There's this bit of news circling in my feed today.
I won't talk about it specifically or the legitimacy of this information aside from saying media attention patterns indicate it's a low value item.
But the essence of it does illustrate a new opportunity for Israel, including in how it forms a strategy.
Right now we know multiple clans are operating in Gaza on Israel's behalf, doing a variety of tasks. From protecting GHF sites in the south, to clearing areas in the north.
In J&S there were also always collaborators but these are several orders of magnitude apart.
Technically the PA is cooperative with Israel but it so far refuses to take it a step further into de-radicalization. And the youth are further radicalized by its excessive corruption.
If a militarized clan in J&S was to take over from PA or Hamas territory, and would go these few steps forward of being more technocratic, work toward de-radicalization, and invest in popularity, then that would be a strategic shift for Israel.
First I'd like to estimate the basis for emergence of such parties:
- Armament - Obviously a prerequisite is armament and that could be from Israel, if they meet criteria.
- Power - Not values like democracy or LGBT rights, but who has the power and who can use it. Despite being the top dog of the entire MENA, Israel was passive, barely even reactionist. Until October 7th that is.
Israel will therefore be judged on the universal challenge of being proactive in its defense. Not just until the war ends, but also in peacetime.
It should matter to a rising party as a sudden Israeli decision to disengage could mean death for them.
- Interia - Past wars showed us Israel is eager to return to a status quo. Show muscle in a contained arena for a month or two, end it when the threat is more or less sufficiently diminished, and finish there. But Israel is not slowing down. It fought Hezbollah until a decisive victory, took up the Houthis' challenge and destroyed their economy, went head on with Iran and subdued it for a while, and is not letting the pressure off Hamas until either the hostages return or Hamas is destroyed, whichever comes first.
This is of course connected to #2.
- Renegotiation - Israel seeks to renegotiate the power balance in the region, and set better conditions for itself going forward. This includes an anti-Hezbollah government in Lebanon, and the toppling of Assad. Both new governments consider normalization with Israel and entry into the Abraham Accords a possibility.
Israel is very open about its desire to change the regime in Gaza, and this leads to point 5.
- J&S as a central front - Despite media attention being on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, the J&S front has been active for about as long as Gaza, and it's not particularly peace-keeping ops.
- Demolition - What characterizes all front on Israel's borders - Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, is demolition. And Israel is doing that in J&S as well right now, in areas known for being terrorist hotspots like Jenin.
This reminds me:
Demolition in Syria's Hermon.
The goal here is quite clear. Undo years and decades of terrorist infrastructure buildup. But that's the surface level of it. The deeper level is that Israel is determined to break the status quo and reshape the region to secure itself from any serious attack.
By far the biggest threat to Israel is not the rockets and missiles of its adversaries, but the economical impact of shutting down airports, businesses, and calling up working reservists.
When defense capability is often reduced to defense expenditure in % of GDP, economical performance has a tremendous impact on Israel's preparadeness for the next war.
What Israel can do:
- Set up "Emirates" in J&S and Gaza - Each capable of policing but nothing more.
- PA and Hamas would be replaced, as are Fatah and other hostiles.
- Israel could start a selection process for groups that are less antagonistic and extreme.
- Use these groups to negotiate a longer term solution that solves territorial issues.
- Including perhaps a Golan model in J&S. Western half (in a moon shape) + Jordan Valley to Israel, eastern half to the Palestinians.
- Perimeter (2km) in Gaza and northern Gaza to Israel.
- In exchange, Israel opens up economical integration options for them.
- The minimal bar is raised far high to include de-radicalization in schools and media.
Of course this is more of a ceiling to the potential of such development, and not the expectation.
Realistically, Israel should cultivate proxies in every Palestinian territory and continuously re-assess the development potential of such relationships.
If the Palestinians adopt such approach, this could also convince Israel to dial down rhetoric and potential efforts for displacement and relocation, simply by showing that it is no longer a necessity.
verfassungsblog.de
