Middle East Defence & Security

STURM

Well-Known Member
Your argument was that they make rational decisions
I said that what they do is governed by self interests; doing what they have to do in line their geo strategic aims and other things - what they do is not driven by religion per see. I also said that it's a common and easily made assumption to say that they are "nutjobs"'. I didn't say or imply rationality or otherwise and various others countries also do things which are irrational and self defeating in the long run.

This elite is highly religious, and does not reflect the average level of religiosity in Iran.
Hardly a revelation they are "highly religious;" the country is after all the "Islamic "Republic of Iran". Also, so what if they're "highly religious" and there's also the question of what your personal definition of " highly religious". To an outsider an individual who does and believes certain things may be "highly religious" but to that individual he's merely carrying out his duties as a Muslim. As for "the average level of religiosity in Iran" I don't have the actual figures to agree or disagree with such a claim but I'm aware that many Iranians take their religion seriously; irrespective of whether they support their leaders or are followers of the "revolution".

For example, their regional conflicts are irrational. .
To you but in reality [as has been discussed] their involvement in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and other places is driven by numerous factors. From their perspective it served a purpose and has resulted in certain results.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
Interesting podcast with an Iranian pilot who joined the air force in 1989 and left in 1993. He clocked about 150 hours on the Tomcat and speaks about his experiences.


He mentions about how when Grumman faced severe cash issues; a massive cash injection by the Shah saved the programme; also mentioned in Tom in Cooper's "Iran- Iran War In The Air 1980-1988". The Shah's decision to buy the Tomcat [driven by the inability to counter Soviet Foxbat recce flights from Azerbaijan]; as well as large stocks of ordance and spares; paid huge dividends during the war with Iraq. Another factor was a large pool of well trained manpower; some of whom were released from incarceration [the air force was viewed as being very pro Shah].after Saddam's invasion. The Tomcat achieved numerous kills against the Iraqis; Phoenix proving to be very effective. I really recommend Tom Cooper's book on the air war with Iraq: as well as several he did with Osprey on the Iranian air force.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Syrian S-300 reportedly fired for the first time on IAF aircraft.
In depth here:

Context and details:
  • Syria's S-300 is its most advanced long range SAM.
  • Russia sold this system to Syria after years of Israel convincing Russia not to. It then "put it on a leash" as an assurance.
  • It is allegedly 'controlled' by Russia. This could either mean a Russian crew, or a Syrian crew but under Russian command.
  • Syria/Russia have refrained from using this system against the IAF until now, even when aircraft and munitions were well within range.
  • Russia-Israel relations have deteriorated recently over Ukraine, and the deconfliction mechanism between the two over Syria (since 2015) has come into question.
  • The report claims the S-300's reload vehicle was destroyed in retaliation.
  • It occurred after reportedly the S-300 system fired on Israeli aircraft.
  • The aircraft were already departing from their strike mission.
  • No lock on was achieved. They were likely launched ballistically which is not uncommon for Syrian air defenses.
  • Israel's strike mission was on a military industrial center in Masyaf that was destroyed and rebuilt several times already.
  • In the recent past Russia also escalated vs Israel by doing joint patrols with SyAAF over the Syrian side of the Golan.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member

Report in Hebrew about American participation in Iran-centric final stage of Israel's month-long army-wide drill.

IDF's Chariots of Fire drill is said to focus primarily on the northern front, i.e vs Hezbollah and Syria, but will include more aspects like dealing with domestic tensions between Jews and Arabs, strikes in distant locations like Iraq, and a whole section on simulating a strike on Iran plus its potential retaliation.
In the simulation, the IAF will practice striking Iran's nuclear facilities over Cyprus, and the US is said to provide aerial tanker support.

It is currently estimated Israel could use assistance in aerial refueling, specialized munitions, and platforms for said munitions.

The same report also adds that preparations began early last year, and some drills could be acted upon on short notice, while others would take over a year from now to be actionable.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
IDF's massive month-long exercise has shifted to Cyprus where simultaneously the IAF is simulating an attack on Iran's nuclear sites, and the ground forces are simulating an attack into Lebanon against Hezbollah.
  • Of note, for the first time in decades the IDF is practicing amphibious landings and on-shore resupply in contested environment.
  • The Iran strike simulation is said to have over a hundred aircraft, and it is said that various types are involved, including fighters, aerial tankers, and transport planes (which can be converted to tankers on short notice).
  • It is not said whether helicopters took part, which if they did would obviously be a classified detail as it could indicate oversized special payloads (like EW systems), a ground element, and/or operation from a base outside Israel.


Former Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot comments in a strategic forum about Iran, saying the IDF and the US have both prevented a middle eastern North Korea for 17 years.

 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Multiple reports that IAF has completed work on allowing F-35 to travel to Iran and back without aerial refueling, and integrated a 1-ton munition for internal carriage.

The report seems to be a continuation of this one from 2021, where development was announced.

First speculations are drop tanks which IAI was said to be working on, themselves non-stealthy but with a unique dropping mechanism, and less likely are conformal fuel tanks developed jointly with Lockheed Martin.
The munition could be, if going solely by Rafael's catalogue and disregarding any potential secretive development (as was with Sea Breaker that debuted after delivery, not the other way around), could be either the Spice-2000 or Rocks based on weight class alone.

We don't actually know the weight of the Rocks. Its parameters are classified. But that makes it a primary target.

An article on Rocks:

Judging by its single stage rocket motor, it could be an air launched ballistic missile like the Rampage, making it particularly useful for densely protected areas both in its flight profile and its standoff range.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Iran is increasing tensions in the ME, they have disconnected cameras that were used to monitor Iranian nuclear sites by IAEA:

IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi revealed that Iran had removed 27 of the U.N. watchdog group’s surveillance cameras from nuclear sites around the country (about 40 remain in place). Grossi said at a June 9 press conference that Iran’s move posed a “serious challenge” and could constitute a “fatal blow” to the prospect of resuming negotiations.
Bennet warned in an interview last Saturday that Iran is dangerously close to producing nuclear weapons. Bennett warns Iran close to bomb as nuclear talks remain at impasse - JNS.org

Eytan Gilboa, professor of political science and a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security believes the West has concluded that Iran is not interested in a deal and are just buying time while finishing their nuclear weapon.

Other analysts (e.g., Pinko and Zisser from Bar-Ilan University, and Tel Aviv University) believe Iran is still interested in negotiating and are merely increasing the pressure to get a good deal.

Iran has now 60 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, about double the 33 kilograms the IAEA reported in March. According to the Wall Street Journal, Iran would need about 40 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium “to produce enough weapons-grade nuclear fuel for a weapon.”

Zisser believes Iran now can make weapons-grade nuclear fuel for a weapon in 12 weeks to 3 months. Pinko postulated that “they have the full capacity for the bomb, including the missiles to carry it and the weapon system to operate the nuclear warhead. "

This does not sound very reassuring. Although painful the Western countries should make a compromise with Iran, but one that Israel is willing to accept. Arriving at a deal would not help if Israel decides the deal is not strong enough and decides to attack. Iran going nuclear would be a major challenge for the region, and also the world. Saudi Arabia and perhaps also UAE would then obtain nuclear weapons. And if that happens, it will be very difficult for Turkey to stay outside of the "nuclear club".

SA made it clear in 2018 that they will go nuclear if Iran goes nuclear: Saudi crown prince: If Iran develops nuclear bomb, so will we - CBS News

UAE has opened their first nuclear power plants, and (for now) say they will not create nuclear weapons: UAE Reactor Reaches Criticality | Arms Control Association -- however they have not yet signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) United Arab Emirates and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (icanw.org)

Erdogan said in 2019 it's unacceptable that Turkey cannot have their own nuclear weapons: Erdogan says it's unacceptable that Turkey can't have nuclear weapons | Reuters
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
An alleged Israeli threat to Syria that if it does not halt Iranian activities in its territory, Syrian leadership (or its property) could be targeted.
It is alleged because none else has reported on it except for JPost (a recycle of Elaph's report). Had it been reliable, it would be picked up by all Israeli media.

 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
(Israeli defense minister) Gantz says regional (air) defenses already thwarted first threats.

Not long ago, news came out that Israel, the US, and Arab states, are forming a regional air defense, and separately it was reported that a regional "NATO" is planned.
I personally have no doubt whatsoever that the weight of the pact will once again fall on the US and Israel, but it's a nice start on the way to forcing the Arab states to become competent.

What might be of particularly high value might be, and this is speculated, an Israeli access to Arab infrastructure e.g airports, and access to Arab intel, particularly radars.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
IDF brass again in internal conflicts over whether to support renewed Iran talks and a potential deal, or not.
Notably, Mossad which leads ops in Iran, is against, as well as the Chief of General Staff himself. Chief of intelligence is for.
The pro camp is at a minority, and it is my assessment that it is due to ongoing operations vs Iran which escalated recently.

Pro camp naturally argues that it needs more time to prepare for a strike.
Those against argue it would aggravate the situation elsewhere, and that current ops and preparations are sufficient.

 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz says defense exports to Arab states reached $3 billion since signing of Abraham Accords.
We know from previous reports at least $500 million are from Morocco, for Barak 8 systems as well as Heron drones and other less strategic systems.

Source:

Source on deal with Morocco:

Of particular importance is the aspect of air defense required to set up MEAD (Middle East Air Defense). Iron Dome was pitched, but as is natural for G2G, it's less flexible and more prone to politics than talking directly to companies, so UAE for example selected South Korea's medium range K-SAM.
But the middle east in general is well covered by long range systems like Patriot variants and THAAD, leaving large capability gaps that should naturally be filled by very short to medium ranged systems.

The large Arab air forces' air defense capabilities are offset by their rather huge territories, multiple potential fronts, lack of proper early warning, and of course by other missions.

That is not to say all this money came from Iron Dome sales. Or any at all. A much more exportable system would be the Barak 8. It takes a very low share of the Israeli IAMD, and was designed from the ground up as an exportable system (meaning minimal practical and bureaucratic hurdles in safekeeping its secrets, like the ones that torpedoed Iron Dome sales to the US).
But even that would be a high profile sale.
What is more likely is anti-drone tech, tactical level sensors, data and battle management tools, and training tools.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member

Link is to a liveblog so it will be broken in a few hours. Will post new one when available and I'll have the time.

Briefly: Polls show 11% of Israelis believe a breakthrough with the Palestinians (regarding peace process) is possible. Traditionally the left wing and left-center are optimistic, while the right wing are neutral to pessimistic on that. It is also difficult to quantify the number of left wing Israelis now that centrist and niche parties dominate the spectrum.
But I can say with certainty that 11% is unprecedented, and definitely shows the core of the left wing are now also pessimistic.
11% seems to correspond with a core of Arab voters, actually, accounting for the relative strength of their parties.

This partially explains the cultural aspect of why despite more centrist and pragmatic Israeli leaders and Knesset (parliament) members, and democratic US leadership, the process stagnated.


In the same poll, 44% of Israelis showed optimism about prospects of Israeli-Saudi normalization, and 44% showed pessimism, in the context of Biden's upcoming visit to the region.

Separately I've been reading somewhat pessimistic takes on Israeli newspapers and other media about a middle east NATO, and big questions that remain unanswered like what the structure will be and who will lead it.

No doubt the visit will be very important, and start shifting things. But the feeling is that Biden might have to make some outstanding performance to score all the victories he needs and expected by his regional allies. The pessimism further grows when understanding Biden might be preoccupied with China, Russia, global oil supplies, and looming elections.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group

Link is to a liveblog so it will be broken in a few hours. Will post new one when available and I'll have the time.

Briefly: Polls show 11% of Israelis believe a breakthrough with the Palestinians (regarding peace process) is possible. Traditionally the left wing and left-center are optimistic, while the right wing are neutral to pessimistic on that. It is also difficult to quantify the number of left wing Israelis now that centrist and niche parties dominate the spectrum.
But I can say with certainty that 11% is unprecedented, and definitely shows the core of the left wing are now also pessimistic.
11% seems to correspond with a core of Arab voters, actually, accounting for the relative strength of their parties.

This partially explains the cultural aspect of why despite more centrist and pragmatic Israeli leaders and Knesset (parliament) members, and democratic US leadership, the process stagnated.


In the same poll, 44% of Israelis showed optimism about prospects of Israeli-Saudi normalization, and 44% showed pessimism, in the context of Biden's upcoming visit to the region.

Separately I've been reading somewhat pessimistic takes on Israeli newspapers and other media about a middle east NATO, and big questions that remain unanswered like what the structure will be and who will lead it.

No doubt the visit will be very important, and start shifting things. But the feeling is that Biden might have to make some outstanding performance to score all the victories he needs and expected by his regional allies. The pessimism further grows when understanding Biden might be preoccupied with China, Russia, global oil supplies, and looming elections.
….especially the last two items. Biden doesn’t really inspire confidence in US leadership nor do many of the likely candidates vying for his job.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Biden's trip to the middle east shows some successes, some losses, and overall a sense of too little and too late.

Touring the air defenses exhibit at the Ben Gurion airport, Biden has seen first hand the new Iron Beam system, set to be a game changer in the economy of war vs Hamas and Hezbollah, in the aspect of homefront defense.

Beyond that, Israel is interested in setting the basic parameters of the follow-up aid package (renewed every 10 years), and is primarily interested in an ability to frontload the deal so most of the money will be spent early on.

Biden's trip has also caused Saudi Arabia to permit Israeli commercial flights to and above Saudi Arabia. At the center of it was a deal to allow Israeli muslims to visit Meccah without any hurdles.
It is almost certainly a gesture of goodwill as Saudi Arabia needs Israeli and American approval for the transfer of 2 red sea islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.


The topic of MEAD is central to this trip, as well as the prerequisites to that. To properly form the MEAD, which is in turn just one step in the plan to rid Iran of nuclear weapons and powerful proxies, we need all hands on deck. The more the better.
Unfortunately, the UAE pours cold water on the project and on Biden's promises this trip.


UAE says they are not part of any plan against Iran, and are even mulling returning an ambassador to Iran after several years of severed ties.
Not long ago the UAE announced a huge Rafale fighters buy instead of American F-35, as a protest for the US's hesitation on the subject. For even more background, Israel and UAE normalized ties under the reported promise to the UAE they will get F-35s. However, despite lack of Israel's and Trump's protests, Congress (IIRC) halted the deal.

The UAE, despite what seemed like good ties with the west, is still importing arms from China and even North Korea, which are also Iran's closest allies. It is important to take these ties into account. However, I do not know how much they affect the Emirates' policies.

Other than UAE, Iraq remains a key player in US plans for a regional alliance. But it too chose to side with Iran on this.
Iraq's new law that criminalizes any ties with Israel, up to a death penalty, is a sign Iraq won't change its policy on that anytime soon.

Are these countries, and even MEAD itself, necessary for Israel? Not that much. It is of greater use to the Arab countries. Israel's air and missile defenses are about as hermetic as they can be with today's technologies, and it gets a boost from American early warning in the region. The Arabs however are vulnerable, especially with their vast territories that can be exploited easily by Iran.

So, really, when we see some resistance from Arab countries to the MEAD, it could be the symptom of their disapproval of involvement in a strike on Iran's nuclear program.


Overall, Biden seems to have added very little value in his trip. The amount of concrete steps was minimal, and there was much more symbolism.
For Israelis, the topic of Iran is urgent. So whatever Biden's actual stance is - military option or not, the Israeli gov't, and the public, need to know it.
The Jerusalem Declaration was thought to be a historic document, but essentially it contained no new information and no change to the status quo.
The press in Israel is more pessimistic about it than otherwise. Quite a few opinion pieces and statements by officials that Israel is okay with following a different Iran policy than the US.

So as said before, Biden needs to show the region he can put realpolitik first (Khashoggi's murder was heinous, and not in line with what's expected of allies of the west, but severing ties over it can negatively affect hundreds of millions, so is it really the moral stance here?), and commit to the region despite important events elsewhere.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Khamenei adviser says Iran ready to build a nuclear bomb.

With Biden and the gulf Arabs subsequently clearly showing no appetite for dealing with the program, there is the growing chance that Iran will eventually end up with a nuke.

Getting sufficient material for a nuke is the point of no return, and beyond that there will always be ambiguity about an actual weapon.
Time is quickly running out, if it hasn't already.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Reports like this,

Have become very common the last few days.
Nasrallah has also made threats specifically about September.
Seems many people more knowledgeable than I am have come to the same conclusion that risk of war with Hezbollah is particularly high right now.

Few factors to keep in mind:
1. There is somewhat of a consensus that if a war breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah, it'll necessarily be in the summer.
2. Iran should feel particularly vulnerable right now due to the status of its nuclear program. Flexing with Hezbollah makes sense.
3. Hezbollah is grasping at multiple different narratives to create a sort of casus belli.

The last time tensions were this high was in 2016, yet nothing came of it. So it could just as easily be a false alarm.
Either way, just posting it to make people aware it's still a thing.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
EU submits final text in Iran nuclear talks, US endorses it, Iran says will consider it, and an answer is expected within "very few weeks".

1. The rhetoric, that it's a final text, and American endorsement of it, is a positive sign from the US to the region that it's willing to go beyond diplomacy to ensure its, and the region's, interests. This could be a western gesture to the wide MENA region that Biden's recent trip is not just words.
  • It could also be a result of a shift in European approach to security matters.
  • I speculated at the start of the Russia-Ukraine wars, as many others have also speculated, that the US and Europe would become too distracted by the war and would thus be willing to make more compromises to score a deal, to in turn score cookie points at home. Instead, we see a hardline stance on Iran and its nuclear program.
2. What could be yet another symptom of this positive (IMO) trend is the unprecedented support for Israel in the west, and condemnation of PIJ, in the recent operation in Gaza (which lasted a few days and ended yesterday). PIJ is not just a Palestinian terrorist organization, but also an Iranian proxy with activities in Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria, and offices in Tehran.

3. And as a bonus, Iran launches a 600kg surveillance satellite through Russia's space agency, and rumors are already spreading about Russia allegedly using it soon against Ukraine, while Iran insists it will control the satellite from day one, and none else will use it, and of course that the satellite is for surveillance of borders and agriculture.

  • In the last few years, Iran made quite a few launch attempts of small payloads domestically, but failures were frequent.
  • The fear of sabotage, as well as an exceptionally heavy satellite (too heavy for local rockets) may have driven Iran to outsource the launch.
 
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