Indian Missiles & Nuclear Development News and Discussions

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indian bull

Banned Member
I think it is pretty clear that sagarika will be a ballistic missile to be used in ATV so as to compelte the indian nuclear triad. As brahmos will be most useful as a cruise missile, it can be deployed India's present submarines with minor modifications. But sagarika is not suitable for these subs, its main launch pad will be ATV.
 

funtz

New Member
I think it is pretty clear that sagarika will be a ballistic missile to be used in ATV so as to compelte the indian nuclear triad. As brahmos will be most useful as a cruise missile, it can be deployed India's present submarines with minor modifications. But sagarika is not suitable for these subs, its main launch pad will be ATV.
So will it be a Agni 3+ or 4 modified for submarine use? what modifications will they be?
This must be classified, i guess, any links sighting a DRDO official?
The range and payload should be better than Agni-3, that is to say to really have a credible submarine based deterrence that can do a lot of damage to the potential adversary.
How many submarine based missiles do other nuclear power have in operation at a time?

If the Klub is effective in meeting targets at the advertised range what is the use of Brahmos modifications? Clearly Klub is a missile which has gone through several tests by India.
Acceptance trials conducted by the Indian Navy for its modernised Sindhugosh Class submarines, resulted in six successful 3M-54E test launches which demonstrated both minimum (20km) and maximum (220km) range capability against surface targets.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Klub.html
But hey no talking on that one people here really get twisted with these questions.

For the future Submarine based land attack cruise missile the Nirbhay program will be a good option as the nuclear submarine and the missile will both take time and the submarine is indigenous so more to the requirements of the available resources. especially when we consider that the missile can not be short on legs, i mean 1000-1500 km range will be necessary, well along with a deadly accuracy ofcourse.
 
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indian bull

Banned Member
confusion really exist over the sagarika programme as some people link it with dhanush and prithvi programmes, some say it is indipendent of other missile developments, but certianly there is no similarity between agni and sagarika, both are technologically different. accordingly some think it is a cruise missile some think it is ballistic, this project is very secret. One thing is very clear that sagarika is for ATV and nothing less. In the past our navy cheif has said that the navy also is nuclearised, so these things are really made complicated so as to keep others in confusion and always keep guessing about these capabilities of india.
 

indian bull

Banned Member
April 30, 2007
http://www.cdi.org/program/document...eLastUpdated&ProgramID=32&from_page=index.cfm

http://groups.google.com/group/noticiarionaval/msg/f2aedcafadba66e4
Indian Nuclear Arsenal

Strategic Delivery System

Possible Delivery System
Year Deployed
Maximum Range (km)
Launcher Total
Warhead
Warhead Yield (kt)
Notes

Missiles

Prithvi I SS-150
1995
150
75-90
-
unknown
Could be equipped with nuclear warheads; liquid-fueled; army designated

Prithvi II

SS-250
1996
250
unknown
-
unknown
Air Force designated; liquid-fueled

Prithvi III

SS-350
2001
350
25
-
unknown
Liquid-fueled

Agni I
2004
700
36
-
unknown
-

Short-range Variant (as yet named)
unknown
700
unknown
-
unknown
-

Agni II
2004
2,000
36
-
200?
Boosted-fission warhead; 1000 kg payload; first tested in April 1999; last tested in August 2004

Agni III
Not yet deployed
3,000
-
-
unknown
1500 kg payload; successfully tested on April 12, 2007; two-stage

SLBM

Sagarika
2010
300
-
-
-
Submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCM); likely vertically-launched

Aircraft

Jaguar
1995
850
88
-
-
-

Mirage 2000
-
-
36-38
-
-
-
390
147
-
-
MiG-27 Flogger
1986Indian attempts to complete the submarine-based portion of its nuclear triad have encountered technical difficulties. The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program has been underway since 1985, but has yet to produce a workable underwater missile launch platform. However, comments made by Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Madhvendera Singh, at the height of the 2002 Pakistan-India crisis, implied the ATV might already be operational.[9] Additionally, the Indian navy has been developing an SLBM, the Sagarika, about which very little is known.[10] Initially slated for completion in 2005, the program has run into setbacks and is now expected to perhaps be operational in late 2007.[11] India is also working on another SLBM, the Dhanush, which has also encountered trouble in development and whose status is presently unclear.
more on indian ATV at:-
http://groups.google.com/group/noticiarionaval/msg/f2aedcafadba66e4
 
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indian bull

Banned Member
i think prithvi3 is solid fuelled,it is also being developed as a naval variant known as the dhanush.
yea man prithvi 3 is most probably called dhanush,
Prithvi-3
Country: India
Alternate Name: P-3
Class: SRBM
Basing: Road mobile
Length: 8.56 m
Diameter: 1.0 m
Launch Weight: 5600 kg
Payload: Single warhead, 750 kg
Warhead: Probably HE, nuclear
Propulsion: 2-stage solid
Range: 300 km
Status: Unknown

Details

The Prithvi-3 is a short-range, road mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile. During the development of the Prithvi-3 in the in the early 1990s a liquid-propellant model was created; that project is believed to be terminated. This model is a departure from propulsion system of the Prithvi-1 and Prithvi-2. The longest-ranged member of the Prithvi family of missiles, it was most likely designed for use as a tactical weapon against Pakistan and China.



Sources indicate that the Prithvi-3 has a range of 300 km and an accuracy of 25 m CEP. It is fueled by a two-stage solid-propellant. The missile has a 500 to 1000 kg payload, with a 10 to 20 kT nuclear warhead. It is also reported that the Prithvi-3 uses 4 fixed tail fins in order to maneuver within the lower atmosphere. Its range and payload are not sufficient to be used against strategic targets, although its high accuracy and mobility are ideal for use against military targets.(1)



The solid-propellant version of the Prithvi-3 was first tested in January 2004 with a second test in October 2004. In October the missile was launched from the Interim Test Range at Balasore, and was tracked by several ground stations including down-range stations. The missile flew what the Indian Ministry of Defence described as a "perfect trajectory, as per design projections."(2) 30 missiles were ordered in 2004 followed by an additional 54 in 2006.(3)





Footnotes


Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 42 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2005), 85-87; GlobalSecurity.org, “Prithvi,” available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/prithvi.htm, accessed on 21 May 2005.
“India Tests Prithvi III and Dhanush,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 December 2004.
Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2007), 53-56.

India Tests Underwater-Launched Missile
October 27, 2004 :: News


India today tested a naval variant of a nuclear capable ballistic missile with a range of 300km. The missile tested has been identified by news sources as a “Prithvi III,” and is said to be the longest range Prithvi tested thus far.
The missile’s characteristics, however, seem to indicate that it is more likely the missile known as the Dhanush, which itself had been derived from the Prithvi II. The missile launched today is said to have previously been launched from a ship, which is also true of the Dhanush.
The missile is also said to have the capability to be launched from a submarine. Today’s launch reportedly took place from a specially constructed underwater platform and canister, from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, in the eastern coast state of Orissa, some 230km from the city of Bhubaneswar. The missile landed in the Bay of Bengal.
Indian and Western news services variously report that the missile consists of a single stage, and the missile reportedly has a length of 8.5 meters (28 ft) and a diameter of 1 meter. While it is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead—described by some reports as “sub kiloton”—it may also carry incendiary or fragmentary munitions. Each of these dimensions and capabilities roughly correspond to those previously assigned to the Dhanush missile. The dimensions of the missile called the “Prithvi III” are not known. The missile may indeed never have been completed.
It would appear that India may have applied the signification Prithvi III to the missile previously termed Dhanush, or that the news reports are simply inaccurate.
That the missile tested is in fact the Dhanush is also suggested by an October 9 report by India’s The Statesman, that such a test was planned. (Link)

Dhanush
Country: India
Class: SRBM or SLBM
Basing: Ship or submarine launched
Length: 9.00 m
Diameter: 1.00 m
Launch Weight: 4000 kg
Payload: Single warhead, 500 kg
Warhead: nuclear, HE, submunitions
Propulsion: Single-stage liquid
Range: 250 km
Status: Development

Details

The Dhanush is a short-range, sea-based, liquid-propellant ballistic missile thought to be a variant of either the Prithvi-1 or Prithvi-2. According to unconfirmed reports, India developed the missile with European assistance, and its motor and guidance system were based on the Russian S-75 Guideline surface-to-air missile.



In its current configuration, the Dhanush variant is 9.0 m in length, 1.1 m in diameter, and weighs between 4,000 and 4,600 kg. It uses a single-stage, liquid-propellant engine, giving it a maximum range of 250 km (155 miles) with an accuracy of 50 m CEP. Its payload is a single warhead weighing up to 500 kg, only half as much as the Prithvi-1, which has a 1,000 kg payload.



The missile's warheads are nuclear, high-explosive, or submunitions. The missile can also be equipped with multiple payloads, to be dispensed by the missile during its flight. The use of high-explosive and submunition warheads enables the Dhanush to be used against airfields, manufacturing complexes, and military units, as well as enemy ships.



The deployment of Dhanush ballistic missiles as a sea-borne force will have little effect on the nuclear balance between India and Pakistan, as all of Pakistan is already vulnerable to the Indian hidden road-mobile systems. However, the Dhanush will dramatically increase the number of targets that India can strike within China, thereby significantly increasing the strength of India's deterrent force.(1)



The Dhanush program may have been used as a technology demonstrator for the Prithvi-3. The two missiles use the same launching mechanism. The Dhanush ship-launched version was first tested in April 2000, then again in December 2000, September 2001, November 2004, Decembr 2005, January 2006, and April 2007.(2
 
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indian bull

Banned Member
Throughout this thread there was not a great deal of discussion about indian nuclear weapons. There are many confusions about indian nukes, the main is about indian thermonuclear weapon(whether it was not fully successful) and another about the boosted fission device(whether reactor grade plutonium was used in it). also confusion really exists about the yields of those tests in may 1998, i think it would be very interesting to discuss these matters.
 

aaaditya

New Member
hey guys,great news here,india is to integrate the astra air to air missile to the su-30mki.

here check out this link and article:

http://www.hindu.com/2007/11/08/stories/2007110855710700.htm

BANGALORE: In what is perceived to be a significant boost to India’s air dominance, the indigenously designed and developed Astra beyond visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) is to be test-fired from the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) most lethal airborne platform, the Su-30MKI long-range multi-role fighter.
Part of India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme that was developed by a team of defence laboratories led by the Hyderabad-based Defence Research and Development Laboratory, the Astra BVRAAM has the ability to evade radar and hit targets up to a range of 80 km. Astra was successfully test fired first in May 2003 from the Chandipur (Orissa) Interim Test Range (ITR). The IAF’s Bangalore-based Software Development Institute (SDI) has received the indigenously manufactured Su-30MKI systems integration rig which will simulate the aircraft’s equipment hardware and software. The SDI will implement requisite changes to the rig’s software and integrate it with the hardware. They will then test the Astra missile using the systems integration rig. The on ground simulated tests are expected to be over by December.
Once simulated tests are successful the integration of the Astra on to the Su-30MKI’s wing will be undertaken at the Bangalore located Aircraft Systems and Testing Establishment (ASTE). The IAF will attach a Su-30MKI to the ASTE for this purpose.
Sources told The Hindu that initially the aircraft will only undertake dummy or carrier trials, carrying a missile which has not been electrically or electronically ‘connected’ to the on-board systems. Once successful the missile will be “connected” to the aircraft’s on-board systems and test-fired at the ITR range.
 

indian bull

Banned Member
Given its immense thorium resources, India is actively interested in developing the thorium/U-233 fuel cycle. India is known to have produced kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in CIR, Dhruva, and MAPS reactors. Substantial production of U-233 is not practical though with natural uranium fueled reactors. The thorium cycle requires more highly enriched fuel to have an acceptable breeding ratio with the non-fissile thorium blanket. Reactor-grade plutonium from MAPS could serve as start-up fuel for U-233 plants in the future. If available U-233 is as effective a weapon material as plutonium.

India has been developing the capability to produce heavy water domestically to provide the moderator load for future reactors. The heavy water for the existing reactors was imported however. Canada provided the heavy water for CIR. The 110 tonnes of unsafeguarded moderator for Dhruva and Madras I and II were ironically provided by China.

Taken together, India has developed an extensive plutonium production and reprocessing capability. SIPRI has estimated that India had produced 420-450 kg of weapons-grade plutonium through the end of 1995 (70-100 bombs worth). These estimates are based solely on CIR and Dhruva production. About 100 kg of plutonium has been consumed though, principally in fueling two plutonium reactors, leaving 320-350 kg of plutonium available for weapons. Approximately 1000 kg of unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium also exists.
Can somebody tell about U-233 based weapons has any nation developed these weapons?
 

indian bull

Banned Member
here are some interesting things about agni RV:-
The 1980-vintage RV was reportedly designed to be able to carry a BARC-developed, boosted nuclear weapon of 200 KT yield weighing 1000 kg, also of 1980 vintage design. After making room for new and lighter Indian thermonuclear weapon payload, of 1995 vintage design, the MRV has room for about 200 kg (estimated) liquid fuel in pressurized vessels. Although for velocity correction, approximately 50 to 80 kg is estimated to be sufficient. At least one MRV variant type uses a set of solid fuelled cartridges for velocity trimming. The RV is reported to have an attitude control system and aerodynamic manoeuvre fins, presumably to make missile defense more difficult. Unconfirmed reports suggest that an improved optical or radar terminal phase correlation system has been developed to provide accuracy of around 40 meters CEP, although later reports have suggested that the accuracy was around 100 to 200 meters CEP. The RV largely inherits the basic shape, design and technology of the earlier Mk.1 RV of the Agni-TD.

Agni is unlike long-range missiles developed by western missiles where the RV is a passive ballistic load, whose accuracy depends on the launching vehicle's exact insertion into the sub-orbital trajectory. A large inaccuracy associated with the first generation RV, involved spinning the RV for greater stability during re-entry. Second generation western missiles were mostly MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle) and the accuracy was greatly improved by the payload bus with HAM velocity correction package for more accurate sub-orbit insertion. It also allowed individual MIRV payloads to impart different velocities, so that each can be independently targeted to a different target, albeit in nearby vicinity of each other. As before the RV continued to be passive and purely ballistic. The Agni-RV Mk.2 is more advanced than the western RVs, because it embodies proposition, navigation and control all the way to the target. The RV re-enters at an altitude of 100 km, at a shallow angle, with a gliding trajectory [38].

Key Features of the Agni-RV Mk.2
The manoeuvring fins that allows it to;
Execute a non-ballistic trajectory to make interception more difficult.
Overcome any perturbation due to high altitude atmospheric disturbance.
Enable use of body lift at hypersonic velocity to glide the missile over longer ranges, thus reducing the thermal and physical stress at a modified Max-Q point.
Trajectory error to be determined late into the fight and corrected using aerodynamic force during re-entry.
Terminal manoeuvre dive for a more acute target interdiction angle improving CEP.
Support a wider range of payload weight and configuration.
Integrated velocity correction package for greater precision; has a set of solid fuelled cartridge(s) that are used to correct impulse variances of solid fuelled stages and subtle launch trajectory perturbation.
Integrated High Altitude Motor (HAM) which is liquid fuelled. Depending on the actual payload configuration, the HAM fuel load can be increased to trade range for a lighter and more compact weapon.
Larger internal volume allows more sophisticated ABM (anti-ballistic missile) counter-measures
Maneuvering re-entry vehicle: Agni RV-Mk.4
Agni-III supports a wide range of weapons, with total payload weight ranging from ~600 kg to 1,800 kg including decoys and other ABM countermeasures. Instead of conventional bus architecture, the RV (Re-Entry Vehicle) is self-contained with velocity correction package, navigation and re-entry control systems.

Lighter and tougher RV body with all carbon composite re-entry heat shield with multi directional carbon re-entry nose tip and control surfaces, the new lightweight composites can withstand temperatures of up to 6000 degrees Celsius, and capable of greater re-entry velocity. The all composite RV has no metal backup.
 

indian bull

Banned Member
Agni-III*
According to one of the country's top defence scientists, Dr M Natrajan, DRDO scientists are working on an upgraded version of the Agni III known as the Agni-III* (Agni-III star) in which the range would be extended by 1500km and carry 12 warheads
 

indian bull

Banned Member
How many nuclear warheads does India have stockpiled already?
Well this is very confusing. According to western experts between 60 to 100 made of weapons grade plutonium. But if reactor grade plutonium is used in making boosted fission bombs then india can make a few thousand nukes and its arsenal can be 3rd largest after US and Russia. ofcourse there is a small stock of U-235 also.
 

funtz

New Member
This has to have some logic behind it, the amount of nuclear material that can be and has been produced.

The amount that the experts agree will be necessary to have as a deterrent (secure a credible second strike capability) etc. etc.

Having a third or second or first largest nuclear arsenal just for the sake of it, does not match the national interest, only that of personal ego.
 

indian bull

Banned Member
This has to have some logic behind it, the amount of nuclear material that can be and has been produced.

The amount that the experts agree will be necessary to have as a deterrent (secure a credible second strike capability) etc. etc.

Having a third or second or first largest nuclear arsenal just for the sake of it, does not match the national interest, only that of personal ego.
so tell funtz what is minimum credible nuclear detterent?
 

indian bull

Banned Member
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Shakti
Shakti I:
A two stage thermonuclear device with a boosted fission primary, its yield was degraded from 200 KT(theoretical) to 45 KT for test purposes. The thermonuclear device tested at Pokhran was not an actual warhead. It was a device that was designed mainly to produce data to analyze the performance of India's Hydrogen bomb technology for future computer simulations and actual weaponisation.


[edit] Shakti II:
A pure fission device using the Plutonium implosion design with a yield of 15 KT. The device tested was an actual nuclear warhead that can be delivered by bombers or fighters and also mounted on a missile. The warhead was an improved, lightweight and miniaturized version of the device tested in 1974. Scientists at BARC had been working to improve the 1974 design for many years. Data from the 1974 test was used to carry out computer simulations using the indigenous Param supercomputer to improve the design. The 1998 test was intended to prove the validity of the improved designs.


[edit] Shakti III:
An experimental boosted fission device that used reactor grade Plutonium for its primary with a yield of 0.3 KT. This test device was used to test only the primary stage. It did not contain any tritium required to boost the fission. This test was designed to study the possibility of using reactor grade plutonium in warheads and also to prove India's expertise in controlling and damping a nuclear explosion in order to achieve a low (sub-kiloton) yield.


[edit] Shakti IV:
A 0.5 KT experimental device. The test's only purpose was to collect data about the explosion process and to study the performance of various bomb components.


Shakti V:
A 0.2 KT experimental device that used U-233, an isotope of uranium not found in nature and produced in India's fast breeder reactors that consume Thorium. This device too was used to collect data.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaRealYields.html
Taking all these factors together, it appears that Shakti II is indeed about 12 kt as claimed. But Shakti I seems limited to about 31 kt, plus some margin of uncertainty that may bound it in the mid-30s. The various other data marshaled by BARC do not prove a yield larger than 29 kt, which closely matches the seismic upper limit of circa 35 kt as perhaps the most plausible yield for Shakti I. This would be consistent with a partially successful thermonuclear test with a roughly 15 kt primary stage and a 15 kt secondary yield.
 
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indian bull

Banned Member
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/nuke-stockpile.htm
India Nuclear Stockpile
According to informed sources, the nuclear warheads located at BARC facilities are under military security.

Two of the research reactors located at BARC in Trombay produce plutonium for nuclear weapons: the Canadian designed CIRUS 40 MW heavy water reactor (HWR) and the Dhruva 100 MW heavy water reactor of Indian design. These two reactors can provide India with perhaps 30 to 35 kilograms of plutonium each year. Depending on the sophistication of the weapon design, this might be sufficient for between four to eight nuclear weapons each year.

It was estimated in mid-1992 that India's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium exceeded 300 kilograms; enough for forty or fifty atom bombs.

By mid-1998 India was generally estimated as having approximately 60 or 70 nuclear weapons. In 1998 India appeared to have stocks of highly enriched uranium and about 300 to 400 kg of reactor grade plutonium. In May 1998 G. Balachandran, an Indian nuclear researcher, estimated India had fewer than 10 weapons ready to be assembled and mounted on warplanes or missiles. The Institute for Science and International Security estimated in March 1998 that India had stockpiled enough weapons-grade plutonium for perhaps 78 bombs.

The Dhruva reactor was initially operational in 1985, and effectively since 1988-89. Dhruva has operated at an average capacity factor of 60 per cent, which means about 12 kg of plutonium per year from Dhruva. Over the first decade of its operation, assuming about 8 kg per bomb, it would have provided material for 15 bombs by 1999. Likewise, Cirus (which was the source of Pu-239 for the 1974 explosion), assuming an average capacity factor of 50 per cent, would yield 4 kg a year. From Pokhran-I in 1974 through 1998, it would have yielded plutonium for 15 to 16 bombs. Taken together, then, India by this estimate had plutonium stocks for about 30 bombs by 1999. [Nuclear and Missile Race in South Asia: Relevance of Military Restructuring By Dr. Vinay Kumar Malhotra]

Some sources estimated that by the year 2000, India's stockpile of weapons grade plutonium could rise to 450 kg. This plutonium stockpile was projected by the same conservative assumptions to reach a level equivalent to 85 to 90 weapons by the year 2000. By another estimate, India easily could have accumulated plutonium from the CIRUS and Dhruva reactors for about 133 weapons by 2000, with the rate of increase from these facilities of nearly 7 weapons annually. [MINIMUM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POSTURES IN SOUTH ASIA: AN OVERVIEW OCTOBER 1, 2001 - DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS OFFICE, PREPARED BY: RODNEY W. JONES]

The Plutonium residing in safeguards-free spent fuel from Indian reactors that had not yet been separated as of 1995 could, if reprocessed, have yielded another 85 to 90 weapons by 2000 [though there is no direct indication that such reprocessing has taken place. In 1998 some estimates of India's stockpile that were as high as 200 nuclear devices were based on such estimates of the plutonium that could be extracted from India's six unsafeguarded heavy-water nuclear power plants.

In late 2003 one estimate suggested that India's nuclear stockpile was about 70 weapons, based on a stockpile of more than 300kg (660lb) of weapons-grade plutonium and a small quantity of high-enriched uranium. [SOURCE]

In 1994 K. Subrahmanyam suggested that a force of 60 warheads carried on 20 Agnis, 20 Prithvis and the rest on aircraft would cost about Rs 1,000 crore over 10 years. In 1996 Sundarji suggested a cost of some Rs 2,760 crore -- Rs 600 crore for 150 warheads, Rs 360 crore for 45 Prithvis and Rs 1,800 crore for 90 Agni missiles.
 

funtz

New Member
so tell funtz what is minimum credible nuclear detterent?
It will be something that must have required huge number of brain storming sessions involving the A list of Indian military experts, leaders and Indian scientists,

one thing that must have been at the base of it was the likely threats and the ability of these threats, which will give a idea of the level or amount of deterrence and the distribution of this deterrence along the depth on India,

The density and distribution will again involve the ability(range of the platforms that are assigned the responsibility of transporting these devices to their destination and the ability of the density and distribution to survive a first strike and still retain a capability to neutralize the threat, which will give the afore mentioned "deterrence".

This is considering a second strike doctrine.

This is all that is way too complex for me to give a number to, like 500-600-700 whatever. and nearly impossible to know how much percentage of this deterrence has been achieved, how on earth the western experts reach the figures that they do is a mystery to me, as any figures about anything that has the word nuclear in it is not for public eyes.
 

indian bull

Banned Member
see also this:-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/south_asia.pdf
Judging potential nuclear arsenal size even for a non-deployed force is feasible if enough is
known about fissile material production. India's and Pakistan's "dedicated weapon facilities"
continue to produce fissile material. Their outputs can be thought of as "nuclear weapon
equivalents" (NWEs). Although the actual number of operational weapons in either's arsenal is
not known, analysis suggests that India has, and probably will retain, a significant lead over
Pakistan. We estimate India had over 100 NWEs from its dedicated facilities by 2000 -- at least
twice and perhaps three times as many as Pakistan. India's NWEs from dedicated facilities are
far fewer than China's estimated arsenal of about 450 weapons. By appropriating fissile material
from its unsafeguarded civilian power reactors, however, India could reach a potential of several
hundred NWEs, exceeding estimates of China's operational nuclear stockpile.
While the Indian government declined to treat these Advisory Board recommendations as
official policy, and experts acknowledged that they would be very costly to implement, the
actual profile of Indian defense research and development and military technology acquisition
closely parallels the Advisory Board's recommendations. This implies that India probably will
follow the main recommendations in defining requirements and building nuclear forces, but do
so gradually within its limited resources. Over time, this could lead to an expansive nuclear
strategy and force structure, with a capacity to respond in a graduated or massive fashion to
potential nuclear threats from all directions.
 If India's nuclear strategy and forces evolve along these ambitious lines, they would not
constitute a "minimum deterrence" posture, as that term is generally understood.
Chart 1 depicts high, low, and "best guess" estimates of the "nuclear weapon equivalents" (NWEs) of
fissile material produced by India's and Pakistan's dedicated nuclear weapon facilities. (The sources
and assumptions for the calculations supporting these estimates are set forth in Appendix A, on
"Fissile Material Stocks and Nuclear Weapon Equivalents (NWEs) in India and Pakistan.") In
general, these estimates favor India by a substantial margin, a ratio of more than 2:1. Ruling out the
100 per cent and 40 per cent efficiency plots for India (unrealistically high and implausibly low, but
useful as limits for comparison), the best guess plot (60 per cent efficiency) shows that India easily
could have accumulated sufficient plutonium from dedicated facilities (the CIRUS and Dhruva
reactors) for about 133 NWEs by 2000. The projected annual rate of increase from these facilities, at
the same assumed efficiency level, is about 6.8 NWEs.
 

indian bull

Banned Member
see also this funtz
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/south_asia.pdf
Chart 2 introduces estimates that are confined to India's unsafeguarded civilian heavy water power
reactors (HWRs), which easily could be operated to produce high quality weapons-grade plutonium.
(Pakistan has no unsafeguarded civilian power reactors, and therefore does not have a corresponding
bar in Chart 2.) Even if these Indian power reactors have not all been operated optimally for the
highest quality of plutonium for weapon purposes, their reactor-grade plutonium could be used for
weapons, albeit weapons that each would require larger critical mass quantities of plutonium (see
assumptions in Appendix A). In essence, Chart 2 shows Pakistan's and India's "best guess" NWE
production profile from dedicated facilities along side India's potential NWE production of
plutonium from its unsafeguarded power reactors -- with separate bars showing the NWE quantities
that could be derived from the already separated (reprocessed) plutonium, and also from the thus far
unreprocessed spent fuel.
These Chart 2 figures show that, as of 2000, India probably could derive up to 113 NWEs from the
separated HWR plutonium alone. From the unreprocessed HWR spent fuel, India could, over time
derive approximately 475 additional NWEs (the pacing being limited, perhaps, by installed
reprocessing capacity). Taken together, these Indian figures in Chart 2 suggest a notional capacity of
about 700 weapons, as of 2000. This is about half again as many NWEs as are estimated to be in
China's operational nuclear arsenal (see second paragraph below). These Indian figures will continue
to climb.
India's estimated 2.6:1 advantage over Pakistan strictly from dedicated facilities in 2000 actually
could be larger if, as might be expected, India has also incrementally expanded its uranium centrifuge
facilities to accumulate significant quantities of weapons-grade uranium, and if India will
successfully operate its fast-breeder reactors to produce weapons-grade plutonium. India's established
advantage over Pakistan almost certainly would remain, even if the Fissile Material Control Treaty
(FMCT) comes into effect with both countries as parties.
7
 
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