Occum said:
The weakness in this force structure is tanking. Without tanking neither the F/A-18 Classic nor the JSF can get to Lombok.
You wouldn't buy an F-22 because it has greater range than the F-35. Besides, the F-35 reportedly has greater internal fuel capacity (~19.5k lbs vs ~18k lbs) and (granted, on paper) has a greater combat radius than the F-22 with internal stores. So, whether they're going to Lombok, Jakarta or Beijing, the JSF and the F-22 will have similar range issues.
Where I agree with Kopp and Goon is the fact that five tankers will not be enough for Australia to maintain high intensity operations in a full-blown regional conflict. Whether that is politically or strategically likely or not, I think at least three or four more MRTTs would be a prudent investment in an AIR5402 'Tranche 2' buy, to give us a true operational capability rather than the limited support capability at best offered by just five aircraft. Five aircraft is fine for dragging a six-ship across the Pacific to Red Flag, or a squadron to Curtin for an exercise, but when you take reserve aircraft into account, at least eight to ten makes much more sense.
Now that Airbus has committed to an A330F launch (or at least, it will at Farnborough), we can also get the cargo door and floor fitted at the same time without being the lead customer and assuming the associated risk. Perhaps more funding can be diverted from Mr Costello's huge surplus to fund the estimated $1bn required, and a 'left field' initiative involving reserve crewing options in conjunction with Qantas can be devised!
But, I digress. During a chat with a senior RAAF official last week, I put it to him that perhaps, in an effort to eliminate risk to the RAAF surrounding both the Hornet centre-barrel replacement (AIR5376, Phase 3.2) AND the JSF programs, that the RAAF should consider acquiring 40-50 Block 2 Super Hornets or F-15SGs (or whatever the latest equivalent would be) from 2008, not as interim aircraft, but as a 20-year proposition. The new aircraft could be 'flogged' for 20 years, with the current 'classic' Hornets being gradually wound down from 2012 as their centre-barrels time expire.
We could then tap into the JSF program (which I still believe is the right aircraft for us) as a later customer and still as a partner in the 2016-18 timeframe, to the tune of 50-60 Block 3 airframes. The per unit acquisition cost will be coming down to somewhere near the mean NRFAC price by then, estimated to be around US$80m in 2012 dollars, and hopefully any development bugs will also have been sorted.
Some very rough costings would see:
- 50 F/A-18Fs @ ~A$120m each = A$6bn
- 60 JSFs @ ~A$120m = $7.2bn
- = ~A$13.2bn (est.)
- less >A$1bn (est.) for Hornet centre-barrels
- less >A$1bn (est.) for Pig ops in 2011 & 12
- = A$11.2bn (est.)
Although there are numerous short term non-recurring costs and personnel issues associated with standing up a new type (and the Super Hornet is a completely new type compared to our 'classics'), this represents a potential real saving over the A$15.5bn currently budgeted for AIR6000, whilst also removing three large elements of risk surrounding the HUG program, keeping the Pigs an extra two years, and buying early JSFs. At the same time, we could still remain partners in the JSF program, and hopefully maintain the Australian industry participation in the program (although this is likely to drop if we only buy 60 jets compared to the currently planned 100).
Such a buy would also stagger the life-of-type (i.e. replacement) of these aircraft, with the Super Hornets from the late 2020s, and the JSFs 10-15 years later, instead of the current budget nightmare we have of having to replace 100+ combat aircraft at once!
His answer was interesting to say the least. Thoughts???
Magoo
