Australian Maritime Doctrine

[aussienscale]

The Bare bases wouldn't come anywhere near the cost of operating an aircraft carrier. Their construction would have been a fairly straightforward engineering project, and their maintenence would probably require a couple of dozen men and women assigned to each base on a full time basis at most.

Compare that to an aircraft carrier that requires fuel, and including flight wing, a crew of 1,000-1,500 and its a bargain.

True enough, but what does concern me about Bare Bases is activation and sustainment ?

Also the sunk cost in the construction and maint of such a capability, after all have we not all argued the point that what direct threat does the Australian mainland have ? So why Bare Bases on the very same area we all agree that are not in any danger of invasion or on the opposite, too distant for us to make any effective mission improbable ?

So what it the purpose of the Bare Bases ? What is the tactical, strategic and doctrinal reason for these bases ?

Cheers

 

[t68]

True enough, but what does concern me about Bare Bases is activation and sustainment ?

Also the sunk cost in the construction and maint of such a capability, after all have we not all argued the point that what direct threat does the Australian mainland have ? So why Bare Bases on the very same area we all agree that are not in any danger of invasion or on the opposite, too distant for us to make any effective mission improbable ?

So what it the purpose of the Bare Bases ? What is the tactical, strategic and doctrinal reason for these bases ?

Cheers

For the same reason the Yanks built a few isolated airstrips in the north during WWII, dispersal of aircraft over a wide area and closer to the AO or in a modern version to cover the air sea gap or Indonesian archipelago.

I have been lead to believe that during Interfet that RAAF Scherger was brought up to operational use, how true it is I don't know

 

[gf0012-aust]

I have been lead to believe that during Interfet that RAAF Scherger was brought up to operational use, how true it is I don't know

its true

 

[Todjaeger]

True enough, but what does concern me about Bare Bases is activation and sustainment ?

Also the sunk cost in the construction and maint of such a capability, after all have we not all argued the point that what direct threat does the Australian mainland have ? So why Bare Bases on the very same area we all agree that are not in any danger of invasion or on the opposite, too distant for us to make any effective mission improbable ?

So what it the purpose of the Bare Bases ? What is the tactical, strategic and doctrinal reason for these bases ?

Cheers

Something worth keeping in mind with respect to the bare bases in the North. If those airfields were not there and maintained to one degree or another, then any time a military aircraft had to fly through the North could have a very long way to go should something happen.

While they might not be used as fully functional airfields all the time, and there might be little threat of invasion from the Indonesians, there are some awfully long distances to be flown. Having the bare bases available to be reinforced for a forward operating airbase gives the ADF much greater flexibility.

-Cheers

 

[aussienscale]

Something worth keeping in mind with respect to the bare bases in the North. If those airfields were not there and maintained to one degree or another, then any time a military aircraft had to fly through the North could have a very long way to go should something happen.

While they might not be used as fully functional airfields all the time, and there might be little threat of invasion from the Indonesians, there are some awfully long distances to be flown. Having the bare bases available to be reinforced for a forward operating airbase gives the ADF much greater flexibility.

-Cheers

Good points, but still concerns me about our ability to activate but more importantly, do we have to ability to sustain and supply for an extended period ? Those same long distances (And I have driven them by 4wd) impose some rather big logistical issues

Cheers

 

[Todjaeger]

Good points, but still concerns me about our ability to activate but more importantly, do we have to ability to sustain and supply for an extended period ? Those same long distances (And I have driven them by 4wd) impose some rather big logistical issues

Cheers

It is my understanding that the bare bases are stocked with some basic fuel and consumables supplies, and have facilities to house personnel and hold/store aircraft, parts and munitions. If one of the bare bases needed to be activated, then personnel and initial stocks of kit would get flown in to bring the base(s) fully up. Once that is done, I suspect long-term sustainment of fuel, parts, etc. would get brought in via ship to whatever local ports were closest. This is of course assuming that the SLOC had not been cut.

At one point previously I had inquired about the extent of same gauge rail lines crossing parts of Australia and whether any of those could be used for land transport. The impression that I came away with is that troops and kit could be moved via rail between the major population centres, but much of the North is away from available rail connections. It might be possible to make use of a rail line put in for rawmats transport to a port, but that would not necessarily have a connection to other rail links.

-Cheers

 

[t68]

It is my understanding that the bare bases are stocked with some basic fuel and consumables supplies, and have facilities to house personnel and hold/store aircraft, parts and munitions. If one of the bare bases needed to be activated, then personnel and initial stocks of kit would get flown in to bring the base(s) fully up. Once that is done, I suspect long-term sustainment of fuel, parts, etc. would get brought in via ship to whatever local ports were closest. This is of course assuming that the SLOC had not been cut.

At one point previously I had inquired about the extent of same gauge rail lines crossing parts of Australia and whether any of those could be used for land transport. The impression that I came away with is that troops and kit could be moved via rail between the major population centres, but much of the North is away from available rail connections. It might be possible to make use of a rail line put in for rawmats transport to a port, but that would not necessarily have a connection to other rail links.

-Cheers

For what ever reason why the bare base's where to become an operational base and with the remoteness of these bases, once any initial material that need to be onsite in a timely manner will most likley be airlifted in. But once the initial advance material are in place even with the vast distance from distribution points in the south using 3rd and 4th line transport to move bulk commodities such as XO and POL with be more efficient than taking up ship from trade. Using staging points thru out the route bulk commodities from the south can be brought forward to a replenishment park in the north in 36/48 hours pending on how far south the matrial has to picked up from.

 

[Todjaeger]

For what ever reason why the bare base's where to become an operational base and with the remoteness of these bases, once any initial material that need to be onsite in a timely manner will most likley be airlifted in. But once the initial advance material are in place even with the vast distance from distribution points in the south using 3rd and 4th line transport to move bulk commodities such as XO and POL with be more efficient than taking up ship from trade. Using staging points thru out the route bulk commodities from the south can be brought forward to a replenishment park in the north in 36/48 hours pending on how far south the matrial has to picked up from.

How many of the bare bases are in areas that road trains can reach? Also how many of the roads leading to bare bases can/do get cut during the wet?

IIRC the roads leading to Cairns QLD were cut by flooding during one particularly rainy season and access to and from the city was by aircraft or ship for several weeks. Given the even more remote location of the bare bases, IMO it would be imprudent to plan on being able to resupply active bases by road alone.

Take RAAF Base Curtin near Derby WA. There appear to be two paved roads connecting the bare base to the Derby Highway, a dirt track which connects to the Great Northern Highway, and another dirt track which connects to other dirt tracks which offer connections to the Derby Highway. Not exactly a plethora of routes available to supply the base. Apart from shipping supplies into Derby the trucking them to the base, the other route is to truck supplies in via the Great Northern Highway from either elsewhere in Oz, or shipping into a different nearby port. In this case, Broome to the west is ~200 km away via the Great Northern Highway. In terms of major population centres, Darwin is ~1,700 km to the east, while Perth and Alice Springs are both ~2,500 - 2,600 km away.

These are not insurmountable distances, but they would certainly add to logistical challenge of keeping some of these bare bases supplied during prolonged high tempo active operations.

-Cheers

 

[t68]

How many of the bare bases are in areas that road trains can reach? Also how many of the roads leading to bare bases can/do get cut during the wet?

IIRC the roads leading to Cairns QLD were cut by flooding during one particularly rainy season and access to and from the city was by aircraft or ship for several weeks. Given the even more remote location of the bare bases, IMO it would be imprudent to plan on being able to resupply active bases by road alone.

Take RAAF Base Curtin near Derby WA. There appear to be two paved roads connecting the bare base to the Derby Highway, a dirt track which connects to the Great Northern Highway, and another dirt track which connects to other dirt tracks which offer connections to the Derby Highway. Not exactly a plethora of routes available to supply the base. Apart from shipping supplies into Derby the trucking them to the base, the other route is to truck supplies in via the Great Northern Highway from either elsewhere in Oz, or shipping into a different nearby port. In this case, Broome to the west is ~200 km away via the Great Northern Highway. In terms of major population centres, Darwin is ~1,700 km to the east, while Perth and Alice Springs are both ~2,500 - 2,600 km away.

These are not insurmountable distances, but they would certainly add to logistical challenge of keeping some of these bare bases supplied during prolonged high tempo active operations.

-Cheers

Don't get me wrong i'm not suggesting that road transport is the holy savour of these logistical problems of the bare base's and know first hand what it's like to sit on the side of the highway while the water subsides, did that only a couple of weeks ago.

Having been involved in road transport for over 20 years in both military and civil aspects I'm more Than aware of what human,mechanical and mother nature can do to the best of well laid plans.

In my time with the RACT I had the pleasure of seeing first hand how a mass coordinated logistical triumph road transport can run in a couple of Kangaroo ex and in saying that how it all turns to mud literally when your TTF is stuck in the mud up to its chassis rails for 3 days and the only way to get it out was by a cat D911.

The greater ADF have been doing these sort of logistical road moves for quite some time and have a lot of experience in moving large amount of commodities over large distance, if and when these bare bases become operation road transport is but one available means of moving large quantity of store and if as suggested by GF that RAAF Scherger did Infact become a operation base for Interfet they had do it over the wet season.

 

[John Newman]

How many of the bare bases are in areas that road trains can reach? Also how many of the roads leading to bare bases can/do get cut during the wet?

IIRC the roads leading to Cairns QLD were cut by flooding during one particularly rainy season and access to and from the city was by aircraft or ship for several weeks. Given the even more remote location of the bare bases, IMO it would be imprudent to plan on being able to resupply active bases by road alone.

Take RAAF Base Curtin near Derby WA. There appear to be two paved roads connecting the bare base to the Derby Highway, a dirt track which connects to the Great Northern Highway, and another dirt track which connects to other dirt tracks which offer connections to the Derby Highway. Not exactly a plethora of routes available to supply the base. Apart from shipping supplies into Derby the trucking them to the base, the other route is to truck supplies in via the Great Northern Highway from either elsewhere in Oz, or shipping into a different nearby port. In this case, Broome to the west is ~200 km away via the Great Northern Highway. In terms of major population centres, Darwin is ~1,700 km to the east, while Perth and Alice Springs are both ~2,500 - 2,600 km away.

These are not insurmountable distances, but they would certainly add to logistical challenge of keeping some of these bare bases supplied during prolonged high tempo active operations.

-Cheers

The one capability that has come into service since the bare bases were built, is of course the fleet of C17A's.

Maybe they couldn't move everything that was possibly needed, but surely they could bring in most of what was needed to sustain those bases?

I saw this article on Flight Global the other day regarding the airlift capability of the RAAF:

IN FOCUS: Australian airlift comes of age

The paragraph that stuck out to me (referring to a comment made by Airlift Group commander Air Cdre Gary Martin) was:

"Martin says the C-17 has revolutionised the RAAF's ability to travel rapidly between points with more than five times as much cargo per flight as the Lockheed Martin C-130. In one airlift operation between the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan in September 2012, a single C-17 moved cargo weighing one million pounds, much of it outsized, in only four days. He estimates it would have taken two C-130s two months to transport the same payload."

So if there was a situation where the bare bases needed to be activated, and if the majority of the C17 fleet was available, I'd assume the amount of cargo moved by those aircraft would be quiet significant and in a short period of time too.

And in the next few years the 2 new LHD's will come into service, assuming that road and rail access was available, they should be able to move a significant amount of supplies to the nearest port or rail head too.

 

[aussienscale]

The one capability that has come into service since the bare bases were built, is of course the fleet of C17A's.

Maybe they couldn't move everything that was possibly needed, but surely they could bring in most of what was needed to sustain those bases?

I saw this article on Flight Global the other day regarding the airlift capability of the RAAF:

IN FOCUS: Australian airlift comes of age

The paragraph that stuck out to me (referring to a comment made by Airlift Group commander Air Cdre Gary Martin) was:

"Martin says the C-17 has revolutionised the RAAF's ability to travel rapidly between points with more than five times as much cargo per flight as the Lockheed Martin C-130. In one airlift operation between the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan in September 2012, a single C-17 moved cargo weighing one million pounds, much of it outsized, in only four days. He estimates it would have taken two C-130s two months to transport the same payload."

So if there was a situation where the bare bases needed to be activated, and if the majority of the C17 fleet was available, I'd assume the amount of cargo moved by those aircraft would be quiet significant and in a short period of time too.

And in the next few years the 2 new LHD's will come into service, assuming that road and rail access was available, they should be able to move a significant amount of supplies to the nearest port or rail head too.

Good points on the C-17 but numbers have an impact and depending on the situation at hand and the required/must have tasking of the C-17 will they be available to do the job ? if they are urgently needed for troop lift, M1's etc etc ?

I suppose Hurcs and C-27 could pick up some slack, depending on their tasking as well ? The LHD's depending on the maint cycle may or may not be able to help, but I would be guessing they would be in the task force for whatever was happening ?

Road transport will play a big part, but depending on the situation, remembering that we have activated the bare bases for an obvious reason, and depending on the foe, do we have the capacity and ability to protect the required logistical highway ?

Also as Todd mentioned, seasonal factors (depending on which base) can play a major factor on the west coast, unless the roads have improved considerably since I was last there 8 years ago was the last time I hit the area on a 4wd trip ?

Cheers

Edit: Are such (remote) scenario's a possible argument or indicator for a 3rd ? 4th AWD ? Etc

 

[John Newman]

Good points on the C-17 but numbers have an impact and depending on the situation at hand and the required/must have tasking of the C-17 will they be available to do the job ? if they are urgently needed for troop lift, M1's etc etc ?

I suppose Hurcs and C-27 could pick up some slack, depending on their tasking as well ? The LHD's depending on the maint cycle may or may not be able to help, but I would be guessing they would be in the task force for whatever was happening ?

Road transport will play a big part, but depending on the situation, remembering that we have activated the bare bases for an obvious reason, and depending on the foe, do we have the capacity and ability to protect the required logistical highway ?

Also as Todd mentioned, seasonal factors (depending on which base) can play a major factor on the west coast, unless the roads have improved considerably since I was last there 8 years ago was the last time I hit the area on a 4wd trip ?

Cheers

Edit: Are such (remote) scenario's a possible argument or indicator for a 3rd ? 4th AWD ? Etc

The whole question of having to activate the remote bare bases brings up a lot of "what if's", and the answers and/or solutions to those "what if's" will vary greatly depending on the reasons for the activation.

Is the reason for activation because:
* Is it a direct threat to the Australian mainland, or our offshore resources?
* Is it a direct threat to a "friendly" neighbour who is close by?
* Is it in the wet or dry season?
* And most importantly, how much warning time do we have?

In regard to warning time, I can't imagine that we will face a "Pearl Harbour" situation where we wake up one sunny Sunday morning and find a direct attack happening without knowing it might be coming.

With the way the world shrinking day by day, I would imagine that if something bad was brewing, that required activation of the bare bases, we would have reasonable warning time to be prepared.

If that was true and we had time to prepare, I'd assume the "activation" and supply could be done reasonably well with the assets at our disposal.

If on the other hand a situation arose where there was no or little warning, I'd assume we would be calling on our friend "Uncle Sam" rather quickly for some help.

I'd assume the ADF has plans based on a whole range of "what if's", maybe some of them along the lines of what I've mentioned above.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Is the reason for activation because:
* Is it a direct threat to the Australian mainland, or our offshore resources?
* Is it a direct threat to a "friendly" neighbour who is close by?
* Is it in the wet or dry season?
* And most importantly, how much warning time do we have?

In the prev q by T68 it was tactical - ie the bare bones base meant that the strike assets came within fighting and strike range of red team mainland targets if all went pair shaped in ET

 

[A.Mookerjee]

On another idea, there can be no doctrine for the Australian armed forces. Compared to the U. S. military, the mentioned armies must have a wide ranging capacity/capability, even if the numbers of Australian service personnel will be relatively limited. The Australian land is vast, more so than the U. S. mainland. The Japanese were a threat in WW2, because they could have made a landing anywhere, where there was no major Australian military presence in Australia.

 

[the road runner]

Mate seriously ,what are you going on about.? Australia has no Doctrine?

Edit. Just realised you are trolling

Cheers

 

[ASSAIL]

Just to bring the thread back to Doctrine I'll link the ADF's Future Maritime Operating Concept 2024 (FMOC 2025)
There has been much discussion on the RAN thread about what platforms should/could be in trhe orbat.
http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/FMOC_2025_Unclassified.pdf

If my interpretation of Part 3 is correct jt would be impossible to conduct those operational concepts with forces that will be available in 2025,
The concepts around; Maritime Manoeuvre,Assured Engagement, Sustained Presence and Enduring Protection to name a few would require at least one possibly two extra DDG's and some kind of improvement over Tiger CAS, whether that be from organic fixed wing or a much upgraded attack helo capability.

To quote on CAS; "Calls for fire support need to be exceptionally responsive and both tailored and precise"

Regarding naval capability (Australia's, without allies); "Preparing the battlespace, establishing local sea control, deploying joint assets ashore and extracting them when required requires at least two significant Task Forces. One Amphibious TF and one Strike TF."
The ref goes on to say that almost all the RAN's resources are needed for the Amphibious TF.

If this is the concept that the ADF leaders have published and I assume ratified by the govt, there must be a huge disconnect or purposeful ignorance from our political masters.

 

[Massive]

The ref goes on to say that almost all the RAN's resources are needed for the Amphibious TF.

If this is the concept that the ADF leaders have published and I assume ratified by the govt, there must be a huge disconnect or purposeful ignorance from our political masters.

Thanks for this ASSAIL.

Unfortunately this doesn't seem to be that uncommon in Defence publications like this. I think the same thing could be said about claimed the force generation capabilities of Beersheba.

To meet these capability ambitions properly would probably require something like 16 major surface combatants - possibly half of which would need to be AWDs, 2 light carriers, 3 LHD, as many as 5 support ships etc.

And it would still require the commitment of pretty much the entire RAN to do it.

This is well out of line with any proposed structure.

Ambitions clearly haven't been adjusted to meet willingness to spend!

Regards,

Massivei

 

[ADMk2]

Just to bring the thread back to Doctrine I'll link the ADF's Future Maritime Operating Concept 2024 (FMOC 2025)
There has been much discussion on the RAN thread about what platforms should/could be in trhe orbat.
http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/FMOC_2025_Unclassified.pdf

If my interpretation of Part 3 is correct jt would be impossible to conduct those operational concepts with forces that will be available in 2025,
The concepts around; Maritime Manoeuvre,Assured Engagement, Sustained Presence and Enduring Protection to name a few would require at least one possibly two extra DDG's and some kind of improvement over Tiger CAS, whether that be from organic fixed wing or a much upgraded attack helo capability.

To quote on CAS; "Calls for fire support need to be exceptionally responsive and both tailored and precise"

Regarding naval capability (Australia's, without allies); "Preparing the battlespace, establishing local sea control, deploying joint assets ashore and extracting them when required requires at least two significant Task Forces. One Amphibious TF and one Strike TF."
The ref goes on to say that almost all the RAN's resources are needed for the Amphibious TF.

If this is the concept that the ADF leaders have published and I assume ratified by the govt, there must be a huge disconnect or purposeful ignorance from our political masters.

I believe that desire is coined "aspirational..."

Because it's about as close to reality as Kim Jong Un...

 

[ASSAIL]

I believe that desire is coined "aspirational..."

Because it's about as close to reality as Kim Jong Un...

Excuse the one liner but it begs the question - Why bother?

Produce a Maritime Doctrine that equates with agreed resources so its not thrown on a shelf to rot but can be disseminated and taught to staff colleges/officer schools.

My real regret after 15 years with a commission in the RAN is that I had no idea how it was resourced, how it worked with govt or why decisions were made (What Maritime Doctrine?). Mind you I never served in Russell Offices.

Thanks to this forum I now know a little.

 

[t68]

Excuse the one liner but it begs the question - Why bother?

Produce a Maritime Doctrine that equates with agreed resources so its not thrown on a shelf to rot but can be disseminated and taught to staff colleges/officer schools.

My real regret after 15 years with a commission in the RAN is that I had no idea how it was resourced, how it worked with govt or why decisions were made (What Maritime Doctrine?). Mind you I never served in Russell Offices.

Thanks to this forum I now know a little.

I can see your point it’s the chicken and the egg syndrome, what comes first the doctrine or the capability?

Well in this case it’s the doctrine and you build you capability’s to suit your doctrine. But that’s happening to a degree but overall we are severely lacking compared years gone by. It seems we do thing backwards at one stage we had the means to protect a task group by self-escorting with HMAS Melbourne (R21) with her S2-Tracker/A4-Skyhawks and we also had the capability to transport them HMAS Sydney (R17) and if we needed could have acted as a helicopter/commando carrier (RAN did an assessment on this in the late 50’s would like to see the document but I can’t find one). We are by definition a green water navy, whilst we are taking great strides in bringing our amphibious task group together with the Canberra and Bay class and tackling our sustainment issues within Army under Plan Beersheba we still have a long way to go to what ADMK2 stated our aspirational goals.