Australian Maritime Doctrine

[the road runner]

I use to purchase Defence Today to ,stopped buying it when i joint this site.
You want to hear something really funny?

My First post here went along the lines of....."I cannot believe the Australian Government is not Upgrading the F-111 to The Kopp -111"

Lets just say i was shot down by a few of you guys and im glad i was.

I was living in sin. I don't buy Mag's now i just read the forums here.

Cheers.

 

[ADMk2]

Don't laugh, I actually remember reading somewhere that the Sea Harrier could / should be adapted for the ASW role using sonar buoys dropped from pods as well as air dropped torpedoes and depth charges. Can't remember where I read it but it was during the post Falklands, "the Harrier can do anything" hysteria. I wonder where they were going to do the signal processing to actually work out where the sub is.

Bugger the Harrier! I want to know what that dipping sonar tethering cable is going to be made of!

It'd be strong...

 

[ADMk2]

I use to purchase Defence Today to ,stopped buying it when i joint this site.
You want to hear something really funny?

My First post here went along the lines of....."I cannot believe the Australian Government is not Upgrading the F-111 to The Kopp -111"

Lets just say i was shot down by a few of you guys and im glad i was.

I was living in sin. I don't buy Mag's now i just read the forums here.

Cheers.

That's the thing, most of the things the mags write about is on here or here:

DSCA -- Arms Sales Notifications

Or on any number of ther news sites, months before it comes out in a magazine and as for A&NZ Defender, their photos used to be good, when John (crazy) Farrell used to go out into the weeds and take his own.

Now they're all stripped off the Aus DoD website or off manufacturers websites with his own (usually incorrect) description of the capability in the "news" section, that is 3 months late on everything...

I will ocassionally buy an AA mag or Air Forces Monthly IF, I am flying somewhere and want something to read, but regular purchases? No way. There's nothing in them that can't easily be found for free, apart from the odd exercise report, with many a platitude from some brass somewhere, if you're interested in such things...

About the only thing I "like" about Kopp is that he steadfastly writes the complete opposite of what virtually EVERYONE else does and reality doesn't sway him an inch.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Did this really happen in a modern ADF? or rather is it the figment of a fertile and deluded Dr Kopp.
Alternatively, is he correct?

Its BS.

The ones who jumped in the early part of the decade were a result of

end of posting cycle and ready to move on
those disenchanted with the side effects of ET, ie that those who spoke out on border protection issues (like RADM Barrie) knew that in no uncertain terms that they'd reached as far as they were ever going to go and that they had no future - whereas those who towed the company line (Gen Cosgrove) were able to take advantage of "govt trust" and seized the window of opportunity to get whatever gear they could for the services. (hence the happy partnering days for army, navy and air force for phat ships and heavy lift aircraft) ET was a wake up call on how rooted our logistics was - although dual hat roles were a good selling point, the govt of the day didn't need convincing - and their focus was certainly on more capability to move and have presence anywhere we thought it was in the national interest. Unfort the capacity to get the Ministers blessing on curr gear means being able to sell them on dual hat roles (a twisted spin on VFM in the selection cycle). Thats easy to see as all the fast track progs of note (under the old definition of "major capital acquisitions") have had dual hat capability.

ADO also went through a re-org on procurement, so a lot of the diehard proponents of single service procurement knew it was time to bail.

The defence of australia proponents existed mainly on the suit side of the shop due to being generated by a few "good idea" fairies

add in the start of the mining boom (in real terms) and you could argue that it was just another variation of the exit cycle

as for his comment that ASW atrophied after the end of the cold war - thats just lazy commentary as it's been well published that all countries with capable ASW changed their stance as the need had shifted - it was a "peace dividend"

what he ignores though is the fact that large ASW fleet owners re-roled their aircraft into an ISR emphasis rather than an ASW emphasis. Sure they killed off major slices of their fleets, but it was under a peace dividend mentality - not due to some other "pet rock" idea like whites "defence of australia"

He only has to read publications such as Proceedings to see numerous articles on this very subject

 

[AegisFC]

Don't laugh, I actually remember reading somewhere that the Sea Harrier could / should be adapted for the ASW role using sonar buoys dropped from pods as well as air dropped torpedoes and depth charges. Can't remember where I read it but it was during the post Falklands, "the Harrier can do anything" hysteria. I wonder where they were going to do the signal processing to actually work out where the sub is.

I've seen pictures of when the USN toyed with dropping torpedos from an A-4. The idea was an ASW carrier would use slower aircraft drop the bouys and helo's to do dipping sonar with an A-4 "CAP" to swing in and drop a torp for the kill.
They never got it to work right.

The stupidest Harrier idea I've seen was the sky crane thingy that was supposed to be mounted on an escort and a Harrier would be picked up and dropped off that.

 

[rossfrb_1]

My First post here went along the lines of....."I cannot believe the Australian Government is not Upgrading the F-111 to The Kopp -111"

Lets just say i was shot down by a few of you guys and im glad i was.

Cheers.

You are not alone there.
I was a Kopp acolyte and a fan of the F-111.
Joining this forum knocked some sense into me.
Don't buy mags anymore unless there is a feature article I am especially interested in - but will have a quick squiz before purchasing to make sure it has info new to me - would occassionaly buy the Navy or Defence one.
I have noticed now that this forum is a source of info that eventually trickles through to some of the local defence mags. I swear I have seen some magazine articles that looked like summaries from this forum!

rb

 

[Volkodav]

I think the most ironic thing with Kopps article is that the greatest negative impact on the ADFs ASW capability actually occurred with the retirement, without replacement, of HMAS Melbourne in 1982. No more Trackers deployed with the fleet, no more dipping sonars from the Seakings, no more targeting data from the Seakings for the Ikaras. The loss of the carrier and the ability to deploy Seakings with the fleet was perhaps the biggest single ASW capability hit the RAN has ever suffered. Looking back only a decade earlier there was HMAS Sydney which operated Wessex helos for ASW self defence on her Vietnam missions, she could have easily been deployed as an ASW helo carrier in her own right. From two to one and then none ASW carriers and he thinks we are worse off now than then, at least we can actually deploy the equipment we do have now.

 

[ASSAIL]

I think the most ironic thing with Kopps article is that the greatest negative impact on the ADFs ASW capability actually occurred with the retirement, without replacement, of HMAS Melbourne in 1982. No more Trackers deployed with the fleet, no more dipping sonars from the Seakings, no more targeting data from the Seakings for the Ikaras. The loss of the carrier and the ability to deploy Seakings with the fleet was perhaps the biggest single ASW capability hit the RAN has ever suffered. Looking back only a decade earlier there was HMAS Sydney which operated Wessex helos for ASW self defence on her Vietnam missions, she could have easily been deployed as an ASW helo carrier in her own right. From two to one and then none ASW carriers and he thinks we are worse off now than then, at least we can actually deploy the equipment we do have now.

A few of my thoughts on past ASW

The biggest hit to the RAN's capability IMHO was the loss of the S2's. They were always there when required under all conditions and in all geographic areas. Can't say the same for the P3's unless they were deployed as part of an international exercise.

CASEX's (Combined Anti Sub Exercises) were a constant feature in the EAEA's off JB with air assets from NASNOWRA/Melbourne and the occaisional P3 (provided it wasn't held on the weekendand). A duty clockwork mouse (sub) was always present.
Given today's circumstances I guess this is no longer true.

I did 3 trips on Sydney taking battalions to Vietnam in 69/70 and I can't remember ever having an ASW equipped Wessex 31B configured that way. My memory is that these were utility a/c however, as a snotty, I didn't know that much and could be wrong.

Without dipping sonar, Ikara and its dedicated link became a devalued asset and I guess that started its demise.

Cheers

 

[gf0012-aust]

A few of my thoughts on past ASW

The biggest hit to the RAN's capability IMHO was the loss of the S2's. They were always there when required under all conditions and in all geographic areas. Can't say the same for the P3's unless they were deployed as part of an international exercise.

CASEX's (Combined Anti Sub Exercises) were a constant feature in the EAEA's off JB with air assets from NASNOWRA/Melbourne and the occaisional P3 (provided it wasn't held on the weekendand). A duty clockwork mouse (sub) was always present.
Given today's circumstances I guess this is no longer true.

would completely agree here, the killing off of Melbourne basically was akin to the USN knocking off their ASW Hunter-Killer groups as that was the capability model that Melbourne was more closely aligned to

killing off by capital dribbles down to killing off a capability.

the "peace dividend" mentality which followed on from the collapse of the Soviets was the nail in the coffin

 

[ASSAIL]

The often varied discussion on the RAN thread regarding the future frigate (SEA 5000) and future OCV (SEA 1180), the numbers and mix, the types of systems etc has promted me to skim through the Navy publication "Australian Maritime Doctrine"
http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf in the hope that there would be some guidance for me to make an informed comment.

I found it to be basic at best, plenty of motherhood statements but if I was given a task to shape the ORBAT of the RAN, that doc would give little guidance and I was disappointed to say the least. Having ferreted around the USN sites in particular, finding a context for the LCS's, there was plenty of relevent direction.

It appears that there is a very specific plan in the USN, the 30 year shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress for regular scrutiny, that gives a sense of continuity for both Maritime Doctrine and naval shipbuilding. There doesn't appear to be the same control over the force structure development in the RAN as it seems to be hijacked by the politicians from time to time

The reason that I'm concerned is, as I have posted on the RAN thread, there must be balance created between 5000 and 1180 but I can't see it.

In the linked doctrine, the total space given to the Patrol forces reads " In a major conflict, the Patrol Boats will contribute to a local patrol and surveillance effort, particularly for inshore and harbour defences. They may also insert small parties ashore where needed" Not much doctrinal development there

 

[aussienscale]

The often varied discussion on the RAN thread regarding the future frigate (SEA 5000) and future OCV (SEA 1180), the numbers and mix, the types of systems etc has promted me to skim through the Navy publication "Australian Maritime Doctrine"
http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf in the hope that there would be some guidance for me to make an informed comment.

I found it to be basic at best, plenty of motherhood statements but if I was given a task to shape the ORBAT of the RAN, that doc would give little guidance and I was disappointed to say the least. Having ferreted around the USN sites in particular, finding a context for the LCS's, there was plenty of relevent direction.

It appears that there is a very specific plan in the USN, the 30 year shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress for regular scrutiny, that gives a sense of continuity for both Maritime Doctrine and naval shipbuilding. There doesn't appear to be the same control over the force structure development in the RAN as it seems to be hijacked by the politicians from time to time

The reason that I'm concerned is, as I have posted on the RAN thread, there must be balance created between 5000 and 1180 but I can't see it.

In the linked doctrine, the total space given to the Patrol forces reads " In a major conflict, the Patrol Boats will contribute to a local patrol and surveillance effort, particularly for inshore and harbour defences. They may also insert small parties ashore where needed" Not much doctrinal development there

If you have time to go through it, the Seapower Conference from last year may give you some more insights ? I still have not had time to go through it yet, and it was in Feb last year

PACIFIC2012 : The Commercial Maritime and Naval Defence Showcase for the Asia Pacific

The 2013 is rather handily not until Oct after the election

PACIFIC2013 : The Commercial Maritime and Naval Defence Showcase for the Asia Pacific

Cheers

Edit: just to clarify, I know the 2013 Conference is timed in conjunction with the IFR, just having a dig at the lead up to the worlds longest election campaign

 

[ASSAIL]

If you have time to go through it, the Seapower Conference from last year may give you some more insights ? I still have not had time to go through it yet, and it was in Feb last year

PACIFIC2012 : The Commercial Maritime and Naval Defence Showcase for the Asia Pacific

The 2013 is rather handily not until Oct after the election

PACIFIC2013 : The Commercial Maritime and Naval Defence Showcase for the Asia Pacific

Cheers

Edit: just to clarify, I know the 2013 Conference is timed in conjunction with the IFR, just having a dig at the lead up to the worlds longest election campaign

Thanks mate, you would assume that the linked doc to the officicial website of the RAN and carrying such a grand title would carry a bit more gravitas and currency though. I'll plow through 2012PACIFIC asap.

 

[aussienscale]

Thanks mate, you would assume that the linked doc to the officicial website of the RAN and carrying such a grand title would carry a bit more gravitas and currency though. I'll plow through 2012PACIFIC asap.

Totally agree, I read it when it come out along with the Amphib stuff around the same time and after several hundred pages, well we will never get that time back.......

Rather than another post here is a bit more light reading and viewing

http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/17474648

http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&article=1156&context=theses&type=additional

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/NCAMO_Book.pdf

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf

As I understand it the last one here AMD 2010 was the fist in the current thinking around Australian Maritime Doctrine, it is the first time I have found the other one so will have to skim over it to see if it is any more informative

Cheers

 

[ASSAIL]

Totally agree, I read it when it come out along with the Amphib stuff around the same time and after several hundred pages, well we will never get that time back.......

Rather than another post here is a bit more light reading and viewing

Introduction to Australian maritime doctrine / Royal Australian Navy - Details - Trove

http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&article=1156&context=theses&type=additional

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/NCAMO_Book.pdf

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf

As I understand it the last one here AMD 2010 was the fist in the current thinking around Australian Maritime Doctrine, it is the first time I have found the other one so will have to skim over it to see if it is any more informative

Cheers

One of the more useful (in terms of determining capability) papers, in addition to your list is http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/FMOC_2025_Unclassified.pdf Future Maritime Operating Concept 2025.

Two paragraphs within the paper caught my attention;
"A unit that does not contribute to the overall protection of the (maritime) force and is not a mission essential unit provides limited utility to future maritime combat power."
and,
There are key assumptions provided in the paper and the assumption that caught my attention 11(c) was; "The ADF will, in general, only acquire and develop capabilities that are structured and designed for combat operations. However, ADF capabilities will be regularly applied to other operations...."

Remembering that this paper is referring to a future goal,2025, I can only hope that these two statements are firmly in the minds of the procurement team for SEA 1180. Clearly, a suped up ACPB does not meet the requirements and should not be considered, which brings me back to my recent hobby horse, that SEA1180 and 5000 must be absolutely complimentary.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Maybe AMPT10E has an update on the status of "Plan Blue" - as thats the other long term paper that should be considered...

 

[ASSAIL]

The University of Woolongong paper by Richard Menhinick (see aussienscale post above) was a great insight despite its relative obsolesence,( ie before the LHD's as he part advocates)
It should be compusory reading for all defence parliamentarians, suits and uniforms before they take any decisions. It really puts the development of Australian Maritime Doctrine in context and shows the totally blinkered DA (Defence of Australia) policies espoused by Dibb and his cohorts to be patently discredited by recent history.

 

[gf0012-aust]

people like Dibb and White clutch on to DoA like its some holy mantra....

 

[the road runner]

The University of Woolongong paper by Richard Menhinick (see aussienscale post above) was a great insight despite its relative obsolesence,( ie before the LHD's as he part advocates)

Was a very good read.I wonder if operating bare bases for the RAAF is more expensive,than operating an Aircraft Carrier? Once again the article did have a lot of good point's in favour of having organic air cover for the fleet.Also showed a number of historical events that can not be discarded.It would be good if the government did have a debate on this subject.

 

[StevoJH]

Was a very good read.I wonder if operating bare bases for the RAAF is more expensive,than operating an Aircraft Carrier? Once again the article did have a lot of good point's in favour of having organic air cover for the fleet.Also showed a number of historical events that can not be discarded.It would be good if the government did have a debate on this subject.

The Bare bases wouldn't come anywhere near the cost of operating an aircraft carrier. Their construction would have been a fairly straightforward engineering project, and their maintenence would probably require a couple of dozen men and women assigned to each base on a full time basis at most.

Compare that to an aircraft carrier that requires fuel, and including flight wing, a crew of 1,000-1,500 and its a bargain.

 

[AMTP10E]

Maybe AMPT10E has an update on the status of "Plan Blue" - as thats the other long term paper that should be considered...

Plan Blue, like pretty much every 'strategic' document is basically dead due to budget cuts (current and future). We can't even really start the re-writing process since the fiscal future continues to be uncertain.