Indian Missiles & Nuclear Development News and Discussions

[funtz]

that is the very problem, the words used in the above mentioned literature, "assumption", "If India", "probably", "could", "might be" etc. etc.

To complicate matters the distinction between civilian and dedicated nuclear reactors is a tough one, considering that figures related to the both of them are not released, one possible case when we might know about the nature of the nuclear program is when the final stage of NSG negotiations (if they do happen sometime in future) happen and a clear distinction between civilian and dedicated military reactors is made, even then a question remains over the amount of material/weapons already derived.

Something as huge as the American, Russian or Chinese nuclear arsenal might not be needed, the local scenario gives us the ability of being less paranoid about it.

 

[indian bull]

ok if we go ahead on nuke deal with US,and seperate civil and weapons nuclear facilities what will happen to the stockpiles of reactor grade plutonium lying already in these reactors? will these stocks come under iaea safeguard? if this not happens then what will be the use of that unused fuel? it is realy creating confusion.

 

[indian bull]

Something as huge as the American, Russian or Chinese nuclear arsenal might not be needed, the local scenario gives us the ability of being less paranoid about it.[/QUOTE]

ok arsenal as huge as US and russia posses are not needed in present scenario, but we must atleast have a arsenal to detter china and pakistan both.

 

[funtz]

Well as i see it Any nuclear threat can only use so many nukes before the whole world comes to an end.

A stockpile of an adversary (1.China - 2.India) that might be in the 1000-2000 range, that does not necessarily translate into a requirement of 3000 nuclear devices to deter the enemy for the nation on the other side (1.India - 2.Pakistan), what is required is survival of enough nuclear devices and the ability to deliver them, to ensure a deterrence (or a damage potential that the threat using the device on a nation will not survive to stroll freely on the radioactive lands).
This figure is a complex figure that must have been worked out by people who possess far greater knowledge than me, may be 500 nukes and corresponding missiles or 400 or 300 or 1000, who knows.

Or one can just keep on making nuclear devices.

As for the nuclear deal, that will happen when it will, and who knows when that will be,
However once that is done we might actually know the cost of the nuclear program on the nation and the exact nature of the nuclear program (civilian and military)

 

[indian bull]

hey funtz interesting thing for u:-
http://chemeng.iisc.ernet.in/alumni/nuclear2.html
Pokhran II : Why the US missed India's nuclear tests

Submitted by Mr. S.S. Vasan (May 13, 1998)


WASHINGTON, May 12 - Despite a $27 billion budget and a galaxy of spy satellites, U.S. Intelligence agencies failed to detect India's preparation for Monday's nuclear blast. Why? U.S. officials are blaming it on a leak to The New York Times. Senior Intelligence and military officials tell NBC News that India put its nuclear testing equipment underground in 1996 following a leak to The New York Times that U.S. spy satellites were monitoring that nation's nuclear test site.

"There was a leak that we knew would have a reaction and it did," said one senior intelligence official. "We watched as they put it underground... We warned back then that India now had the capability to test very quickly and predicted that we wouldn't be able to tell."

The Times report ran Dec. 14, 1995, and quoted unnamed government officials as saying satellites had recorded activity in western India that suggested a test might be imminent. No tests occurred and an Indian government spokesman said the Times report was "highly speculative." As a result, said officials, India was able to very "quickly and subtly" make preparations for the test of three nuclear devices Monday.

In fact, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters the United States still had no confirmation of the test nearly 12 hours after the blast occurred. India calculated the orbits of spy satellites and then moved equipment at times when they believed nothing was overhead. India, several officials noted, has long had a space program and is capable of determining what satellites are in which orbit. "They were in our blind spot," said a senior military official. Moreover, intelligence officials note that the Indian nuclear weapons program is the "most secretive" of all Third World programs. "We know more about the North Korean program than we do about the Indian program."

Satellite Imaging Capability

The reasons, say officials in both Washington and New Delhi, are varied. India has its own satellite-imaging capability, which gives it an understanding of what can and can't be seen from space. It's nuclear program is kept separate from its military, which like many militaries is prone to boasting and leaking. And unlike many programs, India's is not as dependent on outside help. India has a large pool of trained nuclear scientists and electrical engineers and an industrial infrastructure capable of producing key equipment. Much U.S. intelligence on other nations' nuclear programs is derived from electronic eavesdropping on sales of equipment related to weapons development. India has prevented Western intelligence from recruiting spies in India by an aggressive program of counterintelligence that includes surveillance and even attempted recruitment of diplomats and suspected agents. "They are very, very good," said one official. "Remember, this is the same country that produced the scientists who designed the Pentium chips," added an official. "They don't need a lot of outside help. They can do it on their own."

 

[Grand Danois]

China has an estimated inventory of c. 200 warheads. Their doctrine is minimal deterrence, i.e. a survivable second strike option and non-tactical use only. Counter force/counter value.

Indications are that China is expanding numbers, as its second strike option is actually not very survivable, if put in context of U.S. first strike capability. That is a function of geography, numbers, delivery methods, etc...

 

[indian bull]

China has an estimated inventory of c. 200 warheads. Their doctrine is minimal deterrence, i.e. a survivable second strike option and non-tactical use only. Counter force/counter value.

Indications are that China is expanding numbers, as its second strike option is actually not very survivable, if put in context of U.S. first strike capability. That is a function of geography, numbers, delivery methods, etc...

well if china increases its nukes india will follow and then pakistan,infact these 3 nations are expanding their nuclear capability presently and where this credible minimum detterent will end nobody knows. Perhaps a new MAD race will start.

 

[indian bull]

http://spyingbadthings.blogspot.com/2007/06/indian-h-bomb-development.html.
Pakistan simply doesn't have the scientific base to develop an H bomb without outside supply
The doubts about the Indian H bomb stem from the low reported yield of the Shakti 1 test. [the Shakti tests (reputedly one H bomb and 4 atomic) took place near Pokhram, western India, in 1998].

However assuming they aimed for 200kT full field brings up the problem of the shaft they used. That could not contain a 200kT explosion. It would have vented, violating the [Limited Test Ban Treaty] LTBT which India has signed. Also, the residents of Khelotai village, just a few km away, would have been killed in their beds as their houses collapsed.

A successful reduced yield test of 47kT would be quite impressive for a first attempt. It means they can design for whatever yield they desire (up to about 300kT).

The Indian physicist [Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram] who worked on both the 1974 and 1998 tests is an advocate of computer simulation. He appears quite confident in the ability of his team to design thermonuclear weapons.

Arun Vishwakarma has done a very interesting comparison of the Shakti-1 device and the Agni missile reentry vehicle [here].

Diameter is <1m>The first official confirmation on Agni-III payload types and weight came on 13-April-07 from Union Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju who said "the strategic payload of the missile is between 100 kg to 250 kg"

 

[indian bull]

some other interesting points on indian nuclear capability:-
http://www.fissilematerials.org/southasia.pdf

The “reactor-grade” plutonium in the high burn up spent fuel being discharged by these reactors has a different mix of isotopes from weapon grade plutonium. However, reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make a nuclear explosive and, as mentioned earlier, one of India’s May 1998 nuclear tests is reported to have involved such material.93
An estimated 8 kg of reactor grade plutonium would be required to make a simple nuclear weapon.94 If this plutonium is not put under safeguards, it could provide an arsenal of over 1300 weapons.
A commonly cited problem with the use of reactor grade plutonium is the increased risk of a “fizzle yield”, where a premature initiation of the fission chain reaction by neutrons emitted by fissioning of plutonium-240 leads to pre-detonation of the weapon and an explosive yield only a few percent of the design value. In Indian PHWR spent fuel, plutonium-240 is over 22% of the total plutonium (compared to about 5% in weapon grade plutonium).95 The greater abundance of plutonium isotopes other than Pu-239 in reactor grade plutonium also leads to increased heat generation and radiation from a mass of this material. However, these are not insuperable engineering difficulties.
The U.S. Department of Energy has noted that “At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating state or sub-national group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear weapon from reactor grade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that). At the other end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactor grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapons-grade plutonium.”96 India presumably falls somewhere in this spectrum.
One ‘modern design’ feature that allows reactor grade plutonium to be used for weapons is ‘boosting’, in which a gas mixture of deuterium and tritium is introduced into the hollow core of an implosion weapon just before it detonates.97 The fusion reaction that is triggered releases a large quantity of neutrons, which are able in turn to initiate fission more quickly in a larger mass of the fissile material than the normal chain reaction. This serves to greatly increase the yield. Indian weapon designers claim to have tested a thermonuclear weapon with a boosted fission primary in 1998.98 One history of India’s nuclear weapons program notes explicitly the use of boosting in a reactor grade plutonium device test in 1998 and observes that “if validated it would increase India’s stock of fissile material dramatically.”99

 

[indian bull]

also very interesting:-
http://www.fissilematerials.org/southasia.pdf

An important concern is that the DAE has chosen to keep the breeder program out of IAEA safeguards as part of the nuclear deal. In support of this, DAE has raised concerns that safeguards would unduly constrain reactor research and development programs.100 But IAEA safeguards do not seem to have compromised or limited the development of commercial breeder programs in Germany and Japan, or that of new generations of PHWRs in Canada. The many technical and safety problems that breeder programs in various countries have experienced have been for other reasons.
DAE chairman Anil Kakodkar has also declared that, “Both from the point of view of maintaining long term energy security and for maintaining the minimum credible deterrent the Fast Breeder Programme just cannot be put on the civilian list.”101 This suggests that the breeder may be used to produce weapon grade plutonium.
India’s first large breeder reactor, the 500 MWe, Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) is located at Kalpakkam, near Madras. It is part of a larger complex that includes the Madras PHWR reactors and a reprocessing plant. This entire complex is being kept outside safeguards.102 The PFBR is expected to be completed in 2010 (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Construction activity at Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, Kalpakkam, April 2006.103
Fueled initially by reactor grade plutonium separated from PHWR spent fuel, the PFBR would produce weapon grade plutonium in both its radial and axial blankets of depleted uranium while plutonium recovered from the core could be recycled for use again as fuel. To recover the weapon grade plutonium, the core and blanket fuel assemblies would have to be reprocessed separately. This would include separating the axial blanket from the part of the fuel assembly that lies within core, which can done by using shearing machines to cut the fuel assemblies prior to reprocessing.104 Plans for a dedicated reprocessing plant for FBR fuel have been developed.105
23
The PFBR is designed to have a thermal power of 1250 MW and an initial inventory of 1910 kg of plutonium in its core.106 The current design is reported to have an overall, equilibrium cycle breeding ratio of almost 1.05.107 Applying the neutron balance in a generic breeder reactor with a homogeneous core permits a first order estimate of plutonium production in the PFBR core and its radial and axial blankets.108 With these uncertainties in mind, we find that at 80% capacity the PFBR could produce on the order of 135 kg of weapon grade plutonium every year in its blanket.109 This would amount to about 25-30 weapons worth of plutonium a year, a four to five fold increase over India’s current weapon plutonium production capacity.
India plans to build four additional breeder reactors by 2020, and then move to larger 1000 MWe breeders and eventually install 500 GWe of breeder capacity.110 Each of the four planned 500 MWe breeder reactors would need two initial cores before they would be able to begin recycling their own plutonium, a total of about 16 tons.111 India would appear to have more than sufficient unsafeguarded plutonium for placing all four of the planned breeders in the military sector. If these five breeders are built and all are kept military, then in about fifteen years, India would be able to produce about 500-800 kg per year of weapon grade plutonium from them.
24

 

[indian bull]

guys guess what is it:-
http://www.idrw.org/2007/07/07/new_missiles_revealed.html

The DRDO is also readying a strategic, nuclear-capable missile for the Navy. While the DRDO is not going into the details, the missile is likely to be submarine-launched and is to be ready in three years. This will give India the triad - the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land, under-sea and the air. DRDO is confident about the completion of the project and says there are no more difficulties.

It’s a strategic missile, so I can't talk much about it. But yes, definitely we have done a lot of work in the propulsion system of such a missile, control and containerisation of these missiles, and I think these elemental technologies are very vital. I am sure that at an appropriate point of time the country will reveal it. The missile can be got ready in 2-3 years, but it is the technologies we are more focused on,” said M K Natarajan, Scientific Advisor.

 

[indian bull]

here's latest on ATV:-
http://www.idrw.org/2007/09/08/exaec_boss_lifts_lid_off_nsubmarine_programme.html


Ex-AEC boss lifts lid off N-submarine programme


Author: idrw team | 8 September 2007 | Views: 202


BY : TOI

Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman P K Iyengar has publicly confirmed the existence of an Indian nuclear submarine programme, something that has for long been spoken about in hushed tones in the nuclear establishment but never officially confirmed.

Speaking at a meeting on the Indo-US nuclear deal, Iyengar questioned the need for India to import light water reactors, saying that a similar one was already under development at Kalpakkam near Chennai for a nuclear submarine.

"If we have to obtain technology from the US in 2007, I am ashamed of being called an Indian. Pokhran-1 (India’s first nuclear weapon test in May 1974) showed that we have indigenous capability. So, I feel that there is no need for us to important light water reactors," the scientist told a meeting on the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Though the nuclear submarine programme has been classified as a "black project", which means it is top secret, this is almost the first time that a man connected with India’s nuclear weaponisation projects has confirmed its existence in public.

Iyengar said that if Raja Ramanna, often described as the father of the Indian nuclear bomb, was alive, he would have adopted a practical approach to international collaboration.

"When there was a need for collaboration, Ramanna backed it. For example, he played a key role in leasing a Russian nuclear submarine for the Indian Navy. But, he refused to accept the Russian terms for supplying Russian reactors. Over this he had a serious dispute with former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi," he said.

 

[indian bull]

India conducts missile test:-

http://www.idrw.org/2007/11/23/india_tests_surfacetoair_missile_near_pakistan_border__officials.html

India has tested an air defense missile at a site close to its tense border with Pakistan where it conducted a string of nuclear detonations in 1998, officials said Wednesday.

Military scientists tested the medium-range surface-to-air missile Akash, or Sky, from Pokhran, some 200 kilometers (120 miles) from Pakistan's borders last week but gave details of the flight only on Wednesday.

The flight was carried out in near-secrecy from Pokhran, where nine years ago India tested a string of nuclear weapons including a thermo-nuclear device and sparked global sanctions against New Delhi.

'The test was a success and we hope Akash will be inducted very soon into the army,' Samir Sinha, spokesman of India's Defense Research and Development Organization, told Agence France-Presse in Jodhpur in Rajasthan state.

First tested in 1993, Akash can carry a 55-kilogram (121-pound) warhead and has a range of 25 kilometers (15.5 miles).
Development of Akash missile is a part of Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), and the missile system was expected to be inducted by the Indian Army and the Air Force by 2003.
As on July 31, 2007, an amount of Rs. 492.41 crore has already been spent on development of Akash, which has a launch weight of 720 kg, a diameter of 35 cm and a length of 5.8 metres.
It can fly at supersonic speed of around 2.5 Mach and can reach an altitude of 18 kms.
The missile is supported by multi-target and multi-function phased array fire control radar called ‘Rajendra’ that has a range of about 60 km.
The first test flight of the missile was conducted in 1990, and since then many development and field trials have taken place.

 

[indian bull]

Can someone explain more on this:-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Agni.html

Unlike Agni-I & Agni-II RV that is sub-optimal & force-fitted solution[107] to carry the lighter thermonuclear payload that were tested in 1998, the RV-Mk3 is the first RV that is designed & optimized for the new lighter 200Kt thermonuclear payload weapon and corresponding long range[108]. The 200Kt yield weapon reportedly weighs less than 450 Kg, however other sources indicate a mass of between 300 to 200 Kg[109]. The first official confirmation on Agni-III payload types and weight came on 13-April-07 from Union Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju who said "the strategic payload of the missile is between 100 kg to 250 kg". One can conservatively deduce that the 250 kg mentioned by the minister corresponded to Indian Thermo-nuclear weapon.

Does anybody has more stuff of these Indian thermonuclear weapons?

 

[indian bull]

also more on this:-

Warhead Options

India's nuclear warhead options are still relatively limited, though quite perfectly adequate. Since the first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 (PoK-I), India adopted the recessed deterrence posture initially consisting of fission weapons (~15 KT yield) followed by boosted fission weapons of 200 KT yield, suitable for the Agni-TD/TTB. The PoK-II 1998 'Shakti' series of nuclear tests in Pokhran were reportedly done to validate multiple weapon designs, of 1995 vintage. Interestingly the 200 KT boosted fission design of 1980 was not tested in PoK-II, ostensibly having long given way to a lighter and more efficient S1 design. It is interesting to note that India has access to large quantities[135] of Tritium - produced at an extremely low cost - which lends flexibility to Indian weapon design options, an option that is not available or viable to prior nuclear weapon states.

Weapon Fission Fuel Yield (KT) Weight (kg) Note
1 High yield, thermonuclear (Plutonium [Pu], Deuterium & Tritium)[136]
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
200 - 300 250[137] • Shakti-I test at Pokharan-II (PoK-II)
• Boosted fission primary of ~20KT
• Plutonium based boosted primary stage. Li-D secondary
• Fusion Spark Plug material (Pu or U235) unknown

2 Medium yield, fusion boosted fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
50 < 200 • In inventory small size medium yield weapon

3 Medium yield, fusion boosted fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
15 - 20 100[137a] • Primary stage of Shakti-1 test at PoK-II
• Standard medium yield weapon

4 Medium yield, pure fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
15[138] 170 - 200 • Shakti-2 test at PoK-II
• This was tested from a weapon stockpile. Almost certainly superseded by a fusion boosted fission version, described above (item 3).

5 Low yield, sub-KT
Pu (Weapon Grade)
0.1 to 1 < 200 (est.) • Battlefield Weapon

6 Low yield, sub-KT[139]
Pu or U233 (Reactor Grade)[140]
0.3 to 1 < 200 (est.) • Reactor Grade Pu or U233




The primary warhead for the Agni family would be a 200-300 Kt fusion weapon based on the Shakti-1 (Pokhran-II) test in 1998. The weapons yield is adjustable from 45-300Kt by changing the amount and quality of tertiary fuel. Yield of 45-200Kt range using natural Uranium and 45-300Kt range using moderately enriched fuel (U235 or Pu).

The fusion weapon based on the S-1 design reportedly weighs less than 450 Kg, however other sources indicate a mass of between 300 to 200 Kg[137A]. The 45kT S1 device reportedly weighed 450 kg and used an inert mantle to ensure third stage did not generate any yield[141]. It has also emerged that by 1982, the BARC/DRDO team had produced a design for a (pure) fission device that weighed between 170 and 200 kg for a yield of 15 KT - a huge change from the 1000 kg monster tested in 1974[142]. This would mean that a missile warhead based on this 1982 vintage design would weigh some 250 - 350 kg. On the eve of Agni-III D1 test flight on 12 April 2007, Union Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju confirmed that "the strategic payload of the missile is between 100 kg to 250 kg"[142a]. One can conservatively deduce that the 250 kg mentioned by the minister corresponded to Indian Thermo-nuclear weapon, and 100Kg correspond to either 20Kt medium yield boosted fission weapon because low yield sub-KT weapon are tactical & not considered as strategic weapons. Therefore, when considering the range and payload parameters of the Agni and Prithvi missiles, these figures must be borne in mind.

 

[indian bull]

hey man i found more:-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Images/Indian_Long_Range_StrategicMissiles_-Agni-III_r11.pdf

Arrival of modern thermonuclear weapon:
Pokhran-II
In response to changed security environment India
conducted Shakti series of nuclear weapon tests16 on
11 & 13 May 1998. Shakti-1 (Figure 8-A) was a two
stage Thermonuclear (TN) bomb (of modern 1995
design vintage) with a passive third stage made of
non-fissionable material. It should be noted that in a
Thermonuclear weapon the third stage provides
around 80% of the yield from fast fission of U238 by
fast neutrons generated by Fusion stage 17 . Fast
fission of U238 (or U235) is a basic material property
that does not require testing in weaponized
configuration. Shakti-1 did not have a third stage to
keep the yield within test-shaft capability (venting) and
test site constrains 18 (seismic damage to inhabited
villages nearby). The Shakti-1 based Indian TN
weapon yield is 200-300Kt depending on if tamper
and case material is made of natural-uranium (U238)
or enriched-uranium19. The new 200Kt TN weapon (Figure 3-B) is much lighter than the earlier 1,000Kg
Boosted Fission weapon (
Figure 3-A) that was the basis for earlier RV-Mk.1
design. Fission weapons are dense and spherical in
shape, whereas TN weapons have lower density and
elongated in shape yet very high yield to weight ratio.
The 200Kt yield TN weapon reportedly weighs less
than 450Kg, however other sources indicate less than
300Kg weight, yet few others indicate a figure as low
as 200Kg20.
Interestingly the 200Kt boosted fission design that was
the basis for Agni-TD and RV-Mk.1 design was not
even tested in Shakti-series of nuclear weapon tests
in 1998. For best performance the 200Kt TN payload
requires its own custom RV design and rocket stages
but that would have to wait for many years.
The 1999 ‘Kargil war’ forced DRDO to improvise and
quickly develop and operationalize Agni-II missile that
used the new light weight TN weapon albeit using the
old RV-Mk.1 that was designed and optimized for
heavier 1,000Kg boosted fission payload. This can be
deduced from the pictures of the Agni-II & Agni-I
released by DRDO.

 

[indian bull]

can somebody tell about U-233 bomb, India is working on it:-
India's silent bomb. David Albright and Mark Hibbs. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol.48, No.07, September 1992, pp.27-31. Quote: "India is also moving toward realization of large-scale use of uranium 233 as fuel for its power reactors. Uranium 233 is a fissile isotope of uranium that requires about as much material per bomb as plutonium. Uranium 233 is made by irradiating natural, non-radioactive thorium in a reactor, and India attaches a high priority to the development of thorium/uranium 233 fuel for its power reactors. Irradiation of thorium in the Cirus, Dhruva, and the MAPS reactors has resulted in the production of kilogram quantities of uranium 233." http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=sep92albright

 

[indian bull]

Hey guys India is also pursuing its Ballistic Missile Defense programme, it has conducted succesfully an Exo-atmospheric interceptor test and is ready to conduct an Endo-atmospheric test in December this year.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=9643

NEW DELHI: In the first week of December, the country plans to unleash a new "interceptor" missile to "kill" an incoming "hostile" missile over the Bay of Bengal.

During the test, a Prithvi missile, modified to "mimic" a hostile ballistic missile with a 300-1,000 km range, will first be fired from the Balasore interim test range in Orissa.

The incoming missile will then be tracked by long-range tracking radars (LRTRs), developed with Israeli help and is a part of the automated command and control network. LRTRs in turn will convey the "threat" to the "endo" (taking the "enemy" missile at an 15-20 km altitude above the earth) missile battery in far away Wheeler Island.

Finally, the interceptor missile will blast off with a roar to eventually destroy the "enemy" missile in fireworks over the Bay of Bengal. The new "endo" missile has been dubbed AAD (advanced air defence), while the "exo" missile was called PAD (Prithvi air defence).

"The endgame this time will be technologically more complex than the exo test because of atmospheric disturbances and other factors. AAD, in fact, will be slightly better than PAC-3 in terms of range and altitude of interception," said DRDO chief controller, R&D, V K Saraswat. In the next phase, defence scientists plan to test PAD and AAD together in an integrated mode. But before you think that India now finally has some sort of a missile defence shield to guard against Pakistani and Chinese nuclear-capable missiles, hold your breath. Such a capability is still several years away.

For one, BMD capabilities are very complex. For another, they require huge investments. Given its size, India would require a large overlapping network of early-warning sensors, command posts and anti-missile land and sea-based missile batteries.

A missile launched from Pakistan, after all, can reach India in barely 5 to 7 minutes. But yes, it can be said India is now finally on its way to join the US, Russia and Israel in the very exclusive BMD club.

"The system will have to be tested for a variety of flight envelopes. We will have to undertake 5-6 trials over the next 2-3 years to validate the complete spectrum of engagement. Only after that can the production and operationalization phase commence," said Saraswat. The 10-metre tall PAD missile was designed by taking Prithvi's propulsion system and adding a second stage to it to ensure it goes up to a height of about 80 km.

The 7-metre tall AAD interceptor, in turn, is a new single-stage missile, powered by solid propellant, with terminal homing seekers and inertial navigation system. It will be able to reach an altitude of almost 30 km.

Interestingly, the crucial LRTRs used in the tests are based on the two Israeli Green Pine early-warning and fire control radars imported by India in 2001-2002.

"But we have upgraded LRTR, which is 30-40% better in target classification and identification. It can prioritize the incoming threats and track 200 targets simultaneously," said Saraswat.

LRTR has a detection range of 600 km and is capable of tracking intermediate range ballistic missiles, with velocities up to 5,000 metre per second. Incidentally, a ballistic missile can be targeted at all the three points in its parabolic trajectory — boost or launch phase, mid-course in space or terminal phase during atmospheric descent.

DRDO, on its part, has designed the BMD system, which will be upgraded in the coming years, to intercept an incoming missile at both the "second mid-course and terminal phases".

 

[indian bull]

Hey guys with the successful test of Agni 3 which has a diameter of 2m India can build an icbm easily by adding a single solid stage in agni 3, earlier it was said by US experts that indian icbm will be based on pslv which has a stationary launch pad and huge weight and which is very much vulnerable to preemptive strikes, but now with the development of a 2m solid state motor India's ICBM will be very much mobile.

 

[indian bull]

I know that the Indian's have bought their weapons from Russia as Russia has became a Superpower again, they can afford more miltary spending on new advanced weapons over the US.

No man Russia presently is not a superpower and India is not buying ballistic missiles and nukes from Russia. There exists a large infrastructure in India to develop WMDs and Missiles although we are buying other weapons from Russia.