This is a blatantly untrue statement. It is February 15th 2026. 4 years ago is February 15th 2022, ~a week before the invasion started. The only parts Russia "held" at that time were Crimea, and the LDNR territories.
news.liga.net
Thats wrong, Ukraine was able to push back most of the hordes in its entire north, evrything west of the Dneper river was cleansed. So far Russia lost over 40% of the areas it captured after the initial attack.
"Now it’s clear that the threats we face demand a step change in our defence and security."
www.theguardian.com
Sea barriers wouldn't stop a Storm Shadow. It isn't a sea skimmer. It can attack from any angle.
The submarine was likely damaged by a near-miss from a unmanned boat. So in theory sea barriers should have worked.
Most of Russian gains in the initial attacks weren't properly under control. Russian forces bypassed towns and cities, to rush inward. They were pushing for a collapse of Ukraine's government. Russia didn't consolidate actual control until after they pulled back from Kiev. The biggest losses of ground came in the fall of '22, when Ukraine collapsed the Kharkov front, and Russia then withdrew from the right shore in Kherson region. Since then Russia has recaptured about a third of what they lost in the north-east, and gained quite a bit of ground in Donetsk region and eastern Zaporozhye. I don't have the math, but I suspect Russia holds about the same amount of Ukrainian soil that they did in Sept. of '22.
NATO strong ? Surely you jest. NATO collectively has hardly done anything to improve its situation. Can Britain, France or Germany field a full strength brigade with supplies for more than a week ?
If you base your takeaway on a random ~15k-follower X account, you’ll inevitably end up with pretty wild narratives. On a platform that size you can find literally any take you want, from solid analysis to complete nonsense, all presented with the same level of confidence.
NATO's low readiness and yet great total strength aren't a paradox. NATO together is very powerful and nobody can really match them. But because of this they haven't had to maintain high readiness of forces. They've also been leaning on US power for a long time. I think if Britain, France, or Germany really had to field a full strength brigade they would do so. In fact if push came to shove, I think they could field far more than that. The Ukrainian armed forces were in a sorry state in '14, but they sent much more than a brigade to the Donbas. NATO has a hard time committing to field forces for political reasons. But if they had no choice, they certainly have the capability. Even if it required some painful and unpleasant decision-making.
You are surely jesting, after reading the article.
Do you wonder if that "mass delusion" is, maybe, inspire by the "pretty wild narratives" of Kallas (After more than a decade of a conflict, including 4 years of full-scale war in Ukraine. Russia has barely advanced beyond the 2014 lines), who doesn't seem to be able to see the "land corridor" and Zelenski (He also called for a clear date for Ukraine to be allowed to join the EU) and his wishes?
I’m less certain about the societal and political willingness side, especially in countries like Germany. After decades without direct war exposure, public tolerance for casualties and long combat deployments is likely quite low. I assume that can make sustained force generation and deployment politically difficult, even if the material capability exists.
On top of that, the political landscape is quite fragmented, and information and influence campaigns appear to be quite effective at amplifying divisions. You can already see how controversial even indirect military support is, there is a non-trivial segment of the population that views supplying Ukraine with means to defend itself as escalatory or somehow “pro-war.” Some voices even argue for munich-treaty-style arrangements with Russia in order to restore stability (Germans of all people should remember how that can work out).
Yes, obviously in the face of existential threats to their existence the German population would just refuse to defend themselves, come on be realistic.
What total rubbish, please provide some form of evidence of what a "meaningful share" is 5, 10, 20, 50, 70 percent?
Please read my point again. I’m talking about the political and societal threshold for sustained deployments being higher. You seem to be responding to a different claim I didn't make.
Please read my point again. My claim wasn’t that the general population would *love* foreign rule or welcome it or not strongly dislike it. I said I wouldn’t be surprised if a meaningful share of people would be reluctant to take up arms in a scenario of direct threat or occupation. That’s a question of *willingness to fight*, not enthusiasm for the outcome.
Around 60% is a reasonable ballpark based on recent polling.
Die Zeit said:
Die Zeit said:
www.zeit.de
If 16% of all Germans will fight for Germany, that means 13 million fighters. That´s a lot. To add are those who will fight for Germany if they will be attacked. The ZEIT writes that less than the half of Germans won´t fight. Okay. That should be enough. And in case of war there is a lot of more to do, fire service, medical...Bundeswehr: Nur 16 Prozent würden auf jeden Fall für Deutschland kämpfen
Weniger als die Hälfte der wehrfähigen Deutschen würde sicher oder wahrscheinlich kämpfen wollen. Dabei rechnen 27 Prozent in den nächsten fünf Jahren mit einem Krieg.
Die Zeit is referring to people eligible for military service, not the total population.
en.wikipedia.org
Russia in its primitivism and barbarism is so low below our cultural and economical standard, that i absolute would prefer death over russian rule over Europe. Your suggestion is like thinking Egypt under Ramses II would accept to be ruled by some australian aboriginie tribal leader. The whole idea is absurdDie Zeit is referring to people eligible for military service, not the total population.
For the sake of argument, if one assumes (the 2009 number of) roughly ~15 million people fall that into that eligible group, then 16% would equal about ~2.5 million potential fighters, and that would be a theoretical upper bound under full mobilization, not a ready, trained, and equipped force.
List of global manpower fit for military service - Wikipedia
For scale only (not as a direct comparison): Russia’s active military is around ~1.5 million personnel today, without full mobilization. Directionally, that shows that a (to be fair very pessimistic) 16% willingness figure alone would not automatically translate into obviously sufficient effective manpower for a large-scale, sustained war compared with many countries.
This and these numbers are not meant as an accurate prediction of what would actually happen, only to underline that manpower assumptions matter, and that population sentiment at this scale is not trivial and can be concerning.