A-10 The ground pounders friend

[ngatimozart]

Since we're discussing CAS issues and platforms, just to get some opinions. For countries that have a requirement for a prop powered CAS platform, what would be the determining factor in choosing either a Super Tucano or a gunship configured CN-235 or a CN-295; apart from factors like procurement cost, hourly operating cost, endurance, range, payload, commonality, operational requirements and threat level?

http://defensetech.org/2011/10/19/atks-light-gunship-package/

Airbus Military | Missions

If it was a roll on roll off system it could be cost effective. IT technology now makes possible to mount weapons and I/O sensor without hardwiring. Use of WiFi etc., makes this possible. In my country's case we've just bought 11 T6C Texan IIs so theoretically it would probably be cheaper for us to acquire the weapons to fit the hard points.

EDIT: Flight Global article on SCAR (self-contained aerial reconnaissance) pod. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/singapore-scar-pod-leaves-mark-on-show-395817/ Uses a WiFi connection between the pod and an user operated laptop.

 

[Volkodav]

I don't know about owning the skies over Korea. The Soviet airforce took quite an active part in that conflict (iirc 2 fighter divisions and 1 bomber division at the peak). That having been said your overall point is quite accurate. Air power doesn't necessarily win wars. It depends on what the objectives of the conflict are.



That makes sense, thanks.



There's a surprising number of third world Su-25 operators in the third world for example Africa (Sudan, Congo, etc.). So it's certainly not that unique. Though I'm not sure how effective they are in using it, but they do keep buying them. There was a sale of used Su-25s to the Congo quite recently from Ukraine.



The Su-25 got it's nickname "rook" in Afghan during the Soviet campaign there, for doing exactly that. Diving into canyons and picking the mujahadeen off out of their caves, and fortified positions, in many cases taking obscene amounts of damage but staying in the fight. There were many instances where even after using up all of its payload (including cannon rounds) the planes would continue to imitate attack runs, to scatter enemy forces, or force them to seek cover.



So there's no money to be made doing that? Strange. How maintenance intensive is the A-10? Would a third world operator be able to keep them flying, provided spares were available?

Not wanting to start anything here but I get the impression that while the USAF wants to control just about anything that flys they really have very little interest in missions supporting the other services. In particular they only appear to do the minimum they think they can get away with to prevent the Army being given their own fixed wing assets to provide tactical support (transport ISR etc.) and CAS.

The USAF appear to have given up trying to kill USN and USMC aviation but their worst nightmare appears to be the US Army gaining the sort of organic aviation capability the USMC has had for decades. The A-10 is probably a quite different machine to what the US Army would have specified if they controlled the requirements.

 

[Waylander]

One should have a look at the Brasilians and their usage of Super Tucanos.
They even hunt down the Cessnas and other small aircrafts which are used by drug runners.

Very versatile, easy to maintain, cheap to operate and in it's modern versions it can employ a multitude of weapons. Nothing with which one decimates tank columns in a MIC or HIC environment but enough for LIC of all kinds.

Do any of our specialists know how it would fare in hot and high conditions like found in Afghanistan?

As for the Su-25. I always thought if it as a very good aircraft for the cash strapped 2nd and 3rd countries out there.

Subsaharan african countries use their aircraft mostly for ground pounding. A Su-25 brings a big punch to the table and all that with a good price, rather modest operating costs and lots of spare parts and instructors available.

When push comes to shove re air superiority thereis always the possibility of buying MiG-29s or Su-27s as well as mercenary pilots like the Ethiopians and Erithreans did.

 

[ngatimozart]

Not wanting to start anything here but I get the impression that while the USAF wants to control just about anything that flys they really have very little interest in missions supporting the other services. In particular they only appear to do the minimum they think they can get away with the prevent the Army being given their own fixed wing assets to provide tactical support (transport ISR etc.) and CAS.

The USAF appear to have given up trying to kill USN and USMC aviation but their worst nightmare appears to be the US Army gaining the sort of organic aviation capability the USMC has had for decades. The A-10 is probably a quite different machine to what the US Army would have specified if they controlled the requirements.

Interesting comment. I have the same impression as well. However as an outsider I could be mistaken given the complexity of the US system.

 

[RobWilliams]

Since we're discussing CAS issues and platforms, just to get some opinions. For countries that have a requirement for a prop powered CAS platform, what would be the determining factor in choosing either a Super Tucano or a gunship configured CN-235 or a CN-295; apart from factors like procurement cost, hourly operating cost, endurance, range, payload, commonality, operational requirements and threat level?

http://defensetech.org/2011/10/19/atks-light-gunship-package/

Airbus Military | Missions

I'm quite a fan of the C-295, it's an airframe which can do tactical transport, AEW, MPA and as a gunship (in different configurations) and seems pretty ideal for countries with a smaller budget and requirements who want to trim life costs.

Although i'd imagine having the aircraft configured in a gunship role seems a bit more specialised than a brace of Super Tucano.

 

[Gremlin29]

Not wanting to start anything here but I get the impression that while the USAF wants to control just about anything that flys they really have very little interest in missions supporting the other services. In particular they only appear to do the minimum they think they can get away with to prevent the Army being given their own fixed wing assets to provide tactical support (transport ISR etc.) and CAS.

The USAF appear to have given up trying to kill USN and USMC aviation but their worst nightmare appears to be the US Army gaining the sort of organic aviation capability the USMC has had for decades. The A-10 is probably a quite different machine to what the US Army would have specified if they controlled the requirements.

Your impression is shared by many in the Army. In the late 80's the USAF was looking at retiring the A10. The Army wanted them to replace the OV-1 who's mission was still relevant but without replacement airframes every time an OV-1 was written off there was nothing to replace it with. The USAF diddn't like the idea of giving a bomb dropping capable aircraft to the dirty Army boys so they made the transfer and training painful enough to disuade the Army. I have many anecdotes about the AF and it's quirky policies, the AF looks out for the AF and they definately don't give the impression that they are there to support anything outside of their own agenda. As we say in the military, perception is reallity. I'm saying this as it pertains to the organization, there are those from within that do the AF credit (JTAC's quickly jump to mind) but they are the exception and not the rule.

Feanor, I wasn't saying the Su-25 was unique to Russia, just that it's use as you described was unique to it and it's users. Providing CAS in a large city can be extremely difficult if ones ROE includes PID of hostiles from beginning to end of an engagement and assurance of no collateral damage. That is practically impossible to do with cannon, rocket or dumb bombs. That's the reason Hellfire is often used in the city, it's blast radius isn't that big and it is very precise.

 

[Volkodav]

I imagine that had what led to the A-10 been an army programme we would have seen A-4Ms and OA-4Ms or similar in army colours, maybe with a KCA cannon working in conjunction with a purpose designed turboprop powered replacement for the A-1.

 

[StobieWan]

I seem to recall the Cheyenne program came under a lot of pressure from the A/F back in the day? As did the AH-64 when that came along.

As to the A10, I suspect it's a bit much for a low intensity COIN environment where a country could easily operate a Tucano or similar - why run something as big and heavy if you're not getting shot back at?

 

[Volkodav]

I seem to recall the Cheyenne program came under a lot of pressure from the A/F back in the day? As did the AH-64 when that came along.

As to the A10, I suspect it's a bit much for a low intensity COIN environment where a country could easily operate a Tucano or similar - why run something as big and heavy if you're not getting shot back at?

From what I have read the USAF did not like the Cheyenne at all as they saw it as the army trying to get around not being allowed fixed wing attack aircraft.

It makes sense to me that a mix of cheap but effective turboprop types for COIN and a versatile attack jet, that could also be used for interdiction and battle field air superiority as required, for high intensity conflicts would have made more sense than a flying tank destroyer.

 

[John Fedup]

From what I have read the USAF did not like the Cheyenne at all as they saw it as the army trying to get around not being allowed fixed wing attack aircraft.

It makes sense to me that a mix of cheap but effective turboprop types for COIN and a versatile attack jet, that could also be used for interdiction and battle field air superiority as required, for high intensity conflicts would have made more sense than a flying tank destroyer.

The A-10 may be dated now but it was appealing back in the day when NATO faced over 30,000 Warsaw Pact tanks. As for COIN/CAS, turboprop fighters and attack helicopters seem to be the better solutions today.

 

[Volkodav]

I am curious as to how the Skyhawk performed as a tank buster in Israeli service, I know they suffered considerable losses as they were thrown into the fray to give army reserve units time to mobilise.

The reason I ask is I am wondering if the A-10 would have done better or even as well in the same circumstances, going up against a layered air defence system in an effort to slow an armoured offensive, exactly what the A-10 was intended to do on Europe.

 

[StobieWan]

A10 would have been better protected against trash fire and manpaads but that would only help in terms of letting them get back home - they made the switch to higher altitude very quickly in DS as almost every aircraft on the line had been hit multiple times and there was no way that that pace could be sustained without major losses.

The Iraqi's feared them for sure but they lacked the kit required to positively identify forces and at night were limited in utility.

 

[swerve]

To be fair, the qualities of the A-10 which I think Mr Conti values are those inherent to the platform, & I think we should judge it on those. Avionics & weapons can be fitted or integrated on to many platforms, & I'm sure the A-10 could be given better sensors, communications, etc.

...Each missile cost more than an average home

$28500 for APKWS, $60000 for Hellfire. Very cheap houses....

. I guess nothing is ever learned from past mistakes. Benghazi comes to mind

How would A-10s have got to Benghazi? They'd have needed local airfields to be able to mount standing patrols over the front. That would have needed ground forces to defend it (unless you were happy to have it defended by local militias of uncertain loyalties & competence), plus logistical support via a secure port (more troops), or a massive air bridge.

An A-10 can stay on station for a long time.

If, & only if, it has a local base. See above.

 

[StobieWan]

If, & only if, it has a local base. See above.

And if the enemy don't have an air force I guess...or at least, not in contested air space.

 

[swerve]

Yeah.

The A-10 might have been very effective in Central Europe against massed Soviet armour. The life expectancy of the pilots would have been extremely short, due to effective Soviet SAMs & fighters, but that was accepted as unavoidable in that war, the one which we're all glad didn't happen.

Sending pilots off to die & hoping for a favourable exchange ratio isn't acceptable in the wars we're fighting nowadays, however.

When you have a big enough technological & economic advantage to enable you to stand back & hit precisely what you want to, without having to loiter in the trashfire waiting for targets of opportunity, why not use it? The advantages of the A-10 thus become unnecessary. When you're able to bomb while cruising above MANPADs & light AA, & there's nothing else threatening you, the ability to resist a lot of fire & absorb a lot of what you can't resist becomes surplus weight.

I can, however, think of one country for which the A-10 might be a valuable asset: South Korea. If Kim Jong Un turns out to be crazier than his father & grandfather & starts a war, something designed for a target-rich environment with relaxed ROEs, a lot of trashfire, & an acceptance of high casualties as long as the exchange rate is good enough, could come into its own.

 

[John Fedup]

I am curious as to how the Skyhawk performed as a tank buster in Israeli service, I know they suffered considerable losses as they were thrown into the fray to give army reserve units time to mobilise.

The reason I ask is I am wondering if the A-10 would have done better or even as well in the same circumstances, going up against a layered air defence system in an effort to slow an armoured offensive, exactly what the A-10 was intended to do on Europe.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War showed that ATGMs like Sagger and the US TOW along with lots of RPGS could be just as effective as any aerial tank buster. This war was a brutal reminder never to counter attack enemy armour without infantry support along side.

 

[StobieWan]

Yeah.

The A-10 might have been very effective in Central Europe against massed Soviet armour. The life expectancy of the pilots would have been extremely short, due to effective Soviet SAMs & fighters, but that was accepted as unavoidable in that war, the one which we're all glad didn't happen.

Sending pilots off to die & hoping for a favourable exchange ratio isn't acceptable in the wars we're fighting nowadays, however.

When you have a big enough technological & economic advantage to enable you to stand back & hit precisely what you want to, without having to loiter in the trashfire waiting for targets of opportunity, why not use it? The advantages of the A-10 thus become unnecessary. When you're able to bomb while cruising above MANPADs & light AA, & there's nothing else threatening you, the ability to resist a lot of fire & absorb a lot of what you can't resist becomes surplus weight.

I can, however, think of one country for which the A-10 might be a valuable asset: South Korea. If Kim Jong Un turns out to be crazier than his father & grandfather & starts a war, something designed for a target-rich environment with relaxed ROEs, a lot of trashfire, & an acceptance of high casualties as long as the exchange rate is good enough, could come into its own.

Gooood point - hadn't thought of SK ..and yeah, if that lit off, it'd look very much like the war the A10 was aimed at.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I don't know about owning the skies over Korea. The Soviet airforce took quite an active part in that conflict (iirc 2 fighter divisions and 1 bomber division at the peak). That having been said your overall point is quite accurate. Air power doesn't necessarily win wars. It depends on what the objectives of the conflict are.

They certainly did.

Once the americans decided to let the sabres go hunting beyond mig alley the russians (including those initially flying the first batch of chinese migs) never came up to fight

the north korean mig pilot defectors made it pretty clear that the sabres owned the skies - and in fact there were more frequent issues of migs going up to rack up time but stayed away from the hot areas. He rated the latter chinese flown migs as more aggressive but not as competent as the russians

 

[Feanor]

They certainly did.

Once the americans decided to let the sabres go hunting beyond mig alley the russians (including those initially flying the first batch of chinese migs) never came up to fight

the north korean mig pilot defectors made it pretty clear that the sabres owned the skies - and in fact there were more frequent issues of migs going up to rack up time but stayed away from the hot areas. He rated the latter chinese flown migs as more aggressive but not as competent as the russians

It's interesting to hear from the other side. Can you recommend good reading on the USAF operations over Korea? What I've read, in Russian, on the subject seems to disagree with what you're writing. But honestly I've read fairly little on it.

I can, however, think of one country for which the A-10 might be a valuable asset: South Korea. If Kim Jong Un turns out to be crazier than his father & grandfather & starts a war, something designed for a target-rich environment with relaxed ROEs, a lot of trashfire, & an acceptance of high casualties as long as the exchange rate is good enough, could come into its own.

How survivable is the A-10 against cannon fire? 37mm, and 23mm?

 

[gf0012-aust]

It's interesting to hear from the other side. Can you recommend good reading on the USAF operations over Korea? What I've read, in Russian, on the subject seems to disagree with what you're writing. But honestly I've read fairly little on it.

The material I read came from a bio done by No Kum-sok - and by subsequent follow on debriefs