Afghan National Army Air Corps

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
There remain many things I don't understand.
Try to read more and make friends in the forum. That way more people will be willing to respond to your posts.

Comparing subsonic L159 to turboprop light attack for the four ANAAC requirements:
1) L159 is better at air to air combat
2) L159 is better at suppressing ground based air defense. But how much better?
3) I don't see why the L159 would be better than turboprop at close air support (CAS) and strategic bombing. {L159 flies faster and could reach its target more quickly; however the turboprop could dwell near the potential target longer and might be more accurate in its air strikes.}
4) L159 is much more expensive to operate per hour in the air than a turboprop, but how much more expensive? What are the costs for the two aircraft per hour flown (fuel + maintenance)?
(i) If you want to talk about A2A combat, then only consider a jet in the class of the F-16 (whose performance is optimised in the trans-sonic zone). Forget about the subsonic L159, as it is too slow and has too many other limitations to be 'fit for purpose' in an A2A combat role. Correctly understood, the L159 has some self defence capability but it is not a true A2A fighter.

(ii) ANAAC does not have a requirement for air defense suppression. Read up on the key words DEAD, SEAD and electronic warfare to see why you are mistaken. Kindly also see my response on defensive aids further below.

(iii) Read the DT thread I cited again. You are not reading it carefully enough to enable you to understand the unique advantages of slow movers (that fast movers cannot match). If I maybe honest, you are reading it with your existing preconceived notions. Your preconceived notions are interfering with your ability to understand. This is why you are asking the wrong questions. Let me explain:

(a) Only rich countries can orbit their fighters waiting for action in support of a planned mission (which is why tankers are put to so much use by the US). Poor countries only fly sorties when needed. When the fuel runs out during a sortie, the air support support ends. That is why turboprops are good and their loiter time is valued for planned missions. As these are planned missions, ANAAC turboprops have their slow transit time factored in.

(b) ANAAC will never have the resources to provide ad-hoc CAS missions that USAF have in place to support US troops. This means that when the ANA call for unplanned missions, the ANAAC will easily need another 30 mins to 2 hours to get ready for a mission from the time of call for help. When you factor in transit time to remote locations, help can take a long time to come (which means that the fight could be over before air support arrives). Fast movers reduce response time over a wider area. This will enable the ANAAC to have less air bases and to contribute in preventing ANA outposts from being overrun over a wider area.​

Therefore both aircraft types (slow movers vs fast movers) have different unique advantages and are suited to serve different purposes. Slow movers perform a complimentary role to the role performed by attack helicopters and it is not useful to compare them to fast movers. If you've got a hot LZ, attack helicopters and slow movers are ideal for suppressing ground fire as your transport helicopters attempt to land. Fast movers are less than idea in the role of suppressing ground fire on a hot LZ. These limitations are explained in the DT thread cited.

(iv) If the equipment is 'NOT fit for purpose', operating cost considerations is irrelevant (ie. ANA bought the wrong gear). OTOH, even if a piece of gear expensive, if it is absolutely essential for operations, then costs be dammed. An example of essential expensive stuff is precision guided munitions (PGMs). PGMs need not be targeted by the latest fancy USAF gear (which can stream live video for the guys on the ground), it could be something cheaper. Laser guided Paveway bombs (LGBs) can work just as well, if there is a trained guy on the ground. All the Afghan FAC on the ground needs is a laser designator to guide the LGBs. If the ANAAC don't have them, even if the aircraft arrive and the troops are in contact (ie. the enemy hugs them and are too close), the aircraft would not be able to deliver ordinance to support the fight. If you don't have this class of weapons, it will become a strategy of the Taliban to neutralize ANAAC airpower. Fundamentally, air power prevents the Taliban from moving in large groups and on roads in groups, as it is too dangerous - so just having the right gear constrains your opponent's tactical choices, which will have important consequences for your plans.

If the need for ground attack is managed by turboprop, then the question becomes what aircraft is best at managing air to air and ground based air defense suppression.
What ANAAC needs is aircraft with 'defensive aids' (and these aids are already specified by US military) that can deal with hand held SAMs. ANAAC does not have a requirement for air defense suppression. You are mistaken. Air defense suppression is a tertiary air force capability - not something we want to help the ANAAC achieve and not necessary in the fight against the Taliban.

Are supersonic aircraft much better than subsonic aircraft at these two functions?
(i) When you say better. Better for what? If you are dealing with the Third World - don't think like that. Think of these key words: 'fit for purpose'. If it can do the job then it is fit for purpose. No need to nitpick over small differences.

(ii) On Afghan A2G missions, the targeting tools, the size of combat load, the aircraft's range and ease of maintenance are more important than supersonic speed. This is partly because with a full A2G combat load, most jet fighters operate at subsonic speeds anyway.

(iii) Supersonic speeds is only important if it is a existing requirement based on each country's threat matrix. Let me use 2 examples to explain:

(a) If I may over simplify it, for the Indian Air Force (InAF), they assume that they will not be able to operate in an air superiority environment (given that they have capable potential aggressors). Therefore the InAF prefer supersonic aircraft that are able to jettison their A2G munitions to run away. This feature will enable their guys to fight another day.

(b) For the SAF, we always assume that we will be fighting a bigger aggressor, with bigger numbers and resources. Therefore, the RSAF has a singular focus on sortie generation as part of our strategy to achieve air superiority. Sortie generation multiplies our air power. Hence an all supersonic fleet is a preferred requirement. In fact even our lead-in-fighter-trainers (LIFT) will be pressed into service, as our offensively orientated conscript army will only be fighting in a war of national survival (and never a war of choice). If we lose, we don't exist as a country.​

In the case of the ANAAC, supersonic performance is not a requirement in contrast to the above over simplified Indian and Singaporean examples. Remember, if a country has a big COIN threat, a slow mover is usually part of air power requirements.

Another question I have is the relative cost per hour flown between an F/A 50 (or Guizhou JL-9, Hongdu L-15 Falcon) and an L159?
I don't know. Not an area of my interest.

I would think that the ANAAC should probably have:
-12 F/A 50s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon (air to air and ground air defense suppression)
-30 to 35 light attack turboprop (A29 or KT-1) for ground attack;
rather than the current proposal for 20 L159s and 14 turboprops light attack aircraft.
Many Chinese aircraft models are not an area of my interest. Don't give me a list of single engined jets made in the Third World and ask if they are as good as the F-16 as a multi-role fighter. IMO, they are not (even the Aviation Industry Corporation of China admitted that China’s WS-10 engine is unsatisfactory in quality). Read up on the following technology key words listed below, as a starting point for further research:

(i) the impact of helmet cueing systems such as DASH (and Python-4) and JHMCS (and AIM-9X) for off-boresight cueing of WVR missiles in A2A combat (see surprisingly good article on helmets by a man that is disliked by many in this forum);

(ii) the impact of radar and BVR missile development in A2A combat, more specifically, the F-16's AN/APG-68(V)9 radar for the block 52s and the AN/APG-80 AESA Radar for the block 60s. You can also read up on the AIM-120C7 (and the development work on the AIM-120D) for BVR combat;

(iii) the impact of targeting pods like Lockheed Martin's Sniper XR targeting pod and other competitor pods for A2G missions like the older LANTIRN, which is a system of two pods (and how it can be used to guide Paveway bombs); and

(iv) the impact of the Great Engine War for how GE (F110 Engine) & PW (F100 Engine) competed in F-15 and F-16 engine development.​

There's a reason why the J-10 is considered as within the F-16 class but for more details you will need to ask other forum members who have the appropriate China military expertise (ie. not me).

The vast majority of militaries in the world are low quality. Only a couple such as Singapore's, Australia's, South Korea's, Japan's, some NATO countries are competent.
I would not compare conscript armies to all volunteer tier-one armies (like that of the US or Australia). I think it would be a mistake to overstate the SAF's capabilities, as I was a former conscript in it. Further, we have some equipping gaps and some very old equipment. Take for instance our AMX-13 SM1s. When the Indians soldiers saw them, they were surprised and asked why we are still using their father's generation of light tanks (ie. old and outdated)... To understand that, you must get used to un-American idea of 'fit for purpose'. The trick is to understand the true purpose of the equipment.

IMO, the SAF is only well regarded for our offensive orientation in capability development, our planning (which means making hard choices with limited funds) and our level of logistics integration. Please see this defence logistics video below:

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GElkNDqvTM]Defence Logistics[/ame]

Is Malaysia's competent? I don't know.
IMO, in the areas that matter, yes (they are more than competent). Keep in mind, that while the Malaysians had external help, in the end they prevailed against the Malayan Communist Party. They beat their insurgents and won their counterinsurgency war - so they are fit for purpose. However, they do have significant logistics issues and capability gaps that take away from their fighting ability. The blame for their problems can be placed on the shoulders of 1 person - Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, their former PM (which was discussed in the RMAF thread).

Remember, Black Hawk down in Mogadishu? It was Pakistani tanks and Malaysian APCs that came to the rescue of the US Rangers. One Malaysian died and eight others were wounded to save US lives - you should remember their contribution.

Indonesia's sucks.
But you forget. The Indonesians were not given their independence. In their 1945-49 war of independence, they were able to drive out the Dutch, who were the colonial power of the day. You may think they suck but the TNI really don't care about what you think, as they have intend and are prepared to fight with a guerrilla ethos against any foreign power (like the Vietcong). Since their founding the TNI has been engaged in COIN type of 'constructive pacification' against internal rebels, such that, their war machine remains well oiled. As the 4th most populous country in the world, their point of view is that they have an endless supply of people and they have the benefit of terrain. Trying to fight the TNI on their own turf would make the American involvement in the Vietnam War look like a Sunday walk in the park. Further, the country sits right on a Maritime Chokepoint - the Malacca Straits.

IMO, the TNI's current problem is lack of force projection capabilities and the presence of significant gaps in their capability matrix.

So does Pakistan's. Pakistan has lost more dead soldiers and police to the Taliban recently than the sum of all foreign troops that have died in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. If you compare the ANA to Pakistan's army, they aren't doing quite as bad as some critics of the ANA imply.
Pakistan's army is capable and it is prepared to fight the Indians who do conduct large scale 10 division sized exercises. This means that the Pakistan's army can operate at division, corp and army level (whereas the Afghan Army operates mainly at battalion level). However, the Pakistani Army is not ready to fight insurgents. So they are capable but they are a little caught off guard in this fight.

If the international community funds educating more officers and NCOs, the quality of the ANA is likely to improve significantly. In particular, ANAAC shouldn't have a shortage of educated highly capable personnel within a few years. {Afghanistan now has 45,000 freshman a year in college versus about one thousand per year in 2001.}
That's a promising sign. In the days ahead, the ANAAC will need to be able to provide direct and indirect fire support to ANA troops so as to overwhelm the Taliban.
 
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anan

Member
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  • #22
Thanks for the info OPSSG. I really appreciate it.

New Afghan National Security Forces Order of Battle update:
Afghan National Army Order of Battle September 2009 update - The Long War Journal
Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle (OOB)
http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/ANSF OOBpage4-ANA.pdf

The US is considering Land/Lease or giving 112 F15s and 134 F16s to the Iraqi Air Force. These are aircraft currently in use that would otherwise be retired or stored.

Could America give a small number of the F16s to the ANAAC (with the Iraqis getting the vast bulk of them) in lieu of Iraq getting the whole lot?

Two disadvantages that I can see:
1) Pakistan flips out
2) It will be a few years before the ANAAC has sufficient qualified college educated personnel
 

anan

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  • #23
China is supplying two squadrons (36 advanced fighter jets) of J-10 fighters for $39 million a pop, or $1.4 billion total.
Ink Spots: Brave new world, same as the meek old world

I don't think J-10s are a good fit for ANAAC, since they don't need anything that high end and because the Pakistanis would rather have better quality aircraft than the ANAAC (which they view with suspicion.) However, are there any estimates available for the life time ownership costs of J-10s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon. Cost per hour flown information?

What would the life time cost of ownership for a squadron of Guizhou JL-9s or Hongdu L-15 Falcons be? I think they would be a better choice for ANAAC than L-159s.

Moreover, China--as Afghanistan's largest trading and investment partner--could potentially be persuaded to foot the bill.
 

anan

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  • #24
Retired General Keane proposed a major increase in the Afghan Air Force (AAF, renamed from ANAAC) budget.

Military Experts Assess Afghan Security Forces | C-SPAN

He specifically proposed replacing the AAF's 20 C27 Aircraft (all 20 will be delivered this year, at least 16 are currently in the fight) with C130s, and replacing AAF Mi17s (approximately 58 currently) with US helos.

Keane's proposals on replacing Mi17s with US helos is unrealistic for Afghanistan for reasons I won't go into here, but his comments on replacing C27 aircraft were very interesting.

Keane said that all AAF C27s were lying on tarmacs broken. An exaggeration to be sure. This said, C27s have a reputation for being difficult to maintain and the AAF lacks the ability to maintain them.

What are the costs per year to operate C27s and C130s assume a high tempo of operations?

Over a 15 year period (assuming aircraft only have a 15 year life expectancy because of poor maintenance), my estimates are as follows:

C27 = $13 million per year. $3.6 million CAPEX depreciation ($54 million/15 years) + (one $25 million upgrade around year 8, or another $1.7 million) + $7.7 million in annual maintenance and fuel costs.

C130 = $20 million per year. $70 million/15 years = 4.7 million CAPEX depreciation + one $30 million upgrade or another $2 million for upgrade + $13 million in annual fuel and maintenance costs

Are these realistic estimates of the cost per year of operating these platforms?

Would adding 1 C130s to the AAF over 15 years really cost only $300 million?

Would adding 1 C27 to the AAF over 15 years really cost only $205 million?

Which of these aircraft platforms is easier for MG Karim's Afghan National Army Training Command to train officer and NCOs to maintain?

Should the ANSF budget be increased by $6 billion over 15 years ($400 million per year) to pay for 20 new C130s?

Or alternatively should the ANSF budget be increased by $ 6 billion over 15 years ($400 million per year to pay for 30 new C27s?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of C130s versus C27s?

This would be a considerable increase in the ANSF budget, from 6.2 billion per year to 6.6 billion per year to sustain the current 353 thousand person force. Or an increase from 4.1 billion to 4.5 billion per year to sustain the smaller 227 thousand ANSF force that many in the Obama administration favor reducing the ANSF to.

Is this practical?
 

anan

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How well did the A-29 light attack Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano perform in the Afghan Air Force (AAF)?

Pres Biden pulled a fast one on the AAF and Afghan National Defense Security Defense Forces (ANDSDF) by unexpectedly accouncing that all of the 18,000 international contractors would be removed from Afghanistan on April 14th, 2021. They left within days or weeks. Which grounded AAF
Black Hawk helicopter, C-130 transports, and surveillance drones. The lack of surveillance drones made it far harder to locate exact enemy targets for the A-29s to hit. The lack of transportation aircraft meant that A-29 rockets, aerial and laser-guided weapon capacity, ammunition, fuel, spare parts couldn't be delivered to Afghanistan or to the regional airports hosting A-29s. The contractors also unexpectedly took proprietary software and weapons systems with them. They physically removed AAF helicopter missile-defense systems and removed access to the software that tracked all ANDSF vehicless, weapons and personnel. Real-time intelligence on targets were gone.

The A-29s were also flew far more sorties than they should have been between April 14th, 2021 and August 15th, 2021, without maintenance. Causing many of them to fall into disrepair.

Having said all this, how did the AAF A-29s perform in combat April 14th, 2021 to August 15th, 2021?

 

FormerDirtDart

Well-Known Member
...
Pres Biden pulled a fast one on the AAF and Afghan National Defense Security Defense Forces (ANDSDF) by unexpectedly accouncing that all of the 18,000 international contractors would be removed from Afghanistan on April 14th, 2021. They left within days or weeks. Which grounded AAF
....
Except of course that the withdrawal of all contactors was part of the overall agreement put into effect last year by Pres. Trump.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
What is the most suitable Plane for the new Afghan Air force ?
On the longer term, anything China is able to gift to the Taliban and willing to maintain on their behalf — the core of their Air Force is 1 helicopter pilot that defected to their side.

Once you realise that the Taliban has frightened away all Afghan air traffic controllers and Qatar is giving technical help to reopen Kabul airport — until the Taliban have trained air traffic control in place, no aircraft is suitable.
 

Follower

New Member
On the longer term, anything China is able to gift to the Taliban and willing to maintain on their behalf — the core of their Air Force is 1 helicopter pilot that defected to their side.

Once you realise that the Taliban has frightened away all Afghan air traffic controllers and Qatar is giving technical help to reopen Kabul airport — until the Taliban have trained air traffic control in place, no aircraft is suitable.
Of course at least 3 to 5 years , we are just discussing , what kind of aircraft would be good for Afg considering it's size and regional powers around and the military budget
 

Follower

New Member
On the longer term, anything China is able to gift to the Taliban and willing to maintain on their behalf — the core of their Air Force is 1 helicopter pilot that defected to their side.

Once you realise that the Taliban has frightened away all Afghan air traffic controllers and Qatar is giving technical help to reopen Kabul airport — until the Taliban have trained air traffic control in place, no aircraft is suitable.
One pilot is the one who been defected to them but no they have pilots , more than 4 or more helicopters being flying even that they used a blackhawk with a machine gun in Panjshir as reports say
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 2: Understanding what it means to be a Chinese client state

Of course at least 3 to 5 years , we are just discussing , what kind of aircraft would be good for Afg considering it's size and regional powers around and the military budget
1. Unless China commits to injecting more than US$331 (to US$600 million each year), for the next 10 years —otherwise in 3 to 5 years, Afghanistan will be much more like Somalia. There is no hurry for Beijing to waste money in Afghanistan until the other party is desperate. The US$31 million (in aid), is Beijing throwing lose change at the Taliban.

2. Beijing will need the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) to surrender sovereignty over Bagram Airfield, so that Chinese and/or Pakistani troops (dressed as civilian contractors) can enter the country quickly, if they are to invest US$3 billion to US$6 billion OVER 10 years.
(a) The terms for IEA for Chinese SOE investments in Afghanistan will not be better than what Pakistan gets. The port of Gwadar, on Pakistan's Makran coastline near the Strait of Hormuz, is owned and operated by a Chinese firm. Make no mistake, Pakistan has surrendered sovereignty over its ports that China has invested in.​
(b) In Apr 2015, China's navy evacuated 225 foreign nationals and almost 600 Chinese citizens from Yemen's southern port of Aden, amid fierce fighting there. If China is to invest in Afghanistan, the PLA will work with Chinese SOEs to ensure that they have a secure an alternate withdrawal route via Bagram Airfield. Using Kabul airport alone as the last ditch defence for withdrawal is just too risky.​

3. The Taliban has given a lease to Kabul Airport, to Qatar and partners (with an agreement for foreign troops to be dressed as civilian contractors), because they can’t operate it — which is why every professional military understands that what the Taliban say and do are not connected. If the Taliban need to deliver something by helicopter in 2024 to 2026, I suspect that they would be better off giving their pals in the ISI a call, for air support. It’s not easy to train a pilot (and it takes a few years to be a rookie pilot under the Singapore system):
  • Basic military training (9 weeks)
  • Air-Grading (6 weeks)
  • Common Leadership Module in OCS (2 weeks)
  • Air Force Service Term (7 weeks)
  • Jungle Orientation (2 weeks)
  • Aviation Ground School (3 months)
  • Basic Wings (6 to 9 months)
  • Advanced Flying Course (about 15 months)
4. Talking about an Air Corps for Afghanistan is like saying the Taliban have artillery — yes, they have 122mm guns but how they use it, is not like an army. Military aviation is just a bit more complex than firing a gun, which is why the Pinoys keep crashing their helicopters (like their brand new S-70i Black Hawk helicopter, one of 16 purchased in 2019 from Poland, that crashed in June 2021) and seeing their C-130Hs catch fire on the tarmac or crashing their C-130H at Jolo Airport in Sulu, Philippines in July 2021. And the Pinoys, in technical ability, is a golden mile ahead of the Taliban.

5. The Taliban can pretend all they like, but they are not an army, nor can their aviation wing be called an Air Corps. A real army does not parade suicide bombers during a parade — it’s such a shameful thing to see a ‘country’ reduced to parading suicide bombers with pride.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
Of course at least 3 to 5 years , we are just discussing , what kind of aircraft would be good for Afg considering it's size and regional powers around and the military budget
Assuming several prerequisites are met [a major if] the aim should in my opinion be to get a handful of Mil-17s flying and to create a pool of pilots and support personne - thus will take time. Naturally external help would be needed for training, as well as other forms of assistance.
 

Follower

New Member
1. Unless China commits to injecting more than US$331 (to US$600 million each year), for the next 10 years —otherwise in 3 to 5 years, Afghanistan will be much more like Somalia. There is no hurry for Beijing to waste money in Afghanistan until the other party is desperate. The US$31 million (in aid), is Beijing throwing lose change at the Taliban.

2. Beijing will need the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) to surrender sovereignty over Bagram Airfield, so that Chinese and/or Pakistani troops (dressed as civilian contractors) can enter the country quickly, if they are to invest US$3 billion to US$6 billion OVER 10 years.
(a) The terms for IEA for Chinese SOE investments in Afghanistan will not be better than what Pakistan gets. The port of Gwadar, on Pakistan's Makran coastline near the Strait of Hormuz, is owned and operated by a Chinese firm. Make no mistake, Pakistan has surrendered sovereignty over its ports that China has invested in.​
(b) In Apr 2015, China's navy evacuated 225 foreign nationals and almost 600 Chinese citizens from Yemen's southern port of Aden, amid fierce fighting there. If China is to invest in Afghanistan, the PLA will work with Chinese SOEs to ensure that they have a secure an alternate withdrawal route via Bagram Airfield. Using Kabul airport alone as the last ditch defence for withdrawal is just too risky.​

3. The Taliban has given a lease to Kabul Airport, to Qatar and partners (with an agreement for foreign troops to be dressed as civilian contractors), because they can’t operate it — which is why every professional military understands that what the Taliban say and do are not connected. If the Taliban need to deliver something by helicopter in 2024 to 2026, I suspect that they would be better off giving their pals in the ISI a call, for air support. It’s not easy to train a pilot (and it takes a few years to be a rookie pilot under the Singapore system):
  • Basic military training (9 weeks)
  • Air-Grading (6 weeks)
  • Common Leadership Module in OCS (2 weeks)
  • Air Force Service Term (7 weeks)
  • Jungle Orientation (2 weeks)
  • Aviation Ground School (3 months)
  • Basic Wings (6 to 9 months)
  • Advanced Flying Course (about 15 months)
Well i just knew that you are just another hater and you info equals nothing , just let those hopes for youself

@Follower There is no need for this attitude. We require that you respect other posters on here. Also abuse of a Moderator isn't a very good idea.

Ngatimozart .
 
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Follower

New Member
Once the Gov is recognized there will be a really fast development of the Air force , with about 12 Attack Helicopters , 30 Transport Helicopters and about 12 4th Gen Fighter jets which are enough for Afg for more than 5 years
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Once the Gov is recognized there will be a really fast development of the Air force , with about 12 Attack Helicopters , 30 Transport Helicopters and about 12 4th Gen Fighter jets which are enough for Afg for more than 5 years
Yeah, sure, right... Can you please provide a rational explanation on how this is supposed to come about. Where are these aircraft coming from? How is this getting paid for? Where are the minimum of 96 trained pilots needed coming from? How/where is the stream of trained pilots going to come from? Where are the needed replacement parts going to come from to keep aircraft flying? Where are the ground crew and maintainers going to come from?

It is one thing to offer a "wish list" but it is something else entirely to propose an actual, workable force. What has been proposed is a force which would require specific specialist skills, and given what I understand the overall level of education to be, it would be rather difficult to establish the required numbers of pilots and maintainers/ground crew to enable that many aircraft to function. Particularly since there was no mention of any sort of training aircraft...
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Follower,

Even if by some miracle cash was made available overnight, impossible for them to operate and sustain the force structure you menntioned. There simply isn't the needed training'/suppott infrastructure.

The best the can do under present circumstances is to approach certain foreign countries for assistance in getting a handful of Mil-17s operational. Even that might take time if they're unable to coax any former ANA people to return.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 2 of 2: Understanding what it means to be a Chinese client state

6. Given the direction the country is moving, the collapse of the Afghan economy is likely to occur as fast as the military collapse of Kabul. The current Taliban acting governor of the Central Bank issued a circular, advising banks to limit withdrawal to their individual customers to AFS2,000 per week or about US$24 (at a conversion rate of 1 Afghanis to US$0.012). This cash-withdrawal restriction indicates that the Taliban regime is facing enormous financial constraints that will intensify; and the Taliban and their backers are responsible for it. This "sudden stop" according to Atif Mian (Professor of Economics, Public Policy, and Finance at Princeton University),“…makes Taliban's second coming very different from their first in economic terms. The first time they came to power, Afghanistan was a subsistence economy with no particular reliance on foreign flows for local demand… So ordinary Afghans did not experience as large a negative decline as they are going to experience now. It seems like its going to be a much tougher road for the Taliban this time.” IMHO, all efforts to assist Afghans will remain meaningless unless the Afghan economy can be stabilised.

7. Economists call this phenomenon a “liquidity trap” when uncertainty forces people to hoard cash bringing economies to a standstill. The Taliban’s extreme interpretation of Sharia Law has caused enormous unease among the population, especially women and it will wipe out entire industries in Afghanistan that were formerly viable. The Taliban face a host of additional economic issues that include:

(a) The inability to print domestic currency​
(b) Stoppage of US$7 billion TAPI gas pipeline — the Taliban do not fully understand the complexities of the project. As a result of the sanctions regime and security concerns, European companies will not be able to provide equipment or the financing. They will certainly not be able to obtain insurance for the project.​
(c) Taliban hopes to profit from the country’s mineral resources have to be scaled back — or abandoned. These need international financing, and insurance to further develop and the list includes:​
(i) the Aynak copper mine, one of the largest untapped sources in the world, which the Metallurgical Corporation of China acquired rights to in 2008;​
(ii) the Hajigak iron ore mine, a mine with world-class iron ore content, for which an Indian firm signed a contract;​
(iii) the Amu-Darya oil basin, where the China National Petroleum Corporation has the rights to drill; and​
(iv) unlikely that Pakistan can provide the level of financial support required for stability to replace these lost projects.​

8. China with Pakistan are providing some but this aid falls far short of the US$19 billion that the West was giving each year. Many in the 3rd World don’t understand China’s approach to aid. Beijing is being generous, when it sells vaccines at their cost or below cost. To facilitate investments and trade, Beijing will give maybe 10% to 20% of vaccines delivered for free (but will expect to be paid for the other 80% to 90%).
(a) The Chinese are generous to client regimes, in aid, but they do expect to get paid within the same year, for other contracts. Chinese aid does come with strings, as shown in Myanmar.​
(b) Beijing’s No. 1 and 2 client regimes are Pakistan, and North Korea. In distant third and fourth, are Myanmar and Cambodia, whereas Afghanistan does not rank as a top 10 Chinese priority (as it has relations with Iran and Turkey to consider).​

What has been proposed is a force which would require specific specialist skills, and given what I understand the overall level of education to be, it would be rather difficult to establish the required numbers of pilots and maintainers/ground crew to enable that many aircraft to function. Particularly since there was no mention of any sort of training aircraft...
9. Never mind specialist skills, this picture explains the trajectory of Afghan aviation.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
For two decades, Afghanistan Air Corp practically run by US support and maintain by Defense Contractor. This shown up until now, ANA doesn't have capabilities to maintain their air assets independently.

So if they want to build their Air assets again, then they have to replace those contractors with China or Pakistan personnel.What OPSSG wrote is shown clear condition of Afghan personnel.

Taliban is not ANA. Despite their latest defeat, ANA personnel has been trained and work for long time along the US, NATO and defense contractors, as part of their transition to become independent on maintaining their assets. This proses is not finish, but at least they have some transfer knowledge already.

Taliban doesn't have that, and most of those trained ANA personnel are running away from Taliban. So what Moderators and other members in here point out, Taliban need to build that with the help from China and Pakistan. Cause don't think anyone else want to do it (building and helping Taliban Air Assets).

For that they will have to give concession to China and Pakistan. @Follower open your mind and see the reality. Like I said even after two decades, ANA still need foreign contractors help to maintain their assets. What do you even think that Taliban after five years can operate all those assets you dream off ??

I'm only touching the issue on technical capabilities to operate and maintain. Not yet on the issue how Taliban can afford that.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
We will see
So you really think that the Taliban can operate and sustain rotary wing capabilities? The image in @OPSSG post above tells me different. The Taliban are indiscipline and unprofessional. There are many militaries in the world who can barely march in time and know how to properly mount a guard, who definitely know that you DO NOT stand on rotor blades, especially when they are attached to a helicopters rotorhub. If we have to explain the reasons why then the cause is lost because the people are to dumb to train. But I will try.

If someone manages to start the helicopters engine, those two specimens of Taliban high quality of intelligence are going to be subject to a very quick lesson in fundamental Newtonian physics - the change of a body from a position of rest to that of motion. In this case the force will be a rotational force as the rotor blade rotates around the shaft. Your two specimens of brilliance will flung off.

The rotor blades of helicopters are very finely balanced and shaped. Any changes to to that has the potential to cause devastating consequences for the aircraft. These changes can and / or will cause vibrations that ca destroy a helicopter. The mere fact of standing on those blades can cause a slight bend in them.

It's all very well have religious fervour etc., but you also require real world knowledge, skills and experience in order to operate in this world and that includes modern technologies and knowledge. At the same time you should encourage and nurture all of your people to gain an education and achieve their best. That includes females because their brains and intelligence are just as good as any male. Some of the world's leading authorities are women.
 
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