Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[MickB]

While I also like the idea of cheap, highly mobile fast attack craft, the problem in the Australian context is range.
The strate of Hormuz is only 20 NMs wide.

I like any factor that that provides an adversary more diverse problems.
But to operate them in our region they would need to be forward deployed.
This in turn means local basing (with the problem of getting local permission) or some kind of depot ship or both.
And then the base or depot ship itself will become a target so must itself be defended.
Roll on the the problems of forward deployed HIMARs but on a larger scale.

I suppose one could operate then like a strike fighter and send an only self defence armed (weight and space) perhaps slightly larger version of the FAC along as a tanker to extend their range.
Fueling both ways would offer a dramatic increase in range but with added complexity.

 

[Stampede]

I’m starting to wonder what our fleet will look like in the 2030s and beyond.
A lot we already know.
Submarines, Hobarts, Hunters Mogami Arafura and Capes.

Mine warfare and Survey are interesting.
Dedicated ships or a new approach!
Looks like no dedicated vessels for this role like in the past
The same question applies to our big ship fleet.
Supply and Canberra classes plus HMAS Choules.

A bit to unpack here, but I get the vibe big ships are not the flavour of the month going forward.

The two supply ships I’d suggest are safe, but with only two in number it does appear inadequate for the larger type of fleet we intend to build.

As for the three Amphib, I regretfully have the feeling the Army landing craft medium and heavy fleet are their replacement , not a complimentary force.
That being the case ,Choules will be gone within the decade and the LHD’s may be retired sooner rather than later.
Certainly no urgency to arm these ships or explore enhanced aviation capabilities off these platforms.
Constant acknowledgment of the China threat and the challenges of the world we live have not lead to a reflective capital injection of finances to fund both the existing ADF capabilities and the capabilities we wish to introduce.

So Navy going forward
SSNs with some quality destroyers and frigates supporting an army amphibious force

Does not look like the type of balanced force I envisaged some years ago.

Thoughts

Cheer S

 

[SammyC]

I’m starting to wonder what our fleet will look like in the 2030s and beyond.
A lot we already know.
Submarines, Hobarts, Hunters Mogami Arafura and Capes.

Mine warfare and Survey are interesting.
Dedicated ships or a new approach!
Looks like no dedicated vessels for this role like in the past
The same question applies to our big ship fleet.
Supply and Canberra classes plus HMAS Choules.

A bit to unpack here, but I get the vibe big ships are not the flavour of the month going forward.

The two supply ships I’d suggest are safe, but with only two in number it does appear inadequate for the larger type of fleet we intend to build.

As for the three Amphib, I regretfully have the feeling the Army landing craft medium and heavy fleet are their replacement , not a complimentary force.
That being the case ,Choules will be gone within the decade and the LHD’s may be retired sooner rather than later.
Certainly no urgency to arm these ships or explore enhanced aviation capabilities off these platforms.
Constant acknowledgment of the China threat and the challenges of the world we live have not lead to a reflective capital injection of finances to fund both the existing ADF capabilities and the capabilities we wish to introduce.

So Navy going forward
SSNs with some quality destroyers and frigates supporting an army amphibious force

Does not look like the type of balanced force I envisaged some years ago.

Thoughts

Cheer S

From the last national defence strategy. Hydrographic services will be contracted and no longer done in house. I don't think this is the end of the world. The task still gets done.

Mine warfare. This is an area that is rapidly changing. I don't think we will ever again have specialised ships for this purpose. It will become an exclusive drone function. It would not surprise me if we use the Mogami mine hunting UUV more widely, or adapt the ghost shark for this type of work. Given the advancements with drones, this seems appropriate.

The LHDs will remain, but Choules will be replaced by the new LCHs. The NDS was clear on that. I think that is OK. The LCHs have a greater combined capacity and its more distributed.

I think we might consider more oilers when we have the full frigate and destroyer fleet. We don't have the demand at the moment. So perhaps 2040 for this, by which time the current two will be up for replacement.

It is intended to be a focused rather than a ballanced force. Designed to protect sea lanes to/from our neighbours and move land forces north. All built around surveilance, drones and missiles.

 

[Volkodav]

While I also like the idea of cheap, highly mobile fast attack craft, the problem in the Australian context is range.
The strate of Hormuz is only 20 NMs wide.

I like any factor that that provides an adversary more diverse problems.
But to operate them in our region they would need to be forward deployed.
This in turn means local basing (with the problem of getting local permission) or some kind of depot ship or both.
And then the base or depot ship itself will become a target so must itself be defended.
Roll on the the problems of forward deployed HIMARs but on a larger scale.

I would not be sending a K130 or ANZAC into the straits of Hormuz, let alone an Arafura.

This would need ships with multiple tiers of sensors, sendor fusion, as well as weapons, with a highly teained and experienced crew, not to forget seemless intergration with allied air and surface systems.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I have always wondered about sea born radar systems. How do they see over the horizon? Is it something like HF which uses the ionisphere to reflect ?

The Russians had a system but it was pretty bad, but useful for "there is a ship over the horizon" and "there is not a ship over the horizon". From all reports it didn't really work, but perhaps was an excuse to not have everyone at stations all the time.

Perhaps an easier upgrade pathway would be say the SAAB Sea Giraffe, which the AMB version is fitted to the LHDs.

Wasn't that the origional fitout of the anzacs? Non AESA girraffe?

IMO, Arafura class opvs have alot of potential.

But we didn't really build them to be combat ships, they don't have high speed/high output engines for example. Im sure we cut back on electrical generation as well.

With the current call for both patrol ships and mine clearing ships. Maybe they will relook at what she can do, but I think its unlikely she will get fitted with super weapons.

 

[SammyC]

The Russians had a system but it was pretty bad, but useful for "there is a ship over the horizon" and "there is not a ship over the horizon". From all reports it didn't really work, but perhaps was an excuse to not have everyone at stations all the time.


Wasn't that the origional fitout of the anzacs? Non AESA girraffe?


But we didn't really build them to be combat ships, they don't have high speed/high output engines for example. Im sure we cut back on electrical generation as well.

With the current call for both patrol ships and mine clearing ships. Maybe they will relook at what she can do, but I think its unlikely she will get fitted with super weapons.

Yes it did have an early Giraffe radar. I had forgotten about that.

 

[iambuzzard]

The Russians had a system but it was pretty bad, but useful for "there is a ship over the horizon" and "there is not a ship over the horizon". From all reports it didn't really work, but perhaps was an excuse to not have everyone at stations all the time.


Wasn't that the origional fitout of the anzacs? Non AESA girraffe?


But we didn't really build them to be combat ships, they don't have high speed/high output engines for example. Im sure we cut back on electrical generation as well.

With the current call for both patrol ships and mine clearing ships. Maybe they will relook at what she can do, but I think its unlikely she will get fitted with super weapons.

A 40mm gun and possibly a small SAM set up would be enough.

 

[MickB]

I would not be sending a K130 or ANZAC into the straits of Hormuz, let alone an Arafura.

This would need ships with multiple tiers of sensors, sendor fusion, as well as weapons, with a highly teained and experienced crew, not to forget seemless intergration with allied air and surface systems.

Sorry i think we got our wires crossed, I was in no way advocated the sending of an Arafura into Hormuz.

My comment was in reply to iambuzzard in reference his comments on the fact that Iran operates a large number of small FAC.
I was (perhaps badly) commenting on the different operational context between Iran and Australia.

 

[spoz]

(Wearily). For about the umpteenth time, the Arafuras are not combat vessels AND THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE TO BECOME COMBAT VESSELS. Over time I rather suspect they may become involved in proving unmanned mine warfare systems, possibly with the concept for employment going back to that of the 80s where actual mine warfare tasks were to be undertaken by COOPs. But their purpose is constabulary, anything else they do is a bonus.

Hydro worries me. Sure, contractors can do it now. But who trains and gives experience to the next generation? Many outsourcing experiences suggest that contractors do not invest in such development. Plus, we are bound by IMO and IHO rules to have a national hydro authority, and that person (and the organisation supporting) need to know the business. A very shortsighted move in my view.

 

[iambuzzard]

(Wearily). For about the umpteenth time, the Arafuras are not combat vessels AND THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE TO BECOME COMBAT VESSELS. Over time I rather suspect they may become involved in proving unmanned mine warfare systems, possibly with the concept for employment going back to that of the 80s where actual mine warfare tasks were to be undertaken by COOPs. But their purpose is constabulary, anything else they do is a bonus.

Hydro worries me. Sure, contractors can do it now. But who trains and gives experience to the next generation? Many outsourcing experiences suggest that contractors do not invest in such development. Plus, we are bound by IMO and IHO rules to have a national hydro authority, and that person (and the organisation supporting) need to know the business. A very shortsighted move in my view.

Spoz, I know what you're saying. All I was trying to put across was that the Arafura class just need the gun they were designed for and a small capability for air defence. They are patrol boats and good ones at that.
The discussion here is way more dignified than unfortunately those in power. We have to think outside the square as the world has changed. What that would be is up to the wiser heads on here. I'm just a hobby shop owner with an interest on where our navy is going with friends, past and present, who have served in the RAN all the way back to Mackenzie Gregory who survived Savo Island, but also 9/11 in Washington DC.
Maybe we do need fast attack craft supported by replenishment in the islands to the north. Layered defence. Just a thought.

 

[Stampede]

Spoz, I know what you're saying. All I was trying to put across was that the Arafura class just need the gun they were designed for and a small capability for air defence. They are patrol boats and good ones at that.
The discussion here is way more dignified than unfortunately those in power. We have to think outside the square as the world has changed. What that would be is up to the wiser heads on here. I'm just a hobby shop owner with an interest on where our navy is going with friends, past and present, who have served in the RAN all the way back to Mackenzie Gregory who survived Savo Island, but also 9/11 in Washington DC.
Maybe we do need fast attack craft supported by replenishment in the islands to the north. Layered defence. Just a thought.

The RAN will have 8 to 9 major combatants for the next ten plus years.
This number will be the surface option and response for every contingency just beyond the capability of our Capes and equally equiped Six OPVs.

The up-gunning of the OPVs is really about giving them some modest extra capability to deal with some scenarios that are just beyond the capability of the Capes.

It’s about freeing up the majors so they are not wasted doing over kill on some lower to middle end tasking.

In effect it will give us 14 to 15 vessels over the next decade to respond to such scenarios rather than the status quo.

Again no one is trying to turn an OPV into a battleship.

Just as we are not asking an infantry solder to carry a 155mm cannon. Just an upgrade to an assault rifle rather than be restricted to using the issued pistol.


Cheers S

 

[Todjaeger]

The RAN will have 8 to 9 major combatants for the next ten plus years.
This number will be the surface option and response for every contingency just beyond the capability of our Capes and equally equiped Six OPVs.

The up-gunning of the OPVs is really about giving them some modest extra capability to deal with some scenarios that are just beyond the capability of the Capes.

It’s about freeing up the majors so they are not wasted doing over kill on some lower to middle end tasking.

In effect it will give us 14 to 15 vessels over the next decade to respond to such scenarios rather than the status quo.

Again no one is trying to turn an OPV into a battleship.

Just as we are not asking an infantry solder to carry a 155mm cannon. Just an upgrade to an assault rifle rather than be restricted to using the issued pistol.


Cheers S

I have a somewhat different take, largely due to how I view the capabilities of the Cape-class patrol boats as well as the Arafura-class OPV's.

As I see it, the major capability differences between the two classes of vessel revolve around the range, potential mission endurance and seakeeping of the respective classes. The Arafura-class OPV's being larger vessels designed for ocean patrolling (blue water as opposed to green/brown water) should be able to safely transit to and patrol longer stretches, particularly of open water. The OPV's likely should also be able to better weather rough seas and storms. Also, due to the greater size and displacement of the OPV's, they could likely safely house/hold a larger number of detainees found aboard SIEV's, illegal/poaching vessels, as well as rescued persons.

However, both the patrol boats and OPV's are patrolling/constab vessels and not combatants or 'fighting' warships. Depending on just what one considers "middle end" tasking either type of vessel might be able to get utilized. OTOH it is quite possible that what one might consider "middle end" taskings could remain something beyond the reasonable capability of either type of vessel.

IMO if such a hypothetical tasking is one that might involve the use of force against AusGov personnel/vessels, then the RAN needs to have capability overmatch. As an example, consider the potential interaction between a Chinese fishing fleet and an Australian Border Force Cutter or RAN vessel. Given the potential threats should there be a clash between an Australian vessel and a Chinese fishing fleet, especially if the fishing fleet is escorted or accompanied by a PRC Coast Guard vessel, then in order for an Australian vessel to even have a chance at reaching force overmatch, it would need to be a major warship. One needs to remember that some of the PRC Coast Guard vessels are ex-PLAN frigates, which even if no longer quite as well armed, could easily still be more than a match for even an up-gunned OPV. OTOH if the "Coast Guard" vessel ended up retaining (or getting re-armed) with some of the typical PLAN weapons fitouts, there would be basically no chance that an OPV could reach the same level of capability much less have capability overmatch.

This then all folds back to just what types of threats does one envision an OPV being potentially 'up-gunned' to make it into a suitable substitute for a RAN major like a frigate or destroyer? Also, what would be realistically required in such upgrades, including the costs in time, money, workforce and yard space?

As I have mentioned before, easy, low cost and modest upgrades, particularly for self-defence systems are things I think would be reasonable and understandable. However, these should really only be done so that an OPV and crew might have a chance of surviving and escaping in the event of a sudden and unexpected attack or outbreak of hostilities. Such upgrades should not be done in an attempt to make the OPV's into something they are not, like being a suitable substitute for a warship.

 

[Volkodav]

(Wearily). For about the umpteenth time, the Arafuras are not combat vessels AND THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE TO BECOME COMBAT VESSELS. Over time I rather suspect they may become involved in proving unmanned mine warfare systems, possibly with the concept for employment going back to that of the 80s where actual mine warfare tasks were to be undertaken by COOPs. But their purpose is constabulary, anything else they do is a bonus.

Hydro worries me. Sure, contractors can do it now. But who trains and gives experience to the next generation? Many outsourcing experiences suggest that contractors do not invest in such development. Plus, we are bound by IMO and IHO rules to have a national hydro authority, and that person (and the organisation supporting) need to know the business. A very shortsighted move in my view.

I can see an opportunity to use one or two of them as trails and training vessels for new systems intended for other combatant classes. Over all I am 100% on the same page as you, they are not warships, never were, and never will be. If we are using them as such, something has gone horribly wrong.

Back before the OPV selection, let alone the GPF program, I was always banging on about if we are going to arm it like a warship, build a warship. As you know there are massive diferences in structure, systems redundancy and resilience.

 

[SammyC]

(Wearily). For about the umpteenth time, the Arafuras are not combat vessels AND THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE TO BECOME COMBAT VESSELS. Over time I rather suspect they may become involved in proving unmanned mine warfare systems, possibly with the concept for employment going back to that of the 80s where actual mine warfare tasks was to be undertaken by COOPs. But their purpose is constabulary, anything else they do is a bonus.

Hydro worries me. Sure, contractors can do it now. But who trains and gives experience to the next generation? Many outsourcing experiences suggest that contractors do not invest in such development. Plus, we’re are bound by IMO and IHO rules to have a national hydro authority, and that person (and the organisation supporting) needtoknow the business. A very shortsighted move in my view.

I'm going to speak outside my expertise, but here goes.

Perhaps long range drones can provide much of the future scanning. I could see a fleet of a stripped down ghost sharks being used to map, including into enemy territory. AI is already capable of them processing that data. I have a feeling that hydrography will be one of the earlier professions killed by autonomous systems and AI.

 

[SammyC]

I have a somewhat different take, largely due to how I view the capabilities of the Cape-class patrol boats as well as the Arafura-class OPV's.

As I see it, the major capability differences between the two classes of vessel revolve around the range, potential mission endurance and seakeeping of the respective classes. The Arafura-class OPV's being larger vessels designed for ocean patrolling (blue water as opposed to green/brown water) should be able to safely transit to and patrol longer stretches, particularly of open water. The OPV's likely should also be able to better weather rough seas and storms. Also, due to the greater size and displacement of the OPV's, they could likely safely house/hold a larger number of detainees found aboard SIEV's, illegal/poaching vessels, as well as rescued persons.

However, both the patrol boats and OPV's are patrolling/constab vessels and not combatants or 'fighting' warships. Depending on just what one considers "middle end" tasking either type of vessel might be able to get utilized. OTOH it is quite possible that what one might consider "middle end" taskings could remain something beyond the reasonable capability of either type of vessel.

IMO if such a hypothetical tasking is one that might involve the use of force against AusGov personnel/vessels, then the RAN needs to have capability overmatch. As an example, consider the potential interaction between a Chinese fishing fleet and an Australian Border Force Cutter or RAN vessel. Given the potential threats should there be a clash between an Australian vessel and a Chinese fishing fleet, especially if the fishing fleet is escorted or accompanied by a PRC Coast Guard vessel, then in order for an Australian vessel to even have a chance at reaching force overmatch, it would need to be a major warship. One needs to remember that some of the PRC Coast Guard vessels are ex-PLAN frigates, which even if no longer quite as well armed, could easily still be more than a match for even an up-gunned OPV. OTOH if the "Coast Guard" vessel ended up retaining (or getting re-armed) with some of the typical PLAN weapons fitouts, there would be basically no chance that an OPV could reach the same level of capability much less have capability overmatch.

This then all folds back to just what types of threats does one envision an OPV being potentially 'up-gunned' to make it into a suitable substitute for a RAN major like a frigate or destroyer? Also, what would be realistically required in such upgrades, including the costs in time, money, workforce and yard space?

As I have mentioned before, easy, low cost and modest upgrades, particularly for self-defence systems are things I think would be reasonable and understandable. However, these should really only be done so that an OPV and crew might have a chance of surviving and escaping in the event of a sudden and unexpected attack or outbreak of hostilities. Such upgrades should not be done in an attempt to make the OPV's into something they are not, like being a suitable substitute for a warship.

I think there is some middle ground.

OPVs, just as they currently are, can take a lot of work of the major surface combatants. Operations such as Sovereign Borders, could be fully managed at a fraction of the cost with OPVs. They would not need any extra weapons to do this. Chasing patagonian fishermen across the Indian Ocean is also a good job for an OPV. OPVs can do much of the routine patrolling and port visits through the Pacific Islands. An OPV could probably even do a right of entry passage through the Taiwan Straight. Rescue is another good job for an OPV.

From my experience, the above would take a good 30% of the workload off the frigates and destroyers, which, by raw numbers gives another 3-4 major surface combatants released for more complex purposes. Fantastic outcome. Gives the 15-16 ships that the Navy can call on for its full range of activities and use them for what they are designed for. Nothing more needs to be done to the OPVs, other than get them in the water.

I do also see a place for an OPV to be given more armament to be able to manage in unexpected situations. Its dealing with a problematic fishing vessel way off the coast, and it suddenly attracts the attention of a larger coast guard or military frigate, which can outrun the OPV. Some weaponry will make that vessel change its tactics and be a little bit more wary (ants might be small, but I am still very careful when comming across a jack jumper).

An OPV with a better radar (not top shelf, but something more mid range) will help it manage the radio wave spectrum, not get jammed completely blind, and have some ability to fight back. Even a two pod NSM would mean that an enemy ship would give it some space (same principle as a sholder launched missile has on the straight of Hormuz). A larger gun will mean that it has some defence against ramming and larger drones. A basic missile defence, not ESSM, but maybe chaff, Mistral or even Nulka. These all buy the OPV some time and space to control the situation, and either withdraw safely or control the area until a frigate/aircraft can arrive to provide that overmatch.

 

[Todjaeger]

I think there is some middle ground.

OPVs, just as they currently are, can take a lot of work of the major surface combatants. Operations such as Sovereign Borders, could be fully managed at a fraction of the cost with OPVs. They would not need any extra weapons to do this. Chasing patagonian fishermen across the Indian Ocean is also a good job for an OPV. OPVs can do much of the routine patrolling and port visits through the Pacific Islands. An OPV could probably even do a right of entry passage through the Taiwan Straight. Rescue is another good job for an OPV.

From my experience, the above would take a good 30% of the workload off the frigates and destroyers, which, by raw numbers gives another 3-4 major surface combatants released for more complex purposes. Fantastic outcome. Gives the 15-16 ships that the Navy can call on for its full range of activities and use them for what they are designed for. Nothing more needs to be done to the OPVs, other than get them in the water.

As I understand it, the above is essentially why OPV's were developed, and precisely why Australia had been looking to get them into service.

I do also see a place for an OPV to be given more armament to be able to manage in unexpected situations. Its dealing with a problematic fishing vessel way off the coast, and it suddenly attracts the attention of a larger coast guard or military frigate, which can outrun the OPV. Some weaponry will make that vessel change its tactics and be a little bit more wary (ants might be small, but I am still very careful when comming across a jack jumper).

An OPV with a better radar (not top shelf, but something more mid range) will help it manage the radio wave spectrum, not get jammed completely blind, and have some ability to fight back. Even a two pod NSM would mean that an enemy ship would give it some space (same principle as a sholder launched missile has on the straight of Hormuz). A larger gun will mean that it has some defence against ramming and larger drones. A basic missile defence, not ESSM, but maybe chaff, Mistral or even Nulka. These all buy the OPV some time and space to control the situation, and either withdraw safely or control the area until a frigate/aircraft can arrive to provide that overmatch.

I have to disagree about the potential value of an OPV, even a significantly upgraded one, in a scenario like the above. If an Australian vessel attracts unfriendly attention from the armed forces of another nation because the Australian vessel is pursuing a fleeing/evading poacher or SIEV, then unless the Australian vessel is kitted out for essentially full spectrum combat like a frigate, then the upgrades would be worth SFA. Again, it comes back to being able to achieve capability overmatch. If a PLAN frigate gets tasked to intervene because a RAN OPV is pursuing a PRC fishing fleet vessel, even an OPV if upgraded is not going to be able to match the combat power of the PLAN frigate, or realistically be able to deal with the potential aftermath of exchanging shots with said frigate. Also depending on where such a scenario took place, it is distinctly possible that other hostile assets like MPA, subs, or additional surface warships could also respond. If the threat enviro is such that it is beyond the domain of a constabulary response, then proper warships are needed.

 

[SammyC]

As I understand it, the above is essentially why OPV's were developed, and precisely why Australia had been looking to get them into service.



I have to disagree about the potential value of an OPV, even a significantly upgraded one, in a scenario like the above. If an Australian vessel attracts unfriendly attention from the armed forces of another nation because the Australian vessel is pursuing a fleeing/evading poacher or SIEV, then unless the Australian vessel is kitted out for essentially full spectrum combat like a frigate, then the upgrades would be worth SFA. Again, it comes back to being able to achieve capability overmatch. If a PLAN frigate gets tasked to intervene because a RAN OPV is pursuing a PRC fishing fleet vessel, even an OPV if upgraded is not going to be able to match the combat power of the PLAN frigate, or realistically be able to deal with the potential aftermath of exchanging shots with said frigate. Also depending on where such a scenario took place, it is distinctly possible that other hostile assets like MPA, subs, or additional surface warships could also respond. If the threat enviro is such that it is beyond the domain of a constabulary response, then proper warships are needed.

Perhaps, but then we are going to need more frigates as constabulary jobs become progressively more agressive. Or more assets to provide protection to an OPV.

Maybe as an alternative, if that OPV had armed ghost sharks in its area of operation, then a hostile frigate would be less likely to engage, and the OPV can do its constabulary job unimpeded. Or perhaps the OPV works in an area screened by other frigates. Or perhaps frigates, drones and OPVs all together.

I think the point here is that when the world deteriorates further (and I am of this mind), then the only non combat area a vessel is likely to have is in Hobart harbour. Everything is going to have to exist in a heightened state of threat. I suspect our patrol boats are going to face this problem to some extent as well.

I also think there is merit in asymmetric conditions. We would send a frontline frigate in the event a Chinese coast guard cutter ventured into our area of interest. To flip the scenario, the Chinese would up rate their asset if an OPV had some offensive capability, regardless of how small. So they would send a frigate to interdict an armed OPV rather than a cutter, pulling that frigate off something else, or perhaps they would choose to not interdict with a cutter or a frigate and leave the fishing boat to its own devices.

 

[Stampede]

As I understand it, the above is essentially why OPV's were developed, and precisely why Australia had been looking to get them into service.



I have to disagree about the potential value of an OPV, even a significantly upgraded one, in a scenario like the above. If an Australian vessel attracts unfriendly attention from the armed forces of another nation because the Australian vessel is pursuing a fleeing/evading poacher or SIEV, then unless the Australian vessel is kitted out for essentially full spectrum combat like a frigate, then the upgrades would be worth SFA. Again, it comes back to being able to achieve capability overmatch. If a PLAN frigate gets tasked to intervene because a RAN OPV is pursuing a PRC fishing fleet vessel, even an OPV if upgraded is not going to be able to match the combat power of the PLAN frigate, or realistically be able to deal with the potential aftermath of exchanging shots with said frigate. Also depending on where such a scenario took place, it is distinctly possible that other hostile assets like MPA, subs, or additional surface warships could also respond. If the threat enviro is such that it is beyond the domain of a constabulary response, then proper warships are needed.

I had a bit of a smile to myself when I saw Arafura parked in between a supply ship and LHD in Sydney late last year.
Looked very small and reinforced the limited expectations one should have for a vessel of that size.
That said an 80m vessel looks big compared to much smaller offerings and there are certainly many equivalent sized vessels to our OPVs that have significant fire power.

Agree regards to over match.
It applies to every scenario.

Just want to increase the scenarios Arafura can contend with and free up our very limited fleet of majors.

Unpredictable world and all.

8 to 9 ships for now and the decade ahead is I’d suggest too lean!

Cheers S

 

[Reptilia]

We are cooked up until 2038.

2026
2 x Hobart class AW Destroyers
7 x Anzac class Frigates
5 x Collins class SSGs
3 x Arafura class OPVs
10 x Evolved Cape class PBs
2 x Canberra class LHDs
1 x Choules LPD
2 x Supply class AORs

2038
3 x Hobart class AW Destroyers
4 x Hunter class ASW Frigates
5 x (Upgraded Mogami) General Purpose Frigates
3 x Virginia class SSNs
5 x Collins class SSGs
6 x Arafura class OPVs
10 x Evolved Cape class PBs
2 x Canberra class LHDs
2 x Supply class AORs
+
18 x LCM
8 x LCH


It will be interesting to see what comes after the last Evolved Cape in 2030, something like an OCV (replacing 1st Gen Capes and then Arafuras down the track) -would give the Navy a real boost in the 2030s.
More replenishment ships off the shelf too.

 

[Todjaeger]

Perhaps, but then we are going to need more frigates as constabulary jobs become progressively more agressive. Or more assets to provide protection to an OPV.

Maybe as an alternative, if that OPV had armed ghost sharks in its area of operation, then a hostile frigate would be less likely to engage, and the OPV can do its constabulary job unimpeded. Or perhaps the OPV works in an area screened by other frigates. Or perhaps frigates, drones and OPVs all together.

I think the point here is that when the world deteriorates further (and I am of this mind), then the only non combat area a vessel is likely to have is in Hobart harbour. Everything is going to have to exist in a heightened state of threat. I suspect our patrol boats are going to face this problem to some extent as well.

I also think there is merit in asymmetric conditions. We would send a frontline frigate in the event a Chinese coast guard cutter ventured into our area of interest. To flip the scenario, the Chinese would up rate their asset if an OPV had some offensive capability, regardless of how small. So they would send a frigate to interdict an armed OPV rather than a cutter, pulling that frigate off something else, or perhaps they would choose to not interdict with a cutter or a frigate and leave the fishing boat to its own devices.

In such scenarios where the ordinary constabulary duties have gotten to the point where it has become reasonable to think a hostile, armed response is possible or even likely, then the role is no longer really a constabulary one and therefore should be handled by a proper warship.

After all, in the event that a hostile power has become willing to target or engage an Australian patrol vessel, the hostile platform(s) could be surface warships, subs, or aerial threats. This in turn means that future Australian patrolling assets would need some sort of sensing and awareness capability covering air/surface and subsurface approaches, as well as some ability to respond to threats coming from same, assuming such a scenario does develop.

This necessity to cover air, surface and subsurface would effectively require at a minimum, corvette-level capabilities and IMO frigate systems would likely be more appropriate for Australia. In effect, such a scenario would mean Australia would need to task GP frigates to conduct patrols due to the breadth of potential threats. An upgraded patrol vessel kitted out with some sort of missile/gun CIWS would just not be adequate, since the Australian vessel could be targeted with hostile torpedoes, AShM (air, surface, and/or sub-surfaced launched), hostile air or ASuW from hostile escorts. Once one has started talking about scenarios where an Australian vessel might become the target of maritime strikes launched using anti-ship cruise missile-armed H-6 bombers, then one has gotten into something where upgrades just would not be sufficient. Without redesigning and then rebuilding the vessels, the damage control and redundancies found in a proper warship design just cannot be achieved in the OPV, and if we have gotten to a scenario where the OPV might be threatened by medium-range assets, one has to assume there is a risk of leakers and thus a need for damage control and survivability measures.