President Trump claimed during remarks on Long Island, N.Y., on Friday that he will make the Strait of Hormuz a U.S. territory, despite the fact that Oman and Iran share jurisdiction of the waterwa…
thehill.com
“Pretty soon, I will be declaring the Hormuz Strait a territory of the United States,” Trump said during an address highlighting his administration’s efforts to combat crime in the U.S.
Strait of America. Sorry, Straight of America.
I watched one of Trump’s press conferences from his first term the other day while looking for something and you can clearly see that the guy has lost it. I mean, he always spewed crazy drivel and showed little intelligence, but you can clearly see the difference, old age has now taken over. It’s quite insane that people would trust a demented old (4 years past male life expectancy in the country) man (and, in this case, not overly bright to begin with) the power of waging wars, dictate foreign policy, etc (I am not talking about internal affairs because this is not the right place for such discussion, regardless of how much can be said). After Biden, too! But here we are, posting in this thread.
New world (middle east) order. What Sandhi Yudha posted above is a direct consequence of the actions of the demented narcissist. Not that the agreement is that big of a deal, but sure is a sign of times.
At the same time, while everyone (basically everyone in the world) tries to find ways to diversify from and offload the United States, which is becoming a liability at this point, everyone finds out how difficult it is and how choices are limited (or simply nonexistent). None are as attractive as a (in “modern” terms) protectorate of or alliance with the US were
deemed to be. This is especially apparent in the Middle East.
It’s also notable how this war revealed that the military bases with proximity to a capable enemy are basically useless and a long-term financial liability (the USA must be the last country to find that out). And capabilities don’t even have to be “all bells and whistles”. Consider how this reflects on Okinawa, for example, in the context of China. If Iran can evacuate the American bases in the ME, one would think that China can obliterate the US assets in Japan with relative ease. At the very least, they can make them inoperable and play little to no role in a theoretical conflict.
Then consider the effect this “excursion” had on deterrence or perception of such. If the American power has such … extraordinary, really, limitations against Iran… Interestingly, on the other (extreme) end of the “competition”, a serious consideration should be given to Russia and its demonstration of readiness/willingness to absorb the magnitude (for many unimaginable magnitude) of economic and human costs, while also having options - that is, they determine the terms for the most part and decide when the conflict ends (to be clear, I am not referring to the UA and Euro position of “Russia decides when the conflict ends” because that is entirely different). This capacity to sustain the losses is, in turn, forming a deterrent all on its own. I would actually want to touch on this quite a bit more as this is very interesting. Maybe in the other thread at some point (probably not though).
Someone should write their dissertation on the subject (and I am sure many will be written in years to come). There is
so much to think about and discuss here. These, call it, five years will change security architecture around the entire world.
At the same time, like I already mentioned, there are no easy (or clear) answers. Another consideration that is quite clear today is that simple production of interceptors is not the solution to the problem at hand. Economic constraints are rather obvious. Concentration will likely (or should) be on developing new means of countering ballistic missiles, as well as various, much cheaper, UAS that will only get better (I have a hunch this will be resolved rather sooner than later though). Zaluzhny’s text from the late 2023 (?) resonates rather well here. Technological break through and whatnot.
Recent evidence has also shown probably more than ever before that enormous offensive capabilities are not guaranteed to deliver the desired outcome against a determined competitor either. But this is not really new. What is relatively new is that there is clear evidence today that nuclear deterrence has real limitations that were not as obvious few short years ago. Of course, that is only until someone breaks the tabu and uses tactical (or, worse yet, strategic) nukes for what they have always been intended to do, with investment by all parties so big, that it is probably hard to even estimate it in the right ballpark figure. Still, nuclear proliferation is as big of a concern as ever.
Anyway… Camping out in Banff National Park, having a beer, and looking at the sky, thinking about all this stuff that is so meaningless in the grand scheme of things… While making the best and most of the short time we have here is the only rational thing to do, instead we come up with the ways to measure our dicks and attempt to prove something that has no meaning whatsoever. Imagine all the people, or something.
Or
Whatever rocks your boat.
Clearly, the beer is doing some heavy lifting at the end of the post here, laughing. I’ll return to the regular programming in no time though!