Short reply to STURM to add thoughts on a possible pivot
Statements however by Biden on the Afghans needing to unite and fight however are silly given that various groups are united with the Kabul government (despite its numerous follies/flaws) in fighting the Taliban. Also; given that highly short sighted and flawed decisions (the list is well documented and quite a long one) made by the Americans contributed to the current cockup; America has an obligation to continue supporting the Kabul government indefinitely.
Statements about American air power being available for the moment or until future notice (link provided in my previous post) isn’t what the Afghans need to hear. In the coming months are we going to hear about proposals to cut aid to Afghanistan (echoes of South Vietnam)?
1. I don’t agree that a withdrawal means American credibility is on the line. Let me provide 3 reasons, for your consideration:
One, history provides plenty of examples of American politicians being shameless. This shows their ability pivot in a manner the locals don’t expect — the 1975 fall of Saigon, Ronald Reagan’s decision to withdraw troops after 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, Bill Clinton’s 1993 withdrawal from Somalia and Barack Obama’s 2011 withdrawal from Iraq have proved this point historically — Tehran’s Ayatollah and his IRGC were forced to allow the Iraqi government to invite the Americans back, to fight ISIL, after the Fall of Mosul in Jun 2014. Sectarian polarization caused the Shia-dominated government of al-Maliki to be a ‘failed state’ in Sunni Arab areas. By 14 Aug 2014, al-Maliki agreed to step down as prime minister of Iraq to allow Haider al-Abadi to take his place. In
Aug 2014, Obama announced that American forces conducted targeted airstrikes against terrorists (that was later named Operation Inherent Resolve). And this time Iraqi Shiites who are in the majority), know that following Tehran’s sectarian path does not bring peace or development.
Two, Afghans and the Biden administration are also frustrated with President Ghani — refusing to keep troops in Afghanistan is a means to an end — getting change to occur. Beyond corruption, Ghani was openly engaged in nepotism in a manner that alienated the power base to resist the Taliban advance. For 9 years, Americans avoided the creeping defeat identified in the 2012 CSIS report and tolerated President Ghani and his equally corrupt predecessor Karzai. Biden has finally said enough was enough. "This is an Afghan strategy that they have to execute" as per the Pentagon Press Secretary on Kabul's plans to stabilize the country in face of the Taliban offensive.
Three, the competing core interests in Afghanistan is between Muslim countries like Iran and Pakistan. They cannot expect to be long term beneficiaries of American pain.
2. The fluid situation has resulted in active discussions about a further drawdown of the US Embassy in Kabul, according to sources familiar with the discussions. Taliban gains have occurred much more rapidly than many US officials expected. U.S. intelligence now assesses that the Taliban could isolate Afghanistan's capital Kabul in 30 days and potentially take it over in 90 days. Details of the assessment, which included analysis from U.S. Central Command, Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA, were first reported by
The Washington Post. Still, some in government are wary of the findings. “It doesn’t sound right. It runs the other way of how [the administration is] briefing,” said one Senate staffer. “The Taliban need another fighting season.”
3. But recent fighting in support of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani indicates “the warlords are still with Ghani. So long as that’s the case, it’ll take more than a month for the Taliban to take Kabul by force.” That’s not all. Two people familiar with the contents of a classified briefing for senators Monday said administration officials argued the decision confronting President Biden came down to sending more troops to stabilize Afghanistan or continuing the U.S. withdrawal from the country.
The Taliban strategy of attacking on a broad front is working. The highly overstretched Afghan government only has so many units with a high level of combat effectiveness and they can only do so much. The anti Taliban forces obviously havs lost the initiative to the Taliban; whether it regains remains to be seen.
4. Turkey is still intent on running and guarding Kabul airport after other foreign troops withdraw from Afghanistan, but is monitoring the situation after rapid advances by Taliban forces, two Turkish officials told Reuters. Which means they intend to have a vote in the future of Afghanistan.
5. It is correct for President Ghani to hold crisis talks in Mazari Sharif with ethnic Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and prominent ethnic Tajik leader Atta Mohammad Noor about defending the city. They are the ones who hold the key to helping the Afghan government survive for another fighting season.
(a) Before this meeting, President Ghani adopted the mistaken policy of tolerating Taliban presence in rural areas, and attempting to coexist — when the mainly Pashtun Taliban clearly do not intend to coexist with the Uzbeks and the Tajiks. As others have noted, the history of U.S. negotiations with the Taliban going back to 2010 is farcical. Even now, as the jihadis rampage into Afghanistan’s cities, the U.S. is still pretending there is viable diplomacy. There is no “peace process.”
(b) It seems that the Afghan led #SanctionPakistan social media campaign has had an impact on Pakistan. But would campaigning for sanctions against Pakistan really stop the Taliban’s conquest of Afghan cities and towns? Pakistan is host to 1.4 million Afghans, and it allows over flight of American fighters and bombers to provide air support for the ANSDF to fight the Taliban. The Pakistani government is not in full control of its borders, as it is non-monolithic nation of 200.3 million Muslims (or 96.5%) and 16.3 million non-Muslims. A significant number of Pakistanis oppose their own oppressive military establishment and the ISI's destabilizing role in Afghanistan.
(c) The bigger problem is that President Ghani is not able to retain honest men, including Afghanistan’s acting finance minister Khalid Payenda who just resigned. Khalid Payenda revived the MoF by repatriating some of its best talents, filling all key positions and embarked on a budget reform. He simplified payment processes by abolishing allotments (reduced the steps from 18 to 4), and made electricity checks and salary payment possible. After he introduced electronic customs processing and addressed organizational issues in customs, the border posts fell to the Taliban.
6. There is shame to be shared by NATO’s political leaders but MORE SHAME to the local actors who abused billions of foreign aid meant for war-affected Afghanistan. Ironically, these corrupt and inept parasites often pose themselves as patriots — spamming others for pointing out the truth.
7. The removal of the country's army chief, Lt. Gen. Wali Mohammad Ahmadzai may be over due and by now too late to reverse matters (only lasting 53 days). Maj. Gen. Hibatullah Alizia has been appointed as new Chief of Armed Forces of Afghanistan; and Maj. Gen. Sami Sadat has been appointed as commander of commando corps on 11 Aug 2021 — I am not sure if it is by design but President Biden’s team is indirectly forcing the hand of:
(a) the incompetent and corrupt Afghan government to do the essentials. This will force the unreliable and corrupt Pashtun faction in Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul to work with what I call the Northern Alliance 2.0 —this will result in more power for the Uzbek and the Tajik communities — a much needed regional reform (that would have never happened if the Americans did not conduct a withdrawal) due to Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul; and
(b) Iran and Turkey to consider giving weapons to the Northern Alliance 2.0 — when both these countries have an agenda that does not align with American interests.
