The Russian Navy has less than 20 carrier qualified pilots.
Admiral Kuznetzov class
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This has become an interesting thread on STOBAR/STOVL vs CATOBAR, but as far as the comparison of the ship characteristics we need to step back a second. There is a lot of focus on technology, and it does matter, but I would argue the wrong technologies are being attributed to superiority.
Russian Naval doctrine is heavily influenced by the lessons learned near the end of WWII, and is very different than western naval doctrine, particularly for carriers.
For those who never studied the differences between 1939-1943 WWII aircraft carrier doctrine and 1944-> naval doctrine, lets review a few things.
Towards the end of WWII, as fleet defense systems improved, air strikes on fleets became extremely difficult, and costly. Attacker losses mounted heavily compared to defender, and ship based defenses could cripple the attacker creating vulnerability to counter-attack. The 3rd Fleet under Adm Spruance carried almost exclusively fighters on all 15 big deck carriers, with very few bombers at all on the big deck carriers, so the combination of improved AAW defenses throughout the fleet and massive numbers of fighters for defense led to outstanding statistics of destroying attacking Japanese aircraft.
At the same time, Halsey, whose 5th fleet ran with more bombers than Spruance did, had less success towards the end of the war than towards the early period of the war, precisely because the Japanese air defenses were so much better. Even the engagement at Leyte Gulf bears this out, while the Taffy force had enough aircraft to deliver severe punishment, they simply couldn't because the air defenses were so capable. It was in fact the combination of the suicidal tendencies of those airmen and equal madness of the US destroyers that made the difference. In the end, air attacks over several days were largely irrelevant to that battle, with most of the Japanese ships sunk in that battle by torpedoes and guns, from both submarines and surface ships.
Russian Naval doctrine was influenced by this. Throughout the cold war, including through the construction of Admiral Kuznetsov, the Russian Navy was built to provide massive defense at the fleet level. The constitution of the Russian Fleet bore this out, they build an aircraft carrier to provide AAW defense, several Kiev class ships to provide ASW defense, and almost all of their cruisers were designed for AAW defense. They had limited strike power on cruisers and destroyers, but for the most part strike power was intended to come from long range bombers and massive numbers of submarines. Compared to NATO, one can see the massive difference in doctrine styles, defense vs offense.
Very long range, fast cruise missiles were developed for offensive strike power, but rather than launching these cruise missiles from the fighter aircraft on their carriers, they stored these strike weapons on their fleet, making ships and subs, not aircraft. primary strike weapons. That is why Russia lists the Admiral Kuznetsov as an aviation cruiser, just like they did the Kiev class.
The Su-33 is not a strike platform in the traditional sense anymore than the Admiral Kuznetsov is an aircraft carrier in the traditional sense. In wartime, if command of the sea was in dispute, you would almost certainly never see the Su-33 conduct any mission profile other than air defense and scouting.
In the cold war, the theory would be to keep NATO ASW assets at bay, NATO strike aircraft away, and ultimately pinpoint the fleet so the combination of submarines and land based strike aircraft could swarm NATO forces. Additionally, as a follow up or if necessary, the large Russian cruisers could deploy shipwrecks and other cruise missiles from very long range.
Since the end of the cold war, carrier aviation has changed in the west, moving to multi-role aircraft like the Hornet and Super Hornet. This reflects many things, but one fundamental aspect is the recognition by the US that defense is more capable than offense at sea, at least from the air. When you account for doctrine and technologies, the biggest differences between western and Russian carrier aircraft is the E-2, which provides a major scouting role advantage.
While people can debate the merits of various other technologies and tactics to determine whose methodology is superior, whether offensive or defensive etc, the most substantial difference in western and Russian aircraft carrier doctrines is the role of scouting, where nations like the US and France have huge advantages over nations like Spain, Italy, Britain, and Russia, all of whom rely on long range land based assets. Of the last 4, Russia has the advantage IMO only because they have superior offensive and defensive capabilities throughout the rest of their aviation fleet and surface forces, but if you start comparing Russia to the French or US, the E-2 is the game changer, and with the US the EA-6B and future EA-18G put the US in a different league, ahead of most of the worlds air forces.
Russian Naval doctrine is heavily influenced by the lessons learned near the end of WWII, and is very different than western naval doctrine, particularly for carriers.
For those who never studied the differences between 1939-1943 WWII aircraft carrier doctrine and 1944-> naval doctrine, lets review a few things.
Towards the end of WWII, as fleet defense systems improved, air strikes on fleets became extremely difficult, and costly. Attacker losses mounted heavily compared to defender, and ship based defenses could cripple the attacker creating vulnerability to counter-attack. The 3rd Fleet under Adm Spruance carried almost exclusively fighters on all 15 big deck carriers, with very few bombers at all on the big deck carriers, so the combination of improved AAW defenses throughout the fleet and massive numbers of fighters for defense led to outstanding statistics of destroying attacking Japanese aircraft.
At the same time, Halsey, whose 5th fleet ran with more bombers than Spruance did, had less success towards the end of the war than towards the early period of the war, precisely because the Japanese air defenses were so much better. Even the engagement at Leyte Gulf bears this out, while the Taffy force had enough aircraft to deliver severe punishment, they simply couldn't because the air defenses were so capable. It was in fact the combination of the suicidal tendencies of those airmen and equal madness of the US destroyers that made the difference. In the end, air attacks over several days were largely irrelevant to that battle, with most of the Japanese ships sunk in that battle by torpedoes and guns, from both submarines and surface ships.
Russian Naval doctrine was influenced by this. Throughout the cold war, including through the construction of Admiral Kuznetsov, the Russian Navy was built to provide massive defense at the fleet level. The constitution of the Russian Fleet bore this out, they build an aircraft carrier to provide AAW defense, several Kiev class ships to provide ASW defense, and almost all of their cruisers were designed for AAW defense. They had limited strike power on cruisers and destroyers, but for the most part strike power was intended to come from long range bombers and massive numbers of submarines. Compared to NATO, one can see the massive difference in doctrine styles, defense vs offense.
Very long range, fast cruise missiles were developed for offensive strike power, but rather than launching these cruise missiles from the fighter aircraft on their carriers, they stored these strike weapons on their fleet, making ships and subs, not aircraft. primary strike weapons. That is why Russia lists the Admiral Kuznetsov as an aviation cruiser, just like they did the Kiev class.
The Su-33 is not a strike platform in the traditional sense anymore than the Admiral Kuznetsov is an aircraft carrier in the traditional sense. In wartime, if command of the sea was in dispute, you would almost certainly never see the Su-33 conduct any mission profile other than air defense and scouting.
In the cold war, the theory would be to keep NATO ASW assets at bay, NATO strike aircraft away, and ultimately pinpoint the fleet so the combination of submarines and land based strike aircraft could swarm NATO forces. Additionally, as a follow up or if necessary, the large Russian cruisers could deploy shipwrecks and other cruise missiles from very long range.
Since the end of the cold war, carrier aviation has changed in the west, moving to multi-role aircraft like the Hornet and Super Hornet. This reflects many things, but one fundamental aspect is the recognition by the US that defense is more capable than offense at sea, at least from the air. When you account for doctrine and technologies, the biggest differences between western and Russian carrier aircraft is the E-2, which provides a major scouting role advantage.
While people can debate the merits of various other technologies and tactics to determine whose methodology is superior, whether offensive or defensive etc, the most substantial difference in western and Russian aircraft carrier doctrines is the role of scouting, where nations like the US and France have huge advantages over nations like Spain, Italy, Britain, and Russia, all of whom rely on long range land based assets. Of the last 4, Russia has the advantage IMO only because they have superior offensive and defensive capabilities throughout the rest of their aviation fleet and surface forces, but if you start comparing Russia to the French or US, the E-2 is the game changer, and with the US the EA-6B and future EA-18G put the US in a different league, ahead of most of the worlds air forces.
I was trying to pull people away from the simple comparative fallback reference which always degrades to fixed wing combat. I've deliberately injected the words organic and packages to steer this to more than an issue of getting ord on targets - however, it always back to mano on mano, fighter on fighter comparisons. (unfortunately)
Perhaps I'm being too subtle. The importance of CATOBAR vis a vis STOBAR when you look at packaged organic events is significant.
Whats been missed by most is that the volley rate for organic packages is whats critical - not just volleying fixed wing combat. The availability of cats, the number of cats, the redundancy that is provided, the ease of tasking etc.... becomes significant.
Unfort, the responses to date have focussed on the pointy jets.
Very informational insight Galrahn. If the soviet doctrine is to have the offence part undertaken by land based strike and land based aviation, this will be usefull when the fight is close to russian mainland. But what if the fight takes place far from Russia?
Also regarding the E2, the AK has the Kamov 52 Helix as an eye in the sky does it not?
Also regarding the E2, the AK has the Kamov 52 Helix as an eye in the sky does it not?
Even if it does it has nowhere near the range, endurance and altitude of the Hawkeye.
A separate question that relates to how the a fleet operates, does Russia have anything like the USN's Link-16 or even the older Link-11?
Yes. Datalinks was always strong point of any big soviet system. Be it aircrafts, AD system or naval groups. Everyone heard of AEGIS, but USSR naval groups had very similar system
Admin Text Deleted. That comment was unnecessary. The discussion is technical, not emotive. If you want to give credit to Russian systems that are parallel to AEGIS or PAAMS then start another thread and demonstrate their technical capability
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Link is separate from Aegis, 2 different systems.Yes. Datalinks was always strong point of any big soviet system. Be it aircrafts, AD system or naval groups. Everyone heard of AEGIS, but USSR naval groups had very similar system - just without these pretty names
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Gf: As has been stated there is avery large difference between CATOBAR & STOBAR/STOVL in terms of sortie rates, and this will tell when putting a package together, no one is disputeing that. HOWEVER the user pays a price in the tednological sophistocation needed to utilise steam cats, and incurrs real monetary, reliabililty and maintinance costs. Clearly cats are not worth it for some navies i.e. the UK on the QE class.
As for the discussion droping to "mano eh mano" i'm not sure what your reffering too. The majority of the discussion has have nothing to do with the individual fighters capabilities but wether the logistical complexity of cats is worth it for tier 2/3 navies and wether the MTOW limitation is significant and if it can be countered by buddy refuleing. I mentioned fighter vs fighter once because in a comparison between STOBAR & STOVL (nothing to do with CATOBAR) because the only major difference i could see is the platform limitations of STOVL i.e. MiG 29K/SU 33 vs Harrier.
Gharlain:
Exellent post mate, many very pertinante points...
This may indeed have been the original doctrine behind the devlopment of the kuznetov class carrier. However the strategic environment has changed, and the russian navy is left with a carrier designed to fill a specific need without said need. However the Kuzt's have real potential for becoming an instrument of power projection in the current strategic environment. The fact that the SU-33 is only a fighter is not a deal breaker, if it was upgraded to SU-30mk(?) standards it would provide the russian navy with an very capable and flexible stike capablility. Therefore the doctrine under which it was originally designed becomes less relevent in the current strategic environment and the accompaning change of doctrine in the RN, and its potential as a true, multi role carrier should indeed be considered.
As for the discussion droping to "mano eh mano" i'm not sure what your reffering too. The majority of the discussion has have nothing to do with the individual fighters capabilities but wether the logistical complexity of cats is worth it for tier 2/3 navies and wether the MTOW limitation is significant and if it can be countered by buddy refuleing. I mentioned fighter vs fighter once because in a comparison between STOBAR & STOVL (nothing to do with CATOBAR) because the only major difference i could see is the platform limitations of STOVL i.e. MiG 29K/SU 33 vs Harrier.
Gharlain:
Exellent post mate, many very pertinante points...
This may indeed have been the original doctrine behind the devlopment of the kuznetov class carrier. However the strategic environment has changed, and the russian navy is left with a carrier designed to fill a specific need without said need. However the Kuzt's have real potential for becoming an instrument of power projection in the current strategic environment. The fact that the SU-33 is only a fighter is not a deal breaker, if it was upgraded to SU-30mk(?) standards it would provide the russian navy with an very capable and flexible stike capablility. Therefore the doctrine under which it was originally designed becomes less relevent in the current strategic environment and the accompaning change of doctrine in the RN, and its potential as a true, multi role carrier should indeed be considered.
what I am saying that some of the coments demonstrate a paucity of comprehension - and the fact that some have missed the subtlety of what I have been trying to say reinforces that.
In absolute terms, the discussion about fighter "a" or fighter "b" is irrelevant. Its all about the multiple "P's" of warfighting at a package level.
The weight of discussion and some of the responses have been pretty ordinary in that respect. If people don't understand the importance of volley rates and organic elements (and whether its STOBAR, STOVL or CTOL they're all effected by the same tertiary requirment) , then its a pretty dumbed down conversation.
Thats the harsh reality.
/subtle mode finally off
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And submarines, never forget submarines.
SSGNs in particular were important to Russian fleet commanders because they could launch a massive strike at a different vector than an air strike. The coordination between a land based bomber strike and a pair of SSGNs from a second and third vector was considered the zenith of offensive power at sea.
This was practiced btw, the expectation that a defending NATO CV force would go active under air attack would allow submarines to determine position for SSGN strikes.
In the cold war, simultaneous missile attacks along multiple threat axis was expected to mission kill an entire enemy fleet, and even today I question how effective CEC and other tech improvements would contribute against such an attack.
K-52, like all helicopter based radar platforms, are a good tool for scouting, but as has been said they are limited by range of detection and individual endurance, making it difficult to keep a forward deployed AEW system. They are very useful against low flying subsonic (stealthy) anti-ship missiles like the Harpoon. That is another example how Russian naval based aviation is designed for the defense role.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Maybe I'm as dumb as everyone else, but i thought you made your point pretty clear. The volley rates of CATOBAR carriers give allow the user to generate packages much faster, and next to the ability to put real AEW and AAR assets in the air, this is the biggest advantage of CATOBAR. Sure thats fine, AFAIK no one was claiming anything different. However there are other issues to consider.
Irrelevent is a big word, and its use is were i disagree with this statement. Now i'm not understimateing the importance of the package, no platform EVER flies a sortie alone, however at a fundimental level the capabilities of said platform dictate the capabilities of the package. An example is the SU-33, which due to the limitations of the platform will not be able to effecteively conduct strike missions. Increased volley and package generation rates will not change that.
With reguards to the major difference between CATOBAR and STOBAR, volley & package generation rates are indeed a significant difference. However would the difference in said rates between two evenly weighed opponants (ok, de gaul and kuznetov) outweigh the advantage of E2C & dedicated AAR? If so could you elaborate? i.e. whats th magnitude of he difference in sortie rates and is it enough to outweigh the huge advantage of dedicated AEW 9which is in itself a HUGE advantage)?
Sorry, plain(and plane) wrong. You only have to look at the aircraft loadout on a variety of Carriers in service to see that very few have the capacity to run real depth of field organic missions. The others are handicapped immediately across a number of support levels. That means that mission parameters are compromised and have to be configured accordingly.
You can't make a silk purse out of a sows ear no matter how much you gussy it up.
No I won't. I regard that kind of info (at a meaningful level) as something thats sensitive wrt to future conflict scenarios in our region.
It is BMCI system with very strong reliance on network capabilites. As such, my comment is completely justified.
How complex(financially-technically) are catapults over the ski/rampcombination with vertical landing or assisted recovery?
STOVL vs. STOBAR effectiveness?
As they say an academic exercise.
and
What will the kuznetsov do till 2030? (much less how will it do it)
The reason behind the lack of AEW-EW stuff could be how will the Kuznetsov carry any, when there are none around to fly from him?
STOVL vs. STOBAR effectiveness?
As they say an academic exercise.
and
What will the kuznetsov do till 2030? (much less how will it do it)
The reason behind the lack of AEW-EW stuff could be how will the Kuznetsov carry any, when there are none around to fly from him?
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I'm not tuned into the improvements of ithe Su-33, maybe someone knows if the Russians can deploy the Su-33s in a ground attack? I'd guess if not, they have at least been working on it. My theory being, if the F-14D can, the next Su-33 will too some day.
I really appreciate this discussion Ozzy because it aligns well with others I've been having on other forums, and because your comments finally allowed me to realize why my perspective is so much different than others when it comes to Russian naval aviation forces and plans.
I don't agree with your assessment of Russian Navy doctrine lacking a future requirement for forward fighter support because of the changing environment, in fact I'd argue exactly the opposite.
One aspect of the recent deployment observed was the use of Tu-160s for long range strike, and the Su-33 force able to provide close fighter support to those bombers at the point of attack. Due to the reach of the Russian naval aviation forces, I suspect Russia sees tremendous value in protecting its bomber force with forward deployed carrier based fighters, particularly in a land attack mission profiles against a lesser power.
From a strategic perspective, long range bomber sorties from Russia guarded at the point of attack by forward deployed CV aviation is an enormous capability, a capability beyond any nation in the world besides the United States. In my opinion, that advantage is hardly "less relevant in the current strategic environment", I see it as just the opposite given the difficulty of forward basing for Russia.
I've gone into considerable detail of my thoughts here. I really appreciate your observations in this thread, because it highlighted that westerns see naval aviation as an offensive role, failing to see how Russian naval aviation, which is and has always been primarily defensive, fits very well in the emerging strategic environment, more important in fact than how naval aviation fit into the context of the Soviet fleet during the cold war.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Galrahn, I really enjoyed you blog its an interesting read. I have a few problems with your conculsions however.
First let me say that I never said the fighter escort role of the SU-33 was irrelevent, just less relevent in the current strategic environment. The combination of strategic air power with a fighter escort at the point of action is a formidable combination in the marritime strike role. However as stated by yourself utiliseing strategic air power to interdict naval lines of communication or large battlegroups centred arround a CVN is no longer as relevent in strategic terms as it was in '85.
Therefore the role of the russian navy has changed somewhat, and if the RF intends to truely become a global alternative to the US, it needs similar strategic reach. Lets face it, Russian strategic air power will never provide the kind of global reach that a deployable, sustainable, multi role CV(N) capability would. Tu 160 or Tu 22 can not realistically reach out any further than mid atlantic or mid pacific with a decent war load. That is a rather limited reach in global terms. Therefore the conclusion that the combination of strategic air power coverd by naval aviation is a substitute for multi role CV (which can also provide said capability) without global baseing infestructure, only realistically applies to Europe and North Asia (North America would be a suicide mission).
Russian naval aviation doctrine may indeed be defenceive, however it seems that said doctrine is in conflict with the strategic aims it is designed to further. If Russia truely intends to become a global superpower once again, it must have sustainable, global reach and without global baseing infestructure, strategic air power simply can not provide it, even with fighter escort at the point of action. IMO not developing the Kuznetov's (or future CVN's) offenceive capability becasue of a reliance upon doctrine developed in a compleatly different strategic environment with different strategic aims is not maximzeing current strategic returns. Doctrine needs to be adaptable to achieve the goals that have been set. Strategic air power does not need to be abandoned, and can still be used in the same was as the dictated by current doctrine, however useing your carriers in a purely defenceive role drastically limits your global reach, which is illogical if your strategic goal is global influence.
First let me say that I never said the fighter escort role of the SU-33 was irrelevent, just less relevent in the current strategic environment. The combination of strategic air power with a fighter escort at the point of action is a formidable combination in the marritime strike role. However as stated by yourself utiliseing strategic air power to interdict naval lines of communication or large battlegroups centred arround a CVN is no longer as relevent in strategic terms as it was in '85.
Therefore the role of the russian navy has changed somewhat, and if the RF intends to truely become a global alternative to the US, it needs similar strategic reach. Lets face it, Russian strategic air power will never provide the kind of global reach that a deployable, sustainable, multi role CV(N) capability would. Tu 160 or Tu 22 can not realistically reach out any further than mid atlantic or mid pacific with a decent war load. That is a rather limited reach in global terms. Therefore the conclusion that the combination of strategic air power coverd by naval aviation is a substitute for multi role CV (which can also provide said capability) without global baseing infestructure, only realistically applies to Europe and North Asia (North America would be a suicide mission).
Russian naval aviation doctrine may indeed be defenceive, however it seems that said doctrine is in conflict with the strategic aims it is designed to further. If Russia truely intends to become a global superpower once again, it must have sustainable, global reach and without global baseing infestructure, strategic air power simply can not provide it, even with fighter escort at the point of action. IMO not developing the Kuznetov's (or future CVN's) offenceive capability becasue of a reliance upon doctrine developed in a compleatly different strategic environment with different strategic aims is not maximzeing current strategic returns. Doctrine needs to be adaptable to achieve the goals that have been set. Strategic air power does not need to be abandoned, and can still be used in the same was as the dictated by current doctrine, however useing your carriers in a purely defenceive role drastically limits your global reach, which is illogical if your strategic goal is global influence.
Strange, I thought USAF bombers have operated from CONUS bases against targets on the other side of the globe with decent war load.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
And they enjoy global baseing infestructure which the russians do not, read my entire post.
Well, but there's the in-flight refuelling. Where is the requirement for Russia to project power? Surely not in Southern America, but to Africa at most?
With refuelling en-route from tankers based along the way.
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