The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Could we maybe see something similar to the Partition of India, when populations shifted massively along new borders, or to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, when Greek and Turkish communities effectively ended up separated into north and south?
It's already happening to some extent. Populations are being displaced as the wall of fire and death rolls forward. Behind the wall, after it has passed, some come out of the basements but they are few. Some return, and they're the ones either supporting Russia or likelier willing to live under Russian rule if it means they can go home. Today Mariupol' once again has over 200 000 population, possibly as high as 300 000, from the pre-war 450 000. But I don't think anyone particularly strongly pro-Ukrainian would return. 1-2 generations later, and it won't be any more Ukrainian nationally then Belgorod. The shift is less dramatic in areas Russia occupied quickly like Crimea, Melitopol', Berdyansk, and northern Lugansk region. If I had to take a guess, I think you'd find the most pro-Ukrainian populations still living in Russian held areas in Energodar, Tokmak, Melitopol', etc. But of course places like Kharkov and Chernigov are plenty russified, compared to somewhere like Vinnitsa or Zhitomir, nevermind L'vov. And it's unlikely that population will rapidly shift. If the war continues and Russia pushed in Kharkov region of course the trend will likely continue. Making matters more decisive, Russia has instituted very thorough background checks on Ukrainians trying to enter Russia including social media history checks. On the other hand residents of areas Russia annexes have an expedited Russian citizenship path, and I'm not clear on how that's being handled vs the background checks in question. Note when I say residents, to the best of my understanding this is based on their Ukrainian residency listed in their internal passport. Lastly Russia is doing what they can to attract population in areas where reconstruction efforts are in effect by handing out free housing and reconstruction certificates to homeowners. So it remains to be seen how much things move.

EDIT: An interesting article from Big Serge discussing the change in Ukrainian strategy and taking a broader look at Russia's strategy in the Donbas. The only thing I would question is that Russia will necessarily push up to the "banana" as he calls it from the south-west. We haven't really seen Russian attempt to take the hills west of Konstantinovka, which would be an important step in that direction. I think Russia will attempt to accomplish the same purpose by taking Dobropol'ye, and then Belozerskoe and Novodonetskoe, pushing north through the western part of Donetsk region. I think the big picture analysis is correct.

 
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Hoover

Member
Just another question:
Does anyone have informations of the mythological Ukrainian partizan units in the Melitopol area? Never heart anything since 2023.
 
It rates to that graph similar to the U.S.A , did the current U.S administration have an influence on its rating might be speculated on .
I find it highly unlikely that the U.S. government could influence a foreign publisher with a solid track record just to shape the opinions of a niche audience about a specific country.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Just another question:
Does anyone have informations of the mythological Ukrainian partizan units in the Melitopol area? Never heart anything since 2023.
These aren't really partisans in the WWII sense, at least we haven't seen any large scale actions that one would expect from something like that. If they are exist, they're a thin network of pro-Ukraine assets. It's hard to even draw the line between local grass-roots resistance vs Ukraine intelligence operations. Every once in a while we hear of a bridge blown, or a train derailed, or something of that sort, but it's fairly minimal. There is basically no pro-Ukrainian insurgency at this time. And of course every once in a while Russian outlets report on Russian security forces arresting someone for passing intelligence to Ukraine or participating in some sort of action against Russia, but these reports are also relatively rare. I don't have a total number for how many people were arrested in this way, but I would be surprised if the number was above triple digits.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
It's already happening to some extent. Populations are being displaced as the wall of fire and death rolls forward. Behind the wall, after it has passed, some come out of the basements but they are few. Some return, and they're the ones either supporting Russia or likelier willing to live under Russian rule if it means they can go home. Today Mariupol' once again has over 200 000 population, possibly as high as 300 000, from the pre-war 450 000. But I don't think anyone particularly strongly pro-Ukrainian would return. 1-2 generations later, and it won't be any more Ukrainian nationally then Belgorod. The shift is less dramatic in areas Russia occupied quickly like Crimea, Melitopol', Berdyansk, and northern Lugansk region. If I had to take a guess, I think you'd find the most pro-Ukrainian populations still living in Russian held areas in Energodar, Tokmak, Melitopol', etc. But of course places like Kharkov and Chernigov are plenty russified, compared to somewhere like Vinnitsa or Zhitomir, nevermind L'vov. And it's unlikely that population will rapidly shift. If the war continues and Russia pushed in Kharkov region of course the trend will likely continue. Making matters more decisive, Russia has instituted very thorough background checks on Ukrainians trying to enter Russia including social media history checks. On the other hand residents of areas Russia annexes have an expedited Russian citizenship path, and I'm not clear on how that's being handled vs the background checks in question. Note when I say residents, to the best of my understanding this is based on their Ukrainian residency listed in their internal passport. Lastly Russia is doing what they can to attract population in areas where reconstruction efforts are in effect by handing out free housing and reconstruction certificates to homeowners. So it remains to be seen how much things move.

EDIT: An interesting article from Big Serge discussing the change in Ukrainian strategy and taking a broader look at Russia's strategy in the Donbas. The only thing I would question is that Russia will necessarily push up to the "banana" as he calls it from the south-west. We haven't really seen Russian attempt to take the hills west of Konstantinovka, which would be an important step in that direction. I think Russia will attempt to accomplish the same purpose by taking Dobropol'ye, and then Belozerskoe and Novodonetskoe, pushing north through the western part of Donetsk region. I think the big picture analysis is correct.

"Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care."

It seems that Serge and me share some same line of thought and "Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded." That is not going to help Zelenski's negotiating position.

"There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs."
So, Ukrainian "victory" is making America great again.

About the Banana...
Maybe not from the SW but, in 2026, with Pokrovsk, Konstiantinivka, Siversk, Liman and Kupiansk gone, Orijiv-Guliaipole and Kramatorsk-Sloviansk sounds about right; with Izium and advances towards Sumy and Jarkiv. Russia has a front wide enough to attack Pavlograd.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
"Ukraine and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not care."

It seems that Serge and me share some same line of thought and "Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for offensive operations appears to be severely degraded." That is not going to help Zelenski's negotiating position.

"There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s willingness to incur strategic costs."
So, Ukrainian "victory" is making America great again.

About the Banana...
Maybe not from the SW but, in 2026, with Pokrovsk, Konstiantinivka, Siversk, Liman and Kupiansk gone, Orijiv-Guliaipole and Kramatorsk-Sloviansk sounds about right; with Izium and advances towards Sumy and Jarkiv. Russia has a front wide enough to attack Pavlograd.
I don't think we will see a big push on Pavlograd. I think we may see a play for Kherson. One of the things that Pokrovsk illustrated is that you don't need large attacks to capture cities when front lines are this porous. If the trend continues and Ukraine's manpower situation gets worse, I suspect we will see Russian troops steadily infiltrate Kherson city. They're currently on Karantinniy island right next to Korabel island, which is already a major built up area. Russia can start infiltrating Kherson with infantry elements, starting a slow penetrating fight for the city, rather then a single large assault. And if successful, it would provide a model for attacking Zaporozhye. I don't think we will see a real attempt to push on Kharkov or Sumy, only opportunistic advances if Ukraine removes forces from those areas. In Kharkov region I suspect Izyum and the push in the area between Oskol and Severskiy Donets rivers will be the focus. To attack Kharkov Russia would need to drastically expand their front north of Kharkov, and push along a wide front on both flanks. Right now Ukraine's focus is in the Donbas, and Russia has taken the time to make opportunistic advances, but not near Liptsi from where they could push towards Kharkov, instead in the Volchansk area, and so far they're mainly east of the Severskiy Donets with their efforts. This has the potential to eventually unite with efforts on the right shore of the Oskol.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
I don't think we will see a real attempt to push on Kharkov or Sumy.
That's what I meant by "advances".
On the other hand, Kherson? That would be just to deny it to Ukraine, it's always going to be on the wrong shore of the river. As useful as any threat against Sumy or Kharkov, only that Russia can actually take Kherson; probably.
 

crest

Member
I suspect the majority of Ukraine's pre-war population and current population want stronger democratic elements. I suspect this is also true of pre-'14 Ukraine. On some level the people who stood at the Maydan and anti-Maydan wanted the same things - more democratic elements. I think that before this war, after '14, Ukraine was firmly set on a course to becoming a steadily more authoritarian oligarchy. This war changes things quite a bit and it might actually provide Ukraine the impetus for a fundamental change of course. This war has also greatly intensified Ukraine's demographic crisis, and it remains to be seen how Ukraine resolves it (if Ukraine resolves it?). Also a lot depends on what territories Ukraine retains after the war. In a way losing many Russian-ethnic heavy regions, where even the Ukrainian population is russified, would make it much easier for Ukraine to move westward. You would no longer have the pendulum swings of national politics between leaders like Kravchuk and Kuchma, Yuschenko and Yanukovich. You could get something close to a concensus or at least a firm majority support for a westward course. A big question is, where will this line be?

I also wonder if Russia realizes they've almost certainly lost whatever parts of Ukraine they don't conquer. Whatever culture ties and soft power Russia had in Ukraine pre-war will be gone. Ukraine's government will stamp it out thoroughly regardless of what the population wants and regardless of what the treaties say. Those areas will be firmly hostile to Russia moving forward. Unless of course we see a total defeat and a crash of the current course set by Ukrainian elites, but I think this is unlikely.

On a note about the actual fighting, it appears I was mistaken about the salient north of Mirnograd. Ukraine has just overrun large chunks of it with frontal attacks, after many weeks of failing to cut the base of the salient. It's very strange that this comes shortly after Russia has effectively opened logistics into the salient and brought in new units. But at point Ukraine has retaken the areas south-west of Kucherov Yar, Novoe Shakhovoe, Zatyshok, and Sukhetskoe. Russian forces are apparently still in Dorozhnoe and Nikanorovka, and of course Russia now holds all of Rodinskoe and the refuse mound east of it. Russia is still making progress inside Shakhovoe itself. It remains to be seen if Ukraine can hold these areas, but it's the biggest Ukrainian counter-attack in this area, in terms of gains. It will be ironic if Ukraine manages to eliminate the salient entirely just as it loses all of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd, where the situation continues to deteriorate with Russian troops now controlling over half of Pokrovsk, contesting much of the rest, and having multiple footholds in Mirnograd from several directions.
Good points I think alot ultimately may come down to the government post Ukraine and just how the peace deal looks. there is a possibility that due to a lack of options Ukraine is forced to have strong economic relations with Russia.

I say that because well ukraine is no doubt going to be anti Russian there may also be a anti Western portion to it. Depending on how the post war government sells the war. There is good reason to think after the war at least some politicians will say Ukraine didn't lose it simply wasn't allowed to win aswell as some sense of betrayal by the west in Ukraine especially if after the war the donations don't come rolling in. But this is secondary to the point I would like to make

The e.u cannot realistically rebuild Ukraine after the war even if the will is there a uncertain bet as even now alot of there support turns out to be more talk then action.
The finances simply aren't toss in the economic problems faced domestically it's going to be hard to sell that kind of spending

The current u.s administration is unlikely to want to foot the bill either at least for anything that's not specifically in there interest. Trump in particular is unlikely to take it well if he's instead of being hailed peacemaker in Ukraine being told he's responsible for the plight of Ukrainians who are now in a country with the economic prospects of a black hole.

Both I think would be likely to just dump it all on Russia. It's there war it's there responsibility.

As to Russia if one takes the opinion that the war is due to national security concerns on there part. Then it's logical to assume that it's in there interest to keep Ukraine stable, the terms of the peace deal if Russia achieves its goals will keep Ukraine from being a threat militarily but no treaty can prevent the threat of having a large destabilized country that has alot of hatred for you. One would think that Russia does indeed know any brotherhood they once has with Ukrainians is gone, no amount of investment will return that but given the option of a toothless but stable Ukraine or a destabilized group of millions of armed anti Russian citizens no treaty is taking a future Ukraine from having drones small arms explosives and experience these things are already there.
That Russia will invest heavily in Ukraine post war economy, This is also in line with having as much influence as possible in Ukraine in supporting the government they will have a degree of it or at least a degree of cooperation. But that's overall less important then stability.

Now this is of course only theory and alot depends on the post war government and the specifics of the peace deal but if Russia decides to take the road of rebuilding in Ukraine it would make sense given there plan to essentialy turn Ukraine in to either a truly neutral country if not one dependent on them. Not to mention the fact that a destabilized Ukraine is a rather large security issue in its own right.
It will be very interesting to see just how much the e.u and u.s.a support Ukraine after the war. I don't think the e.u has the resources and I don't think the u.s,a has the desire.
Either way it's unlikely to be a easy sell domestically for either.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
I find it highly unlikely that the U.S. government could influence a foreign publisher with a solid track record just to shape the opinions of a niche audience about a specific country.
I was not suggesting U.S influence to influence a publisher here, but that this graphs displayed also had the levels, of corruption in Ukraine as to be same as the U.S I was suggesting the current admin were corrupt in comparison to previous administration ,I would be going off thread to go into details
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Imagine 250 Russian troops (probably poorly trained, some maybe with shovels) terrorizing the city of 60,000 inhabitants (prewar) and area of about 30 sq km, killing drone units, etc.

The entire city is basically a “grey zone” (what’s not yet red).

IMG_2751.jpeg

Myrnohrad is not in a much better shape:

IMG_2746.jpeg

Still “controlled by UA”. Ukrainian Forces are likely not taking many losses, as usual, and grinding the Russians by thousands, being in an advantageous position, as usually (otherwise, they would withdraw to the next line, which is actually prepared this time, though Russians had already crossed that before on a couple of occasions, but were pushed back).

IMG_2749.jpeg

Situation in Kupiansk is not much better than in Pokrovsk. Other major parts of the front are soon to be experiencing the same fate by the looks of it. In the meantime, we can’t entirely eliminate the possibility that, at this very moment, the brightest strategic minds of the Ukrainian command, headed by Zelensky, are planning another epic counteroffensive in order to raise spirits and distract from reality, which is sirely to succeeded (in intended purposes).

IMG_2748.jpeg

Back to building 12-point plans nobody cares about, quite literally.

Also planning to use the frozen Russian assets to keep Ukraine in the fight for, reportedly, two more years (the period of time the money are assumed to be enough for). What then - who knows. Money meant for restoration of Ukraine, supposedly.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
"I imagine that line..."
French, actually. But more from a soldier's perspective than anything else, not that the French Empire was happy with the British Empire. (Even less later on, but we all know that.)

[snip]
You are not formatting your posts correctly. Without selective quoting for each point/counter-point, the reader is left wondering what you are talking about. There is no context.

Here is an example of how it should work:

Rsemmes: " To achieve what exactly, that is what I wonder. After Robotine and Kursk, he is going to get what?"

VASS: Achieve ? Not be a RU puppet state. Not be anchored to Putin. Is this surprising ?

Rsemmes: " I cannot remember that line from Istanbul."

This is better. However, there is still a problem. Even with proper quoting, the reader is left what you are talking about. Case in point, you ask what Z hopes to achieve, and I respond with a perfectly reasonable "not be a RU puppet state". Point, counter-point. Your response about Istanbul is obtuse. I suspect your context is "what does Z hope to achieve after the 2022 Istanbul talks", but my answer is the same. Whether or not "being a puppet state" relates to "Istanbul" leaves us trying to interpret your stream of consciousness.

To make sure you understand (for this specific point) - UKR keeps fighting so as to not be a satellite, an extension, a Belarus-South. Thats why they fight, even though they are losing ground. They dont want to be Russian.

Reformat your post correctly and we can try again.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Or, I cannot obviate hypocrisy.
Every time Ukraine kills women and children is collateral damage, every time Russia kills women and children is a war crime (every time we kill women and children is "human shields used by the terrorists"); I cannot swallow that.
Of course UKR is not completely innocent, and RU is not completely guilty. We all can read various sources of information. What is problematic is trying to morally equate UKR and RU. RU and UKR might hit civilian targets, but RU makes a habit of it.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
I don't think Zelenski is.
Ukraine (in broad terms) has no money, no weapons and no soldiers. Conditions (terms for a Peace Agreement) were better in Istanbul than now, in three years time they will be worse. There is nothing (to improve the terms) that Ukraine can do about it.
I cannot read any other reality.
Well, in that case, the RU army should be in Kiev tomorrow.

The Istanbul terms were far worse.


Highlights:

RU keeps what it has
RU get those parts of territories it doesnt have, but claims (Donetsk, etc)
UKR is contractually obligated to never join NATO
UKR disarms
All sanctions against RU are lifted

These are not peace terms, they are surrender terms. Czechoslovakia 1938, again.

What can UKR do about it ? Kill enough Russians to make a difference (difficult). Do enough damage to the RU economy to make a difference (not as tough).

The west should enable UKR to defend itself, to put an end to Putins expansionist dreams. Just like we helped Nationalist China in 1941, South Korea in 1950, Britain in 1940, western Europe in the cold war, etc etc.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Unless you start (WW3) escalation. You don't know Russia's reaction, you don't know how we will react.
That would be a closer war.
If you are permanently stuck clutching your pearls in fear of what Putin might do, you might as well demobilize your military and hand your wallet over to Putin.

Putin is a rational actor, and is not going to sign his own death warrant over UKR. Russia was just fine (even better, really) before the 2022 invasion, and they can go back to being fine if they can be convinced to leave UKR.

Putin can die tomorrow and we will all be happier.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
How many of those are people that lived there before the RU invasion, and how many are RU "colonists" ?
I don't know, that's a good question. Clearly there are many people returning, you can see it on social media with people talking about it. Also I'm not aware of any distinct Russian effort to "colonize" the area. And it's not like Russia has surplus population, they have their own demographic problem. However... as far as Russia is control Mariupol' is just another Russian city. So anyone can really move there. It's not the special zone near the front line where access is restricted. And there's work, especially with the reconstruction that went on there. I'm also sure some of the city administration, teachers, doctors, etc. are from other parts of Russia. I've also heard rumors of DNR fighters faking Mariupol' residency to get free condos as part of the reconstruction, though to be fair they would be Ukrainian citizens too (at least they used to be pre-'14). It would be interesting to get an exact count, but as it stands we can't even get an independent population count.

Of course UKR is not completely innocent, and RU is not completely guilty. We all can read various sources of information. What is problematic is trying to morally equate UKR and RU. RU and UKR might hit civilian targets, but RU makes a habit of it.
I'm not sure this is true. Both sides seem to hit civilian targets. In Kherson region for example it appears Ukraine has been systematically targeting civilian medical facilities and vehicles. In Belgorod and Bryansk region we've had Ukrainian drone operators targeting vehicles indiscriminately pretty consistently.
 
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crest

Member
Also, on the frozen Russian assets:

View attachment 53726

View attachment 53727

For key risks I would add in dollar decentralization. To be honest im rather surprised the u.s hasn't privately tried to keep this from happening. I know it's a technicality not the u.s doing it but it's the same financial system that's underpinning the whole thing thats the point. Not to mention the overall effort was a u.s initiative the e.u wasn't super excited about full on sanctions. Well not once they found out they couldn't just have any exceptions they wanted before that tho yeah they were ready to drop the hammer! I even remember them saying there wasn't enough sanctions on oil and gas then two weeks later insisting that they needed exemptions. But they were willing to pay Russia less for there energy (sorry I just had to let that one out, it's perfectly embolic of what is wrong in group right now)

Well it was no doubt other factors there has been a increase in dedollerisation

As to the legal arguments.....
The issue is more that the money can be taken at all not what the excuse is. This isn't something that was supposed happen tho it has and against small or in the case of Iran isolated states and in small amounts tho all knew it was possible.

discussions about the how are disingenuous as they by default invalidate the primary issue and imply legitimacy. I really hate those kind of arguments.
 
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