Afghanistan War

[STURM]

For the Afghans the main worry is to ensure they still are beneficiaries of U.S. aid which they badly need; long after the U.S. completely withdraws. For the U.S. it wants to be seen after withdrawing as doing everything possibje to ensure the Afghans can sustain rhemselves or to “hold the fort” so to speak.

As quoted in Al Santoli’s “Leading The Way”: Chuck Homer (we all know who he is) told a Vietnamese refugee in the U.S; a country which put its unlimited faith in the U.S. once had a capital called Saigon. Sure the Afghans are far from blameless then neither is the U.S. but U.S. credibility - as the sole superpower and “leader of the free world” - is at stake; at one point the U.S. declared that there would be no negotiations with the Taliban and no place for them in a future Afghanistan.

 

[Blackshoe]

if there are claims of Taliban operating artillery — I am certain it is not the rebels that really operate them.

Why? We've watched rebels operate artillery in Syria and Yemen (probably a pretty good baseline for illiteracy in your locals) for long periods of time. You can get apps to do the math for you.

 

[Feanor]

Why? We've watched rebels operate artillery in Syria and Yemen (probably a pretty good baseline for illiteracy in your locals) for long periods of time. You can get apps to do the math for you.

The word "operate" is also... fungible. Shelling targets with precision and speed on demand from frontline units is one thing. Shelling a city-sized target is a complete different thing. Not to mention that it's possible they're operating artillery pieces but using them as direct-fire guns.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 2: Responding to Blackshoe’s and other’s valid points by providing context

Why? We've watched rebels operate artillery in Syria and Yemen (probably a pretty good baseline for illiteracy in your locals) for long periods of time. You can get apps to do the math for you.

1. I hear you and understand your point on rebels wildly firing artillery guns — with the possibility of hitting your own guys. I don’t disagree with your basic point of observed reality in Syria and Yemen but the Taliban are not technocrats, doing one-round adjustment, the way Singaporean FOs are able to do so (in my reserve service period, where I see them in action while on exercise).

​

(a) When I say “operate”, I mean to provide accurate responsive fires like that of a trained Forward Observer (FO), supported by a trained battery, to call for different effects — like preparatory fires (or what we call part renewal) vs final fires before assault, just to throw in a bit of jargon — that I normally avoid (to reduce the fog factor).​

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(b) Alongside the British and Australians, Singaporean gunners helped set up the curriculum to train Afghan National Army gunners. We know that the Afghan FOs that graduate in this ‘British’ system can do the math and can adjust fires.​

2. Let me focus on the areas of difference but that should not be taken as a broad disagreement with your post. Instead, think of my reply as minor refinements to the context of what I wrote. I mean that if you see a ‘Taliban’ firing an artillery gun on social media, these are actually ‘former’ Pakistani army guys mixed in with ISI trained Pashtuns that have infiltrated into Afghanistan (like Russia’s little green men in Ukraine). Below is an interview with the former Pakistani Ambassador to US who confirms certain truths about the Taliban and the peace process to the BBC. It’s disgusting.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1421661801004085249

3. In this current fight, the Afghan National Army is not just facing locals (who switched sides — ‘renting’ an Afghan fighter) but imported fighters, whose level of tactical proficiency, supply of weapons and C2, is too good for illiterate farmers taking up arms.

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423156890255695872

(a) That being the case, it is more than likely, the Pakistan’s ISI had a hidden hand in providing the planning, logistics and training to stage this Taliban offensive — the scope of the attacks, showed months of preparation. It’s not the fighters, it’s the level of tactical coordination that shows its hand as Pakistani — as the example of Herat shows.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423013235863822350

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(b) Islamabad has set up car bomb factories to penetrate hard targets in Afghanistan — that takes expertise and logistics that a farmer does not have. The really impressive part is not the car bombs but the intelligence gathered for their use. They know when a meeting is occurring and are able to time the attack.​

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(c) The degree and level of intelligence collection needed to conduct the numerous car bomb attacks at Kabul, especially those that penetrate the green zone — is the work of an intelligence agency. The ISI is trying to kill both acting Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi and Ahmad Massoud (31), the son of anti-Islamist Afghan commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Below, we have Ahmad Massoud sharing a picture of the blast scene of the room they had a meeting in.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1422890679387279366

4. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced the creation of a movement during the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Meeting (JBCM), in the presidential palace. Amrullah Saleh, First Vice President, in a tweet on Thursday quoted Ghani as saying:

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(a) “Every Afghan village and community that have stood up against Taliban terror offensive have been and will be incorporated under the National Resistance Movement to be led by the ANDSF (Afghan National Defense and Security Forces). It is already happening.”​

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(b) The First Vice President also stressed that Afghanistan would not bow to Taliban proxy or their supporters, referring to the neighboring Pakistan.​

The word "operate" is also... fungible. Shelling targets with precision and speed on demand from frontline units is one thing. Shelling a city-sized target is a complete different thing. Not to mention that it's possible they're operating artillery pieces but using them as direct-fire guns.

5. Exactly. Thanks.

6. In international relations, the American diplomats often like to use the carrot and stick approach. But given that the Taliban are not rabbits, no amount of carrots will make them come to the negotiating table. They will come, when they are forced to come to the table. The issue is what kind of sticks to use and are there enough nails embedded in the stick. For the Afghan National Army, the FO is the welder of a big stick against the Taliban.

 

[STURM]

All those pics we saw of rebels in Syria, Libya and Yemen of using tablets alongside mortars and artillery; have been so far been absent in Afghanistan. Maybe it’s just a matter of time before such pics appear showing Afghans doing the same.

I would be interested in knowing how much arty the Taliban has as opposed to their their traditional mortars, RCLs and rockets.

Then again; how effective the Talibs are with their arty (whether operated by Pakistani trained gunners or otherwise) has to be seen in relation to how effective ANA artillery really is at present. One thing’s for sure; the Taliban will be trying its best to avoid presenting itself as easy targets for ANA arty and air power.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 2: Responding to Blackshoe’s and other’s valid points by providing context

Then again; how effective the Talibs are with their arty (whether operated by Pakistani trained gunners or otherwise) has to be seen in relation to how effective ANA artillery really is at present.

7. The Afghan commandos are battle hardened and bravely charge into battle — but I would say that both the ANA and the Taliban are not very effective users of their artillery guns — because they are not employed at a battery level (6 guns) or in layers, in conduction with organic infantry battalion mortars (from the mortar platoon) or other division assets.

8. Employment of indirect fire weapons, effectively, needs the C4ISR of an advanced army, trained to operate at brigade and division levels, that understands battlefield geometry.

9. I don’t see phase line reporting like we do and the types of fire-support coordination that we do routinely. Looking at what they do, passage-of-line must be a nightmare.

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(a) At it’s core, battlefield geometry is concerned about the range of artillery guns — these affect the area of influence (AofI) — this is the area within which a commander can directly affect operations. In other words, an AofI is the volume of physical space within which a combined arms commander can directly influence the situation by fires and manoeuvre.​

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(b) The ANA are just at secondary school, C2 level, firing 1 or 2 guns concurrently, in a non-lineal battle with insurgents— they are not concerned about counter battery work or leakage of enemy forces, as they have American air power for over watch. They do not have sophisticated C4ISR systems and they basically don’t have to care about artillery hitting their own ISR assets and they don’t stack the air space into different layers, like we do. They have very basic deconfliction methods because they don’t have layers of support like we do.​

10. For the artillery guns and mortars in conventional urban warfare scenario, you need good logistics to set up brigade or division support areas — only then can we talk about the ability to move 5,000 to 8,000 rounds for a single battle for a brigade to take a sector of a small city. It’s not fun to read or talk about, but good logistics support by the S4 will make a huge difference.

 

[STURM]

I have no idea about the situation with the ANA but a traditional use of arty by various Afghan groups throughout the 1990’s was as direct fire weapons and to lay down fire on unobserved targets. On paper: despite the Taliban rarely presenting themselves in large numbers and having few actual fixed targets vulnerable to arty; ANA arty should be able to provide units with responsive and accurate indirect fire support. Assuming of course various prerequisites are met.

I also suspect that while the value of arty was fully recognised and appreciated by the various groups; including the Taliban; there was no serious intent to improve on numbers or quality given that for the type of warfare being waged; in line with operational conditions/circumstances: plus the need to move things in numbers across long distances over rough terrain with limited transport; mortars, RCLs and rockets (despite whatever inherent limitations) were found to be far more practical.

 

[STURM]

It’s not fun to read or talk about, but good logistics support by the S4 will make a huge difference.

Indeed. Not fun to read but highly essential. Which is why I’d recommend the following books for anyone interested in logistics.

Like everywhere else; the war in Afghanistan is driven by logistical concerns. Throughout the 1990’s until the present: thing’s only happen when logistics is sorted. Fighting stops or slows down when stocks are low. It’s one thing having stocks ferried across the Pakistan border; a very different thing having those stocks put in place where they are needed.

Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945–1954 (Charles R. Shrader)

Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare
(Kenneth L. Privratsky)

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 4: Choice of fighting for victory or facing the loss of the voices of reason and the certainty of death

1. The UN Security Council, currently under India's Presidency, issued a 3 Aug 2021 Press Statement on the escalating violence in Afghanistan and condemned in the strongest terms the “deplorable attack against the UN compound on 30 July 2021, which resulted in the death of an Afghan security forces guard and several injured.” "The members of the Security Council called on both the Islamic Republic and the Taliban to engage meaningfully in an inclusive, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process in order to make urgent progress towards a political settlement and a ceasefire, the press statement said.

(a) Members of the 15-nation Security Council reaffirmed that there is no military solution to the conflict, and declared that they do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423297752608350209

(b) Antony Blinken, US Secretary of State spoke on the phone on 5 Aug 2021 with Abdullah Abdullah, head of the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR). “Both leaders deplored continuing Taliban attacks, loss of innocent Afghan lives and displacement of the civilian population, and underscored the widespread international condemnation of these attacks,” read the statement.​

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(c) President Ashraf Ghani met with Seyed Ebrahim Raisi, President-elect of Iran, in Tehran on 5 Aug 2021, the Presidential Palace said in a statement. “We support a system in which the rights of all Afghan citizens, including minorities, are protected, and our neighbors, especially Afghanistan, have a high position in our foreign policy,” Raisi said. In turn, Ghani thanked Iran for its assistance and cooperation in various fields and stressed the need for joint economic cooperation and the expansion of relations between the two countries.​

2. The Taliban, as a movement, are “Khawarij,” an extremist Islamist insurgent group which emerged in the first century of Islam. It is no surprise that:

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1420634680647290880

(a) The Taliban detained Nazar Mohammad (known as Khasha Zwan), a comedian who was also a member of local police. They then insulted shot him and hung his body from a tree — Taliban like all other Pakistan-funded terror groups seek to destroy strides Afghans made in freedom of the arts, literature. Laughter offends them.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423239135028994048

(b) The Taliban tortured and killed Abdullah Atefi (historian and poet), in Uruzgan province's Chora district, said provincial governor Mohammad Omar Shirzad. Abdullah Atefi had 2 master degrees, in Economics and in History — Taliban like all other Pakistan-funded terror groups promote anti-intellectualism. Voices of reason threaten them.MEDIA=twitter]1421769902390759425[/MEDIA]​

3. Herat Governor Abdul Sabur Qani said the Taliban launched group attacks in seven parts of PD2, PD3, PD10 and PD11 in Herat city overnight, but were beaten back by security forces, who were supported by public uprising forces. He added that three security personnel, including Wahid Ahmad Kohistani, the commander of Herat’s PD10 police district, were killed in the Taliban attacks. Qani meanwhile said more than 100 Taliban militants were killed and dozens more were wounded in the airstrikes.

4. The latest reports show that 40 civilians have been killed and 118 injured within the last 24 hours in the city of Lashkar Gah as the Taliban seek to gain ground. We can tell you that we are deeply concerned about the safety and protection of people in Lashkar Gah, in the south, where tens of thousands of people could be trapped by fighting, Stephane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General Guterres, said at the daily press briefing.

5. Although the Taliban appear to be closing in on centres such as Herat, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar, the Taliban have not yet been able to capture one. Taliban are getting civilians killed for the small territorial gains to try to strengthen their position in Doha negotiations seems like such a waste of lives to me. But any gains the Taliban manage to hold also generate revenue in the form of taxes. In the next few days, I expect to see more good news on ANDSF clearing operations at places like Herat and Lashkar Gah but bad news in other places (once the Afghan Army’s reserves have been depleted).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423200440238362626

 

[STURM]

they are not concerned about counter battery work

It’s probably because there is little chance of Taliban counter battery fire. This isn’t an ideal arrangement but driven by operational necessities and it does enable them to focus on direct support and interdiction/harassment. Naturally if the Taliban was able to target ANA arty then the inability to perform counter battery work would be a major issue.

I don’t get what’s driving the Taliban strategy of attacking on a broad front several cities simultaneously; in addition to attacking various key border points - command/control and logistics becomes somewhat harder. If the Taliban enjoyed a numerical superiority of the government forces what they’re doing makes sense but they don’t.

I also don’t buy the narrative that all or even much of what they do in terms of overall strategy is driven by the Pakistanis. Sure Pakistan has a lot of influence but the fiercely independent Taliban is known to have had several disagreements in the past with the Pakistanis and the Taliban is less reliant on external advice compared to the past.

A Taliban victory is still a long way off despite recent successes but a key danger sign would be government forces giving up a major urban area without resistance or units defecting. A lot of what we’re seeing now is also reminiscent of events in 1996 when the then Afghan government held off the newly created Taliban; which however was much more reliant on Pakistani advice and volunteers compared to the present. The Taliban also hasn’t made inroads into Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara areas.

 

[STURM]

An interesting article on “third count nationals” : the important role they’ve long played and the consequences of the U.S withdrawal for them.

Searching for the Next War: What Happens When Contractors Leave Afghanistan?

As U.S. troops withdraw, many contract employees – most of them from poor countries, including Nepal – are leaving Afghanistan and fanning out around the world.

thediplomat.com

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 4: Choice of fighting for victory or facing the loss of the voices of reason and the certainty of death

6. Two things are clear to at this stage. One, the Taliban have been using Doha negotiations to gain recognition and they are engaging in deception of the Americans, NATO and Afghans. They have no real intention to engage in meaningful negotiations, at this time unless they lose or meet a stalemate on the battlefield. Two, if the personnel of the Afghan National Army surrender, they will have their eyes gorged out, they and the millions they protect will be killed or enslaved under Taliban rule. Their family will be sold into slavery for revenge. As the US Embassy has stated:

"Concerning reports the Taliban entice ANDSF units to surrender with the promise they will be unharmed, and then those soldiers disappear in the night and their widows are forced to marry Taliban fighters. If true, these could constitute war crimes."​

In other words, some factions of the Taliban are not interested in ‘renting an-Afghan.’ The Taliban are a highly factionalised organisation, with incurable internal contradictions. If the Afghan elites in power know how to exploit the differences, those idiots will not get to power - in my opinion, those in the West giving them airtime only helps unify them.

7. On 3 Aug 2021 night, in Lashkar Gah city, security forces launched a major operation to drive out the Taliban from the city. Heavy fighting has been continuous for the last 2 days.

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423241208873328644

(a) On 5 Aug 2021, Mullah Omar's son Mullah Yaqoob is seen in Helmand after the Taliban’s failed attempt on Lashkar Gah prison and police HQs. Taliban were forced to pull from parts of the city due to high casualties. But Mullah Omar's son has zero battlefield experience. Since he's got the name, the Taliban make him head of the Quetta military commission, but no one really listens to him.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423258783602540548

(b) According to the army’s 215 Maiwand Corps, operations will continue until “the last terrorist in the city has been suppressed”. Clearing operations are being carried out in Lashkar Gah slowly and precisely because the Taliban use people's homes as strongholds and civilians as shield; over the last 2 days Taliban casualties have risen.​

8. Thankfully, the Taliban offensive in Afghanistan is "gradually running out of steam" as the group lacks resources to take over major cities, Interfax news agency quoted a senior official at Russia's foreign ministry as saying on 5 Aug 2021. If not, thousands of Afghan girls will face inescapable despair. The horrors of the Taliban movement is undeniable.

9. The Taliban as a movement are the enemy of progress in the country. It is demonstrated in:

(a) their failed attempt to destroy the US$290 million dollar Salma Dama in Herat (also known as the India-Afghanistan friendship dam) by firing rockets at it; and​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423118660529532935

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(b) their destruction of other public goods like girls schools everywhere and their destruction of bridges, in Surkh Rood district of Ningarhar province.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423235050888388612

 

[OPSSG]

Part 3 of 4: Choice of fighting for victory or facing the loss of the voices of reason and the certainty of death

10. Over the last 20 years, NATO and the Americans have helped the Afghan elites take control of more and more territory — the high point of which was the Obama surge. The more territory the Afghan Government held, the more it will fracture. Which is why the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani only looks after the interests of his faction and Abdullah Abdullah has his own factional interests to look after.

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423580801862717444

(a) That is also why Abdul Rashid Dostum had to go to Turkey and only in the last few days returned — he left to avoid being killed by other factions — he has to return (see my prior post that mentions the fact that the son is going to the frontlines).​

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(i) The Taliban briefly entered from Eastern gates Sheberghan. However, after heavy fighting Yar Mohammad Dostum’s Jamiat militia forces pushed them back. Dead bodies of Taliban are left behind on streets.​

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(ii) Upon Abdul Rashid Dostum’s return, his message to the 2 gangs in Kabul is that we have to trust each other. So that’s three factions that I can be bothered to identify, when it’s actually closer to 25 to 35 factions, that can bring a man with a gun to the fight, all with differing interests.​

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(b) Then there is Ahmad Massoud’s faction. He is son of the deceased Ahmad Shah Massoud’s — they have Soviet eta T-55 tanks stored for use in this civil war — surprisingly, they also have eight BM-21 Grad launchers — they are not unprepared for other factions trying to move into their territory.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423325909940006912

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(c) Let’s not even talk about the local village to village shit. The networks that make up the Taliban, the Mansoors, the Haqqani network and so on have no real plan for government — their ‘government’ functions in a way that a person living in the West find hard to understand. Americans who speak of abandonment of Afghan allies obviously don’t understand the mafia like networks that exist there and should ask themselves:​

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Q1: Would they deem it a noble sacrifice if their children, who joined the US military, came back paralyzed or in a casket.​

• Commitment involves skin in the game.

(d) As Dr Mike Martin explains: There's a bunch of Ishaqzai drug lords, led by Gul Agha and Saddar Ibrahim, in Helmand. They've got strong links to Iran and these Helmandi guys, with all of their drug money, are pretty organised. But why do they have links to Iran? Because the River Helmand flows into the Sistan region of Iran where it keeps about a million or more people alive. Control of the Helmandi River is a vital national interest for Iran, hence they build links with groups in Helmand. The groups can then get their drugs out through Iran too. The Helmandis can easily go as far as the Noorzai stretch in Farah - which tells us that there are some Noorzai elements in that network. But they can't go much further than that because they run into Ismail Khan - and he is not fucking around.​

11. While military commanders of all tribal inklings have disobeyed prior Taliban leadership council instructions at times, this does not necessarily constitute a fragmentation. The fact that in wars, military commanders obtain an oversized importance is not unique to this or other insurgences.

12. The Taliban leadership are deluded — their ‘movement’ will become weaker the closer it gets to government as different interests within centrifuge. The same split that we see between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah will occur within the network that comprise the Taliban.

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(a) The modern institutions of a "bureaucratic state" are not going to survive in Afghanistan once Western aid is cut off, as the criminal networks gain power and prominence by 2028. IMO, not matter who wins, the Afghan economy will fall to ruin, and most government services will cease by 2025. Is Ismail Khan a hero for fighting to save Herat? Yes. But is he part of the problem? That is a question I don’t want to try to answer — as I am just an observer of this multi-focal civil war.​

 

[STURM]

One of the strengths of the Taliban during the period it was coming to power and even later was the fact that it was largely united under a single leadership: in sharp contrast with its various opponents who were divided on political and ethnic lines. If cracks appear within the Taliban; hopefully this is something its opponents will try to capitalise on.

All the various parties entered the peace talks for slightly different reasons. The U.S. because it had grudgingly and belatedly come to the conclusion that no military solution was possible; that the Taliban was here to stay and could not be ignored and it was already looking at withdrawing from the country. The Taliban; because it desired political legitimacy; didn’t want to be seen as an obstacle to peace and because it knew that time was on its side; that foreign troops were leaving.

Plus the fact that certain outside powers pressured it to engage un talks. We also have to note that unlike the Americans who once declared that it would never negotiate with the Taliban; the Taliban always kept open the possibility of talks with the Americans. Like the North Vietnamese negotiators; knowing that the Americans wanted out and were willing to make certain concessions (often at odds with the Kabul government) was a major trump card for Taliban negotiators.

The possibility of another foreign country directly filling the void after the Americans leave is slim. China will naturally seek to protect its interests in the country and milk it for all it’s worth but won’t make the mistake of committing troops. Greater Chinese involvement will also have bearings on what Pakistan does. Plus the fact that the Afghans won’t want to be dominated by anyone. The question is how China and Pakistan will react if India seeks a greater presence in Afghanistan.

Iran will continue to protect its interests; including safeguarding the long border against drugs; preventing IS and other similar groups from operating and keeping a protective eye on the Hazaras. Not only will some of Iranian aims be in line with American interests but how the Iranians are viewed by many Afghans differs greatly from how the Americans view them.

 

[STURM]

Is Ismail Khan a hero for fighting to save Herat? Yes. But is he part of the problem?

In my humble opinion; the answer is a mixture of yes and no. Yes in that warlords like him have long enabled a far more effective system of governance in areas they control compared to the government in
Kabul. The problem is warlords like Ismail Khan are more committed to their city or province than to the country and his troops and the locals swear allegiance to him or the community rather than to Kabul.

Ask NGO and human rights advocates and they’lls say that Khan, Dostum and others - who are not accountable to anyone and who commit atrocities - are a large reason why the country can’t progress and why Kabul’s reach in certain areas is so limited. They’ll also say that warlords like Khan are only interested in maintaining power and the wealth that comes with it: only minimal taxes reach Kabul.

Under Khan Herat was known as a progressive city; “secular”and “liberal” in contrast to other Afghan areas and women were encouraged to seek education. It was also the site of a brutal massacre of Soviet advisors and there families; leading to Soviet retribution.

Warlords like Khan, Dostum and Massoud has their flaws but they weren’t damaging to the country as a whole compared to the “instant” warlords the Americans in their haste and ignorance created: leading to so much resentment with ordinary Afghans and marginalising an already weak Afghan government which already had very little influence in far flung provinces. The sole purpose of these “instant” warlords was to make money (a lot from American contracts); they also often offered limited resistance against the Taliban (often making mutually beneficial deals/arrangements) and dealt in various illegal ventures.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 4 of 4: Choice of fighting for victory or facing the loss of the voices of reason and the certainty of death

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(b) I tend to think of the Afghan state as a Kitchen Cabinet, holding dried food and antique silverware, that is badly termite infested. It still looks solid but if you give it a hard kick, the structure holding the contents will collapse. The silverware is the educated Afghans that will scatter if the Kitchen Cabinet breaks. I see Iran as another colony of termites ready to move in and Pakistan as a colony of army ants interested in the dried food, with India as a ant-eater. The ant-eater is only interested in the ants, if they move in. As I see it, neither Iranian nor Pakistani influence is really good for building up Afghanistan as a nation state — what the country needs is more secular education. Only through more education will the country gain more silverware (aka educated Afghans) and have less termites (aka the Taliban movement).​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1422666006946791427

(c) After this round of fighting in this 43 year civil war, Afghanistan will revert to the way it was in the period between 1992 to 2000, before the Americans came. This was the time of the warring factions that included Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic Tajik; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun; and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek. Back then it was a period of temporary alliances. The era of horror is back and the civil war will rage on.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423035350155464705

13. There is utter nonsense on social media that claim the Taliban only started targeting provincial capitals in response to U.S. airstrikes. This is factually wrong. These USAF airstrikes were launched to support Afghan security forces and to stop the Taliban’s long-planned offensive on the provincial capitals.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1329353190886703106

14. A tribute to Afghan commandos who are over used in every fight!

 

[ngatimozart]

In my humble opinion; the answer is a mixture of yes and no. Yes in that warlords like him have long enabled a far more effective system of governance in areas they control compared to the government in
Kabul. The problem is warlords like Ismail Khan are more committed to their city or province than to the country and his troops and the locals swear allegiance to him or the community rather than to Kabul.

Ask NGO and human rights advocates and they’lls say that Khan, Dostum and others - who are not accountable to anyone and who commit atrocities - are a large reason why the country can’t progress and why Kabul’s reach in certain areas is so limited. They’ll also say that warlords like Khan are only interested in maintaining power and the wealth that comes with it: only minimal taxes reach Kabul.

Under Khan Herat was known as a progressive city; “secular”and “liberal” in contrast to other Afghan areas and women were encouraged to seek education. It was also the site of a brutal massacre of Soviet advisors and there families; leading to Soviet retribution.

Warlords like Khan, Dostum and Massoud has their flaws but they weren’t damaging to the country as a whole compared to the “instant” warlords the Americans in their haste and ignorance created: leading to so much resentment with ordinary Afghans and marginalising an already weak Afghan government which already had very little influence in far flung provinces. The sole purpose of these “instant” warlords was to make money (a lot from American contracts); they also often offered limited resistance against the Taliban (often making mutually beneficial deals/arrangements) and dealt in various illegal ventures.

Maybe that's the answer to the problem. Instead of Kabul running the country as a single entity, why not a federation where each region has far more responsibility for its own domestic affairs including internal security, leaving the Federal government in Kabul responsible for national policies such as finance, infrastructure, legal, foreign affairs, national defence etc. The national political executive could be made up of the leaders of each region with a Head of State being a figurehead.

 

[OPSSG]

… a Head of State being a figurehead.

What you is describe is already the case by default. The head of state is a figurehead (which is why he is often called the Mayor of Kabul, as an insult) and Kabul does not collect taxes from all the provinces — for all intents and purposes, it’s a Federal System, by default, as the ‘Governors’ are free to do what they want — except items funded by the central government.

Rather, Kabul’s role is to collect international aid and misuses it.

 

[STURM]

They had a real (by Constitution) figurehead in the form of the King. He lived in luxury in Rome during the Soviet war; was surrounded by well dressed aides and rarely or never even visited a refugee camp in Pakistan. There was a largely ineffectual Mujahideen faction which was aligned to him.

Following the U.S. invasion and in the run up to the Bonn Talks; there were hopes that he could serve as a uniting and stabilising figure. Unfortunately like the well dressed and suave Iraqi exiles whom the Americans courted; the King and his people had been away far too long and had no wide support base in the country. In one of Sandy Gall’s books about one of his trips inside Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation; he recounts how the Mujahideen use to sing songs deriding the King.

 

[STURM]

Central Asia’s leaders meet as Taliban makes gains in Afghanistan

Talks between five nations held in Turkmenistan, with war in neighbouring Afghanistan topping their agenda.

www.aljazeera.com

The heads of Central Asian states are meeting over the alarming situation in Afghanistan. Compared to 1996 when they were still reeling from the effects of their new found independence: they are now in a better position to render aid in various forms to should things worsen. The prospects of large numbers of refugees and other problems is very alarming for them.

Could a full-scale war return to Afghanistan?

Have peace talks held in Qatar between the Afghan government and the Taliban become pointless?

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