Should Germany become a military superpower again?

Should Germany become a military superpower again?

  • Yes it should.

    Votes: 66 49.6%
  • No it should not.

    Votes: 67 50.4%

  • Total voters
    133
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Not open for further replies.

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The fact that we had to "borrow" a LHD from the USN - and bow out when the US Administration didn't ok the mission - might be the more convincing thing. Might not have occured if another carrier had been chosen, say HMS Ocean.
I haven't heard anything about real equipment criticism. The primary point was apparently that there was a one-week decision lag after the hostage-taking on whether to deploy GSG9 at all. Within the given time-frame, a German LHD would have to have been in theater already, no way really to sortie down there within a three week timeframe.

On a side note, the Federal Police is getting four new transport helos (more AS-332L1 iirc) and twelve Dingos for use in Afghanistan among other places, along with thirty troop transport vehicles and 190 patrol cars for use in Germany. Within the next year. It's not like they're underfunded or anything like that.
 

Falstaff

New Member
The fact that we had to "borrow" a LHD from the USN - and bow out when the US Administration didn't ok the mission - might be the more convincing thing. Might not have occured if another carrier had been chosen, say HMS Ocean.
I haven't heard anything about real equipment criticism. The primary point was apparently that there was a one-week decision lag after the hostage-taking on whether to deploy GSG9 at all. Within the given time-frame, a German LHD would have to have been in theater already, no way really to sortie down there within a three week timeframe.
Apparently some people in Berlin are happy there is an excuse from outside. Speculations are that rivalry between police (GSG 9) and Bundeswehr (KSK) made the Bundeswehr convince the Americans not to ok the mission.
Besides that obviously there were some difficulties to organize airlift as there were not enough capacities available when needed.
The equipment on location seemed to be ok.
 

Verstandwaffe

New Member
Why? Is there some benefit for Germany or the rest of the world?

I won´t elaborate if for the rest of the world, for example I see no benefit for Mexico having UK such important Navy.

This is not a matter of the past, Germany can not ride itself into the future by solely watching the rearview mirror.

On the other side Germany thinks that keeping it's forces with no projection capability will help it´s image on what happened time ago, but on the other side, openly or not, many german companies have helped (in secrecy) Israel to develop weapons that have killed thousands of civilians, so I think things must be clear straight, if not I see a real contradiction if the idea is to be a pacifist country.

Attending just facts, these are situations that may get clearer why I think Germany should (at least) have a better navy deployed:


1. Largest exporter worldwide for years, even if that changes and Chine eventually gets on top, Germany will be an exporter country
2. Largest or one of the largest and in many areas more specialized merchant navies in the world.
3. Even for it´s military industry would be fine (3rd ranked by export numbers), customers I guess feel more confident if seller country uses the weapons and not only exports them.

I think more projection resources will be fine and will fit anyway with Germany current policy and within NATO, but at the same time a little of independence is fine.
 
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Tavarisch

New Member
Well, yes i mean personally id sleep better knowing that there was another strong ally to help america/NATO/UN and other alliances :)
In my personal opinion, NATO doesn't need to exist anymore. The threat of Soviet forces launching an invasion into Europe no longer exists. And as far as I know, the EU keeps Europe together more than NATO does, but that's because EU is more versatile than NATO in most aspects.

However, the enemy is no longer there. And it's not like Russia wants to have another Cold War. They don't want another one, and don't plan to instigate one anytime soon, or anytime at all. Look at their economy, it's not going to last very long if they intend to re-make the scenes in the Battle of Alfeld from Red Storm Rising EVEN IF THEY WANTED TO. In fact, I recall Vladimir Putin wanting Russia in NATO, but the request was denied.
 

Falstaff

New Member
In my personal opinion, NATO doesn't need to exist anymore. The threat of Soviet forces launching an invasion into Europe no longer exists. And as far as I know, the EU keeps Europe together more than NATO does, but that's because EU is more versatile than NATO in most aspects.
I believe there are already a few threads about if NATO needs to exist or not. As this is clearly OT I'll only respond that NATO today is a lot more than defending against Russia, which btw does a lot these days to become western world no 1 evil empire again.
Besides that, NATO and EU are very, very different things. I recommend reading a bit about the EU.
Finally what keeps Europe together is not the EU but millenia of common cultural history.

In fact, I recall Vladimir Putin wanting Russia in NATO, but the request was denied.
Oh, I never thought this statement would resurface again. Please inform yourself about the context in which this statement was made and what it was intended to trigger. Putin never wanted Russia in the NATO.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Well, yes i mean personally id sleep better knowing that there was another strong ally to help america/NATO/UN and other alliances :)
By definition as a superpower Germany would then make its own politics though. Not necessarily coinciding with US politics. :D
 

Bewolf

New Member
Sorry for coming late here, but I feel I have a thing or two to add.

Fist of all, how do you define a Superpower? Do you take all factors of a country into account, economy, political stability, diplomatic power, etc. or is it the military responsible for most of that reputation?

And is beeing a superpower in the traditional sense an advantage to the average people living in such a country?

If I take a look at the US, the USSR and lately Russia, to me the question rather appears to be "no".
Superpowers often feel to be "above" other nations. Not even with evil intend, but simply because of the nature of things. Indeed they "are" above other countries and play on another level. But as it is with human nature, there always is a tendency to dislike the mightiest fractions, especially as the strongest boys on the yard usually also are the bullies.

As a result the superpowers hardly ever enjoy a good reputation, especially as sooner or later all superpowers abuse their powers, as proven in history on so many occasions.

This kinda offsets the diplomatic advantages gained by military means. Short term military solutions do not stand up to long term diplomatic investment, a condition that equals the difference in gaining your goals through threat or respect.

I have quite a bit of confidence in this assessment in comparing the history of Germany to other current and former supowerpowers since the end of World War 2. Despite beeing a parted, moraly and militarily beaten and largely destroyed nation, Germany regained it's economic and political influence after only 60 years at a level never seen before, while all other principal World War 2 participants saw a decline sooner or later.

The USSR is the best example here. It wanted to be a Supwerpower so badly, it bankrupted itself for it's military spending. Without ever fighting a major war. The sums sunk into this military over the course of 60 years is absolutely unbelieveable. If Russia invested this money into her economy, she nowadays could sustain her cold war militaries with ease. Her ppl would be far better of in overall living conditions, education, infrastructure and income specificly. And just imagine how the US could look today with investments the size of it's military spending. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, wars that brought nothing to the american people but a short lived warm glowth to the rightous heart before reality kicked back in. Same with the USSR, in Afghanistan, in controlling eastern Europe. A whole country so gripped in Paranoia over a western attack to destroy their communist system they finally crashed it in their determination to defend it.

Both nations also are looked down as morally inferior by the rest of the world today. The USSR was the universal "evil" anyways, and since the Bush years the US took over this world wide reputation. Countries that were and are generally more seen as a threat then part of a solution, just as was Germanys standing in Europa at the eve of WW1.

After WW1 that pride and arrogance, always obvious with nations that somehow managed to attain a dominant role, was hurt, responsebilities for failure put upon others. Quite similiar to what happens in Russia right now. Despite their economic malaise, they rearm to play a game of sabre rattling again, instead of investing the money from her natural ressources in reconstructing the country and making it robust enough to endure the near future, laying the foundations to eventually rebecome a Supwerpower in 50-70 years on a then expanded and and strong economy to provide the income nessecery to maintain a standing military without hurting the overal performance of the country on a much higher standart of living. The same course China followed after the Mao years, and look where they are heading now. Then again, now China is rearming as well, trying to copy the old pattern in beeing since the 19th century nation states, something that eventuell will contribute to her downfall a century later. Just as happend with the german, british and japanese Empires, the USSR and to a lesser degree, the US

What's adding to this, Germany today is one of the most respected and influental nations on this planet. This realisation only becomes visible slowly, but polls and assessments on a worldwide basis support this perception. Germany acts through backchannels, never pushing itself to the front, always voluntarily staying a step back. At the world summit, it was Sarzkoy doing the talking, while Merkel was standing in the back. Quite a few of the results of this summit were within german interests. A very good example of how most of german foreign politics work.
This staying in the back and humbleness gives Germany a lot of credit in world affairs, other countries actually are willing to listen to us.

To give a few examples, it's mostly Germany doing the talking between Russia and the west, based on a special relationship formed between the countries shortly after the war with Adenauer and his travels to Moscow to bring german POWs home. Willy Brandts Ostpolitik continued and deepend this relationship, even though this behaviour was seen suspiciously by the US. A lot of this later contributed to the reunification of Germany and today to a larger influence on russian acting the even the US.
Similiary, sensible exchanges and dialouges of palestine/general middle east and israel are usually executed through german channels, as both side respect Germany for it's fairness, though the current involvement of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan hurts this a bit. And the political weight Germany carries within the EU (and through it on the world stage) and its economic influence should be obvious. In a way Germany is already dominating Europe, able, willing and actually managing to accomplish most of her national interests and thus is in exactly the position both world wars had as an eventual goal.

That this is not associated with a rather chauvinistic view on military might in this case is an advantage, as Germany simply does not go out there to make itself enemies to defend against. Even now we don't so much defend ourselves in Afghanistan and our peacekeeping missions, but our reputation within our alliances to be a trustworthy and reliable partner.

Certainly this only works until someone else wants to deliberately make us their enemies. But apart Germanys ability to quickly rearm should the need arise, this is rather unlikely. The EU alone achieved what only Bismarck managed before, forming alliances to secure Germanys back, an underlying fear dominating all german actions from expiriences of the 30 and 7 years wars until the end of World War 2.

If we again become a superpower, this game will repeat itself, sooner or later. There is nothing to gain in this, but all to lose. And the losses in public spending would directly cut into our childrens future and standart of living.

I personally would rather allocate more ressources in exploring space, if life is not to become too boring in the long run.
 

Verstandwaffe

New Member
Bewolf a very good writing from you which coincides with articles in magazines and newspapaers I have read... about the west - east menaces Germany was always afraid of (thus a military doctrine was created to cop with this).

And as Forbes or Fortune stated Germany could be seen as 2nd "super power" of the world ( I am still looking for that article) based on politics, economics, assistance to other countries, technology, etc.

But still a super power or not being such a big exporter and having the biggest merchant ship worldwide and with so much peacekeeping and stabilization missions abroad Germany should be able to project force and at least protect it's own interests.


Here a note which I received from Der Spiegel on the issue:

Politics on the High Seas: Are German Anti-Pirate Forces Hampered by Bureaucrats? - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International

POLITICS ON THE HIGH SEAS
Are German Anti-Pirate Forces Hampered by Bureaucrats?
By SPIEGEL Staff

A review of the political complexities behind a recent aborted anti-pirate operation off the coast of Africa has revealed that German security agencies tend to fight each other sooner than the enemy. Politicians in Berlin are trying to draw lessons from the failed mission.

The return of the would-be heroes from Harardhere took place almost as quietly as their departure three weeks earlier. After landing at Cologne-Bonn last Tuesday evening, the chartered flight from Mombasa was directed to a military section of the airport, where nondescript-looking busses awaited the 200 members of Germany's GSG-9 elite federal police unit.

There was no champagne, no buffet, no cameras, no press. It wasn't the reception that GSG-9 chief Olaf Lindner, or August Hanning, a junior secretary at the Interior Ministry, had in mind. Hanning had made a special trip to Cologne to greet the frustrated elite troops. He had trouble hiding his disappointment.

Lindner gave Hanning another detailed account of the highly successful dress rehearsal for storming the German freighter, the Hansa Stavanger. He also explained how thrilled the US special forces were with the Germans. And he said US colleagues on the American helicopter carrier the USS Boxer were extremely impressed with the Germans' cutting-edge equipment.

Hanning knew the rest. Ever since Somali pirates had boarded and hijacked the Hansa Stavanger on April 4, and abducted the crew, including five German sailors, a crisis team had met almost every day in Berlin. Hanning himself had to announce that the US government had pulled the plug on the GSG-9 operation off the coast of the Somali pirate stronghold of Harardhere roughly two weeks ago. He'd witnessed the squabbling among ministries in Berlin, the complicated and contradictory levels of decision-making, the political blame game.

But how could he explain to the demotivated men of GSG-9 that operative ability and a political will to conduct foreign operations were sometimes light-years apart? How could he break the news to Germany's elite forces that, when in doubt, German bureaucrats were more prepared to fight each other than to tackle Somali pirates?

It's not the same as, say, the Labor Ministry in Berlin squabbling with colleagues from the Family Ministry over the details of rent subsidies -- or the economics minister attacking the finance minister because he doesn't agree with the amount of money offered under Germany's car-scrapping bonus plan. That's all part of business as usual in a democracy.

But when the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries lock horns while thousands of kilometers away a strike team waits for orders, then it's no longer democratic business as usual -- it's a matter of national security.

'Post-Heroic' Politics

The failed Somali mission can also be explained by the fact that, since the end of World War II, Germany has been reluctant to engage in violent interventions -- in contrast to the US and France, which used their militaries to secure the release of hostages over the past few weeks. In the words of Berlin political scientist Herfried Münkler, Germany is a "post-heroic society." Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the country would like to play a key role on the international stage. But it's rarely prepared to bear the consequences.

The typical German response to hijacking and hostage threats has been the way of the bank account, not the special military mission. Since this strategy tends to save hostages' lives, a broad consensus has emerged among the general public that ransom payments are acceptable. But paying ransom, in the long run, is an inadequate response to the asymmetrical warfare conducted by Afghan Taliban fighters and Somali pirates. There's a world of difference between Berlin sensitivities and the raw realities of a failed state.

Over the past few months, these realities prompted German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of the left-leaning Social Democrats (SPD), to search for an alternative. They'd had enough of checkbook diplomacy, so they decided to organize an aggressive hostage rescue to send a strong signal to the pirates not to mess with Germany.

The Germans proved themselves last Thursday when the special forces command of the German military, or KSK, captured a Taliban leader in a spectacular operation in northern Afghanistan. After the flop in Somalia, it was a sign that Germany would resist falling back into old patterns.

But news of the Afghan military operation also shed cruel light on the reasons the hostage rescue operation off the coast of Harardhere was doomed to fail. The Bundeswehr, or German military, is solely responsible for the KSK elite unit, but no less than three ministries were involved in the planned GSG-9 operation: Foreign, Interior and Defense. The German Federal Police, the Bundeswehr and various commando and leadership levels also wrangled over power and influence. The scuppered operation to free the hostages illustrates what is wrong with the nation's security architecture.

Germany's closest allies operate differently in such crises. In France and the US the presidents decide whether hostages abroad should be freed by force. Then experts on the ground carry out the plan as well as they can, and if it fails, the president -- as commander in chief -- takes the heat.

Government leaders in Berlin prefer to pass such issues down the ladder, where interministerial struggles often take over. It can be impossible to reconstruct afterwards just who supported and who opposed a given operation. This is compounded by a chancellor who, as a matter out of principle, avoids commitment, issues no directives and delegates problems to her cabinet.

There are "no recognizable coordination efforts from the chancellery," says Sascha Lange from a think tank called the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Merkel dispatched only a departmental head to the crisis team meetings, while she herself took a trip over the Easter break -- right in the middle of the critical operational planning phase -- and enjoyed a holiday on the Italian resort island of Ischia. Merkel's chief of staff Thomas de Maizière was briefed on the situation, but he indicated no preference for a particular course of action.

With no firm political leadership, the squabbles between participating ministries can spiral out of control. The German Foreign Office heads the crisis team and thus has the job of freeing the hostages -- but it has no authority over an operation by the GSG-9. The elite police force is under command of the German interior minister, who cannot deploy the commandos without the defense minister, whose navy patrols the Indian Ocean to combat piracy.

Everyone is in charge, in other words, but no one is at the helm.

The chancellor has maintained a safe distance from all participants. She seems unwilling to risk a botched operation just a few months before an upcoming election. This would make the foreign minister -- her rival in the fall -- responsible for any fiasco. If the GSG-9 mission had failed, Interior Minister Schäuble might have resigned too, because he, according to German law, has to give the final strike order together with the foreign minister. Merkel could have dodged any political flak.

Two Warring Units

This lack of political leadership is compounded by other problems. The German government has two elite units intended for crisis situations like the one in Somalia. Both have their hands slightly tied. The KSK was established in 1996 to "save and evacuate" Germans in trouble abroad, but this military force is chronically undermanned and hard pressed in Afghanistan. Only some 200 out of a total of 400 available positions in the German special forces are currently filled, meaning that the KSK is unavailable for missions in Somalia. KSK operations also require approval by the German parliament.

The roughly 200 men of the GSG-9 police unit are perfectly trained for hostage-taking situations, but they have trouble reaching remote locations. The GSG-9 is therefore dependent on the military's aircraft and ships.

Why can't the GSG-9 and KSK cooperate to balance these deficits? The answer is simple and sobering: The two units can't stand each other, and the aversion grows every time they try to work together.



Part 2: Spats, Rivalries, Contradictory Field Assessments


Ever since the two elite units freed hostages last summer, "they haven't been on good speaking terms," says a member of the military. At the time, a group of criminals in the border region between Egypt and Sudan had abducted 11 tourists, including five Germans. The German government dispatched over 100 GSG-9 police along with KSK forces, workers with the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, and Transall cargo planes.

The hostages were released before the special units could fire a shot. But the actual trench warfare took place between GSG-9 head Lindner and KSK Brigadier General Hans-Christoph Ammon. The police were afraid that the KSK wanted to seize command of the operation, and the army was annoyed because the GSG-9 had sent an advance commando before the KSK units had reached the area.

The soldiers were particularly offended by a show staged by the police when they returned to Germany. At the airport in Berlin, the GSG-9 men ostentatiously lined up in front of their Lufthansa plane in parade formation -- without their usual masks. While the police filed past, the KSK soldiers had to stay humbly in their seats, waiting for the photographers to disappear, so no one could recognize them.

In Berlin the GSG-9 is said to be better suited for missions like the one in Egypt. But the aborted mission in Somalia also revealed a range of weaknesses. Spats, rivalries and contradictory field assessments are certainly not limited to interactions with the KSK. During the Somalia mission there were also deep divisions within the Federal Police that nearly immobilized the agency. Police overrode police, and the head of operations in Potsdam contradicted the head of operations on board the US helicopter carrier Boxer. It became clear that the German Federal Police, which had been reformed only a year ago, wasn't equipped to handle crises, or at least not a crisis on the other side of the globe.

A Fair-Weather Structure

On April 4, after the first reports reached Germany that the Hansa Stavanger had been seized by pirates, the country's police force formed a special organizational structure which was to be based in Potsdam, at the headquarters of the Federal Police. The command was assumed by Joachim Franklin, head of the Federal Police Regional Headquarters in Bad Bramstedt, where he could be responsible for emergencies at sea.

This made Franklin the most important man in the operation. But he was 6,000 km (3,700 miles) from Harardhere.

Under Franklin's command was GSG-9 head Lindner, as "on-scene commander." This fair-weather structure is outstandingly well suited to handling domestic disasters like a train wreck in Germany's industrial heartland, or even a hostage situation at a small bank in the otherwise quiet town of Winsen an der Luhe. It's unsuitable for freeing a freighter in a remote corner of the world, where criminals have the upper hand.

While Lindner had access to reconnaissance aircraft photographs, US military analyses and on-location reports, the Federal Police in Potsdam had to rely on other sources to assess the situation for the Interior Ministry, including freely available information such as Google Maps on the Internet. This conflict came to a head in the last few days before the mission. Franklin made an appointment with Interior Ministry State Secretary Hanning to voice his concerns.

Franklin said the Federal Police in Potsdam was advising against the operation -- it was too risky. He said it was still unclear where the hostages were being held on the ship, and he added that the time between the possible discovery of the attack commando and the boarding of the Stavanger was too long. Berlin was left with the impression that the man from the Federal Police wanted to abort the operation.

In fact, the situation looked very different in the Indian Ocean. While Franklin was conveying his concerns in Berlin, Lindner was training his troops day and night. The GSG-9 tested rappelling from the air and using suction equipment to climb the side of a vessel. The US Navy SEALs on board the USS Boxer assisted during these exercises, adding to a growing sense of optimism on board the helicopter carrier. On April 27, the Monday before the planned operation, Lindner wired an upbeat risk assessment to Berlin. But he said the dress rehearsal would determine the final decision.

The last rehearsal was conducted during the night from Tuesday to Wednesday. According to sources in Berlin, the result was "outstanding." Lindner now believed he could launch the operation with a justifiable amount of risk. He'd also picked a specific time. He wanted the GSG-9 to strike early on May 1, Friday morning. Just a few hours before US National Security Advisor James Jones withdrew American support for the operation, the GSG-9 commander sent his optimistic message to Berlin.

But who or what had moved Jones to pull the plug on the mission? There is a rumor circulating in a number of ministries and agencies in Berlin that the Bundeswehr had contributed to this decision with critical assessments of the situation, which had allegedly also been sent to US Central Command in Bahrain. According to this version of events, although the commanders on board the Boxer supported the operation, the headquarters in Bahrain voted against it in Washington.

The decision prompted Hanning to ask his counterpart from the Defense Ministry, Peter Wichert, for a word on the sidelines of the crisis team. He wanted to know if there was any truth to the rumor. Had the Bundeswehr actually passed on a statement to the Americans? Wichert denied it. No such statement had been issued, he said.

'The Sword is Dull'

In the wake of the failed Somalia mission, most of the major players in Berlin now realize that things can't continue in the same vein. There won't be a second operation without reforms because "the sword," as a high-ranking official from the crisis team says, "is dull." A repeat failure is too predictable. Interior Minister Schäuble and Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung now want to hold talks with other European countries and the US government to ensure that the transport of the GSG-9 at sea and in the air will go smoothly in the future.

"Germany apparently can't resolve hostage crises like this on its own, but is instead reliant on outside help," says Peter Struck, a former defense minister who leads the Social Democrats' parliamentary faction, and "we have to seriously consider the question of whether we should build up our own capabilities to handle similar situations."


Both special units lack large cargo aircraft for long-distance transports, big ships to transfer troops, reconnaissance instruments and modern communications technology. "The deficits are well-known," says defense expert Lange with biting sarcasm. "We've been debating them for 15 years."

Little has apparently changed since the first foreign mission by Bundeswehr infantry and supply troops. In 1994, US and German units beat a hasty retreat after abandoning the disastrous United Nations operation in Somalia. Since the Americans didn't allow their allies on board their landing ships, the Bundeswehr had to evacuate its rearguard troops by cramming them onto a narrow frigate. After the recent failed GSG-9 mission, Defense Minister Jung may exhume old plans for a German landing ship.

More equipment alone won't be enough. From now on, Germany will undoubtedly avoid having dual strategists in Potsdam and on location in the field. Birgit Homburger, a defense expert with the opposition liberal Free Democrats, is calling for a new policy decision to use the KSK instead of the GSG-9 in the future. She says this would place the leadership of an operation "unequivocally under one agency" -- the military. Her SPD colleague Rainer Arnold advocates that the two units should at least "train together and collaborate."

Schäuble took Jung aside during a cabinet meeting last week. He wanted to know if the Defense Ministry would be willing to station a kind of mobile task force consisting of KSK soldiers and frogmen on the German frigates in the Indian Ocean, at least as a provisional measure? This could make it possible to quickly end hijackings before the seized ships reach the pirate ports on the coast. Jung remained noncommittal.

He's aware that Schäuble's suggestions don't have a good track record. In response to a request by the Interior Ministry, Jung sent a submarine to Somalia to secretly observe the pirate stronghold from periscope depth and drop off GSG-9 men. On the way there, the much-praised fuel cell propulsion system -- which allows the world's most advanced conventional submarine to stay under water for weeks on end -- came to a grinding halt. Before it even reached the Suez Canal, U-34 was stopped in the Mediterranean by engine trouble.

REPORTED BY RALF BESTE, MATTHIAS GEBAUER, KONSTANTIN VON HAMMERSTEIN, HOLGER STARK, ALEXANDER SZANDAR, ANDREAS ULRICH.

Translated from the German by Paul Cohen.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
As usual, overly long article from Spiegel... and they miss some of the most significant points.

Namely, that GSG9 is a police unit. And the German constitution expressly forbids mixing police and military.

Also, KSK would have been totally unsuitable for the mission - not because they lack manpower, but simply because they do not have a amphibious/maritime arm. That mission operationally falls to the Navy Special Forces (SEK-M) within the Bundeswehr, the KSK's "maritime" units are restricted to riverine and coastal approach over or under water towards stationary or mobile land targets. The KSK does not have the necessary means or training to attack floating targets.

Ah, and minor point: the operational strength of the KSK is typically given at 450-500, not 200. Their STAN strength is 1,100 though, not 500.
 

Falstaff

New Member
@Bewolf: Yes, a good writing indeed. I do not agree with everything you write, but I don't want to be an nitpicker. You summed it up pretty well, IMO.

Overly long or not, the article shows that our forces (police and military) are not prepared for such incidents. We lack the organisational structures, we lack the legal foundations (when will we get a "Einsatzrecht"?) and the means to transport and base special operation forces where they are needed.
To my understanding, how can it be that the director of operation on location is overruled by the one in Berlin?
IMHO, in case of such a situation, the chancellor must have the ability and responsibility to command such an action without interference from 3 different ministeries.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Sorry, disagree.

we lack the legal foundations (when will we get a "Einsatzrecht"?)
No we don't. There have been a number of legal analyses and comment on this case already, and they all say that everything is clearly defined and covered:
It's covered as a police action by standing law - and it would have been covered as a military action too, by the EUFOR Atalanta mandate.

Einsatzrecht is a legal term for operations laws and rules of engagement. Both forces - police and military - have them, and they're clearly defined (actually, a bit more refined with the police, since they use it every day).

IMHO, in case of such a situation, the chancellor must have the ability and responsibility to command such an action without interference from 3 different ministeries.
The chancellor? The chancellor has absolutely nothing to say about anything action-wise. He or She has Richtlinienkompetenz only - the power to set the direction the government is steering in. It's enshrined in the constitution, you know.

It's up to the Interior Minister to decide a GSG9 mission, and no one else. It's up to the Foreign Minister to clear the action with host nations, if taking place in another country. And the Bundeswehr only got involved because they think they're supposed to run the show.

The situation is being exploited and hyped - especially by Schäuble and Jung - in order to gain more competencies and funding for their respective forces.
Arguably including Schäuble trying to shove a number of his pet projects through the back door, such as wanting to use the Bundeswehr domestically.
 

Falstaff

New Member
Sorry, disagree.
You're welcome ;)

No we don't. There have been a number of legal analyses and comment on this case already, and they all say that everything is clearly defined and covered:
It's covered as a police action by standing law - and it would have been covered as a military action too, by the EUFOR Atalanta mandate.

Einsatzrecht is a legal term for operations laws and rules of engagement. Both forces - police and military - have them, and they're clearly defined (actually, a bit more refined with the police, since they use it every day).
In this context you're right but I was thinking more of the incidents that took place in Afghanistan on may 7th and 8th. I think that it is not a good situation that the basis for German troops to actually fight is self-defence. Although there are statements that following enemies in such a case is self-defense, there are a lot of people that think otherwise, and the fact alone that the attorney had to state in public that the soldiers that killed 2 talibs would not be prosecuted is a scandal in its own right. We need a solid legal basis for soldiers that fight abroad.

The chancellor? The chancellor has absolutely nothing to say about anything action-wise. He or She has Richtlinienkompetenz only - the power to set the direction the government is steering in. It's enshrined in the constitution, you know.
Oh, I know, and I think that has to change in situations like these. I think that a situation similar to the case of defense should be defined and implemented in which, when German or EU cititzens lives are at stake abroad, the chancellor has the authority to command such a mission and take responsibility for it.

The situation is being exploited and hyped - especially by Schäuble and Jung - in order to gain more competencies and funding for their respective forces.
Arguably including Schäuble trying to shove a number of his pet projects through the back door, such as wanting to use the Bundeswehr domestically.
I don't think that secretary Jung is ressourceful enough to do something like this. He is just trying to get through his term somehow, IMO.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Oh, I know, and I think that has to change in situations like these.
Nah, i don't see any need for that. There was never any problem in getting GSG9 on the ground, never between 1977 and now. And in combination with the SEELIFT unit of the THW, they do have a solid logistics base for that too.

The reasoning for the lack of command authority of the chancellor over police and military forces is well-founded in Germany. Just like the even weaker position of the president.
Technically, even the definition of the "defense case" violates the Freiheitlich-Demokratische Grundordnung. Simply because it was defined after the BVerfG defined the FDGO in 1953 :D
(and quite seriously, ever looked up what the "defense case" entails politically in Germany, with regard to ... restrictions to constitutional rights? nationalization of industry?)
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
So what would you propose to do in order to avoid situations like this one for the future?
Clear definitions. Define clearly under which circumstances it will be a police op, and under which it will be a military op.

Say if there is a mandate for a longer-term military "occupation" operation in place (such as in Afghanistan, but also off the coast of Somalia), make it a military operation with responsibility laying with the military command. Otherwise, clear case for the GSG9, with no involvement from the military other than maybe support.

Perhaps, in future mandates for such missions as ISAF, include a definition whether certain operations in the defined theater such as hostage freeings will be done by police. Since they're all time-limited, there'd be a clear definition for every military op in place within half a year or so.
 

Verstandwaffe

New Member
How ironic is history, now many are trying to awake old and great prussian military tradition:

Germany's low-key military passes a battle milestone - Feature

Posted : Mon, 18 May 2009 05:05:54 GMT
Author : DPA
Category : Europe (World)
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Germany's low-key military passes a battle milestone - Feature : Europe World

Berlin - Row upon row of tiny toy warships from the 1930s fill a private Hamburg museum, a testimonial to a lost era when enthusiasm for all things military was not uncommon in Germany. The models - originally designed to train sailors to recognize warships by their silhouette - were once eagerly collected. That contrasts sharply with the modern day, when a German soldier died in battle in Afghanistan in April - the first German combat death in decades - and the event was largely overlooked.

After their defeat in World War II, the study of military matters dropped off as a German pastime. At the same time, an annual public survey by the armed forces social-sciences institute shows 85 per cent of Germans have a positive image of the forces.

That contradiction means Germany has a military it likes, but also largely ignores, sometimes to the point of hurting morale.

"Not an armed forces in the world can rely solely on modern arms: they also need the backing of their citizenry and sympathy for their dangerous duties. A well-meaning indifference to the Bundeswehr is not good enough," President Horst Koehler told a security conference late last year.

There are still a few military enthusiasts around, but Germans tend to know less than many foreigners do about Prussian military innovations of the 19th century or why German arms and tactics were once held in such awe worldwide.

Modern Germany, founded in 1949, waited six years before creating its own armed forces, in 1955, to resist a possible Soviet invasion. For more than half a century the army trained, but never went to war.

Few noticed when the modern German military marked its first combat death in decades on April 29. An infantryman, 21, shooting at Taliban rebels near Kunduz, Afghanistan was killed when an enemy rocket-propelled grenade struck his light-armour Dingo vehicle.

"It's the first time one of our soldiers has ever been killed in a direct exchange of fire," explained Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kirsch, head of the Bundeswehr Federation, which functions as a trade union for military personnel.

In 54 years, Germany had lost many soldiers in fatal accidents, and 12 have been killed by Afghan suicide bombs and booby traps.

But last month's gunbattle, beginning with a Taliban ambush and lasting several minutes, was the first time a German serviceman was killed fighting for his life, using lethal force against an enemy he could see.

Was Sergej Motz, the soldier, a hero? It is almost an embarrassing question for a military that has endured mockery from its French and British friends for its lack of experience on the battlefield.

Alluding to the public indifference, and an undercurrent of doubt in Germany about the 3,800 personnel serving in Afghanistan, Kirsch appealed after the death to Germany's leaders and people "to stand four-square behind service personnel and their families."

Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung attended Motz's funeral. But neither Germany's chancellor nor president were on hand.

Officers deny that the new Germany's low-key military is more timid than the German army and navy of old, which often took bold risks, endured shocking casualties and revered its dead as war heroes.

The difference, they explain, is a doctrine known by the German term "innere fuehrung," which means guidance from within.

Devised before the new forces were established in 1955, the doctrine discourages personnel from blindly following orders and requires them to pay attention to the ultimate purpose of their duties and to the law, and even listen to their conscience.

It draws on a part of the Prussian tradition known as "mission tactics," which encouraged initiative by junior officers. It melds this with the idea that all German military personnel are ultimately "citizens in uniform," with a duty to defy any illegal order.

Harsh training methods are one sort of breach of the principles of innere fuehrung, says the Bundeswehr Federation.

Critics of the principle have claimed it stifles courage and flashes of brilliance, but the military says it keeps German personnel capable even when chains of command fail during missions.

Back in the 1960s, several "traditionalist" generals who preferred the old German approach and openly criticized innere fuehrung were forced to resign. Many barracks and bases are named after the great Prussians, but tradition remains a touchy topic in the Bundeswehr.
 
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