Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

IMO this is true, but only in part. What I get concerned with is whether or not the reduction in projected numbers will become permanent and without replacement or adjuncts, i.e. replacing 11 MFU's consisting of three Hobart-class DDG's and eight ANZAC-class FFH's with 9 MFU's by retaining the Hobart-class DDG's and then only adding six Hunter-class FFG's. This is particularly worrisome of those who advocate for corvettes still hold any influence with gov't.

There is also IMO legitimate reason to be concerned about what some of the new/additional capability that has yet to be funded or ordered will be. Long-ranged, land-based AShM for instance comes to mind as a potentially very expensive money pit which would require massive investment to be able to make effective use (if that is even possible in an Australian context) whilst delivering a less flexible and versatile capability to the ADF.

For longer term plans, what it the plan for National Shipbuilding if the Hunter-class build programme stops after six vessels? I know my preference would be for the Hobart-class replacement programme to be brought forward but AFAIK that has not been indicated in the DSR.

Back in the 2000s when I began harping on about the reduction in fleet size, i.e. the replacement of three DDGs and six FFGs with only three AEGIS frigates, I was firmly and consistently put back in my box.

The argument back then was, Australia has never had more than about a dozen large warships, ANZAC ASMD delivers greater capability in some areas than AEGIS, PBs are perfectly adequate for EEZ constablrary work. The acquisition of the LHDs were also thrown in as an example of evolving capability for changing times.

My point of view is Australia has always needed, and continues to need at least twenty large warships. Not patrol frigates, not corvettes, but DDGs, FFGs, and ASW frigates (or destroyers), plus GP frigates (or sloops), and maybe even a couple (three) larger ships, i.e. CGs (DLG) or DDH.

Any patrol frigates would be a separate capability to the main fleet, i.e. the upper end of what used to be called coastal forces, the PBs, FACs, and corvettes.

This is a pipe dream, it never has been, and likely never will be funded. Just because our geography dictates a navy of at least this size and capability, doesn't mean it will ever be funded.

 

[Redlands18]

Back in the 2000s when I began harping on about the reduction in fleet size, i.e. the replacement of three DDGs and six FFGs with only three AEGIS frigates, I was firmly and consistently put back in my box.

The argument back then was, Australia has never had more than about a dozen large warships, ANZAC ASMD delivers greater capability in some areas than AEGIS, PBs are perfectly adequate for EEZ constablrary work. The acquisition of the LHDs were also thrown in as an example of evolving capability for changing times.

My point of view is Australia has always needed, and continues to need at least twenty large warships. Not patrol frigates, not corvettes, but DDGs, FFGs, and ASW frigates (or destroyers), plus GP frigates (or sloops), and maybe even a couple (three) larger ships, i.e. CGs (DLG) or DDH.

Any patrol frigates would be a separate capability to the main fleet, i.e. the upper end of what used to be called coastal forces, the PBs, FACs, and corvettes.

This is a pipe dream, it never has been, and likely never will be funded. Just because our geography dictates a navy of at least this size and capability, doesn't mean it will ever be funded.

I have never been able to understand why, in the early to mid 80s(pre Dibb), when there was a clear need for 7-8 new ships (just to maintain numbers) delivered by mid to late 90s, we ordered just 2 FFGs to be built at Williamstown. And then we totally ignore that experience built up, and have to re-start a couple of years later on an all-new design. If we had built 5 FFGs at Williamstown by 95-96, we would have been in a much better position to then move on to replacing the Perth class with a new DDG.

 

[Reptilia]

[

The way I see is that the force structure is always evolving. Strategic circumstances change but you are always going to have a mix of legacy equipment, new equipment and planned equipment. At no point are you ever likely to have that perfect force structure.

The current planned surface fleet is 3 X AWD, 9 X ASW frigates and 12 X OPVs. That will almost certainly change with the navy review but even if it does it would take decades for these changes to work their way through the fleet.

I would suspect that by the mid thirties we will have a mix of Hobarts, a couple of Hunters, a few legacy ANZACs, maybe a few corvettes/GP frigates and Arafuras. What the fleet will be building towards is another story. There will be plenty of defence reviews and changes of governments between now and then.

MID 2030s
3 HOBART AWD
6 of 8 ANZAC GPF, 2 decommissioned
5 of 6 COLLINS SSK, 1 in full cycle docking
6 ARAFURA OPV + follow on Corvettes or GP Frigates? (Type 31 Frigate looks to be the preferred option on here/Henderson)
3 of 6/9 HUNTER ASW + follow on AWD? (Type 83 Destroyer would make the most sense given the timeline/Osborne South)
2 of 3/5 VIRGINIA SSN + follow on 8 AUKUS SSN/Osborne North)

 

[knightrider4]

In terms of long range land-based AShMs it would depend on how you define "long range".
If you define "long range" as >100 nmi then putting NSM on the back of a Bushmaster Copperhead would fit the bill and not be particularly difficult.View attachment 50458
If you define "long range" as >800 nmi then we will likely have to sort out a land based launcher system for Tomahawk Block Vb although a similar system named Typhon is in development for the US Army and so getting involved in that would be a good idea.

It does look pretty I wonder if I can trade my ranger on one. In all seriousness though I wonder the utility of this system in the Australian context. A 250 km range weapon is in my opinion hardly going to bother a serious enemy, maybe I'm being too simplistic but why not park yourself 255 km from it providing you know where they are and let's face it that wouldn't be insurmountable for the Chinese just turn it and the crew into unidentifiable bits and pieces?

 

[StingrayOZ]

Big questions about submarine gap coming up.. Four corners and elsewhere.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1651371496680615937

Collins may effectively be out of service. New subs will still take nearly a decade. This of course is no surprise, the subs have been ping ponged between governments for decades. They are coming to the end of their lives, and supply chains have been underfunded and most companies involved in the project are no longer or not stocking equipment. A whole class of Japanese submarines have come and gone in the space we have farted around between finishing the last Collins and FOC of its replacement. The surface fleet isn't in much better state.

Removing them for LOTE won't instantly make them more available as you are removing subs from the water to do that, and at the core, they are old subs already. This further compounds the problem. Don't know what they will be doing post 2030, but it won't be in the SCS, we won't have the platforms to make regular patrols that far.

Big questions about how we can augment that sub/ASW capability with what we have or what we can get in a short order. Including leasing ships. We won't have the luxury of being choosey with ships either. They will be ships other navies are trying to dispose of. Old tired, broken platforms. I hope we don't go there.

Some pretty optimistic view of the future going around. Remembering the Hobarts, Collins, Anzacs, all need to go in for significant refits, combat systems, sensors, weapon upgrades etc. With so many platforms gone, manpower will dissipate. Doubtful of seeing more than 1 hunter FOC by 2035. Doubtful of seeing more than 1 Virginia SSN by 2035.

 

[buffy9]

Big questions about submarine gap coming up.. Four corners and elsewhere.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1651371496680615937

Collins may effectively be out of service. New subs will still take nearly a decade. This of course is no surprise, the subs have been ping ponged between governments for decades. They are coming to the end of their lives, and supply chains have been underfunded and most companies involved in the project are no longer or not stocking equipment. A whole class of Japanese submarines have come and gone in the space we have farted around between finishing the last Collins and FOC of its replacement. The surface fleet isn't in much better state.

Removing them for LOTE won't instantly make them more available as you are removing subs from the water to do that, and at the core, they are old subs already. This further compounds the problem. Don't know what they will be doing post 2030, but it won't be in the SCS, we won't have the platforms to make regular patrols that far.

Big questions about how we can augment that sub/ASW capability with what we have or what we can get in a short order. Including leasing ships. We won't have the luxury of being choosey with ships either. They will be ships other navies are trying to dispose of. Old tired, broken platforms. I hope we don't go there.

Some pretty optimistic view of the future going around. Remembering the Hobarts, Collins, Anzacs, all need to go in for significant refits, combat systems, sensors, weapon upgrades etc. With so many platforms gone, manpower will dissipate. Doubtful of seeing more than 1 hunter FOC by 2035. Doubtful of seeing more than 1 Virginia SSN by 2035.

Just an ABC article on top of that, which includes a number of influential quotes.

How Australia was left with only one deployable submarine

Until Australia's submarine fleet can go nuclear the navy must keep its near-retirement vessels deployable. It's been a struggle.

www.abc.net.au

I would like to see how people in British and US circles would be reacting to this at the moment.

I can see this being immensely damaging - to recruiting sailors, to building a workforce, to our allies and to our intent to appear as a capable nuclear steward.

 

[ASSAIL]

$7.8b in capability is not proceeding and is being “redirected” according to the defence minister himself.

It is completely inaccurate to suggest these decisions will have no impact on capability. The chief of Army himself admitted as much in a video that needed to be released on the day the DSR dropped, to try and head off mass exodus...

Unfortunately exodus of committed members is vastly underestimated by those making these decisions.
I’m one of quite a few I know who resigned from the RAN when the decision to not proceed with the carrier replacement was announced. Some transferred to the RAAF and other non FAA simply saw the writing on the wall.
What followed was 3 decades of degraded ASW capability only now being addressed “hopefully”

 

[devo99]

It does look pretty I wonder if I can trade my ranger on one. In all seriousness though I wonder the utility of this system in the Australian context. A 250 km range weapon is in my opinion hardly going to bother a serious enemy, maybe I'm being too simplistic but why not park yourself 255 km from it providing you know where they are and let's face it that wouldn't be insurmountable for the Chinese just turn it and the crew into unidentifiable bits and pieces?

In our region of maritime chokepoints, a 250 km strike radius can do quite a bit of area denial. And really we are not getting these for launching directly from Australia. They are an expeditionary capability like the USMC's NMESIS which they seem to think is a good idea despite also using the 250 km ranged NSM.

 

[Volkodav]

I have never been able to understand why, in the early to mid 80s(pre Dibb), when there was a clear need for 7-8 new ships (just to maintain numbers) delivered by mid to late 90s, we ordered just 2 FFGs to be built at Williamstown. And then we totally ignore that experience built up, and have to re-start a couple of years later on an all-new design. If we had built 5 FFGs at Williamstown by 95-96, we would have been in a much better position to then move on to replacing the Perth class with a new DDG.

The original plan was ten FFGs, the original US built four, plus six Australian built. These were meant to replace the Daring class destroyers and the river class DEs/frigates. Also, and quite critically, this was meant to be in addition to replacing the carrier.

Spoz is more across this than me, and I may have it back to front, but I believe, following the decision not to replace the carrier the aspiration became to increase the number of major surface combatants. Also each of these ships was to embark a helicopter, as well as having a minimum of a self defence missile capability.

The Dutch M class was seen as desirable but primarily for risk reduction, two additional FFGs were ordered to be built at Williamstown. This was the Australian Frigate Program (Project?).

This was followed by a project to replace the River Class DEs, initially seen as an ASW frigate, but, post Dibb, it was recast as a greater number of patrol frigates, that became the ANZAC class.

With Dibb the DDGs and FFGs became tier 1, the Rivers, then ANZACs became tier 2, and the PBs tier 3.

The ANZACs were seen as too large and capable to be PFs but no where good enough to be tier 1, while the tier 3 PBs were slated to be replaced by much more capable corvettes. The tier 1 replacement requirements, as far as I can tell were never set, instead the entire tier system was dropped.

The fallout from this is the DDGs were retired, four FFGs were upgraded and eventually three air warfare ships were ordered, while the ANZACs became GP frigates. Tiers were gone, and instead we had major and minor combatants, with only the Hobart's being anywhere near as capable as intended under the original plans.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I can see this being immensely damaging - to recruiting sailors, to building a workforce, to our allies and to our intent to appear as a capable nuclear steward.

No point in buying SSNs, if there is nobody to crew them.

What followed was 3 decades of degraded ASW capability only now being addressed “hopefully”

It would seem prudent and doable to refocus the ADF on ASW capability. Clarify against the questions being raised.

• Turn the LHD's into ASW, at least some of the time. We already have a reasonable number of Romeo's, combined with drones (such as strix), such as those already in development, they could be powerful platforms. This will be required anyway. As if we can send an ARG out into hostile waters in 2030 against peers with subs without some ASW carrier capability.
• We should also attach ourselves to the JSM integration onto the m60r.
• Acquire additional P8's (two) to strengthen our capability. Forward deployed to Butterworth and Momote.
• Acquire drones that give MAD sensor capability and can be deployed from the sonar bouy launchers on the P8. These have been in development since ~2015.
• Refit the Collins with VLS. Literally the K-VLS from the South Koreans fitted in a similar 6m extension. Fire NSM/Chonryong from these VLS and TLAM from the front tubes. These subs no longer become attack subs as their primary mission, but stand off strike. Launching ~ 10 x NSM + say 4 TLAM is a substantial deterrent that can sit in water in the Indian ocean. This frees up any SSN for a purely attack role. Conventional subs regular snorting is fine, because they will need regular situational updates on marine and land strike situations. They will also be likely doing this in the Indian ocean, not in the SCS where it will be easily picked up and prosecuted. Doing a low risk mod on Collins is pointless, their mission won't exist in 2030 and they won't be able to do it. But they can attack into the SCS. While talking to the Koreans, raid as much tech for the LOTE.
• Joint development with Korea, including using woomera for testing of a long range, land/naval based ~ 5,000 km missile. For Australia, something that can launch ~ 5 small JSM type warheads/seekers from a single missile, or two large warheads.

Thus firepower and capability can be increased with minimal extra platforms.

• Build 4 additional ready to cut steel 5000-7000t "frigates" to be in the water before 2032. This will help cover the LOTE/upgrades of collins, Hobart and Anzacs. They are smaller, cheaper, less range than hunter. After this (late 2030) one of the Hobarts will have its crew moved off, and two crews will cycle through the three ships in a similar manning concept as the Norwegians use. Aegis ships will require regular sensor and computer updates on a continuously rolling model; this needs to be modelled into manning and deployment going forward.
• Urgent development of the Hunter based AWD with long range strike capability. To be the 4-6 ships built.

Gov should kill off talk about corvettes. This would make it clear where the money and future focus is going. It would clarify what purpose the Collins have post 2030. It would strengthen our ASW capability at a time where it would be particularly weak, using existing off the shelf solutions we have in-service. We gain firepower without unreasonable cost or additional new platforms.

It is about deterrence. There has to be believable, workable, timely deterrence. Delivered from multiple, capable systems. It can't be able non existent platforms, arriving in 2050.

 

[Redlands18]

The original plan was ten FFGs, the original US built four, plus six Australian built. These were meant to replace the Daring class destroyers and the river class DEs/frigates. Also, and quite critically, this was meant to be in addition to replacing the carrier.

Spoz is more across this than me, and I may have it back to front, but I believe, following the decision not to replace the carrier the aspiration became to increase the number of major surface combatants. Also each of these ships was to embark a helicopter, as well as having a minimum of a self defence missile capability.

The Dutch M class was seen as desirable but primarily for risk reduction, two additional FFGs were ordered to be built at Williamstown. This was the Australian Frigate Program (Project?).

This was followed by a project to replace the River Class DEs, initially seen as an ASW frigate, but, post Dibb, it was recast as a greater number of patrol frigates, that became the ANZAC class.

With Dibb the DDGs and FFGs became tier 1, the Rivers, then ANZACs became tier 2, and the PBs tier 3.

The ANZACs were seen as too large and capable to be PFs but no where good enough to be tier 1, while the tier 3 PBs were slated to be replaced by much more capable corvettes. The tier 1 replacement requirements, as far as I can tell were never set, instead the entire tier system was dropped.

The fallout from this is the DDGs were retired, four FFGs were upgraded and eventually three air warfare ships were ordered, while the ANZACs became GP frigates. Tiers were gone, and instead we had major and minor combatants, with only the Hobart's being anywhere near as capable as intended under the original plans.

We have to stop this cycle of creating grand shipbuilding plans and then gutting them, that goes back to the 1960s.

Late 60s-early 70s: build 10 DDL, result: reduced to 3 then scrapped and 4 Tier 2 Frigates ordered from US Shipyards.
1970s-to early 80s: replace Melbourne with a new build Carrier, result: cancelled with no real way left to take the Sea Kings to sea.
Early to mid 80s: build 6 FFG in Australia, result: only 2 built
90s: build 8 Patrol Frigates, 8 Tier 1 Ships, 9 Corvettes, up to 8 Subs, result: built 8 Frigates that were neither PFs nor Tier1 ships, convert 4 Tier 2 Frigates to Tier 1 ships, no Corvettes and only 6 Subs.
2000s: build up to 4 Tier 1 Ships, result: only 3 built
Currently: build 9 large ASW Frigates, 12 OPVs, 8 SSNs, result: FFGs and OPVs under review.

 

[knightrider4]

In our region of maritime chokepoints, a 250 km strike radius can do quite a bit of area denial. And really we are not getting these for launching directly from Australia. They are an expeditionary capability like the USMC's NMESIS which they seem to think is a good idea despite also using the 250 km ranged NSM.View attachment 50459

Yes but theirs is unmanned so it's not a big deal if it gets destroyed. How do we get ours to a remote island in all but the most benign of environments ie peacetime. I mean your enemy is hardly going to just let you put it where you want unencumbered are they and in the miniscule numbers we will purchase them say no more than two batteries say 6-8 vehicles that is a whopping 16 missiles. How do we target them? Once fired everyone now knows what island your on. Maybe just bypass the island and not deal with them at all. Something to keep in mind the ADF is not in the same universe as the USMC. To give the impression that it is, is very dangerous to the poor Cannon fodder who will ultimately pay the price. Apologies for my constant editing but what choke points are you referring to? There is no sovereign Australian territory anywhere near a choke point of consequence. To assume another nation will give you access particularly if they are not interested in the fight is quite frankly beyond stupid.

 

[Todjaeger]

In our region of maritime chokepoints, a 250 km strike radius can do quite a bit of area denial. And really we are not getting these for launching directly from Australia. They are an expeditionary capability like the USMC's NMESIS which they seem to think is a good idea despite also using the 250 km ranged NSM.

As I had mentioned previously, I foresee some fairly significant potential problems with attempting to use land-based AShM in an Australian context.

I can see the USMC having some of the same issues under some circumstances, but people seem to mistakenly see what the USMC is doing and conflate that with something that the ADF can or should do. In reality, the USMC can do things which the ADF just cannot, whether people like this fact or not. The USMC is ~3x the size of the ADF, and the USMC is only one of the six branches of the US armed forces. The overall size of the US armed forces on active duty is over 20x that of the active component of the ADF. What this means is that some of the issues which the ADF would likely encounter, attempting anti-access/area denial tactics using land-based AShM could be mitigated or overcome by other elements of the US armed forces.

Again, this has to due with likely problems attempting to utilize land-based AShM in an Australian context.

One of the first and most obvious issues I see is where could such an Australian system be based/operate from whilst delivering an actual useful capability? Some could of course be based in mainland Australia and potentially make attacks upon Australian facilities more difficult or dangerous, but there are no real chokepoints within reach, particularly if using AShM like NSM or the like. Attempting to field extreme range (1,000+ km AShM has it's own, additional problems). What this issue of where useful launch sites are located introduces is the need for the ADF to have the ability to rapidly lift and deploy such launchers and associated kit away from Australia. Such an expeditionary capability would need to be able to be carried out both rapidly, and potentially against forces already in place requiring opposed landings. Further, since this would be an expeditionary deployment into hostile/opposed territory, Australia would need to be able to support and sustain the expeditionary force with an adequate logistical train when there would likely be multiple ways and opportunities for hostile forces to cut the supply lines.

Secondly, an expeditionary battery of AShM would require protection from attacking hostile forces which could be land, air, sea or even undersea. This means that such an expeditionary forces by necessity becomes even larger and requiring both more assets to carry out the initial lift and deployment, but also a larger logistical train to move the increased amount of supplies and personnel required. Such an increase in the size of an expeditionary deployment would also mean that Australia could only manage to carry out and sustain a few or perhaps even only a single such deployment.

Thirdly, Australia would likely have ISR issues which would limit the ability of the ADF to make effective use of OTH land-based AShM. If such missiles were of very long or extreme range (1,000+ km, etc.) Australia's sensor footprint problem would just get worse. After all, even if Australia could land and then sustain an AShM battery somewhere in the nearby archipelagoes, such a missile battery would be useless without an asset which could detect and then provide targeting data for the battery to fire upon. Assuming a chokepoint launch site was in Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines, would the ADF have the capability to constantly maintain ISR surveillance of the chokepoint which by necessity would be some distance from Australia. The ISR assets would need to be able to monitor the chokepoint, ID what is transiting through said chokepoint, and then deliver sufficiently accurate targeting data for AShM launches. Australia does possess systems which can give an awareness of something transiting through some of the chokepoints to the north, but AFAIK these systems cannot determine what is transiting, i.e. is that a tanker transiting the Malacca Strait, or an LHD belonging to a hostile power? Which then raises the question of whether the current and planned long-range ISR assets of the ADF would be sufficient to provide the necessary sensor coverage to make a deployed AShM battery expedition useful, particularly when one remembers that those assets would not be solely available to support the expedition.

 

[knightrider4]

As I had mentioned previously, I foresee some fairly significant potential problems with attempting to use land-based AShM in an Australian context.

I can see the USMC having some of the same issues under some circumstances, but people seem to mistakenly see what the USMC is doing and conflate that with something that the ADF can or should do. In reality, the USMC can do things which the ADF just cannot, whether people like this fact or not. The USMC is ~3x the size of the ADF, and the USMC is only one of the six branches of the US armed forces. The overall size of the US armed forces on active duty is over 20x that of the active component of the ADF. What this means is that some of the issues which the ADF would likely encounter, attempting anti-access/area denial tactics using land-based AShM could be mitigated or overcome by other elements of the US armed forces.

Again, this has to due with likely problems attempting to utilize land-based AShM in an Australian context.

One of the first and most obvious issues I see is where could such an Australian system be based/operate from whilst delivering an actual useful capability? Some could of course be based in mainland Australia and potentially make attacks upon Australian facilities more difficult or dangerous, but there are no real chokepoints within reach, particularly if using AShM like NSM or the like. Attempting to field extreme range (1,000+ km AShM has it's own, additional problems). What this issue of where useful launch sites are located introduces is the need for the ADF to have the ability to rapidly lift and deploy such launchers and associated kit away from Australia. Such an expeditionary capability would need to be able to be carried out both rapidly, and potentially against forces already in place requiring opposed landings. Further, since this would be an expeditionary deployment into hostile/opposed territory, Australia would need to be able to support and sustain the expeditionary force with an adequate logistical train when there would likely be multiple ways and opportunities for hostile forces to cut the supply lines.

Secondly, an expeditionary battery of AShM would require protection from attacking hostile forces which could be land, air, sea or even undersea. This means that such an expeditionary forces by necessity becomes even larger and requiring both more assets to carry out the initial lift and deployment, but also a larger logistical train to move the increased amount of supplies and personnel required. Such an increase in the size of an expeditionary deployment would also mean that Australia could only manage to carry out and sustain a few or perhaps even only a single such deployment.

Thirdly, Australia would likely have ISR issues which would limit the ability of the ADF to make effective use of OTH land-based AShM. If such missiles were of very long or extreme range (1,000+ km, etc.) Australia's sensor footprint problem would just get worse. After all, even if Australia could land and then sustain an AShM battery somewhere in the nearby archipelagoes, such a missile battery would be useless without an asset which could detect and then provide targeting data for the battery to fire upon. Assuming a chokepoint launch site was in Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines, would the ADF have the capability to constantly maintain ISR surveillance of the chokepoint which by necessity would be some distance from Australia. The ISR assets would need to be able to monitor the chokepoint, ID what is transiting through said chokepoint, and then deliver sufficiently accurate targeting data for AShM launches. Australia does possess systems which can give an awareness of something transiting through some of the chokepoints to the north, but AFAIK these systems cannot determine what is transiting, i.e. is that a tanker transiting the Malacca Strait, or an LHD belonging to a hostile power? Which then raises the question of whether the current and planned long-range ISR assets of the ADF would be sufficient to provide the necessary sensor coverage to make a deployed AShM battery expedition useful, particularly when one remembers that those assets would not be solely available to support the expedition.

The classic solution looking for a problem.

 

[Going Boeing]

Collins may effectively be out of service. New subs will still take nearly a decade. This of course is no surprise, the subs have been ping ponged between governments for decades. They are coming to the end of their lives, and supply chains have been underfunded and most companies involved in the project are no longer or not stocking equipment. A whole class of Japanese submarines have come and gone in the space we have farted around between finishing the last Collins and FOC of its replacement. The surface fleet isn't in much better state.

Removing them for LOTE won't instantly make them more available as you are removing subs from the water to do that, and at the core, they are old subs already. This further compounds the problem. Don't know what they will be doing post 2030, but it won't be in the SCS, we won't have the platforms to make regular patrols that far.

The schedule that has previously been posted on this forum indicates that the LOTE is planned to be completed within each boat’s normal 2 year Full Cycle Docking thus there won’t be any additional Collins taken out of service. Whether that can be achieved is beyond my knowledge but that is the stated plan.

 

[Takao]

As I had mentioned previously, I foresee some fairly significant potential problems with attempting to use land-based AShM in an Australian context.

I can see the USMC having some of the same issues under some circumstances, but people seem to mistakenly see what the USMC is doing and conflate that with something that the ADF can or should do. In reality, the USMC can do things which the ADF just cannot, whether people like this fact or not. The USMC is ~3x the size of the ADF, and the USMC is only one of the six branches of the US armed forces. The overall size of the US armed forces on active duty is over 20x that of the active component of the ADF. What this means is that some of the issues which the ADF would likely encounter, attempting anti-access/area denial tactics using land-based AShM could be mitigated or overcome by other elements of the US armed forces.

Dear Mods...can we pin this para, please?

Again, this has to due with likely problems attempting to utilize land-based AShM in an Australian context.

It has made me unpopular among certain areas, but I agree 100% I think that the pursuit of AShM for Land Forces is a waste of time and effort. Mainly for the three points you have very clearly outlined. But, some green-suiter's just don't like being dosed with reality. The last point is actually really important, I remember a PWO looking aghast when a LTCOL explained that AShM were always accurate and would have no problems discriminating in something like the Straits of Malacca. When the PWO explained how a AGM-84 seeker worked the LTCOL's response was 'and....?'

I think it is a distraction from our core business. If the RAN thinks an additional 4 or 8 missiles will aid their strike, then add FFG or use another P-8. Leave the maritime domain to the maritime experts.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Maybe just bypass the island and not deal with them at all.

300km doesn't quite reach Lombok. Not sure of the range of JSM, but 250-300 seems realistic, another 100km and we could have ready fires from Christmas that could threaten Sunda.

250km is probably enough to reach across the strait at Butterworth. 250km is enough to provide some defence of Christmas island from surface attacks (which are unlikely).

Where else are we going to use them?

These are key strategic choke points, you can't bypass these two locations. If you do you would force all traffic closer to mainland Australia and in range of fighter aircraft. Ashmore reef would also be desirable strategically. It would close up some loose ends. But may be better served by aircraft as that is a very small island to base anything on.

What it does then is narrow the opportunity and make it much harder for the enemy. It is also a point that then needs to be negotiated.

Sure they could strike them, but they could be re-enforced. Striking them would be a huge statement, as basically flag a full on conflict between the US and China. Striking them would allow morally strikes on Chinese held islands in the SCS, which would strategically be much more detrimental for the Chinese than taking out a JSM launcher for Australia.

But...

JSM doesn't get us there. It probably doesn't have the range from a ground launched positions. Even if you had 400 km range, it barely closes Sunda, Lombok is open, Butterworth it would be easier for the Chinese to apply pressure to the Malaysians, who, for valid reasons right now probably don't want anything like that there.

and...

The last point is actually really important, I remember a PWO looking aghast when a LTCOL explained that AShM were always accurate and would have no problems discriminating in something like the Straits of Malacca. When the PWO explained how a AGM-84 seeker worked the LTCOL's response was 'and....?'

I think it is a distraction from our core business. If the RAN thinks an additional 4 or 8 missiles will aid their strike, then add FFG or use another P-8. Leave the maritime domain to the maritime experts.

This a million times. There is no way to ensure accurate target identification even if we did have the range. It would be a hollow threat. Only useful if another power, like the US, actually closed up the straits for us. If a truck with 2x missile on it was enough to change China's minds, people would have done it years ago.

The schedule that has previously been posted on this forum indicates that the LOTE is planned to be completed within each boat’s normal 2 year Full Cycle Docking thus there won’t be any additional Collins taken out of service. Whether that can be achieved is beyond my knowledge but that is the stated plan.

Yeh, skeptical of that. That is one of those things where people have fudged a timeframe to meet an existing time frame. How long will it take to put in all new sensors, new batteries, new diesels, rewire, refit basically every system, component on a submarine?

Why the same amount of time it takes to do a grease and oil change. I don't know if anyone believes that. Hence why people are genuinely worried about a submarine gap. Particularly given the issues with past issue with Collins ready days. The US, UK, France and Germany have all experienced cost and time issues related to submarine maintenance and upgrades. Submarines are complex machines, and work is always very complicated and takes significant time. A huge upgrade with an orphaned class, which is an old platform being extended past its original intended life time supported by industry which has seen sporadic work and many, many cancelations.

Submarine maintenance backlogs and delays take toll on fleet’s development work at sea

The SSN fleet is meeting its operational obligations overseas, but there's not enough bandwidth for at-sea time to develop future tactics.

www.defensenews.com

Submarine Maintenance Backlog Threatens Crisis Response: Admiral - Breaking Defense

CRYSTAL CITY: The good news? The US submarine fleet is meeting day-to-day demands around the world, without having to do the extra-long deployments that have ground down surface ships and sailors. The bad news? A massive maintenance backlog that could idle 15 submarines for months – costing an...

breakingdefense.com

Germany Does Not Have One Working Submarine

And that is a big problem.

nationalinterest.org

It doesn't really matter, its a single point of failure. Any issues with the LOTE and they quickly become log jammed. What is the plan B?

What will Collins do when the SCS is off limits to conventional subs operating from Australia? We have Schrodinger's submarine dilemma, conventional submarines aren't capable enough for operating as attack subs in the SCS post 2030, but Collins, a conventional submarine needs to be upgraded so we have a modern conventional attack submarine. It makes no sense to LOTE Collins, if you want it to do the same mission with the same weapons that it was deemed not able to do. Now we are talking about not acquiring TLAM. The most useful platform for TLAM to be on is, Collins. Collins more than the hobarts, hunters or SSNs.

 

[ngatimozart]

It does look pretty I wonder if I can trade my ranger on one. In all seriousness though I wonder the utility of this system in the Australian context. A 250 km range weapon is in my opinion hardly going to bother a serious enemy, maybe I'm being too simplistic but why not park yourself 255 km from it providing you know where they are and let's face it that wouldn't be insurmountable for the Chinese just turn it and the crew into unidentifiable bits and pieces?

An antiship SSM is great for A2AD because it greta for blocking choke points, and / or keeping enemy ships well away from you coast. Fixed SSM have a high probability of being attacked by enemy missile strikes. However a SSM on the back of a small truck could be anywhere, making it a tad more difficult to find and eliminate. This is the basis of the USMC A2AD plan. They intend to insert small covert teams into various islands and resupply using small ships <4,000 ton displacement. The targeting info is received from off island assets, such as F-35, P-8A, HALE or MALE UAV etc. In an archipelago this could prove to be quite a good deterrent, closing off very large areas to enemy naval surface forces. This could work very well in both the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos.

 

[seaspear]

There might be some small islands in very disputed waters used as military bases that could be subject to missile attack, that may be easily launched from ground based units
China has fully militarized three islands in South China Sea, US admiral says | South China Sea | The Guardian

 

[OldTex]

An antiship SSM is great for A2AD because it greta for blocking choke points, and / or keeping enemy ships well away from you coast. Fixed SSM have a high probability of being attacked by enemy missile strikes. However a SSM on the back of a small truck could be anywhere, making it a tad more difficult to find and eliminate. This is the basis of the USMC A2AD plan. They intend to insert small covert teams into various islands and resupply using small ships <4,000 ton displacement. The targeting info is received from off island assets, such as F-35, P-8A, HALE or MALE UAV etc. In an archipelago this could prove to be quite a good deterrent, closing off very large areas to enemy naval surface forces. This could work very well in both the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos.

While the land based AShM used in the manner you described can be effective you also indicate some of the other elements that would be needed. It would also be necessary for the missile system to have local ground defence as well as at least very short or short range AD. Otherwise the missile battery will be able to be eliminated by SF or stand-off munitions. All of these additional elements mean that the footprint of the missile battery is increased and the logistic support is also increased. The last element required is a suitable means of extracting the entire force in the event the position becomes untenable. (Don't want any repeats of Lark, Sparrow or Gull force in the modern era)