Aircraft Prices

Vivendi

Member
In Norway a rough estimate that has been mentioned is around NOK 63,000 for one hour (F-16). With today's exchange rate that is around 10,1800 USD.

The Norwegian MoD expected the F-35 to be around 40% more expensive to operate per hour than the F-16 (i.e. 89,000 NOK, 15,250 USD), but that's a very rough estimate of course, and to some extent an apples-to-pears comparison (or apples to oranges?). Also these figures are a couple of years old, I don't know what they would be today.

The same document indicates that the cost of obtaining the Norwegian F-35 will be around 1089 million NOK per plane (2011; 186 million USD).

The cost for the plane with no weapons or logistics (i.e. plane "with necessary equipment" only) was estimated to 679 million NOK (116 million USD). Again, this is 2011 NOK and estimate.

Vedlegg 1 - stortinget.no
 

Vivendi

Member
Does anybody have cost estimates for the SU-30 planes being exported? What are their cost per hour compared to Western planes?

I know it's very difficult to get comparable numbers, however some air forces like the Indian and Malaysian do operate both SU-30 and Western planes, and they should be in a position to at least produce numbers that are based on the same assumptions (within their respective organizations).

Edit: In another forum I found the following claim:

"RTAF claim F-16 is twice as expensive to operate as Gripen, and Su-30 twice as expensive to operate as F-16. "

and with a link to the following document: http://www.rtaf.mi.th/news/n07/gripen/rtaf_whitebook_f5_replacement.pdf

Anybody who speaks Thai could comment on whether this document really indicates anything about operating costs (or costs per hour) for the 3 different fighters mentioned?
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Well, it wouldn't surprise me if the SU-30 is the most expensive out of the lot to operate, given it's the only one with two engines, and its huge weight compared to the other two could be an indicator that its fuel costs relative to the other two aircraft might be higher... but I'm just speculating. From what I recall some of the Flanker variants don't have the greatest reputation for engine serviceability, maybe someone who knows more about it could chime in. As I said, it's just speculation on my part, but it seems logical. Can't speak a word of Thai though, so can't help you there.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Well, it wouldn't surprise me if the SU-30 is the most expensive out of the lot to operate, given it's the only one with two engines, and its huge weight compared to the other two could be an indicator that its fuel costs relative to the other two aircraft might be higher... but I'm just speculating. From what I recall some of the Flanker variants don't have the greatest reputation for engine serviceability, maybe someone who knows more about it could chime in. As I said, it's just speculation on my part, but it seems logical. Can't speak a word of Thai though, so can't help you there.
The Malay AF pilots who have interacted with RAAF across a number of levels have made it pretty clear that the support and maint costs have been a nightmare, and that includes platform availability

I've interviewed ex Sukhoi maintainers and they had similar stories.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
This is an explanation of US FMS costing differences. Whilst this is placed here, it equally applies to naval and ground platforms.
Why Foreign Military Sales Are Always Worth Less Than The Published Number

Loren Thompson , CONTRIBUTOR

SEP 19, 2017 @ 01:30 PM

Arms sales to overseas partners are a major tool of U.S. foreign policy. They are also a growing source of revenues for U.S. defense contractors, who have faced flat domestic demand in recent years due to congressionally mandated caps on Pentagon spending. When arms sales are done right, they can bolster regional security, strengthen alliances, lighten the warfighting burden on U.S. forces, improve the trade balance and create jobs in the U.S.

To make sure they are done right, all foreign military sales are subject to strict standards set forth by the Arms Control Export Act of 1976. The Department of State has final say in approving proposed transactions, with the Department of Defense assuming a leading role in executing deliveries. Other cabinet departments and agencies may also participate, and Congress always is given an opportunity to block big arms deals.

However, there is one facet of this highly articulated process that often gets quite confused, and that is the value of the transactions. News reports about the value of pending arms sales are often greatly exaggerated, particularly compared with the amount of money that the companies manufacturing the arms are likely to ultimately receive. Here, for example, is a passage from a news story that appeared on the eve of President Trump's May visit to Saudi Arabia:

The official, who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said the arms package could end up surpassing more than $300bn over a decade to help Saudi Arabia boost its defensive capabilities while still maintaining US ally Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors.​

$300 billion would be nearly half of Saudi Arabia's annual gross national product, a level of weapons outlays unlikely in all but the most extreme circumstances. After the president completed his trip to the kingdom, many news accounts settled on the more "modest" estimate that Riyadh's new purchases of Lockheed Martin helicopters, Boeing maritime patrol planes, and other U.S. military items would be worth around $110 billion.

But where do such figures come from? Usually they come from congressional notification documents alerting Capitol Hill to proposed transactions. Congressional notification always occurs after a prospective purchasing country has formalized its request for specific military items, but before the U.S. government has responded with a proposed package of goods and services -- called a Letter of Offer and Acceptance.

And that's where what we might call the "arms sale inflation process" begins. Because negotiations with overseas buyers haven't been finalized when Capitol Hill is informed about an impending deal, the executive branch typically includes everything in its estimates that could possibly be covered by a deal. Not just weapons quantities but options for follow-on purchases, spare parts, initial training and maintenance, etc. It may also include a "just in case" financial buffer that further inflates the likely value.

If Congress doesn't like what it sees, a joint resolution can be passed to block the deal. But to avoid having to go back to the Hill later if subsequent discussions with the customer take an unexpected turn, congressional notifications tend to include everything but the kitchen sink, and the resulting price-tag is quite imposing. It is not uncommon for the publicly reported value of a transaction drawn from congressional notification documents to be a quarter or a third bigger than the price that is ultimately agreed to.

Now, that might not be so bad if the real price were eventually disclosed, but it generally isn't. The Department of Defense claims an exception to the Freedom of Information Act for foreign military sales data that might cause competitive harm to weapons makers, or might impair the government's ability to secure necessary information in the future, or simply might undermine some undefined interest of the government. So usually the inflated estimates in congressional notification documents are the only cost data to reach the public.

So imagine, if you will, that the negotiated price for an arms package is $3 billion rather than the $4 billion contained in congressional notification documents. That's what the U.S. companies building the weapons being sold will actually get, right? Wrong. Because much of the price negotiated for a sale actually consists of so-called "government furnished equipment" (like aircraft engines and munitions) or services the U.S. government itself provides, rather than money that counts as revenue for weapons makers.

Thus, even before the weapons makers start passing revenues through to their own suppliers, the value of a transaction may have shrunk to less than half the figure that readers are seeing in published reports. Granted, the original equipment manufacturer may reap additional revenues after weapons are delivered to the foreign customer for maintenance and other in-service support, but those arrangements vary markedly from transaction to transaction, and they often are not finalized at the time an arms sale is agreed to.

The problem with inflating publicly available pricing data the way the current arms sale process does is that it can inflame opposition in purchasing countries because the size of transactions is so exaggerated. In other words, deals become harder to do because the locals get "sticker shock." The truth of the matter is that foreign buyers like the Saudis are canny negotiators striving to get the best deals they can, and deals don't happen unless both sides are comfortable with the outcome.

Several companies engaged is selling weapons through the foreign military sales program contribute to my think tank. Some are consulting clients.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Half of annual GDP over a decade is 5% a year, which is high, but not impossibly so. It's not grossly out of line with spending on military equipment in some high-spending countries. Israel used to spend that much, for example.

But yes, the estimates of what things may cost are very often far too high. The Typhoon sale, for example, was still being reported as costing what newspapers had guessed at, after the (much lower) contract value had been published.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
From post # 165,

"The problem with inflating publicly available pricing data the way the current arms sale process does is that it can inflame opposition in purchasing countries because the size of transactions is so exaggerated. In other words, deals become harder to do because the locals get sticker shock."

There is no better example of the above than Canada's fighter replacement debacle.:(
 

Millennium7

Member
The Malay AF pilots who have interacted with RAAF across a number of levels have made it pretty clear that the support and maint costs have been a nightmare, and that includes platform availability

I've interviewed ex Sukhoi maintainers and they had similar stories.
This is the main issue connected with buying Russian. Not technology, not performance but the fact that those planes are resource intensive, when it comes to keep them flying.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
This is the main issue connected with buying Russian. Not technology, not performance but the fact that those planes are resource intensive, when it comes to keep them flying.
That is an ongoing operational cost that sneaks up well after the aircraft are acquired where people haven't done their due diligence. It doesn't come into the flyaway cost calculations and will only appear in the whole of life cost figures when a contract is signed and budgeted for, IF that cost is known and accounted for when said contract is signed. The collary is that the vendor is not economical with the truth when it comes to performance and maintenance costings. Each govt has its own way of calculating and accounting for defence procurement costings so when an aviation capability contract is announced valued at US$x unless we know how that particular govt does its sums, we can only roughly guesstimate the flyaway cost of that platform.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
That is an ongoing operational cost that sneaks up well after the aircraft are acquired where people haven't done their due diligence. It doesn't come into the flyaway cost calculations and will only appear in the whole of life cost figures when a contract is signed and budgeted for, IF that cost is known and accounted for when said contract is signed. The collary is that the vendor is not economical with the truth when it comes to performance and maintenance costings. Each govt has its own way of calculating and accounting for defence procurement costings so when an aviation capability contract is announced valued at US$x unless we know how that particular govt does its sums, we can only roughly guesstimate the flyaway cost of that platform.
Yes but the ex-Soviet aviation industry is notorious for poor post-sale support. Sukhoi is actually probably the best at it, the others are far worse. Look at the issues Interjet and Cityjet are having with their SSJ airliners. It's the same problem. And Sukhoi made a pretty impressive (in the context of Russian aerospace) effort at setting up the necessary post-sale support. It's why you don't see many Russian airliners, and virtually no Ukrainian ones, despite both countries inheriting production capabilities, and design bureaus with serious experience. Military sales of course come with a political component, and to top it off many less sophisticated operators, especially when they have shoddy relations with the west, are taken in by the low initial purchase cost and the relatively advanced capabilities that they may not be able to easily acquire otherwise.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Yes but the ex-Soviet aviation industry is notorious for poor post-sale support. Sukhoi is actually probably the best at it, the others are far worse. Look at the issues Interjet and Cityjet are having with their SSJ airliners. It's the same problem. And Sukhoi made a pretty impressive (in the context of Russian aerospace) effort at setting up the necessary post-sale support. It's why you don't see many Russian airliners, and virtually no Ukrainian ones, despite both countries inheriting production capabilities, and design bureaus with serious experience. Military sales of course come with a political component, and to top it off many less sophisticated operators, especially when they have shoddy relations with the west, are taken in by the low initial purchase cost and the relatively advanced capabilities that they may not be able to easily acquire otherwise.
If memory serves, Soviet aviation was designed to function with a different support philosophy than that used by the West as well. Aircraft was designed and manufactured to be less expensive or resource intensive to acquire initially, but the aircraft would require more frequent maintenance work. The requirements for more frequent maintenance was then offset by establishing a support infrastructure which could perform large volumes of the required maintenance efficiently.

Where this philosophy seems to have started to fail is following the reductions in Soviet/Russian aviation force levels, there was no longer the volume of work required to maintain efficiency for some types of maintenance. By way of example, if a fighter jet engine needed to undergo a 100 hour depot-level maintenance, and the local depot could complete that within a day, that would be fairly efficient if the personnel at the depot tasked with doing that are doing it every day. Inefficiency can creep in though, if the frequency is reduced because there are less engines being used and/or less hours of operation are accumulating. If that same 100 hour depot level maintenance starts being required only once per week, then either the engine maintenance personnel will be sitting idle for long periods (never good for efficient or quality operations) or they need to be cross-trained to also perform other maintenance functions. A third option would be to further consolidate depot-level maintenance functions for that specific engine at a regional or larger area depot, though that in turn would introduce additional transit times between the depot and the various bases where the aircraft engines are used.

I would be interested to find out what measures (if any) have been taken by the Russian and Ukrainian aviation industries to improve the mean time between failure rates and/or reduce the frequency of various deep-level maintenance requirements like Western aviation has been doing for decades.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
If memory serves, Soviet aviation was designed to function with a different support philosophy than that used by the West as well. Aircraft was designed and manufactured to be less expensive or resource intensive to acquire initially, but the aircraft would require more frequent maintenance work. The requirements for more frequent maintenance was then offset by establishing a support infrastructure which could perform large volumes of the required maintenance efficiently.
Well also remember, there was one ministry running basically all of civil aviation. So it wasn't an issue to have the design bureaus, manufacturers, and maintenance personnel, all be part of separate organizations. They still all work under the same structure. But following independence this changed, and aircraft design bureaus, and manufacturers, had little knowledge of how to properly set up and run maintenance, while those who did found themselves de-funded by the government that was rapidly going broke.

Where this philosophy seems to have started to fail is following the reductions in Soviet/Russian aviation force levels, there was no longer the volume of work required to maintain efficiency for some types of maintenance. By way of example, if a fighter jet engine needed to undergo a 100 hour depot-level maintenance, and the local depot could complete that within a day, that would be fairly efficient if the personnel at the depot tasked with doing that are doing it every day. Inefficiency can creep in though, if the frequency is reduced because there are less engines being used and/or less hours of operation are accumulating. If that same 100 hour depot level maintenance starts being required only once per week, then either the engine maintenance personnel will be sitting idle for long periods (never good for efficient or quality operations) or they need to be cross-trained to also perform other maintenance functions. A third option would be to further consolidate depot-level maintenance functions for that specific engine at a regional or larger area depot, though that in turn would introduce additional transit times between the depot and the various bases where the aircraft engines are used.
Not only that but once each aircraft manufacturer and each airline became separate economic entities, things got even more complicated. And none of this was meant to operate under open market conditions. Arguably it could have been adapted, but given the level of general fuckery going on in the 90s, nobody was worried about that at all. Entire industries died, and industrial giants turned into scrap metal, so something like aviation maintenance fell by the wayside. The military got by on cannibalism, and internal maintenance capabilities for the tiny flight hours they did have. Civil aviation meanwhile puttered along as best as it could, buying large numbers of used western aircraft.

I would be interested to find out what measures (if any) have been taken by the Russian and Ukrainian aviation industries to improve the mean time between failure rates and/or reduce the frequency of various deep-level maintenance requirements like Western aviation has been doing for decades.
This subject interests me also. Ok, wall of text, sorry if it's a little boring.

As it stands, the Ukrainian aviation industry is more dead then alive, with Antonov being on life support, using the profits of their Soviet-era fleet flying cargo flights to pay for the chronically unprofitable design and production side of the business. A good look at their fundamental inability to keep even a small fleet flying is the story of the Cuban An-158s, 6 of which were purchased and last time I checked only 2 were flying. Cuba of course has little choice, as when it turned to Russia, the Ilyushin Finance Co. offered them the 158s, and nobody else will sell to them. This unbelievably bad post-sale support is the ultimate reason for the failure of the An-148 family (though the fact that it's a redesign of the An-74 rather then a new aircraft also adds problems, instead of designing to the demands of the market, they worked from what they had).

Other then that only 2 airlines were produced in the post-Soviet space in any appreciable quantities, both in Russia; the Tu-204 family (including the 214) and the SSJ.

The Tu-204 was the latest and greatest of Soviet aviation at the end of the 80s, and went into low scale production despite the collapse. It's production continues to putter along to this day at a glacial pace (though over the decades something like ~100 aircraft have been produced) mostly for government orders. Very few are used commercially, and even the attempt to revive the type with the upgraded Tu-204SM failed (it had 3 start-up customers, Red Wings who dropped out, Iran who got hit by sanctions in iirc 2011 and could no longer buy anything with a large percentage of US components, and Syria who dropped out due to their Civil war, the list of customers of course itself illustrates how less then in-demand the type was).

The only remotely successful civil airliner is the Sukhoi Superjet. Unsurprisingly it comes from the only truly successful airplane manufacturer in the CIS; Sukhoi, and is the fruit of massive international cooperation, with consultants from Boeing, and with participation from firms all over the world including the US, but most notably France and Italy. Sukhoi made a huge (by Russian standards) effort to get post-sale support up and running for this new type, especially for foreign operators. And initially it appeared to be successful with the international launch customer Interjet giving glowing reports to the press. The aircraft itself appears to be quite good, with compliments from both pilots and passengers, and managed to fight its way on to the highly competitive international market. However over the past years reports have been coming in, starting with domestic operators (Yakutia) and now Cityjet and Interjet, regarding maintenance delays. The Russian side is blaming poor quality of the French engine components for straining the maintenance, and there may be some truth to that since the French expected a much larger production run and therefore greater economy of scale benefits. In the absence of this they may have had to cut corners to keep the production line profitable. On the flip side, Aeroflot was reporting maintenance issues from the get go, and complaining that GSS (Sukhoi's civil aviation division) was prioritizing their international customers over the domestics (which makes sense since Aeroflot was basically forced to buy them, and also since domestic airlines get a fat tax cut for buying a domestic aircraft). It remains to be seen whether Sukhoi can overcome this hurdle and scale their post-sale support appropriately to deliver the level of service that airlines and leasing companies typically expect from manufacturers. If so, we may see a revival of Russian civil aviation. If not, Russian aerospace will be doomed to financially wasteful projects like producing an upgraded Il-96-400, and requiring domestic airlines to buy it. Or restarting production of the Il-114, with new engines. Of course as long as money from state-run industries remains plentiful, and confrontation with the west continues, projects like these will still find a domestic audience but will never succeed in the international market.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Well also remember, there was one ministry running basically all of civil aviation. So it wasn't an issue to have the design bureaus, manufacturers, and maintenance personnel, all be part of separate organizations. They still all work under the same structure. But following independence this changed, and aircraft design bureaus, and manufacturers, had little knowledge of how to properly set up and run maintenance, while those who did found themselves de-funded by the government that was rapidly going broke.



Not only that but once each aircraft manufacturer and each airline became separate economic entities, things got even more complicated. And none of this was meant to operate under open market conditions. Arguably it could have been adapted, but given the level of general fuckery going on in the 90s, nobody was worried about that at all. Entire industries died, and industrial giants turned into scrap metal, so something like aviation maintenance fell by the wayside. The military got by on cannibalism, and internal maintenance capabilities for the tiny flight hours they did have. Civil aviation meanwhile puttered along as best as it could, buying large numbers of used western aircraft.



This subject interests me also. Ok, wall of text, sorry if it's a little boring.

As it stands, the Ukrainian aviation industry is more dead then alive, with Antonov being on life support, using the profits of their Soviet-era fleet flying cargo flights to pay for the chronically unprofitable design and production side of the business. A good look at their fundamental inability to keep even a small fleet flying is the story of the Cuban An-158s, 6 of which were purchased and last time I checked only 2 were flying. Cuba of course has little choice, as when it turned to Russia, the Ilyushin Finance Co. offered them the 158s, and nobody else will sell to them. This unbelievably bad post-sale support is the ultimate reason for the failure of the An-148 family (though the fact that it's a redesign of the An-74 rather then a new aircraft also adds problems, instead of designing to the demands of the market, they worked from what they had).

Other then that only 2 airlines were produced in the post-Soviet space in any appreciable quantities, both in Russia; the Tu-204 family (including the 214) and the SSJ.

The Tu-204 was the latest and greatest of Soviet aviation at the end of the 80s, and went into low scale production despite the collapse. It's production continues to putter along to this day at a glacial pace (though over the decades something like ~100 aircraft have been produced) mostly for government orders. Very few are used commercially, and even the attempt to revive the type with the upgraded Tu-204SM failed (it had 3 start-up customers, Red Wings who dropped out, Iran who got hit by sanctions in iirc 2011 and could no longer buy anything with a large percentage of US components, and Syria who dropped out due to their Civil war, the list of customers of course itself illustrates how less then in-demand the type was).

The only remotely successful civil airliner is the Sukhoi Superjet. Unsurprisingly it comes from the only truly successful airplane manufacturer in the CIS; Sukhoi, and is the fruit of massive international cooperation, with consultants from Boeing, and with participation from firms all over the world including the US, but most notably France and Italy. Sukhoi made a huge (by Russian standards) effort to get post-sale support up and running for this new type, especially for foreign operators. And initially it appeared to be successful with the international launch customer Interjet giving glowing reports to the press. The aircraft itself appears to be quite good, with compliments from both pilots and passengers, and managed to fight its way on to the highly competitive international market. However over the past years reports have been coming in, starting with domestic operators (Yakutia) and now Cityjet and Interjet, regarding maintenance delays. The Russian side is blaming poor quality of the French engine components for straining the maintenance, and there may be some truth to that since the French expected a much larger production run and therefore greater economy of scale benefits. In the absence of this they may have had to cut corners to keep the production line profitable. On the flip side, Aeroflot was reporting maintenance issues from the get go, and complaining that GSS (Sukhoi's civil aviation division) was prioritizing their international customers over the domestics (which makes sense since Aeroflot was basically forced to buy them, and also since domestic airlines get a fat tax cut for buying a domestic aircraft). It remains to be seen whether Sukhoi can overcome this hurdle and scale their post-sale support appropriately to deliver the level of service that airlines and leasing companies typically expect from manufacturers. If so, we may see a revival of Russian civil aviation. If not, Russian aerospace will be doomed to financially wasteful projects like producing an upgraded Il-96-400, and requiring domestic airlines to buy it. Or restarting production of the Il-114, with new engines. Of course as long as money from state-run industries remains plentiful, and confrontation with the west continues, projects like these will still find a domestic audience but will never succeed in the international market.
Sukhoi also has the bad luck that many of the buying airlines went bankrupt.
For example Sky Aviation from Indonesia went bankrupt after receiving the third SSJ-100 (from 12 ordered), the to be reactivated Kartika Airlines also ordered 15 SSJ-100s, but it doesn't even survive the restart.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sukhoi also has the bad luck that many of the buying airlines went bankrupt.
For example Sky Aviation from Indonesia went bankrupt after receiving the third SSJ-100 (from 12 ordered), the to be reactivated Kartika Airlines also ordered 15 SSJ-100s, but it doesn't even survive the restart.
I don't think it was luck. Airlines who are stable, and are doing well, aren't likely to experiment with a whole new aircraft manufacturer, especially in a niche as small as this one. I think Sukhoi had to settle for airlines who were either small and looking to expand or were in financial trouble and were looking for a new aircraft to improve their performance. If you look at the pattern of their starting orders, very many of those airlines failed, across multiple markets. This suggests that they were keeping in mind a low success rate among these customers, but were primarily concerned with getting on the market. And it worked, mostly. The problem that really hit them hard was 1) the deterioration of relations between Russia and much of the world post-2014, and 2) the failure of their post-sale support. These two factors made the SSJ commercially problematic, and politically risky.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Nice info. Susi Air that focus on charter and 'bush' flying in Papua and Eastern Indonesia basically build their fleet on Cesna Caravan and Pilatus. Kodiak if not mistaken is very popular in Alaska and Canadian Artic Circle.

Not expecting Socata made the list tough, I thought that airplane mostly for Private Millioners market for weekly commute between their City dwelling to their country or island estate.
 
Nice info. Susi Air that focus on charter and 'bush' flying in Papua and Eastern Indonesia basically build their fleet on Cesna Caravan and Pilatus. Kodiak if not mistaken is very popular in Alaska and Canadian Artic Circle.

Not expecting Socata made the list tough, I thought that airplane mostly for Private Millioners market for weekly commute between their City dwelling to their country or island estate.
You are incorrect, most of the turboprops Both single engine and multi, are used in small businesses. Sales, moving installation folks around, etc. from what a I’ve seen less than 30% of their use is personal.,they are a great force multiplier for a growing business.

Art
 

Projectman

New Member
Indian airforce has placed an order for 83 tejas fighter jets from HAL for a price of 37000 cr, ie 445 cr per plane. Which is 60 m usd per plane , a lot for a homegrown plane, with a lot of imported parts.
I was trying to break up the part costs . If anyone has a link to any study with cost per part of a modern fighter jet , pl help.

For the tejas - from open source- Major imported items -
1. Engine GE - 404 , 99 bought for a total of 600 m usd. Per engine, 6m usd.
2. Radar- israeli AESA - I calculated approx 3 to 4 m usd based on a American order for AESA radars
3. Radome , maybe 1 m , guesswork.
4. Missiles , cant say whether cost of missiles is included in the above cost. So 7 missiles with 4 air to air missiles @ 1 m per missile equals 4 m usd per plane. And 3 air to ground missiles @ 0.25 m usd equals around 1 million usd. Total for missiles is 5 m usd per plane.
5 . Baker ejection seats - 300000 usd

Rest is mostly indigenous or low cost .

So for major imported parts , its approximately 17 m usd .
The body is 40 % of composite materials.
43 m usd is for the rest of the plane.
So with a 6 % mark up for profit , how does a single plane become so expensive. Labour costs in India are pretty low.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Indian airforce has placed an order for 83 tejas fighter jets from HAL for a price of 37000 cr, ie 445 cr per plane. Which is 60 m usd per plane , a lot for a homegrown plane, with a lot of imported parts.
I was trying to break up the part costs . If anyone has a link to any study with cost per part of a modern fighter jet , pl help.

For the tejas - from open source- Major imported items -
1. Engine GE - 404 , 99 bought for a total of 600 m usd. Per engine, 6m usd.
2. Radar- israeli AESA - I calculated approx 3 to 4 m usd based on a American order for AESA radars
3. Radome , maybe 1 m , guesswork.
4. Missiles , cant say whether cost of missiles is included in the above cost. So 7 missiles with 4 air to air missiles @ 1 m per missile equals 4 m usd per plane. And 3 air to ground missiles @ 0.25 m usd equals around 1 million usd. Total for missiles is 5 m usd per plane.
5 . Baker ejection seats - 300000 usd

Rest is mostly indigenous or low cost .

So for major imported parts , its approximately 17 m usd .
The body is 40 % of composite materials.
43 m usd is for the rest of the plane.
So with a 6 % mark up for profit , how does a single plane become so expensive. Labour costs in India are pretty low.
It is quite difficult to ascertain because it depends upon the terms and conditions of each individual contract, the currency exchange rate used for the acquisition, how each government does its accounting, in the case of US sourced material whether or not it's acquired thru FMS, how the acquisition is funded, all sorts of variables and each country has its own methodology for calculating these costs. So unless you have original documentation, or published govt budget data etc., anything that come up with is pure speculation.
 
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