sustaining friendly targeting with the 7th fleet despite PLA(N) countermeasures, enabling small-scale non-kinetic or kinetic attacks; and​

(iii) increasing the survivability of JMSDF weapons to reduce the number of platforms and weapons required for attacks.​

5. NZ’s FPDA partners are Australia, UK, Singapore and Malaysia — and 3 of these countries that give orders in English; and have a ship building plan that will match NZ’s plans for frigate replacement. Shouldn’t interoperability be a factor for consideration in platform selection? How many of NZ’s sailors speak Japanese? When you buy a platform, you will seek host nation support — often times, your 1st set of crew will be trained there.

6. When any navy acquire a warship, the crew train to fight the ship. Once that basic competence is acquired through a series of exercises, the crew then train to fight the ship in a task group, under the direction of a PPO/task group commander. If the Royal NZ Navy will be operating under Australian air cover and in an Australian task group, wouldn’t CONOPS and interoperability with the Australians be a concern?

7. Even now, at least 1/3 of Singapore’s current submarine crews speak Swedish — because we sought host nation support to build our submarine capability. Their kids today speak Swedish, because they either stayed there or were born there. There will be a whole new generation of Singaporean Type 218SG crews who speak German, because many will be trained there as part of the package.
 
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Nighthawk.NZ

Well-Known Member
(b) IMO, Saab JAS 39 Gripen doesn’t have the range required, and I would favour a type with conforma fuel tanks and with a modern naval strike missile integrated, along with the ability to accept Australian inventory of air-to-air missiles — in this respect the F-18E block 3 (and F-16V), are strong candidates.
To be fair the Gripen E/F model has comparable ferry range 4,000 km (2,500 mi, 2,200 nmi )+/- and comparable combat range 1,500 km (930 mi, 810 nmi)+/- to most other fighters. Compare that to say the Super Hornet ferry range 3,330 km (2,070 mi, 1,800 nmi)+/- Combat range 722 km (449 mi, 390 nmi)+/-. While not the conformal tanks can take standard drop tanks.

10 Hard points giving a decent load out if needed.

Gripen has been proving itself against all the other big boys, it also has impressed the yanks at "Red Flag"

Saab say they can, and will adapt any weapon system to work with the aircraft. Canada is looking at the Gripen, Saab has offered the integration of American and other non-Saab equipment so that the aircraft is interoperable with the US military. (Canada signed with Saab) My point here is if they can do it for Canada then I am sure if NZ did go with the Grippen they can make it compatible with what ever is in the Australian inventory.

One of the major selling points is ease of maintenance as well as pretty low fly cost. The more I looking to this little fighter the more I actually like it...

Would it suite RNZAF... that I wouldn't as I am no expert...
 

ren0312

Member
Well I remember the Australians looking at Japanese submarines not too long ago right? And the Australians chose a Spanish design for their new destroyer, and even operated French jets. I am just suggesting alternate platforms if you want to look outside your usual sources.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
To be fair the Gripen E/F model has comparable ferry range 4,000 km (2,500 mi, 2,200 nmi )+/- and comparable combat range 1,500 km (930 mi, 810 nmi)+/- to most other fighters. Compare that to say the Super Hornet ferry range 3,330 km (2,070 mi, 1,800 nmi)+/- Combat range 722 km (449 mi, 390 nmi)+/-. While not the conformal tanks can take standard drop tanks.

10 Hard points giving a decent load out if needed.

Gripen has been proving itself against all the other big boys, it also has impressed the yanks at "Red Flag"

Saab say they can, and will adapt any weapon system to work with the aircraft. Canada is looking at the Gripen, Saab has offered the integration of American and other non-Saab equipment so that the aircraft is interoperable with the US military. (Canada signed with Saab) My point here is if they can do it for Canada then I am sure if NZ did go with the Grippen they can make it compatible with what ever is in the Australian inventory.

One of the major selling points is ease of maintenance as well as pretty low fly cost. The more I looking to this little fighter the more I actually like it...

Would it suite RNZAF... that I wouldn't as I am no expert...
WRT Canada, NATO and NORAD interoperability are two separate requirements. Saab meets requirements for the former but AFAIK the latter is still a work in progress. American jets, needless to say, meet both.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Well I remember the Australians looking at Japanese submarines not too long ago right? And the Australians chose a Spanish design for their new destroyer, and even operated French jets. I am just suggesting alternate platforms if you want to look outside your usual sources.
The NZ Ministry of Defence has a robust acquisition process that it uses now. It is different to the Australian system and it is in someways better. This has been learned through hard expensive lessons. You cannot compare Australian defence acquisition practices with NZ defence acquisition because they are different countries with different outlooks and different rules. They are as different as chalk is to cheese.

Recent NZ government defence procurement practice has been conservative, reducing the risk where possible. Hence the preference for capabilities that are already operated by other FVEY partners. However, our recent AOR was designed and built in South Korea, a bespoke design by the way. Some of us DEF PROs have been looking at future frigates for NZ and we have looked very seriously at Japanese and South Korean DDG & FFG that are afloat or are in the works. So we are aware of the platforms and their capabilities. Much discussion upon this has been had on the RNZN thread over recent years, so you should read through that before broaching the subject here again.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
To be fair the Gripen E/F model has comparable ferry range 4,000 km (2,500 mi, 2,200 nmi )+/- and comparable combat range 1,500 km (930 mi, 810 nmi)+/- to most other fighters. Compare that to say the Super Hornet ferry range 3,330 km (2,070 mi, 1,800 nmi)+/- Combat range 722 km (449 mi, 390 nmi)+/-. While not the conformal tanks can take standard drop tanks.

10 Hard points giving a decent load out if needed.

Gripen has been proving itself against all the other big boys, it also has impressed the yanks at "Red Flag"

Saab say they can, and will adapt any weapon system to work with the aircraft. Canada is looking at the Gripen, Saab has offered the integration of American and other non-Saab equipment so that the aircraft is interoperable with the US military. (Canada signed with Saab) My point here is if they can do it for Canada then I am sure if NZ did go with the Grippen they can make it compatible with what ever is in the Australian inventory.

One of the major selling points is ease of maintenance as well as pretty low fly cost. The more I looking to this little fighter the more I actually like it...

Would it suite RNZAF... that I wouldn't as I am no expert...
A few years back I argued the Gripens case in the RNZAF thread and was shown the errors in my thinking.
  1. It's not operated by a FVEY partner.
  2. Only Brazil and South Africa operate it in the southern hemisphere.
  3. Only Thailand operate it in the Asia Pacific region.
  4. It would be an orphan platform.
  5. The logistics line would be extremely long.
  6. It's too risky from a NZG POV.
  7. With something like the F-18F we can hook into the USN fleet train.
So that's how I see it now.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1: Getting back to the fighter & frigate biz — keeping the modernisation momentum

1. I am going to speak frankly — on a few matters that is hard to hear but better the truth than everlasting denial. If sensible voices get crowded out, NZDF will lose its modernisation momentum (after the logical C-130J and P-8A decisions). Any move by NZ to prioritise constabulary operations is likely to elicit a negative reaction from traditional security partners, in particular, Australia. Should NZ move to delay replacement of the Anzacs, would be the reduction of the RNZN’s ability to contribute to wider regional security efforts. The growing competition between the US and China risks sparking a naval conflict that could impact New Zealand’s SLOCs.

2. In 2021, NZ has a chance to shape up and keep up with defence procurement but only if the country decides to seize this chance soon. In addition, a risk associated with a failure to invest in high-end naval combat platforms would be that the RNZN would lose its interoperability with allies and be unable to make a meaningful contribution
to international operational efforts. Any intention by NZ to change its maritime security focus would need careful consultation with key partners, in particular, Australia. Without interoperability with Australia, future NZ Governments may have to make the choices that the Philippines have today under Duterte. Be a vassal state or a client state of China.
One of the major selling points is ease of maintenance as well as pretty low fly cost. The more I looking to this little fighter the more I actually like it...

Would it suite RNZAF... that I wouldn't as I am no expert...
3. Like you, I am a fan of the Gripen but it’s just not practical (for advanced tactics development in areas like maritime strike operations for a tiny air force of 12 to 16 fighters that has to fight in the ocean) unless NZDF:
(a) is going to acquire between two to three squadrons (of 36 to 54) a platform type;​
(b) are planning to double your P-8 fleet; and​
(c) is going to concurrently acquire 2 MRTTs.​

4. The unprepared like Qatar is replacing a single squadron of 12 Mirage 2000s with 108 new fighters in 5 squadrons due to a crisis – including 48 Boeing F-15QAs, 36 Dassault Rafales, and 24 Eurofighter Typhoons. The increase in the QEAF’s frontline fighter force from the current 12, in particular, will represent a massive enhancement in its capacity and capability. The only thing they lack is AEW&C; following from the Oct 2018 decision not proceed with QEAF planned acquisition of 3 Boeing produced E-737 AEW&C aircraft. Qatar (spend too much for tool little), Brazil (spend ineffectively to build military capability) and Canadians (dysfunctional at multiple levels) are case studies of how to unwisely spend on their air force. Don’t emulate them.

5. A flight of 4 RNZAF fighters launching 8 anti-ship missiles will need extensive Australian AWAC, ISR, tanking and Growler support (firing their AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles to force enemy frigate / destroyers to turn-off their radars); if their anti-ship missiles are to have any hope of hitting a single enemy frigate / destroyer operating in a task group. The growth and spread of precision munitions has led to the emergence of a salvo competition between offensive precision strike weapons and precision air defences. As air defences of a naval task group become more capable, strike salvos will need to grow larger or become more survivable to reach defended targets. A notional PLA(N) IADS laydown consisting of one HQ-9 long-range SAM battery, one HQ-16 medium-range SAM battery, and one HQ-7 short-range SAM battery would have the capacity to defeat up to 68 incoming weapons in two minutes. Even if these naval air defenses have a single shot probability of kill (SSPk) of only 0.7, more than 30 weapons would be needed to ensure that an aimpoint defended by them is struck with 90% confidence.

6. Raise, train and sustain — the key to building a maritime strike capability. Platform selection only answers the raise stage. Train and sustain are even more important, over a period of 4 to 6 years after platform arrival. This means if the fighters arrive in 2028, the capability will be delivered in 2034. The lead time is long, even if you do everything right.

7. IF NZDF want to get back in the fighter game in the mid-2030s, please aim to have 15% to 18% of RSAF’s capability in 2010 (within 6 years of platform acquisition). I am not asking NZDF to aim for 20% of RSAF’s capabilities in 2020 (or 2034); as the RSAF is growing in capability every year.

8. If the RAAF provides instructors, it’s possible for NZ to achieve. If the NZDF is capable, NZ is sovereign, but you can’t buy it or rent it, from others.
 
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OPSSG

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Part 2: Getting back to the fighter & frigate biz — the threat matrix explained

A few years back I argued the Gripens case in the RNZAF thread and was shown the errors in my thinking.
9. That was like 6 to 7 years ago — glad that most members in DT have had the same epiphany. Systems not platforms define capability. And at a systems level, NZDF is intended to integrate with the ADF.

10. Sweden uses the 300km+ ranged RBS15 Mark 4 anti-ship missile; but I am not sure if this will be integrated into Brazil’s Gripens. Or will they type qualify the 200km+ ranged Exocet MM40 Block 3C (which is in Brazil’s inventory)? Saab is always pleased to do integration of new weapons, as the cost is borne by the user.

11. Sweden’s CONOPS is littoral strike, using terrain masking for the RBS 15 Mark 4, to hit home. In contrast, NZ is surrounded by open water (and cannot apply littoral maritime strike CONOPS). With so many Swedish speaking sailors that are trained there, Singapore is intimately familiar with Sweden’s CONOPS for littoral strike and submarine warfare.

12. IMO, RNZAF will want to conduct the strike up to 1,000 km from your air base, which is why a platform’s ability to carry 2 anti-ship missiles, 2 drop tanks along with conforma fuel tanks (1% drag) are so useful. Ideally a KC-130J will refuel the strike group once, 30mins to 45mins after take off.

13. Now, imagine if NZDF’s notional enemy is a task group of 2 Formidable-class frigates (with 64 Aster missiles) and 2 Independence-class corvettes (with 24 MICA VL), protecting 2 high value targets, as demonstrated in Ex Pacific Griffin in Apr 2017 and in Oct 2019.
Q: Do you think that a squadron of 16 NZDF Gripens, tasking a flight of 4 fighters to fire 8 RBS 15 anti-ship missiles from 300km away will penetrate this defence screen?​
Ans: See video for answer. What is being proposed to be built can’t penetrate a screen put up by frigates and corvettes. Therefore, there is no chance for 4 NZDF fighters against PLA(N) destroyers and frigates.​

Just to take a foreign policy point of view, so taking the Type 31 means that New Zealand has ruled itself out of having a navy that can participate in anything close to a high intensity warfare environment against a first-rate navy, so in the foreseeable future, the only roles that the navy will seen adequately equipped to be sent to are peacekeeping roles in the South Pacific, or something like anti-piracy patrols? The problem with the Type 31, is that unlike a Hunter Class or a fully upgraded ANZAC class, it is not really a ship that is adequate to be sent to the SCS in a military action against the PLAN, as least in its Royal Navy configuration.
14. This is such an useless platform centric discussion — we should discuss how a platform will fit into a system and enhance NZDF capabilities. A Type 31 at 5,700 tons and 138.7 m long is much larger than any Singaporean frigate, which is only 3,200 tons. IMO, the platform is not the be all, end all. Systems matter. Weapons fit matter. How you fight the ship matters. How the ships uses its off-board sensors matters. In NZ’s case, being in a coalition helps — without Australian help, NZ can be spanked by 4 vesssels from a tier 3 navy like the RSN (not that we will even consider doing so).
(a) In the early 2030s, a RSN task group of two 114 m long frigates have certain classified capabilities and can elect to launch up to 48 Blue Spear anti-ship missiles (also known as the 5G SSM) to saturate the air defence screen put up by enemy frigates in the South China Sea.​
(b) The RSAF with its 5 Fokker 50 MPAs and fighters have certain classified capabilities and can be expected to contribute with another coordinated strike with 12 more anti-ship missiles, in the same wave, to support the navy. That’s up to 60 advanced anti-ship missiles arriving within seconds of each other. The Blue Spear has to be far superior to the Harpoon Block 1C that it will replace, due to the adoption of the latest technologies. It should also have better performance compared to the most advanced Harpoon Block II+ER.​
(c) But before the 300km to 500km ranged 1st Blue Spear anti-ship missile is fired, the RSAF must conduct SEAD to suppress enemy picket ship radars — without SEAD it is a waste of anti-ship missiles.​
(d) Around 6 to 8 hours after the 1st salvo from 300km to 500km away, a second more deadly salvo from the RSN and RSAF will be on the way. While the enemy is busy with the air picture, a Singapore AIP submarine will be in the mix to add to the confusion before running away.​

15. To be clear, the PLA(N) is not the enemy. Singapore only aims to be an armed neutral; which means the country as part of ASEAN get a vote on matters that affect our destiny.

16. To have a voice in geo-political issues, the RSN aims for a force structure that will be useful and relevant to both the Australians (Ex Trident) and the Americans (Extending the 1990 MOU for 15 years and demonstrating capability for deterrence at Ex Pacific Griffin).

17. The PLA(N) is infinitely more capable than the 5,000 sailor strong RSN. Fortunately for us, we are in the second island chain, with USN and JMSDF bearing the brunt of the fighting. And our 6 frigates and 8 corvettes work under the air cover provided by RSAF’s 100 F-16s/F-15s that are supported by AWACS, tankers, MPA, combat ISR and so on. RSAF fighters will be tasked for SEAD, OCA, DCA, combat ISR, which is why they can only launch about 12 anti-ship missiles per wave.

18. In comparison, JMSDF CONOPS is to bottle up the PLA(N) within the 1st island chain, to prevent their escape to blue water. In the 2030s:
(a) the US 7th Fleet will be aided the 7th Fleet’s Block V Virginia submarines – that adds 28 more missile tubes per submarine — to greatly enhance the strike capability of these SSNs to attack PLA(N) sensors; and​
(b) JMSDF naval task groups will be aided by Japanese F-15Js, American F-18Es and B-1Bs firing hundreds of 560km+ ranged LRASMs in a campaign — LRASM, the weapon system for the OASuW Increment 1, is a 2,400-pound, long-range, conventional, air-to-surface, precision standoff missile. Each F-15J or F-18E can easily carry 4 LRASM. Each B-1B carries 24 LRASM. A flight of two B-1Bs, can fire up to 48 LRASMs in one salvo. Given the capability of the PLA(N), at least 2 fights of B-1Bs attacking in multiple directions are needed to saturate a PLA(N) task group’s defence — that are equipped with Type 055 destroyers that displace more than 10,000 tons, with 112 vertical launch missile cells.​

19. Before the four B-1Bs fire a single salvo of 96 missiles, the USN’s Growlers will be fighting the EW battle to jam China’s AWACs, and to penetrate the defensive PLA(N) screen of frigates (to attack the carriers and high value command ships), waves upon waves of USAF and JASDF F-35As, US Marines and JASDF F-35Bs and USN F-35Cs will be firing dozens of AGM-88E AARGMs, in multiple salvos that would exceed HARM usage during Operation Allied Force, to assist in the conduct of SEAD missions to suppress enemy radars, prior to the arrival of a tidal wave of LRSM. NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day Operation Allied Force campaign.

20. While the PLA(N) is busy with the air situation, 12 to 16 JMSDF and USN submarines will appear on scene and start sinking the enemy capital ships.
 
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