Indian Defence News

ngatimozart

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True, but I think the scenario being talk about here for Pakistan involvement based on scenarios on China by passing Malaca Strait and used land transport through Central Asia and Sea Lane toward Pakistan ports to transport oil imports to China Interior.

The safety on that routes can be compromise by India, but for Indian to compromise that route will means they have to pacified Pakistan first.
India can pacified Pakistan, there's no doubt in there. However to do that, they have to commit most of their forces.
As India pretext to pacified Pakistan in this scenario is for compromising Chinese routes, then China will come to equation. India simply can't afford to take both Pakistan and India in same time.
If India looked like it was going to overrun Pakistan, the Pakistanis would probably go nuclear. What's the point of having a nuclear arsenal if you aren't going to use it when your country is in military and strategic extremis with the survival of the nation at the it's most perilous.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
True, but I think the scenario being talk about here for Pakistan involvement based on scenarios on China by passing Malaca Strait and used land transport through Central Asia and Sea Lane toward Pakistan ports to transport oil imports to China Interior.

The safety on that routes can be compromise by India, but for Indian to compromise that route will means they have to pacified Pakistan first.
...
The land route from Pakistan to China is very thin indeed. India doesn't need to pacify Pakistan, or even occupy any of it. to compromise that route. Some accurate air strikes on the road would do the job. There are some beautiful high bridges, & tunnels the mouths of which could be hit . . . . and it's within easy range of Indian bases in Kashmir.

If China builds a pipeline the same considerations would apply.

Traffic through Iran, Turkmenistan, etc., bypassing Pakistan, would not be vulnerable to India.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

I put this article, as it put the list of 101 defense items that India Government put on negative list to import. I put in this thread as the list mostly related to Army Equipment.

However, found this negative list quite interesting. Like it put as Negative list on DDG (Guided Missile Destroyers), and not surprisingly as India already have Dehli Class DDG. However how about the systems on DDG ? As that where most of cost will be.

Also this list not include Fighters on negative list, but missile like BVR AAM is put as Negative list as way to promote Astra BVRM, which is understandable. However this means all future Fighter suppliers has to open their source code in order to make their system compatible with Astra BVRM. Also, how about Astra BVRM performance it self ? Are Indian AF already comfortable that Astra will be in par with AIM120, R27 or PL15 ? Astra is new BVRM, and perhaps it's too early for India to rely only to Astra , as this negative list will be soon be enforce.

Also, Light Transport Aircraft being put in Negative list and it's bit question to me. Is India already have AN-32 domestic replacement ? Putting LCA is right way as way to make sure Tejas own domestic market, however why Light Transports? Is the Light Transports program with Russia already provide proven products ? Since I read some questions from Indian forums and media on that.

There're some items on those 101 list that in my opinion justifiable considering India own domestic Defense Industry. However some other items, bit questionable in my opinion. What does this Import Negative list means ? Complete Domestic products are also include License Production ? As they put SSK on that list, but unlike China, Japan or ROK, India does not have domestic SSK. They're now still license production their SSK, just like Pakistan does.

Will be quite interesting to see how this's going to develop.
 
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Toptob

Active Member
WOW! That's an extensive list that hints at some very ambitious plans. I mean I think they should be able to build all of their ships in country. Once you have the capacity to build submarines you'll eventually be able to design a submarine that works, more or less. The systems are another matter of coarse, but the list contains a lot of what you'd need.

What's interesting is I saw the artillery on there so I looked around. But the guns they're buying at the moment are 42 caliber guns, but on the list they put 155mm by 52 caliber. Is this to be a different gun from the Bofors derived one, or a modification? And it lists a (presumably) new 7.62x39mm assault rifle, so are they not going to buy new AK's from Russia then? And what I can't find on the list is tanks, presumably because they just ordered more T-90's. But the Arjun program always looked like a source of pride for the Indians much like the LCA, so are they not confident in the mark 2 for their future needs?

They also list AFV's which they are already working on. But I think it's a good idea because they need a lot of those and it's nice to have something that's built specifically for your requirements. But maybe most interesting on this list is all the different radar equipment. Big shiny missiles are very impressive, while support systems like radars don't look as "cool" on the cover of a magazine. But when you're doing SEAD/DEAD you don't target the TEL's but the radars guiding them, and while a missile has to work once a radar has to work all the time and it has to work well.

So to see the Indians put such critical yet not so flashy items on an import block list to stimulate local development makes me believe ,at least a little bit, that they indeed consulted with the end user (the military) and industry to see what was needed and what was possible. And it looks like they are planning on a much needed defense wide upgrade/ rearmament program.
 

OPSSG

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Staff member
LAC Fiasco — continued segment 1 of 4

1. The situation along the LAC is one of heightened tension, which will need some sane handling from both sides and as such the talks should continue. There is always a probability of a spiral, wherein hardening of positions have the potential to lead to a skirmish. Any escalation is definitely not in the interest of either China or India. As China plans and prepares to challenge the US for global supremacy, some Indians think that China can not afford a conflict with India. While others believe China can afford the conflict.

2. Indian sources have reported that: "In Pangong Tso itself, Chinese troops withdrew only a bit and then stalled. And instead, the PLA has made preparations to sit out the winter. All military-to-military conversations in the past month have been quite rough and hostile, at times plain rude". Not sure what has changed in the dynamics of the withdrawal negotiations; but I am pretty sure Indian politicians will not be willing to pay the necessary price despite the fact that tensions remain.

3. The Indian army said in a statement that Chinese troops carried out military movements over the weekend to change the status quo on their disputed border in a fresh flare-up between the two sides (see: reut.rs/31L5WUS). The committing of the Special Frontier Force into Indian operations in Ladakh is a signal from New Delhi of how seriously it takes the Chinese intrusions and the lengths India will go to in combating them, said a senior diplomat and China expert.

4. The Chinese military spokesman said China is taking countermeasures and will safeguard its territorial sovereignty.

 
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swerve

Super Moderator
Also this list not include Fighters on negative list, but missile like BVR AAM is put as Negative list as way to promote Astra BVRM, which is understandable. However this means all future Fighter suppliers has to open their source code in order to make their system compatible with Astra BVRM.
If any future fighter supplier can't say "Here's the application interface", rather than revealing its source code, I'd wonder why they haven't noticed what millennium this is.

Unfortunately, you're probably right that some still won't have sorted that out. The military have been remarkably slow. The USA's adopted the Universal Armament Interface (UAI) now, for weapons & aircraft, & software & hardware are available to enable some other weapons to interface with it, but others?
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
LAC Fiasco — continued segment 2 of 4

5. It was officially announced that Tenzin Nyima, a Company Commander of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) under the Indian Army, died as the result of an operation on the night of 29 Aug 2020 to enable the Indian army to seize high ground on the south bank of Pangong lake (allegedly to pre-empt a Chinese move).
(a) Certain less reliable news sources have reported that another two soldiers, including Tenzin Londhen, who was also critically injured in the same explosion, and is currently undergoing treatment at the military hospital in Ladakh. These soldiers belonged to the 7th Battalion of the SFF, a unit under the Indian Army made up of Tibetans. Indian soldiers call them the “Vikas Battalion”.​
(b) PLA crossed into the Indian side of the LAC south of Pangong Tso lake, occupied a mountain called Helmet Top and began building fortifications.​
(c) It has been reported that the SFF soldiers launched an operation to repel the Chinese intrusion around the Black Top Hill that had been occupied by Chinese soldiers. Black Top Hill adjoins Helmet Top and India’s important Thakung Post. Both Black Top and Helmet Top are on India’s side of the LAC. While details are classified, PLA soldiers are said to have been injured in the clash.​
(d) There are differing accounts of what transpired but, according to one source, the SFF detachment clashed with Chinese troops and inflicted significant casualties on them. One Tibetan SFF officer was reportedly killed and at least two injured in the operation. PLA's political commissar would certainly be concerned with the use of SFF soldiers in an operation, given its implications for Tibet.

6. On the north bank of the Pangong lake, the PLA has shifted the LAC to its advantage by about eight kilometres, from Finger 8 to Finger 4. On the south bank, however, the strongly held Thakung post – which has a mixed garrison of army soldiers and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troopers – continues to dominate the Pangong lake’s southern bank.

7. Even as the PLA’s continuing aggression in Pangong hogs the spotlight, senior Indian planners apprehend this might be a Chinese ploy to divert attention from Depsang, in Northern Ladakh, which might be China’s actual target.

8. Depsang offers the shortest and easiest route for Indian armoured columns to reach the strategic Tibet-Xinjiang road (Highway G219), the security of which is Beijing’s core sensitive in this area. PLA intrusions 15 kilometres into the Depsang sector have currently blocked Indian patrols’ routes to the LAC.

9. New Delhi would remember how Egypt imposed upon a far more powerful Israel a cost for its enmity, even fighting a limited war to bring Tel Aviv to the table. Israel’s crushing defeat of the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day War of 1967, coming soon after its victory in the 1948 War, had engendered a widespread impression of Israeli invincibility and Arab impotence. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat realized that his country was held hostage by the no-war-no-peace situation that existed with Israel. Knowing that an acceptable and sustainable peace settlement with Israel required Tel Aviv to be equally convinced of its benefits, Sadat ordered his military to prepare for a war with clear strategic aims.

10. According to Ajai Shukla, India must do what is necessary – including the use of military power – to enforce a PLA withdrawal to its side of the LAC. If China insists in the negotiations upon retaining its territorial gains, it must also feel the pain. This is feasible, now that India’s military has built up its numbers and neutralised the PLA’s head start.

11. The Indian Army has moved over a division worth of Special Forces to Ladakh, which can operate between Chinese positions and occupy tactically important heights to isolate them. The air force, despite its shortfalls in fighter aircraft and force multipliers such as airborne warning and control aircraft and mid-air refuellers, enjoys significant advantages over the PLA Air Force, whose aircraft would suffer major performance degradation from operating from the oxygen-starved, high-altitude airbases in Tibet. Unlike in 1962, Indian ground troops would benefit from close air support.

12. If the reports are correct, given the casualties on both the Indian Army and the PLA — they are at war, even if it is a limited war — both sides are hiding the scale of operations to reduce domestic alarm but make no mistake — no matter how misleading the Indian or Chinese politicians are, both armies have moved beyond Phase Zero planning into Phase 1 operations.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Modus operandi of a Indian oxygen thief or two

1. Beware of fake news from Indian Twitter and sources during this period, just like past Indian claims of a Pakistani F-16 shootdown when it was an Indian MiG-21 Bison that was lost in an air-to-air encounter between the two rival air forces on 27 February 2019 during Operation Swift Retort.

2. It is also not uncommon for some Indian social media who support the BJP to attack the bearer of bad news or people who dare to point out the fake news from Indian social media.

3. I normally do not share Twitter Links from Indo Pacific News, as they seem to disproportionately share news that is unfavourable to China; but they are useful in providing background information and for updates on news related to the South China Sea. I think it is quite novel for certain Indian Twitter accounts to accuse the Indo Pacific News Twitter account of being pro-China, when it is anything but.

4. As I mentioned in another thread, in Asia, trade is strategy. Nothing unites North East Asian (NE Asian) interests like a threat to their shipping — which is why, both Korea and Japan have deployed naval ships to the Gulf of Aden.

5. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; and in a capitalistic society, businesses will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving China’s cargo in the Indian Ocean to get round an Indian blockade. Just as the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake, the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake.

8. Three points to note: One, attempts by Indian strategists to talk about disrupting Chinese (aka NE Asian) trade routes in the Indian Ocean is not credible. Two, as a non-aligned state (free of alliance responsibilities), Indian attempts to get more than lip service sympathy from ASEAN members with regards to its border issues, with China or Pakistan, is doomed to failure. Three, China’s 3,700 plus merchant ships carry cargo from not just China but for NE Asia, and vice versa for the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese merchant ships in these interlinked economies. Any Indian Navy attempt to disrupt commercial shipping will make it a pariah state.

(a) A simple way for China to avoid Indian Navy attempts to do so, would be to reflag 15% to 30% of Chinese flagged merchant ships to another flag (eg. Singapore, Panama, Marshall Islands, and Hong Kong to name 4 of the top 5 flag states). About 8,600 ships fly the Panamanian flag. By comparison China has just over 3,700 registered vessels. From decision to the massive reflagging (for 550 to 1,100 ships), this administrative task can be done in about 3 to 4 weeks. In the event of an Indian blockade, the PLA(N), wil just escort some of their own remaining merchant ships, with higher value cargos in convoys — in 2019, China had a 335-ship naval fleet, according to a US Congressional Research Service report — the PLA(N) is also well rehearsed in forming counter piracy escort groups for the last 12 years. The PLA(N) has the capability to conduct convoy escorts for its own merchant ships on the scale of Operation Earnest Will, conducted by the Americans, in 1987.​

(b) If the Indian Navy plays its cards wrongly, and their dispute with the PLA(N) affects innocent merchant traffic, the RAN, JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN and RSN could end up running escorts to convoy NE Asian and Oceania cargo routes transiting through the Indian Ocean — esp container liner trade that is currently controlled by:​

(i) Mitsui OSK Lines, NYK and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha;​
(ii) Hyundai Merchant Marine, CK Line, Dongjin Shipping, Don Woo Shipping, Dong Young Shipping, Hansung Line, Heueng-A Shipping, KMTC, Namsung Shipping, Pan Continental Shipping, Pan Ocean, Sinokor Shipping, SM Line and Tai Young Shipping;​
(iii) Evergreen Line and Yang Ming Marine Transport; or​
(iv) Pacific International Line.​

(c) Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Singaporean owned or flagged cargo ships would just enjoy high cargo usage — from a multi-modal transport cost point of view, cargo moved by sea is much cheaper than rail.​

(d) For the energy trade, to evade an Indian Navy blockage, Chinese SOEs could also buy a portion of its supply from other trading hubs (eg. Singapore) or from sources that do not need to sail through the Indian Ocean. The LNG and oil will be owned by MNCs importing it into a port outside the reach of the Indian Navy — the Chinese would buy it there — thereafter, their merchant ships pick it up from the trading hub — by-passing an useless Indian Ocean blockage.​

7. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or ASEAN members (like Indonesia and Singapore) and the businesses of these countries will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving container cargoes, bulk cargoes, oil and LNG cargoes that are ultimately destined for China, at a later stage, and transiting through the Indian Ocean.

8. The reverse is also true, just because China has a border dispute with India, it does not mean that the PLA(N) is free to escalate in any manner it likes.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
If India blockade Chinese trade routes in Indies, it will only benefit China as so far China doesn't do any trade disruption in SCS.
Both Chinese and Indian forums, blogspot, media are full of Ten Cents and Fifty Rupees that their sole purpose to provide miss directions and Nationalistics Bravado to raised up tensions.

I put on other thread on how Indonesia, Australia and India talking toward building 'understanding' toward response on PRC development in SCS. However in same time (at least from Indonesia side), there's still unease with India especially under current BJP's administration. Both Xi Jinping and Modi are frequently drum up Nationalistics mood especially if facing internal problems.

If India unilaterally put disruption toward Chinese shipping in Indies International waters, then they will isolated them selves. There's no ground for Asean for instance to hindered PLAN movement to Indies Ocean from their water, as India open the front first.
Pakistan for sure will give access to PLAN on their ports and perhaps joining them to counter Indian Navy. What can also happen is for Both Srilanka and Bangladesh to take sides with China. Thus if Indian Navy doing unprovoked actions toward Chinese trade in Indies, they are just isolating it self, and only drove their other South Asian neighbors toward China.

That will be extremely unproductive for India, as standing now only Pakistan that openly gang up against India with China.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Modus operandi of a Indian oxygen thief or two - Segment 2
if Indian Navy doing unprovoked actions toward Chinese trade in Indies, they are just isolating it self, and only drove their other South Asian neighbors toward China.

That will be extremely unproductive for India, as standing now only Pakistan that openly gang up against India with China.
9. Agreed.

10. Recently Indian nationalists had encouraged a boycott of Malaysian palm oil due to comments by Dr M, when he was PM. It would be accurate to say that some citizens in Malaysia are hostile to the BJP government — it is just that the Malaysian government cannot at this time afford to be openly hostile.
If India blockade Chinese trade routes in Indies, it will only benefit China as so far China doesn't do any trade disruption in SCS.
11. A blockade is a declaration of war — no responsible Indian politician who understand its grave implications for India would dare to do it. The Soviets and Cubans were actively shooting at the USAF, as they conducted over flights on Cuba in 1962 and no one in the Kennedy administration was willing to declare war, officially.

12. The Indian Navy can posture differently and force the PLA(N), to increase its deployments to the IOR and there is no need to push neutrals with capable navies, like Australia, Korea, Japan or Singapore, to be hostile to India by enacting an Indian Ocean blockade on Chinese shipping. I am certain Modi does not dare to announce a blockade against Chinese shipping; and the Indian Navy will advice against it. For an objective analysis, there is an excellent US-China ESRC report to provide background. The PLA Navy has extended combat reach to Indian Ocean (with useful reference to IISS Military Balance to get a sense of perspective).

13. Even President Kennedy did not dare utter that phrase in 1962 and called it a naval quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We should also remember that:
(a) India got its ass kicked during 1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war was inevitable due to diplomatic meltdown and the ‘denied negotiation’ with each side being stuck at its ideological calling. By 1962 both India and China had developed two different notions of negotiations, with each misunderstanding the other. Such erroneous conclusions and recommendations gave further weight to the stringent diplomatic stance.​
(b) If war occurred in 2020, the PLA is expected to kick the Indian Army on its ass. The Indian Army is brave (but being brave is not the issue) and the country has many options that would make the PLA regret any prior bravado — but then Indian Army is not expected to win against a determined PLA on a land battle — as a retired Indian Army Col has suggested, New Delhi would remember how Egypt imposed upon a far more powerful Israel a cost for its enmity, even fighting a limited war to bring Tel Aviv to the table.​
(c) The Indian Army has 7 battalions of SFF paratroopers recruited from the Tibetan refugee community in India. Trained and equipped for operations behind Chinese lines, these troops, once inside Tibet, would live off the land, dependent for food and shelter on a restive Tibetan populace that is intensely hostile to the Chinese. Any stirring up of the Kashmir insurgency by China, or by Pakistan at its behest, would see the SFF being launched into action immediately.​

14. As I mentioned, both India and China have moved into Phase One (beyond Phase Zero planning). No one wants to declare war but this tense situation at the Sino-Indian border, if not well managed, will result in more deaths in the days ahead, even if war is not declared.
Both Chinese and Indian forums, blogspot, media are full of Ten Cents and Fifty Rupees that their sole purpose to provide mis-direction and Nationalistics Bravado to raised up tensions.
15. Agreed.
Both Xi Jinping and Modi are frequently drum up Nationalistics mood especially if facing internal problems.
16. From an ASEAN perspective, India is also a threat to our economic growth if they are silly enough to impose a blockade on Chinese shipping.

17. As the Americans have noted, Singapore has pursued close relationships with India, the United States and China while attempting to protect its autonomy in foreign affairs; and remains dedicated to its relationship with the United States, as exemplified by its robust economic and security ties — including a fighter fleet (F-16V, F-15SG & F-35B) that is all made in America. The United States and Singapore hold an annual Strategic Partnership Dialogue to strengthen bilateral cooperation and to discuss ways to expand collaboration in new areas. One mechanism that further strengthens mutual cooperation for the benefit of the Asia-Pacific region is the Third Country Training Program (TCTP). Aimed at providing technical assistance and training to ASEAN member states.

18. At the same time, Beijing seeks a closer economic and military relationship with Singapore. Rhetorical commitment to greater security ties with China, as well as our role as a financial hub for China’s BRI, demonstrates the challenges Singapore faces in hedging between India, the United States and China. Likewise, in Jul 2018, India and Singapore have elevated their ties to the ‘strategic partnership’ level and signed bilateral agreements to upgrade defence cooperation, including ministerial-level dialogue and in areas like cyber security, shipping and civil aviation, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Modus operandi of a Indian oxygen thief or two - Segment 3
@OPSSG an ANI article that supports you argument about the futility of the Indian Navy of attempting to block PRC trade in the Indian Ocean. It suggests different reasons, but has the same end result.

19. Thanks for that link — a naval blockade against Chinese shipping is not an option on the table for the Indian Navy. Those who suggest it are idiots.

20. Beijing's disdain for New Delhi is clear. The PLA flatly refuses to return to its side of the border, or to define the LAC — going so far as to tell Indian ministers that Indian troops need to behave. Sources on the ground say the PLA brought along enough building materials to Helmet Top to construct fortifications for 300 to 400 soldiers.
21. Patience is running out on the Indian Army which believes China is tying it down in fruitless dialogue, while continuing its aggression on the ground. Also, Indian Army has concerns that PLA is really focused on changing LAC in Depsang, while diverting Indian attention towards Pangong. But the Indian Army is not without options for escalation at the Sino-Indian border — but these are hard choices to make for the political class. The best option is to occupy unheld territory with SSF and Scouts and then trade.

22. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat has stated that, if dialogue does not persuade Beijing to withdraw its troops from Indian territory in Ladakh, a military option remained on the table.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership —Part 1

1. A sweeping 2017 Congressional sanctions bill, CAATSA and Executive Order 13849 [380 KB] “Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” opens up India to sanctions for procuring Russian-made S-400 missile systems.

2. While Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper said: “The CAATSA sanctions are not designed to be punitive to a partner and ally that has got a sustainment issue or an operation or maintenance issue. We’re certainly not looking to disrupt that…”, its existence means no Indian bank is willing to provide a letter of credit to facilitate a Russian cross border significant transaction that involves missiles.

3. India had emerged as one of the principal markets for US defence equipment that includes P-8Is, AH-64Es and CH-47Fs, C-17s and C -130J-30 aircraft. Concurrently, India had also acquired M777 155mm/39 calibre lightweight howitzers and assault rifles and has additional Apache’s, 127mm Mk 45 naval gun systems and armed and unarmed unmanned UAVs, two Raytheon ISTAR business jets, amongst sundry other equipment, currently under purchase from the US. Raytheon is partnering with aircraft maker Bombardier to modify its Global 6500 business jet. The airframe would be outfitted with multiple capabilities, including an advanced active electronically scanned array RF system, which combines ground moving target indicator capabilities with synthetic aperture modes; multi-spectral long range imagery, which provides visible and infrared intelligence and targeting information; and signals intelligence – an entire suite to deliver the precision and intelligence for making decisions and maintain the advantage of strategic surprise to spot and combat threats first.

4. Given the benefits of India-US cooperation, some US officials and experts on defence matters are trying to find ways to avoid sanctioning India, lest one arms deal poison the well. Looks like this point of potential S400 sanctions is unresolved. Below is a transcript of the interview with Austin on the point of sanctions:

Q: I just wondered if during your discussions with Prime Minister Modi or Minister Singh, during those meetings did you press them not to buy the S-400? And what problems would that propose for the U.S./India relationship?​
SEC. AUSTIN: Lara we -- we have countries that we work with from time to time that have Soviet or excuse me Russian equipment that they acquired over the years are we certainly urge all our allies and partners to move away from... Russian equipment. In some cases it was Soviet equipment because they bought it so long ago.​
But to move away from that and really avoid any kind of acquisitions that would trigger sanctions on our behalf. There has -- there has been no delivery of an S-400 system. And so that conversation -- the issues of sanctions is not one that's been discussed. But we did address with the Minister of Defense the issue of the S-400.​
Q: So, if I can just follow-up. You (inaudible) sanctioned Turkey over the purchase of the S-400. So this must be something that is on your mind and their mind. So, is that -- is sanctions on the table?​
SEC. AUSTIN: Again they have not -- have not acquired an S-400 system yet. So, there would be no reason for sanctions (inaudible).​
Q: So that's the agreement that they have? They (inaudible) delivery but they have an agreement to purchase that system?​
SEC. AUSTIN: Yes, we're aware of the fact that they have expressed an interest in acquiring a system. But again that system has not been delivered.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership —Part 2

5. I am not a fan of CAATSA sanctions and I think an American over use of these tools provided by the US Congress will in the long-run diminish American standing and bring back for bad Indian memories of sanctions following from Pokhran-II.

(a) Keeping in compliance with the 1994 anti-proliferation law, the US State Department imposed economic sanctions on India. The 1998 sanctions on India consisted of cutting off all assistance to India except humanitarian aid, banning the export of certain defence material and technologies, ending American credit and credit guarantees to India, and requiring the US to oppose lending by international financial institutions to India.​
(b) Are the Indian press (or fanboys) so silly as not realise that Biden’s team cannot just ignore CAATSA? This is an American law that is binding on the current administration and the staff in the US DoD and the US State Department.​

6. When I see news reports like this, the Indian defence focused press in their discussions of options do not understand the degree to which India needs American ISR and fighter engine technology, if they are serious about the use of air power at its border with China.

7. These Indian fanboys will point to a parallel effort in India by ignore DRDO-Indian Air Force turf war over testing of an indigenous ISTAR platform — while forgetting that Indian defence science has a terrible track record of on time, on spec delivery. If the Americans really want to enact serious sanctions to cripple Indian developmental efforts in ISR and engines, do the Indian fanboys really believe that Israel can continue to be a preferred alternate technology supplier for ISR? If the US wants to block the transfer of dual use chipsets, mil-spec IC cards and aircraft engines, does the Indian defence establishment manufacture its own chips/engines or sources for these chipsets/engines?

8. The Indian establishment seems to over value S400 capability, when it is certain that this air defence system layer has some teething problems against VLO aircraft. In late 2020 and early 2021, the Israeli air force hit more than 200 targets in Syria connected to the Iranian effort to upgrade Hezbollah’s rockets. Some of those attacks have been reported to involve Israeli F-35As. The attacks continue apace this year with Syrian air defense forces having launched more than 1,000 surface-air missiles to try and foil the repeated Israeli attacks. They’ve had little effect so far. Tal Inbar, an Israeli defense analyst, told Breaking Defense that the S-300 and S-400 have never been proved in action against advanced fighters. “In addition the S-400s in Turkey are not operational,” he noted.

9. If I were an Indian defence analyst:
(a) I wouldn’t bet on the S400 as a successful counter to the Chengdu J-20, given China’s mastery over this technology. IMO, the Indian Air Force needs to take a systems of systems approach to layer their IADS. There are far better products in the international arms market that the Indians can buy if they are serious about adding more capable layers to their IADS; and​
(b) I would value American ability to transfer ammo, smart bombs, radars, artillery, Apaches, Chinooks, ISR and comms nodes and/or Reaper UAVs to India (see: Operation Nickel Grass, where Kissinger notified the Israelis on 9 Oct 1973 that Nixon had agreed to replace all of Israel’s losses, including aircraft and tanks and to fully resupply all of the expended ammunition, equipment, and consumables), should the PLA decide to have another go at border dispute 3.0.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership —Part 3

10. No matter what we read in print about progress under Biden (on improved American—Indian bilateral relations), the fact is that American and Indian strategic interests often do not converge. America does not want to join India in a border war against China; nor does India as a non-aligned nation want to confront Iran or North Korea on behalf of or in partnership with the Americans. The fact that the Indian Navy is providing reasurance to Indian merchant shipping proves that point that there is no alignment of American and Indian strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. It is accurate to assume that India has absolutely zero interest in confronting Iran on behalf of American or British merchant ships.

11. Up until the 1989, the Chinese were considered by NATO and the Americans as partners in containing Soviet aggression. Even today, the Chinese are business partners of western MNCs. India was NATO and America’s enemy during the Cold War. Many current American and Indian pundits simply ignore Cold War history, when it suits them. NATO and the Americans won the Cold War without India. And truth be told, China was a better partner for the Americans after Nixon went to China, for the duration of the Cold War, than India is today. There was zero doubt that China would have marched north had the Soviets marched West — as part of their understanding.

12. After 9 months of tense military confrontation, which included the first deadly clash in decades between Indian and Chinese troops along their disputed border, on 11 Feb 2021 the two sides began withdrawing from their positions on the southern and northern banks of the lake. By publicly confirming that 4 PLA soldiers had lost their lives in the clash—as opposed to India’s 20—Beijing was declaring a sort of political victory over India.
  • This public relations blitz, just as the two militaries were finishing their joint withdrawal, made Beijing’s talk of reconciliation ring hollow. While de-escalatory steps are a positive move, they do not by themselves guarantee peace.
  • I see this as a tactical PLA withdrawal, and it is temporary on both sides. The Indians need to keep in mind that if they screw-up relations with the Biden administration over a S400 purchase, what message does this send to Xi?
13. American allies in the Quad, namely, Japan and Australia have zero assurances that India will do anything if a Chinese fleet sails to invade Taiwan or starts shooting at American allies in the South China Sea. So until India and the US have signed a binding treaty, the latest Quad naval exercise is really just a dog and pony show. Nice to look at but the collaborative war fighting details are lacking — unlike how closely coupled American forces are with the Australians or the Japanese.

14. In recent updates, India's COVID-19 death toll jumped by a record 3,689 deaths on 2 May 2021, the highest single-day rise since the start of the pandemic, taking the country's death toll to more than 215,000. Both the Western countries and the Russians are sending aid; but we have to look at the positive press by the Russian lobby in India. This means that Indian strategic community are still captured in their minds over Russian importance (over the S400 system), when the Americans have just sold to Indian Navy 24 MH-60 Romeo naval helicopters (crucial for ASW) and the ability to fulfil the order of 83 HAL Tejas for the Indian Air Force, depends on the sale of American GE F404 engines (badly needed for air parity).

15. Indians seem to believe that Western democracies will take a credibility hit if China wins over India but how important is the disputed and desolate Indian border area to the rest of the world? China’s 20 Oct to 21 Nov 1962 lesson for India should be kept in mind. I am pretty sure the Indian public will vote out an incompetent Prime Minister and his BJP majority in parliament — if the Indian Army starts a war against the PLA it can't win — or if the CORVID-19 crisis continues on its present path in India. That is democracy in its purest form; that is also the reason why I do not pay much attention to or hope in the Quad, as the Quad lacks relevance to a person living within ASEAN.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
LAC Fiasco — continued segment 3 of 4

13. According to some Indian press sources, behind the Modi Government's doublespeak on Eastern Ladakh, there is a refusal to acknowledge reality. As part of this doublespeak, the Indian Prime Minister Modi declared on June 19, 2020 – 4 days after 20 Indian troops were killed in the Galwan Valley and Indian prisoners being held by the Chinese – that “neither is anyone inside our territory nor is any of our post captured.” By prioritising spin over the truth, India is in the danger of closing the feedback loop, as their decision-makers start drinking their own Kool-aid. A system without honest feedback always collapses.
(a) Thankfully the double speak is being challenged by some in the Indian press. In 13th round of talks held on 10th Oct between Sino-Indian military commanders, but PLA continues to block a return to April 2020 positions. But that’s not all. According to less reliable sources, the PLA have built up 6 brigades with tanks and artillery close to LAC in Ladakh. The build-up of Chinese tanks and artillery has been matched by India.​
(b) As the Indian Armed Forces began their second modernisation in the mid-1980s, it became clear that their defence production base, particularly the OFB, lacked the infrastructure, technology, and work culture to meet India’s requirements. The bane of the OFB was poor management and a large inefficient workforce of 80,000 employees whose wage bill was Rs 7,000 crore. The new DPSUs will continue to carry this burden. A government department can sustain this burden, but a corporate entity cannot. The ever-increasing defence imports rang alarm bells for the government. Since 2014, 27 soldiers were killed in 403 accidents due to faulty ammunition and 159 wounded apart from the cumulative losses of Rs 960 crore.​
(c) The four-decade saga of the development of the Arjun tank to acceptable standards only proves the point. The Dhanush artillery gun was developed in-house by the OFB in 2010 based on transfer of technology that came with the Bofors gun in 1987. After prolonged trials, it was approved for series production in February 2019. An order was placed for 114 guns. Two and half years later, not even the requirement of 18 guns for one regiment has been met.​
(d) According to Lt. Gen. (retired) H.S. Pangag, when India was on the brink of war in Eastern Ladakh, the huge differential in technological military capability vis-a-vis China limited Indian Army options to merely rushing to the front with large number of troops. While the Indian government, after these military setbacks, carried the day with the public relying upon rhetoric and nationalistic/patriotic emotions, the lesson was very clear – reform or perish.​

14. After encroaching 15 km into the Indian side of the LAC in 2020, the PLA had blocked Indian Army patrols from going up to their traditional patrolling points (PPs), which were PP-10 to PP-13. In Oct 2021, it is learnt that Indian patrols are effectively being denied access to PP-4, PP-5, PP-6, PP-7, PP-8 and PP-9 as well; and five new LAC flash points are identified.

15. The humiliation for the hawkish but impotent Indian Government never ends, as the PLA drip feeds propaganda of their 2020 victory at the LAC. The release of the above pics is a response to the latest clash on China-India border on 28 Sep 2021; and given that Indian media claimed that Indian forces have detained PLA soldiers, the Chinese are showing detained Indian Army soldiers being released. The release of the above pics is a response to the latest clash on China-India border on 28 Sep 2021; and given that Indian media claimed that Indian forces have detained PLA soldiers, the Chinese are showing detained Indian Army soldiers being released.
 
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Redlands18

Well-Known Member
An Indian Military Mi-17V5 Helicopter has crashed in Tamil Nadu State killing Indian Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, his wife and 11 others in what has been called a tragic accident. No reason for the cause of the accident has been announced at this stage.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
CAATSA an American law that diminishes American Influence

1. India's Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla said India and Russia had signed 28 investment pacts, including deals on steel, shipbuilding, coal and energy. He added that a 2018 contract for the S-400 missile systems was currently being implemented. "Supplies have begun this month, and will continue to happen," he said, referring to the S-400.

2. Looks like India is determined to put India at risk of sanctions from the US under Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a 2017 U.S. law, aimed at deterring countries from buying Russian military hardware. Team Biden is now trapped by a Trump era law.

3. Russian oil company Rosneft said it signed a contract with Indian Oil to supply up to 2 million tonnes of oil to India by the end of 2022. The countries also signed a MOU for Russia to send an uninterrupted supply of coal to India to support its steel production, among other deals.

4. Sanctions against India by the US can push the former more toward Russian defence acquisitions, which can hamper the US defence sales in India. This is a delicate bridge that the US has to cross – it is trying to moderate its reactions to not sway the bilateral relations to the other side. Currently, the US views India as a strong defence partner – while the defence sales of the US to India were insignificant earlier, it has reached about US$20 billion, in the last 20 years. In 2016, the US even designated India as a strategic defence partner.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
Sanctions against India by the US can push the former more toward Russian defence acquisitions, which can hamper the US defence sales in India.
This's going to be interesting by some countries to watch how US going to react with India S400 and other defense items procurement with Russia. I know at least Turkey and Indonesia watch it intensely on US CAATSA reaction to India after this.

Base on looking to Turkish defense forums and on-line media, there're significant public support that very adamant to cut defense co-op with US, if US did not out CAATSA with India. After all they fell CAATSA is the reason why US kick Turkey from F-35 program after S400 deals.

They're also interest in Indonesia on at least continuation on Marines amphibious armoured vehicles (more BMP-3F), and they'll see how this going to effect on US defense co-op. Thus how US will react with India, also make interest from Indonesian side.
 
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