Middle East Defence & Security

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Given that they had police firing AK's at UH-60s during the pilot rescue op, they clearly don't have enough MANPADS.

Need to have those things hanging above the fireplace in every home
Ah in general policemen anywhere are not supposed to have MANPADS lying around , even if it is Iran. Those would be with IRGC or Artesh forces and would require specialised training to use correctly.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
However, we don't know what exactly Iran is getting through support.
Back in Feb, Reuters was also cited six unnamed sources, the Iranians are buying anti-ship missiles from China.

It might well the true but these are claims that does not have any independent or third party validation. Neither the Americans or Israeli governments have commented on these reports.

 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Spoke to some other people about the Reuters reports. A lot of people are skeptical. It has not been confirmd or validated by any American or even Israeli sources, who would be definitely all over something like this.

Presumbly if someone is cooking such stories, why? China would predictable deny it. Only the general public who have little knowledge of such issues (unlike folks here) might believe them.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member

“Pretty soon, I will be declaring the Hormuz Strait a territory of the United States,” Trump said during an address highlighting his administration’s efforts to combat crime in the U.S.

Strait of America. Sorry, Straight of America.

I watched one of Trump’s press conferences from his first term the other day while looking for something and you can clearly see that the guy has lost it. I mean, he always spewed crazy drivel and showed little intelligence, but you can clearly see the difference, old age has now taken over. It’s quite insane that people would trust a demented old (4 years past male life expectancy in the country) man (and, in this case, not overly bright to begin with) the power of waging wars, dictate foreign policy, etc (I am not talking about internal affairs because this is not the right place for such discussion, regardless of how much can be said). After Biden, too! But here we are, posting in this thread.

New world (middle east) order. What Sandhi Yudha posted above is a direct consequence of the actions of the demented narcissist. Not that the agreement is that big of a deal, but sure is a sign of times.

At the same time, while everyone (basically everyone in the world) tries to find ways to diversify from and offload the United States, which is becoming a liability at this point, everyone finds out how difficult it is and how choices are limited (or simply nonexistent). None are as attractive as a (in “modern” terms) protectorate of or alliance with the US were deemed to be. This is especially apparent in the Middle East.

It’s also notable how this war revealed that the military bases with proximity to a capable enemy are basically useless and a long-term financial liability (the USA must be the last country to find that out). And capabilities don’t even have to be “all bells and whistles”. Consider how this reflects on Okinawa, for example, in the context of China. If Iran can evacuate the American bases in the ME, one would think that China can obliterate the US assets in Japan with relative ease. At the very least, they can make them inoperable and play little to no role in a theoretical conflict.

Then consider the effect this “excursion” had on deterrence or perception of such. If the American power has such … extraordinary, really, limitations against Iran… Interestingly, on the other (extreme) end of the “competition”, a serious consideration should be given to Russia and its demonstration of readiness/willingness to absorb the magnitude (for many unimaginable magnitude) of economic and human costs, while also having options - that is, they determine the terms for the most part and decide when the conflict ends (to be clear, I am not referring to the UA and Euro position of “Russia decides when the conflict ends” because that is entirely different). This capacity to sustain the losses is, in turn, forming a deterrent all on its own. I would actually want to touch on this quite a bit more as this is very interesting. Maybe in the other thread at some point (probably not though).

Someone should write their dissertation on the subject (and I am sure many will be written in years to come). There is so much to think about and discuss here. These, call it, five years will change security architecture around the entire world.

At the same time, like I already mentioned, there are no easy (or clear) answers. Another consideration that is quite clear today is that simple production of interceptors is not the solution to the problem at hand. Economic constraints are rather obvious. Concentration will likely (or should) be on developing new means of countering ballistic missiles, as well as various, much cheaper, UAS that will only get better (I have a hunch this will be resolved rather sooner than later though). Zaluzhny’s text from the late 2023 (?) resonates rather well here. Technological break through and whatnot.

Recent evidence has also shown probably more than ever before that enormous offensive capabilities are not guaranteed to deliver the desired outcome against a determined competitor either. But this is not really new. What is relatively new is that there is clear evidence today that nuclear deterrence has real limitations that were not as obvious few short years ago. Of course, that is only until someone breaks the tabu and uses tactical (or, worse yet, strategic) nukes for what they have always been intended to do, with investment by all parties so big, that it is probably hard to even estimate it in the right ballpark figure. Still, nuclear proliferation is as big of a concern as ever.

Anyway… Camping out in Banff National Park, having a beer, and looking at the sky, thinking about all this stuff that is so meaningless in the grand scheme of things… While making the best and most of the short time we have here is the only rational thing to do, instead we come up with the ways to measure our dicks and attempt to prove something that has no meaning whatsoever. Imagine all the people, or something.


Or


Whatever rocks your boat.

Clearly, the beer is doing some heavy lifting at the end of the post here, laughing. I’ll return to the regular programming in no time though!
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
An addition to my post ^ from yesterday (this builds on Trump’s post re NorthSouth Korea, posting here since this directly related to my discussion above):

This is all wrong:

1. Kim Jong-Un is not Trump’s friend. They’ve personally interacted for just 5 hours, in a diplomatic setting, & haven’t seen each other since 2019. Deluding himself into believing that typical leader interactions like this are actually ‘friendships’ is how Trump gets take advantage of by shifty opponents like Putin. Recall that Trump’s ostensible friendship with Kim got us nothing on nukes during the 2018-19 US-NK negotiations. So even if they are 'friends,' who cares?

2. The exercises aren't that costly (probably $10-20 M), & it is unclear who pays the cost. Trump is probably thinking of the US military presence on the peninsula. Those expenses are divided pretty fairly.

3. Calling long-established training exercises w/ a long-standing ally 'inappropriate & hostile' is literally what NK calls them Trump once again unnecessarily tilts towards dictators.

4. 'NK is unthreatening and respectful to the US.' This is only true if we abandon SK (which I think Trump wants to do). NK posted a map as early as 2013 showing it nuking the US mainland.

5. SK was in no position to help the US war against Iran even if it had wanted to. It does not have the blue-water navy or long-range bombers for that. It's much further away from the Persian Gulf theater than NATO countries are. And it is pretty obvious that if we had won the Iran war, Trump would be saying the opposite - that US allies are useless free-riders whom we don't need and who should pay up.

6. US grand strategy is now Trump's whim and petulance, whatever moves his polling or he sees on Fox. There is no framing, no 'reverse-Kissinger' or anything like that. The Trump National Security Strategy published last year is useless as a guide to US action. US foreign policy since its release looks nothing like what it says.

Don't be surprised when US allies start cutting deals with local opponents. US security guarantees are not credible under Trump, and the Iran war just showed how overstretched the US is. If Iran can stalemate the US, consider what China or maybe even NK will be able to do?

Allies will also start considering nuclear options. Does anyone believe in the US nuclear umbrella now? That the US would run nuclear risk for an ally? Except for Israel perhaps, the answer is obviously no. So if you are an exposed, forward US partner or ally (SK, Japan, Poland, post-war Ukraine, maybe Germany), you're thinking about post-American nuclear security on your own.


Robert Kelly’s thoughts from here: Robert E Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) on X


Edit:




(Reference to “Asia pivot”, while the Middle East consumes all the resources… again)
 
Last edited:
An addition to my post ^ from yesterday (this builds on Trump’s post re NorthSouth Korea, posting here since this directly related to my discussion above):

This is all wrong:

1. Kim Jong-Un is not Trump’s friend. They’ve personally interacted for just 5 hours, in a diplomatic setting, & haven’t seen each other since 2019. Deluding himself into believing that typical leader interactions like this are actually ‘friendships’ is how Trump gets take advantage of by shifty opponents like Putin. Recall that Trump’s ostensible friendship with Kim got us nothing on nukes during the 2018-19 US-NK negotiations. So even if they are 'friends,' who cares?

2. The exercises aren't that costly (probably $10-20 M), & it is unclear who pays the cost. Trump is probably thinking of the US military presence on the peninsula. Those expenses are divided pretty fairly.

3. Calling long-established training exercises w/ a long-standing ally 'inappropriate & hostile' is literally what NK calls them Trump once again unnecessarily tilts towards dictators.

4. 'NK is unthreatening and respectful to the US.' This is only true if we abandon SK (which I think Trump wants to do). NK posted a map as early as 2013 showing it nuking the US mainland.

5. SK was in no position to help the US war against Iran even if it had wanted to. It does not have the blue-water navy or long-range bombers for that. It's much further away from the Persian Gulf theater than NATO countries are. And it is pretty obvious that if we had won the Iran war, Trump would be saying the opposite - that US allies are useless free-riders whom we don't need and who should pay up.

6. US grand strategy is now Trump's whim and petulance, whatever moves his polling or he sees on Fox. There is no framing, no 'reverse-Kissinger' or anything like that. The Trump National Security Strategy published last year is useless as a guide to US action. US foreign policy since its release looks nothing like what it says.

Don't be surprised when US allies start cutting deals with local opponents. US security guarantees are not credible under Trump, and the Iran war just showed how overstretched the US is. If Iran can stalemate the US, consider what China or maybe even NK will be able to do?

Allies will also start considering nuclear options. Does anyone believe in the US nuclear umbrella now? That the US would run nuclear risk for an ally? Except for Israel perhaps, the answer is obviously no. So if you are an exposed, forward US partner or ally (SK, Japan, Poland, post-war Ukraine, maybe Germany), you're thinking about post-American nuclear security on your own.


Robert Kelly’s thoughts from here: Robert E Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) on X


Edit:




(Reference to “Asia pivot”, while the Middle East consumes all the resources… again)
As Carmine Jr put it, "You're at the precipice of an enormous crossroad"

This is the end of the end of Pax Americana. Security strategists in Asia are doing the math and realizing that their alternatives are to 1) create new alliance blocs, 2) cozy up to China or 3) wither on the vine. Security strategists in the Middle East are (hopefully) realizing that US bases are a liability and the only reasonable path forward is a new security architecture that includes Iran. Security strategists in Europe are... well they're still looking for a job because the Mark Rutte and Ursula van der Leyen have no need of their services.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
For whoever is on holidays...

Don't worry, you are not going to get bored:
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
For whoever is on holidays...

Don't worry, you are not going to get bored:
At least he doesn't plan to change the name to Strait of Trump....
Well, who knows. You can expect everything from him.
 
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