NZDF General discussion thread
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Shanesworld
Well-Known Member
Would you agree Airbus and its military division are European based and somewhat tied to greater European abilities?
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Yes, but that does not make every Airbus product a project carried out by the EU. Most EU countries don't have a stake in Airbus or Airbus factories. A400M has two non-EU partners, one of them completely non-European. It is typical of multinational European military & aerospace projects in that it is run by an ad-hoc consortium, not the EU. There are various such consortia, with varying membership. There is no EU-wide equivalent of the US DoD inititiating new military equipment projects.
The EU is not like the USA.
The EU is not like the USA.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Malaysia and Turkey are the two non Euro partners as South Africa left the consortium. Does Brexit mean the number should be three?
This is an interesting article I read in nsm news about 5 eyes and some security goings on over the years in NZ . You need to read the links in the article to get the full effect
Crikey, going by the headline I steeled myself for a rant from a crusty old Vietnam war protester, who is probably the world's most effective anti-aircraft weapon... I mean she led the destruction of an entire airforce's combat wing without a shot being fired! Does that classify her as special forces?
Anyway upon reading it I was quite surprised to she her quoted as saying 'Helen Clark said she believed the Five Eyes alliance was a net benefit for New Zealand, but it was vital that the country maintained its independence within the network'. So she's actually not just bagging it but mature (a.k.a. politically astute) enough to realise the benefit it has. I also agree NZ should maintain an independence... losing that is a very dangerous game to play.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I think what NZ and Canada contribute to the 5EYE group and what we get back in return is a huge net gain.. could be wrong but I doubt it.
My view follows her successors view who regarded the FVEY's club as New Zealand's most important external organisational membership and was the foundation stone of why we actually punch above our weight rather than Helen's who obviously regarded UN membership as more paramount. A question of difference in ones political compass. New Zealand is more independent and more influential, less vulnerable and less strategically challenged beyond its critical mass as a small liberal democratic nation state because of our close FVEY's connections than otherwise. We are in a far better shape to handle our own independence because of it and not in spite of it. UN membership is important, and we get great leverage there, but in a collective sense we are just bit players and not at the top table.
As for being a "target" because of FVEY's membership like some on the progressive left think (but not Helen mind you) - there is a difference between being a soft target and a hard target. I am happier that we are with the swimmers than non swimmers in the shark invested pool that is 21st Century global politics where easy targets of opportunity are devoured first.
That is definitely the case with the 3 junior partners.
This article was in today's NZ Herald:
www.nzherald.co.nz
Maybe this could be a cunning plan to increase NZ's defence capability. One even Baldrick would be proud of
UK's latest Covid-19 plan: 'Declare war on NZ, then immediately surrender'
A petition calls on the British government to declare war on NZ as a Covid-19 strategy.
www.nzherald.co.nz
Maybe this could be a cunning plan to increase NZ's defence capability. One even Baldrick would be proud of
Shanesworld
Well-Known Member
I knew one of her speech writers. The air combat wing was a trade for green party backing (confidence of supply). She would have expanded the air force if it suited her aspirations. Burton was the idealogue.
Me too and one of her Press Secs I used to regularly go to the pub with.
It was the Alliance Party who were really driving it (and their buddies in the media) and one very much opposed to Defence was then Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs Matt Robson, Laila Harré and on the Greens side it was Keith Locke who was on DFA&T select committee and Sue Bradford. For the Greens there really was no trade off they just fully endorsed the Alliance position. A number in Labour also strongly endorsed the no ACF such as Burton, Mark Gosche, Marian Hobbs and "Dame Margaret" Wilson.
The Alliance Party took to the 1999 Election all the talking points from the alternative Defence of New Zealand paper developed by a small group of five Treasury officials whom had a very low grasp of what force structure was, based their view entirely on a peace keeping focus of the preceding decade and took no soundings of like future scenario's. Sadly for Defence this naive and amateurish policy paper became very politically influential. IIRC the DONZ paper advocated scrapping the Air Combat Wing as the main target, replacing the Orions with CASA 235M's by not pursuing the Sirius upgrade, disestablishing the Territorials & Reserves, and completely refocusing the majority of resources to the Army but with a "Marine" focus. As for the RNZAF the paper did consider keeping a reduced amount of Macchi's and increasing the Hercules fleet to eight but not replace the B727's and endorsed the scrapping of the Andovers.
Came across this site a while back Pop-up Think Tank | Small States and the New Security Environment | College of Arts | University of Canterbury and think that some of these policy briefs are worth discussing.
I am going to start with this quote from Dr Peter Jennings paper on the 2016 Australian DWP: The 2016 Defence White Paper and the ANZUS Alliance
Bear in mind the comments about NZ in the quoted paragraph as we discuss the following because the lynchpin of NZ defence policy is Australia. The Aussies don't see it that way and I would say with quite valid reasons.
NZDF Role in NZ Foreign Policy.
Key findings
• The NZDF is a key player in supporting New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives.
• This role has been extended into a range of areas, increasing organisational risk and increased militarisation.
• The NZDF should either be pulled back into stricter limits or be subject to a deeper reassessment. That is, one option would see the NZDF only engage in defence and deterrence roles. Alternatively, a more fundamental redrawing of the NZDF would require an emphasis on making the NZDF a ‘constabulary’ force – in this case the NZDF would be remade in a less militarised fashion, with less emphasis on alliance commitments and more on collective security and regional commitments.
• Whether a ‘narrowing’ or ‘fundamental’ re-envisaging of the NZDF’s core purpose occurs, the capacity and capability of other government agencies should be reassessed and boosted to enable increased support of foreign policy objectives and a redrawing of NZDF engagement within a whole of government approach. This could include the creation of a civilian reserve or similar.
This paper is by Dr Beth Greener and asks a fundamental question: What is NZDF's purpose? If you look at the key findings she does have a valid point and given that I do believe that the question posed has to be answered. However the answer is not purely black or white, so I would suggest that in fact that the government must first determine what it wants NZDF's core role to be. Once that is determined, then any other roles should be prioritised in descending order. The next and important point is that NZDF should be funded properly and consistently, not as has been happening since 1991 in piecemeal states being equipped with the absolute minimum that the GOTD can get away with.
In today's geostrategic environment I would argue strongly that the NZDF core role has to be that of a fighting force across the maritime, land, air, space, electronic, and cyber domains in order to defend the Realm of New Zealand, its peoples, territories, economies, and interests. In order to do so sufficient resources must be allocated to NZDF for it to accomplish the policy requirements that have been laid down by the government. This means resourcing at a level well beyond bare minimum; something in the region of same level as Australia. For example, if Australia can be self sufficient in the field for two weeks, then NZ should be able to achieve the same level of self sufficiency. It also means reinstating some lost capabilities and expanding others.
Because of previous and current governments backsliding on defence, Australia no longer views NZ as being a valued partner that can be relied upon. I believe that is evident from the Peter Jennings quote above. When you look at it, Japan for example has a lot more to offer in an alliance than we do. Yes they have capabilities that NZ would never have, but they don't bludge - they actually contribute. They aren't a liability on the battlefield. They don't require allied or coalition assets to provide air defence etc.
NZ pollies talk the talk but never walk the walk. They boast about how they are supporting defence and defence personnel, about how NZ is pulling it's weight in its defence agreements and arrangements, and how NZ is doing so much around the world. But it is all smoke and mirrors. The pronouncements are lies, the media don't call them out on them because the only time the media is really interested in defence is when it's doing a beat up of it.
So another question has to be asked, Is Australia really interested in continuing the defence relationship with NZ? What's in it for them? Which brings us back to the lynchpin of NZ defence policy - Australia.
I am going to start with this quote from Dr Peter Jennings paper on the 2016 Australian DWP: The 2016 Defence White Paper and the ANZUS Alliance
The 2016 Defence White Paper 1acknowledges that “Australia’s security is underpinned by the ANZUS Treaty” (para 5.20) but more typically the document refers to the “alliance with the United States” (Minister’s Introduction) as the standard short-hand reference to the relationship. The modern alliance is emphatically bilateral. New Zealand is relegated to the rather lukewarm status of a “close defence relationship” (para 5.31). Enthusiasm for trilateralism is most regularly voiced for an array of Australia United States-Japanese cooperation, which is said to be expanding “for our mutual benefit” (para 5.63). In spirit if not in the treaty itself the next White Paper could replace the ‘NZ’ in ‘ANZUS’ with a ‘J’—clearly an emerging strategic focus.
Bear in mind the comments about NZ in the quoted paragraph as we discuss the following because the lynchpin of NZ defence policy is Australia. The Aussies don't see it that way and I would say with quite valid reasons.
NZDF Role in NZ Foreign Policy.
Key findings
• The NZDF is a key player in supporting New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives.
• This role has been extended into a range of areas, increasing organisational risk and increased militarisation.
• The NZDF should either be pulled back into stricter limits or be subject to a deeper reassessment. That is, one option would see the NZDF only engage in defence and deterrence roles. Alternatively, a more fundamental redrawing of the NZDF would require an emphasis on making the NZDF a ‘constabulary’ force – in this case the NZDF would be remade in a less militarised fashion, with less emphasis on alliance commitments and more on collective security and regional commitments.
• Whether a ‘narrowing’ or ‘fundamental’ re-envisaging of the NZDF’s core purpose occurs, the capacity and capability of other government agencies should be reassessed and boosted to enable increased support of foreign policy objectives and a redrawing of NZDF engagement within a whole of government approach. This could include the creation of a civilian reserve or similar.
This paper is by Dr Beth Greener and asks a fundamental question: What is NZDF's purpose? If you look at the key findings she does have a valid point and given that I do believe that the question posed has to be answered. However the answer is not purely black or white, so I would suggest that in fact that the government must first determine what it wants NZDF's core role to be. Once that is determined, then any other roles should be prioritised in descending order. The next and important point is that NZDF should be funded properly and consistently, not as has been happening since 1991 in piecemeal states being equipped with the absolute minimum that the GOTD can get away with.
In today's geostrategic environment I would argue strongly that the NZDF core role has to be that of a fighting force across the maritime, land, air, space, electronic, and cyber domains in order to defend the Realm of New Zealand, its peoples, territories, economies, and interests. In order to do so sufficient resources must be allocated to NZDF for it to accomplish the policy requirements that have been laid down by the government. This means resourcing at a level well beyond bare minimum; something in the region of same level as Australia. For example, if Australia can be self sufficient in the field for two weeks, then NZ should be able to achieve the same level of self sufficiency. It also means reinstating some lost capabilities and expanding others.
Because of previous and current governments backsliding on defence, Australia no longer views NZ as being a valued partner that can be relied upon. I believe that is evident from the Peter Jennings quote above. When you look at it, Japan for example has a lot more to offer in an alliance than we do. Yes they have capabilities that NZ would never have, but they don't bludge - they actually contribute. They aren't a liability on the battlefield. They don't require allied or coalition assets to provide air defence etc.
NZ pollies talk the talk but never walk the walk. They boast about how they are supporting defence and defence personnel, about how NZ is pulling it's weight in its defence agreements and arrangements, and how NZ is doing so much around the world. But it is all smoke and mirrors. The pronouncements are lies, the media don't call them out on them because the only time the media is really interested in defence is when it's doing a beat up of it.
So another question has to be asked, Is Australia really interested in continuing the defence relationship with NZ? What's in it for them? Which brings us back to the lynchpin of NZ defence policy - Australia.
Shanesworld
Well-Known Member
I bow to your superior knowledge. I was an angry 18 Yr old at that point. And she was a very understanding mum of my school friend.
I was told later that there was interest in further frigates once the economic trade benefits came to light but max Bradfords (under national) look at cheaper alternatives for the 4th and possible 3rd frigate had already tired the Australians and was a difficult turn to make for the labour caucus to its partners and party faithful. So they buried the financials.
Didn't Harre jump ship and some point after some "irregularities"?
Whoever told you that is not quite correct. Paul East was the initial DefMin through that 1997-1999 period, but yes Max Bradford who took over from East personally wanted all four Anzacs (I know this because he told me), and tried hard for three through cabinet with a view to replacing F421 in 2005 once they knew that F69 (the 3rd Leander Frigate F69 was decommissioned in 1999) was not going to be replaced. The people who killed the 3rd Frigate option was Winston and Debra Morris in late 1998. Shipley as PM was forced to say that a National government would move forward with it after the election (They lost). The search for cheaper alternative came later with a view to acquiring two OHP's because Max and the higher ups in Defence felt that the 2005 3rd frigate (replacing CY/F421) was not locked. The OZ really wanted the 3rd build Anzac and were prepared to offer it cheaply ($355m) and said that a swap out of two OHP's was a no goer. Labour and the Alliance were dead against it. As was NZ First - only for reasons of short term political damage to the Government which they were a part of until Shipley had enough.
Not Laila for irregularities. Just did not get on with people thats all.
Shanesworld
Well-Known Member
Sorry I should have clarified. Irregularities on the part of the party rather than herself. But yes I heard she turns on people and can be difficult.
Seems I am completely forgetting Alliance and just blaming greens out of habit.
The company I used to work for sub contracted some of that wiring that has been mentioned. Apparently some long lead items for the 4th frigate had been ordered which my boss had been happy about as they were mostly paid for. But angry that we were being so short sighted.
Seems I am completely forgetting Alliance and just blaming greens out of habit.
The company I used to work for sub contracted some of that wiring that has been mentioned. Apparently some long lead items for the 4th frigate had been ordered which my boss had been happy about as they were mostly paid for. But angry that we were being so short sighted.
I'm quite sure Australia is past caring about NZ as a defence partner... and you don't need to look hard to see the other rifts opening up in the trans-Tasman relationship. Australia has clearly gone up a couple of gears in the last 20 years with it's place in the world...as they understand the 3-legged dog of Foreign Affairs+Trade+Defence very well. Alas NZ has largely gone in an opposite direction and certainly the Defence aspect of the 3-legged dog is more a shrivelled-up limb that needed attention years ago!
What's in it for Oz... well we are still 5-eyes partners which does mean quite a lot ... and by 2025 we should be in a position to be able to take on a few 'peripheral regional tasks' that would allow the ADF to avoid taking their eye of the big game... plus we do have a very capable SAS! However the planned $20Bn has to happen, plus some!
There's a very important reason for NZ to espouse inter-operability etc with Australia whilst the latter shrugs their shoulders... this talk (largely in white papers etc) is because it provides perhaps the strongest rationale for NZ to sell any credible argument for maintaining combat capability. If the Australian Govt ever publicly went 'bye bye NZ, we're off to AJUS....' then we would fairly soon after see no further argument for a combat capable defence force...and I think the NZDF know it! We'd be down to a coastguard & peacekeeping force in no time.... albeit I'd say the SAS would be retained.
The NZDF has been ordered in to supervise the mandatory quarantine at the borders because of the ineptitude of the Ministry of Health in their handling and control of the quarantine measures at the border. NZDF doesn't need this crap because it has better things to do, and is already stretched as it is. This is just the latest example of the ineptitude of the Ministry of Health.
www.stuff.co.nz
Stuff
www.stuff.co.nz
This is my second post based on material from the Small States and the New Security Environment (SSANSE) Think Tank at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch. In the previous post I discussed Dr Beth Greener’s article which asked the question of what is the basic purpose of NZDF? It is my contention that the Kiwi pollies don’t really know and don’t want to make a decision on it. I finished by asking the question, Is Australia really interested in continuing the defence relationship with NZ? Which is highly relevant because Australia is the lynchpin of NZ defence policy.
So now I move forward and discuss another article by Dr Jim Rolfe, NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA: PRAGMATIC OPTIMISATION OR RADICAL RENEWAL? ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. Dr Rolfe states that: “The future security environment could well be more dangerous than now. If so, Australia and New Zealand will need a closer strategic relationship.” He lists his key findings as:
“• Indications are that the strategic environment is becoming less stable and more dangerous.
• A new strategic environment would require a new form of partnership.
• To develop the relationship more deeply will require the strategic situation to demand it and imaginative solutions to achieve it.”
He states that the geostrategic situation has deteriorated and if it continues to deteriorate, the current NZ policy settings, especially wrt the security relationship with Australia, will be ineffective. The article was written in 2017 and the geostrategic situation has continued on a downward spiral since then. What he actually suggests is a somewhat radical reform of the relationship, especially from the NZ side:
“The Starting Position
• New Zealand needs to be able to operate effectively in the security environments described in its own policy documents. This will be best achieved through a close relationship with Australia.
• There is more that could be done, either for the best case or the worst case analysis.
The Best Case: Pragmatic Optimisation
• Pragmatic optimisation enhances the current relationship for the contemporary security environment and assumes that there will be little change to that environment. In addition to current approaches:
• Seek formal input to each other’s defence assessments and ultimately to defence policy.
• Enhance the concept of the Australia-New Zealand Ready Response Force.
• Harmonise individual training so there are common skills across the full range of armed forces activities.
• Develop a long-term combined collective training programme
• Develop a combined approach to understanding the likely future military operating environment.
The Worst Case: Radical Renewal
• Radical renewal ensures that New Zealand is able, with Australia, to respond to any worsening security situation. The countries should investigate:
• A permanent secretariat for the Australasian Defence Agencies; leading to
• Australasian Defence Union; and failing that
• Common policy approaches and commitments to specified threats
• Alignment of defence budgets • Combined operations centres • Combined specialist commands
• Capability specialisation and commitment
• Continual rather than ad hoc collaboration to include operationally ready combined units and eventually operationally ready combined formations
• Combined defence science and technology and development of an integrated defence industrial base
• Common approaches to development of ‘new’ capabilities
Conclusions
• A close strategic relationship already exists. If a significantly closer relationship is desired, radically new approaches will have to be considered.
• Choices will have to be made and will depend on assessments of the future strategic environment. The choices are:
• In the less threatening environment, seek to make the best of the relationship (optimise), but approach the relationship with a clear understanding of what is possible (pragmatism).
• In the more threatening environment, radical restructuring will be necessary. Deep analysis of the necessity and the full range of benefits and costs should be the first step.”
I can just see the pollies and Treasury officials in Wellington going into conniptions over this and coughing their teeth into their morning cuppa. However I do believe that something along these lines would go a long way towards regaining the trust of Canberra in Wellington’s willingness to be serious about defence. Whether or not the political and bureaucratic elites in Wellington would be willing to undertake such a radical move is another completely different story. The current GOTD wouldn’t because it flies in the face of their ideological identity and they don’t have the mana or willingness to make such a change. Secondly, it’s too close to the election and this Parliament closes this week, so the government will then go into the period which convention states that no new policies are introduced and enacted. So something like this will have to be left to the next Parliament. These suggestions also raise sovereignty issues and that would have to be worked through by both governments.
However l do see positives in these suggestions if they were adopted. It would mean another 3 possibly 4 Hunter class FFGs. The NZ Army would probably acquire the Boxer CRV. From a NZ POV there is the economies gained in scale of numbers when buying. For both nations it would be a win win, and would create a larger defence block in the region.
So now I move forward and discuss another article by Dr Jim Rolfe, NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA: PRAGMATIC OPTIMISATION OR RADICAL RENEWAL? ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. Dr Rolfe states that: “The future security environment could well be more dangerous than now. If so, Australia and New Zealand will need a closer strategic relationship.” He lists his key findings as:
“• Indications are that the strategic environment is becoming less stable and more dangerous.
• A new strategic environment would require a new form of partnership.
• To develop the relationship more deeply will require the strategic situation to demand it and imaginative solutions to achieve it.”
He states that the geostrategic situation has deteriorated and if it continues to deteriorate, the current NZ policy settings, especially wrt the security relationship with Australia, will be ineffective. The article was written in 2017 and the geostrategic situation has continued on a downward spiral since then. What he actually suggests is a somewhat radical reform of the relationship, especially from the NZ side:
“The Starting Position
• New Zealand needs to be able to operate effectively in the security environments described in its own policy documents. This will be best achieved through a close relationship with Australia.
• There is more that could be done, either for the best case or the worst case analysis.
The Best Case: Pragmatic Optimisation
• Pragmatic optimisation enhances the current relationship for the contemporary security environment and assumes that there will be little change to that environment. In addition to current approaches:
• Seek formal input to each other’s defence assessments and ultimately to defence policy.
• Enhance the concept of the Australia-New Zealand Ready Response Force.
• Harmonise individual training so there are common skills across the full range of armed forces activities.
• Develop a long-term combined collective training programme
• Develop a combined approach to understanding the likely future military operating environment.
The Worst Case: Radical Renewal
• Radical renewal ensures that New Zealand is able, with Australia, to respond to any worsening security situation. The countries should investigate:
• A permanent secretariat for the Australasian Defence Agencies; leading to
• Australasian Defence Union; and failing that
• Common policy approaches and commitments to specified threats
• Alignment of defence budgets • Combined operations centres • Combined specialist commands
• Capability specialisation and commitment
• Continual rather than ad hoc collaboration to include operationally ready combined units and eventually operationally ready combined formations
• Combined defence science and technology and development of an integrated defence industrial base
• Common approaches to development of ‘new’ capabilities
Conclusions
• A close strategic relationship already exists. If a significantly closer relationship is desired, radically new approaches will have to be considered.
• Choices will have to be made and will depend on assessments of the future strategic environment. The choices are:
• In the less threatening environment, seek to make the best of the relationship (optimise), but approach the relationship with a clear understanding of what is possible (pragmatism).
• In the more threatening environment, radical restructuring will be necessary. Deep analysis of the necessity and the full range of benefits and costs should be the first step.”
I can just see the pollies and Treasury officials in Wellington going into conniptions over this and coughing their teeth into their morning cuppa. However I do believe that something along these lines would go a long way towards regaining the trust of Canberra in Wellington’s willingness to be serious about defence. Whether or not the political and bureaucratic elites in Wellington would be willing to undertake such a radical move is another completely different story. The current GOTD wouldn’t because it flies in the face of their ideological identity and they don’t have the mana or willingness to make such a change. Secondly, it’s too close to the election and this Parliament closes this week, so the government will then go into the period which convention states that no new policies are introduced and enacted. So something like this will have to be left to the next Parliament. These suggestions also raise sovereignty issues and that would have to be worked through by both governments.
However l do see positives in these suggestions if they were adopted. It would mean another 3 possibly 4 Hunter class FFGs. The NZ Army would probably acquire the Boxer CRV. From a NZ POV there is the economies gained in scale of numbers when buying. For both nations it would be a win win, and would create a larger defence block in the region.
From memory Australia also elects left wing governments as well. Last time I looked the ALP was left wing. SO NO NEED FOR THE POLITICAL RUBBISH. 5 WARNING POINTS FOR 3 MONTHS FOR BREAKING THE RULE ABOUT POLITICS. RULE #18 REFERS.