The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think the Chinese are investing in Central Asian infrastructure, & I can certainly see them being interested in building infrastructure in Russia to facilitate raw material imports, but I wonder if there's an issue of Russian wariness of Chinese ownership or control.
The negotiations might be complex, but Russia needs markets, and China needs resources. Something would get worked out somehow. Ownership is also a legal relationship in societal terms. How secure is legal ownership of anything in Russia?
 

Vanquish

Member
Well, let's consider the logic here more broadly. Obviously in the specifics he's just wrong. But could there be transit bottlenecks for Russian resources to reach the Chinese market? Absolutely. But that won't get China to drop Russia. It will go on the other direction and push China to invest in Russian infrastructure for resource delivery. And China has plenty of experience doing that. This could push China to back Russia more, not less. Especially if other sources of oil become more limited.



It's an ugly Ukrainian practice thats been going on since '14. In this case these are Russian civilians that Ukraine took out of Kursk region. Either kidnapped or evacuated, depending on who you ask. Of course the fact that they weren't simply allowed to get on a bus to Belarus speaks volumes.
Kind of like what Russia does. Sending Ukrainian's and kids to far eastern Russia from occupied territories.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kind of like what Russia does. Sending Ukrainian's and kids to far eastern Russia from occupied territories.
There's a distinction between kids separated from their parents being sent to various government sponsored foster and orphanage facilities and adult civilians being held. More-so we've seen civilians included in "POW" exchanges during the Minsk Accords era on multiple occasions, generally from one side. Moreover we've seen Ukrainian parents recover their children from Russian government custody not as part of some sort of POW exchange process but by navigating the admittedly inept and complex Russian bureaucracy.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Congratulations, you read one article. Now, "not a single Russian refining plant west of the Urals is operational" when it says "40% idle"... Maybe you rather live in your own fantasy?
Sorry to disappoint, but… the article is basically rubbish. Just a couple of weeks ago or so, there were news that the Washington Post basically fired their Russia, Ukraine, as well other departments. I believe this is the first article that I read in its entirety since then that definitely shows the results and decline. It basically gives a vibe of something written by mediocre students that tried to do their homework and plugged in a bunch of quotes with numbers and otherwise without actually understanding of the subject matter: they basically ran an internet search and copy pasted a whole bunch of stuff from the top search results and without verification to boot. A quote:

Citing data from Seala, a Russian energy markets analysis agency, the Russian business daily RBC reported that nearly 40 percent of the country’s refining capacity remains idle, mainly due to repairs after attacks.

“Attacks by Ukrainian drones are the main cause and account for up to 70 percent of the shutdowns,” Seala’s Vladimir Nikitin said, noting that scheduled maintenance on some facilities has been pushed back in a scramble to keep refineries running.

Russia’s fuel market is facing a shortfall equal to about 20 percent of monthly gasoline demand — roughly 400,000 tons out of the 2 million consumed — the Kommersant business daily reported, and consumers are starting to feel it. Roughly 1 in 50 gas stations have stopped selling gasoline as nationwide production has dropped by about 10 percent.

Since July, Russia has increased its gasoline purchases from neighboring ally Belarus by 36 percent compared with last year. In September, gasoline imports jumped by 168 percent compared with the previous months, but volumes are still not sufficient to meet demand.


Those are consecutive paragraphs and that is a lot of numbers and percentages, comparison to undefined “previous months” and so on. This is just garbage for the lemmings who either lack interest or mental capacity (often both) to process the information presented in front of them, but get excited because “zomg, big numbers, big trouble”, etc. The article further talks about civil unrest and whatever else. They also state the following and I want to insert an actual screenshot to illustrate the formatting practice as well:

IMG_4126.jpeg

Who the hell inserts hyperlinks like that and this the norm through out the article. Anyway, here is the reality as far as the ban is concerned:

The Russian government said on Saturday it was lifting the ban on gasoline exports for oil producers to avoid overstocking while extending the ban on exports for non-producers until the end of July 2026.

So not really a ban on the gasoline exports and not till the end of the year either, alas…


Diesel exports:

Russian diesel exports rebounded to around 900,000 b/d in December (after falling to a five-year low of 590,000 b/d in September), as refinery runs recovered from 5.0 to 5.5 million b/d.


From the same article for a larger perspective:



A Reuters article (from last week) talking about the Russian diesel exports (as well as further implied EU dependence on the US and cheaper RU diesel for others):



The burden of proof is on the person making the claim.
For whatever reason it doesn’t work in this case, lol. A whole bunch of people keep pointing out and disproving the dude’s claims, but he just keeps posting nonsense. At least the engagement is up with these low-credibility and questionable source quality posts, am I right? Laughing.

I also don’t even know what I am supposed to disprove here either. That 17 does not equal 38 (or whatever the number was)? Go figure.

Let’s see about regime change, but it at least looks like it’ll need new leadership
Indeed. We will see what happens. Overall, I, personally, fail to see any significant vulnerabilities and negative impacts that Russia may be exposed to here. First and foremost, this turn of events was not only predictable, but fully anticipated (speaking for myself) since the first attack on Iran last year and I doubt Russia didn’t account for the contingencies and serious vulnerability of Iran (maybe even encouraged some of it behind the scenes?).

In the short (maybe even medium, pending developments) term, it provides them with leverage in regard to the barrel discounts and higher oil prices in general. Supplies of interceptors to Ukraine will certainly be affected; other weapons likely as well. Ukraine attention sharing or losing it altogether (probably why this effort to insert it back via “Shahed expertise”). And so on. I fail to see how this does not benefit Russia, even if supplies of some imports from Iran are disrupted or disappear.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Russia is advancing down the valley instead of up the hills...

And Grishine looks like a Russian town to be.
Is Ukraine counter-attacking there?

Nordstream would be now in the best European interests.
"That (Qatar) is 20% of the world’s LNG going offline at a stroke, which would be a fundamental change in the market if sustained for a long period."
 

personaldesas

Active Member
Nordstream would be now in the best European interests.
"That (Qatar) is 20% of the world’s LNG going offline at a stroke, which would be a fundamental change in the market if sustained for a long period."
Prices may move, but Qatar isn’t a major supplier to Europe, most of its LNG goes to Asia. So Nordstream wouldnt have changed much here.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Prices may move, but Qatar isn’t a major supplier to Europe, most of its LNG goes to Asia. So Nordstream wouldnt have changed much here.
That is not how the market works though. All of a sudden, everyone, including Asia, competes for the same LNG coming from the US, Russia, etc and it goes to the highest bidder. At the same time, being basically the only one connected to a pipeline with uninterrupted flow, under a long-term contract to boot, however:

 

personaldesas

Active Member
That is not how the market works though. All of a sudden, everyone, including Asia, competes for the same LNG coming from the US, Russia, etc and it goes to the highest bidder. At the same time, being basically the only one connected to a pipeline with uninterrupted flow, under a long-term contract to boot, however:
Prices may move (as I said, I think you missed that). My point was just that Europe isn’t directly dependent on Qatari volumes. Nord Stream wouldn’t magically shield Europe from global LNG pricing dynamics. It would reduce exposure at the margin, sure, but thats it.

And frankly, rebuilding that kind of dependency on Russia, especially after they already cut Europe off in 2022 would be hilariously stupid.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Of course it would. Europe would have the advantage of increasing purchases of the pipe gas at contract prices up to the pipe capacity and lean more on the spot market when the price settles. Used to happen all the time. In other words, if you buy 20% of your supplies on the open market instead of 60% (arbitrary numbers), makes a big difference. Which is also why, again, arbitrary speaking, I am paying a lot more for the gas today than I did yesterday, while my neighbour’s cost hasn’t changed because he signed a 2-year contract with the provider.
 

personaldesas

Active Member
Thats oversimplified.

- Many contracts have price formulas linked to oil or hub prices. They are not immune to global dynamics.
- You can’t just “increase purchases up to pipe capacity” unless: Contractually allowed, technically available, politically viable, physically flowing. All of those are "If",
- In 2022, flows were reduced even under contract by russia.

Also, you point assumes:
- Russia is a stable supplier
- No sanctions interference
- No geopolitical escalation
That’s a very strong assumption post-2022.

Your neighbor example works for retail consumers. But wholesale European gas pricing is interconnected and financialized. Even long-term contracts adjust over time.

And again: trusting Russia again after they already cut Europe off in 2022, and effectively giving a state that is famously targeting its neighboring countries energy infrastructure leverage over Central and Eastern Europe’s energy security, would be a new level of stupidity in this whole conflict.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Russia was a stable supplier. That’s the only assumption that matters. That is exactly how contracts used to be set up. The long-term contracts are (were, in this case) intended to have guaranteed reliable supply and avoid uncertainty and price fluctuations over the duration of the contract and prices are adjusted at or before the expiration date if (rather when) a new contract is signed. In 2022, flows were reduced (Germany begging Canada to return refurbished turbines for months was one of the reasons) and then the pipe was blown up.

The entire debate began with a “would”.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia is advancing down the valley instead of up the hills...
And you'll notice Russia hasn't had much success in the Ivanovka area.

It appears Ukraine has shifted their resources away from this area and towards the Zaporozhye front. Russia seems poised to make significant gains in this area, though so far Russian consolidation hasn't been confirmed, only a substantial expansion of the grey zone. Grishino is probably about to be under Russian control. I keep waiting to see Russian forces enter Biletskoe.
 

personaldesas

Active Member
Russia was a stable supplier. That’s the only assumption that matters. That is exactly how contracts used to be set up. The long-term contracts are (were, in this case) intended to have guaranteed reliable supply and avoid uncertainty and price fluctuations over the duration of the contract and prices are adjusted at or before the expiration date if (rather when) a new contract is signed. In 2022, flows were reduced (Germany begging Canada to return refurbished turbines for months was one of the reasons) and then the pipe was blown up.

The entire debate began with a “would”.
It was stable, until it wasn’t. You can debate causes endlessly, but the outcome was reduced flows and then a shutdown. That alone alters the risk profile. Europe can’t base its energy security on the assumption that 2022 was just a one-off anomaly.

Even setting aside they'd need to trust something of that importance to someone that designated them “unfriendly countries” and musing about nuking their capitals on state TV.

The simple fact remains that Russia is at war, its infrastructure has been exposed to disruption, and deliveries were severely impacted in recent past. That alone makes energy reliance a strategic non-starter.
 
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rsemmes

Active Member
Thats oversimplified.

- Many contracts have price formulas linked to oil or hub prices. They are not immune to global dynamics.
- You can’t just “increase purchases up to pipe capacity” unless: Contractually allowed, technically available, politically viable, physically flowing. All of those are "If",
- In 2022, flows were reduced even under contract by russia.

Also, you point assumes:
- Russia is a stable supplier
- No sanctions interference
- No geopolitical escalation
That’s a very strong assumption post-2022.

Your neighbor example works for retail consumers. But wholesale European gas pricing is interconnected and financialized. Even long-term contracts adjust over time.

And again: trusting Russia again after they already cut Europe off in 2022, and effectively giving a state that is famously targeting its neighboring countries energy infrastructure leverage over Central and Eastern Europe’s energy security, would be a new level of stupidity in this whole conflict.
Hopefully, Denmark was not "trusting" any "secure" US energy supply.
I think that "trusting" implies certain level of "stupidity" even without a conflict. In "geopolitical escalation" I will guess that Trump is included.
 

personaldesas

Active Member
Hopefully, Denmark was not "trusting" any "secure" US energy supply.
I think that "trusting" implies certain level of "stupidity" even without a conflict. In "geopolitical escalation" I will guess that Trump is included.
If sarcasm and whataboutism generated heat, you could heat Europe all on your own!

Like I said, the conversation began with a would. Non of it matters as it is not an option regardless of the circumstances.
Fair enough!
 
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