US Navy News and updates

[hauritz]

I wonder how close this variant of the FREMM is to the design that was offered to Australia.

I am quite happy that Australia went with the Type 26 but it could have been beneficial if we operated the same ship as our major ally. Perhaps NZ could be interested in becoming involved in this program.

 

[oldsig127]

I wonder how close this variant of the FREMM is to the design that was offered to Australia.

I am quite happy that Australia went with the Type 26 but it could have been beneficial if we operated the same ship as our major ally. Perhaps NZ could be interested in becoming involved in this program.

No CEAFAR for a start, with all that implies including a very different superstructure - seen in the models at the time. Also, the USN mandated a 57mm main gun, presumably to emphasis the low end role intended and prevent congress conflating them with destroyers. Ours, anti submarine role notwithstanding, will be expected to operate more broadly because we don't have the numbers to specialise so much and so are armed more or less as the AWDs are

oldsig

 

[ngatimozart]

I wonder how close this variant of the FREMM is to the design that was offered to Australia.

I am quite happy that Australia went with the Type 26 but it could have been beneficial if we operated the same ship as our major ally. Perhaps NZ could be interested in becoming involved in this program.

It may be of interest, although we'd swap the 57 mm gun for a 5 in gun and some other mods.

 

[stevenyeadon]

I did some math for a project I am working on and it shocked me. I think I may be reading the information wrongly, or I may have found something worrying to me but not others. It has to do with the sustainment costs per year of the different elements of the USN's fleet. I use the CBO's force architecture primer for the sustainment costs per year.

The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer

The U.S. military’s capabilities and budget are determined primarily by its forces. This report describes each type of major combat unit’s structure, function, strengths and limitations, past usage, size, and cost.

www.cbo.gov

I begin by giving the USN's desired fleet with a 355-ship Navy.

The U.S. Navy of the U.S. Navy Force Structure Assessment:

Ballistic Missile Submarines	12
Cruise Missile Submarines	0
Aircraft Carriers	12
Amphibious Warfare Ships	38
Attack Submarines	66
Large Surface Combatants	104
Small Surface Combatants	52
Combat Logistics Force	32
Expeditionary Fast Transport/High Speed Transport	10
Expeditionary Support Base	6
Command and Support	23
Total	355

I will now organize these assets by their role:

Carrier Strike Groups 12 - 12 CVN, 9 CVW, 70 Destroyers (I go with 7 destroyers per carrier, as in the Fact File, and allow for a 90% availability in a crisis)
12 Amphibious Ready Groups - 38 Amphibs
Ballistic Missile Defense - 24 Destroyers
Attack Submarines - 66
Ballistic Missile Submarines - 12
Littoral Combat Ships - 35
Destroyers - 10
Frigates - 20

I now turn to an original table that puts things in perspective. All sustainment costs are from the CBO.

Sustainment costs for a proposed 355-ship Navy and its Aircraft

Unit Type	Unit Sustainment Cost per Year (millions of dollars)	Number of Units	Total Sustainment Cost per Year (millions of dollars)	Percent of Sustainment Budget*
CSG	3,070	12	36,840	51.5%
ARG	810	12	9,720	13.6%
Attack Submarine	140	66	9,240	12.9%
Littoral Combat Ships	100	35	3,500	4.9%
Ballistic Missile Defense Large Surface Combatants	140	24	3,360	4.7%
Frigates	140**	20	2,800	3.9%
P-3 and P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft Squadrons***	330	8****	2,640	3.7%
Ballistic Missile Submarines	170*****	12	2,040	2.9%
Destroyers	140	10	1,400	2%

*Estimate rounded to nearest tenth, may not add up to 100%
**Estimate only, assumes new Frigates will cost the same in sustainment as Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers
***Notional 12 aircraft squadron
****Estimate only
*****Estimate only, assumes the sustainment costs of the Ohio-class vessels

This excludes the cost of Seabee construction engineers, Navy special-operations forces, Military Sealift Command, Marine Corps expenses, and all other Department of the Navy expenses such as overhauls.

OK, at the end of this. The jarring thing I see is the over 50% of sustainment costs taken up by the 12 CSGs planned. In a fast evolving time for warfare, it just seems dangerous to invest so much in the aircraft carrier. They also cost 13+ billion per ships, which further exacerbates things. Did I miss something, or is my qualm on target? I could have the core of a short article just on the danger of so many eggs in one basket.

 

[Todjaeger]

Well, this first thing which comes to mind is that you have started with some bad data.

There are currently only 11 CSG's, not 12. The USN used to operate 12 CBG's, but this number was reduced by one. There is a new Gerald R. Ford-class CVN, the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) which has been launched, but has yet to be commissioned and is currently being fitted out. Once that is completed she will replace the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on active duty, retaining an 11 carrier fleet.

The other thing to keep in mind is that while a CVN, and certainly a complete CSG, is expensive to acquire and sustain, a complete CSG is also a very potent force. The air combat and aerial sensing capabilities of a CAW is in many cases equal to, if not greater than, the air combat and sensing capabilities of many middle power air forces. While is power is concentrated and potentially vulnerable, a carrier is also effectively a mobile short airfield which affords the USN and US as a whole a much greater deal of flexibility in terms of response options.

 

[stevenyeadon]

Well, this first thing which comes to mind is that you have started with some bad data.

There are currently only 11 CSG's, not 12. The USN used to operate 12 CBG's, but this number was reduced by one. There is a new Gerald R. Ford-class CVN, the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) which has been launched, but has yet to be commissioned and is currently being fitted out. Once that is completed she will replace the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on active duty, retaining an 11 carrier fleet.

The other thing to keep in mind is that while a CVN, and certainly a complete CSG, is expensive to acquire and sustain, a complete CSG is also a very potent force. The air combat and aerial sensing capabilities of a CAW is in many cases equal to, if not greater than, the air combat and sensing capabilities of many middle power air forces. While is power is concentrated and potentially vulnerable, a carrier is also effectively a mobile short airfield which affords the USN and US as a whole a much greater deal of flexibility in terms of response options.

I'm sorry I didn't make it more clear that I am going with the desired 355 ship USN. This is the USN it wants within 20 years.

 

[Todjaeger]

I'm sorry I didn't make it more clear that I am going with the desired 355 ship USN. This is the USN it wants within 20 years.

The problem with that is that the currently planned build cycle for the Gerald R. Ford-class CVN, a sustained 12 carrier navy would not be achieved by the USN until the 2060's. See page 2 here for details.

 

[spoz]

Sustainment costs include crew costs, therefore a frigate will not cost anywhere near as much as a 51, particularly as their systems are their systems are not as comprehensive. A CSG doesn’t just include the CVN; there’s CGs, DDGs and air groups; even if you propose getting rid of the carrier do you propose getting rid of all the surface combatants as well?

 

[Boagrius]

It strikes me as a case of getting what you pay for. To echo Tod's sentiments, the USN CSG capability gives it totally unrivalled sea control capabilities and influence over SLOC around the globe. I don't see there being a substitute for it any time soon.

 

[ngatimozart]

It strikes me as a case of getting what you pay for. To echo Tod's sentiments, the USN CSG capability gives it totally unrivalled sea control capabilities and influence over SLOC around the globe. I don't see there being a substitute for it any time soon.

It does until it gets within DF21D range (840 nm) and then all bets are off. If things get hot between the US and the PRC, there is a significant chunk of the Pacific Ocean that will be denied to any CBG: the SCS, East China Sea, waters around Japan. Once the PRC move the DF21 to their illegal artificial islands in the SCS, they will push the CBGs further back. They are launched from mobile launchers, so hard to counter.

DF-21 (CSS-5) | Missile Threat

The Dongfeng-21(CSS-5) is a Chinese medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile.

missilethreat.csis.org

The range of the DF21D neuters a CVN because it can't deploy its strike weapon due to it being unable to get within range of any mainland PRC targets.

 

[Boagrius]

It does until it gets within DF21D range (840 nm) and then all bets are off. If things get hot between the US and the PRC, there is a significant chunk of the Pacific Ocean that will be denied to any CBG: the SCS, East China Sea, waters around Japan. Once the PRC move the DF21 to their illegal artificial islands in the SCS, they will push the CBGs further back. They are launched from mobile launchers, so hard to counter.

DF-21 (CSS-5) | Missile Threat

The Dongfeng-21(CSS-5) is a Chinese medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile.

missilethreat.csis.org

The range of the DF21D neuters a CVN because it can't deploy its strike weapon due to it being unable to get within range of any mainland PRC targets.

Yes the DF21D is a fascinating weapon and one that could be a game changer if it works as advertised. Up to this point I've been skeptical about it as I am not sure how the Chinese intend to supply it with the targeting data it needs to find its mark at such extreme ranges against a target doing 20-30kts. I would expect it to need some kind of onboard terminal guidance capability but this ought to be seriously hampered by the ionization of air molecules surrounding the weapon while it dives on the target at hypersonic speed.

Nevertheless it wouldn't surprise me if DF21D provided the impetus for scaling the SM6 up to Block 1B standard, as it is also rumoured to be a hypersonic weapon (with even greater range than its already extreme-ranged predecessor).

 

[Todjaeger]

It does until it gets within DF21D range (840 nm) and then all bets are off. If things get hot between the US and the PRC, there is a significant chunk of the Pacific Ocean that will be denied to any CBG: the SCS, East China Sea, waters around Japan. Once the PRC move the DF21 to their illegal artificial islands in the SCS, they will push the CBGs further back. They are launched from mobile launchers, so hard to counter.

DF-21 (CSS-5) | Missile Threat

The Dongfeng-21(CSS-5) is a Chinese medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile.

missilethreat.csis.org

The range of the DF21D neuters a CVN because it can't deploy its strike weapon due to it being unable to get within range of any mainland PRC targets.

I will be honest and state that, at present, I am rather skeptical of the effectiveness of the DF-21D in a long-range, non-nuclear anti-shipping ballistic missile role.

Assuming some of the published information is reasonably accurate in terms of a range of 800+ n miles, Mach 10 speed, and so on, I see problems with both the OODA loop and the actual impact of the DF-21D.

Issues with the OODA are such that in order to effectively utilize DF-21D, sensors would need to be able to detect and track potential targets, and then have data links in place to cue DF-21D launchers which would be well over the horizon from the target(s). This would mean either having an asset like an MPA aircraft (which could be engaged/driven off by aircraft from a CSG), or else reliance upon some sort of long-ranged OTHR. There are issues with using OTHR as among other things they cannot really deliver target quality data, and also they can do SFA about determining what a contact is. Given the volume of shipping which transits the SCS on a daily basis, picking out which ship is a CVN, or which cluster of ships is a CSG would likely be a real problem. This in turn means that there would be difficulties in determining when a target is in range, and when to launch. Unless of course a decision was made, backed up by sufficient numbers of DF-21D's, to just fire upon every contact.

Now for the actual impact of a DF-21D, at least when fired from ~max range. My rough calculations have a flight time of ~7 minutes for around 800 n miles for a DF-21D. Now if a target vessel was steaming at 18 kts, that would mean the vessel would have moved ~2 n miles between the time of launch, and when the DF-21D would strike the original target location, assuming the CEP was completely on point. This in turn would require one or more of a few capabilities which AFAIK have yet to be documented, and in some cases would not make much sense for a ballistic missile to have.

Either there would need to be a system in place for an offboard sensor to track the targeted vessel and then use data links to relay target updates, or there would need to be a functional terminal guidance sensor aboard the ballistic missile/warhead able to provide detect and determine needed course corrections. The inbound missile or warhead would also need a sufficiently capable maneuvering ability during a terminal ballistic trajectory, in order to adjust the point of impact potentially by several km's, while literally on the fly. The other alternative would be the warhead would need to have a large area of effect. While this would certainly be possible if a nuclear warhead were to be used, I find have difficulty understanding how a conventional warhead, even one using sub-munitions, would be able to have an area of effect of 12+ sq. n miles or more.

For further food for thought, the range of an F-35C/JSM strike package can be ~770 n miles, assuming using internal fuel/weapons and a low-low-low flight path. A high-high-low flight path could extend that range out to ~970+ n miles. Using other standoff ordnance with a longer range, like the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, drop tanks, or air-to-air refueling, or some combination, could extend that range even further.

Please do not misunderstand me, I consider the possibility of anti-ship ballistic missiles a threat which needs to be considered and dealt with. However, I do not automatically consider ASBM's as being effective in creating "no-go" areas, at least not yet.

 

[stevenyeadon]

Sustainment costs include crew costs, therefore a frigate will not cost anywhere near as much as a 51, particularly as their systems are their systems are not as comprehensive. A CSG doesn’t just include the CVN; there’s CGs, DDGs and air groups; even if you propose getting rid of the carrier do you propose getting rid of all the surface combatants as well?

1. I should have estimated the sustainment costs of the Frigates as more similar to the LCS.

2. The point about what to do with the savings is hitting the nail on the head. What is our opportunity costs for CSG sustainment per year?

To get at that I will give the sustainment costs of each naval unit. Again this is from the CBO report I linked in the OP.

Sustainment Cost of Naval Units Per Fiscal Year

Type of Vessel	Cost of Sustainment Per Fiscal Year
Aircraft Carrier	1.180 billion
Carrier Air Wing	910 million
Arleigh Burke	140 million
Ticonderoga	110 million
LCS	100 million
Zumwalt	100 million
Attack Submarine	140 million
Amphibious Ship Average	270 million
MEU ground combat element	740 million
MEU air combat element	520 million
Ballistic Missile Submarine	170 million

Thus, the alternatives to an aircraft carrier and carrier air wing would be any mix of assets equal to 2.09 billion dollars. This is on top of freeing up seven destroyers for other missions.

Using that I can show the opportunity cost of investing in different classes. The opportunity costs for CSGs can be presented as:

~15 additional destroyers with seven destroyers of the CSG freed up for other tasks.
~2.5 additional ARGs with seven destroyers freed up for other tasks
~21 Frigates with seven destroyers freed up for other tasks (this assumes a sustainment cost per frigate equivalent to an LCS)
~22 nuclear attack submarines, if the seven destroyers of the CSG are replaced with attack submarines.

IMO, the only one that seems worthwhile is the 22 nuclear attack submarines, especially given the shortage we currently have. Perhaps an argument can be made to go down to 10 CSGs until 2060 when an eleventh can be added. Investing all that into submarines to get us to 66 of them at warp speed. The other options are not worth comparing to the capabilities of a CSG, IMO.

 

[Todjaeger]

At this talk about the costs, as well as alternatives, all seem rather divorced from reality as none of this seems to consider what US capability requirements are, and what vessels/TF's provide provide in terms of service to meet those capabilities.

Assuming the assertion on the sustainment cost is correct, and that 22 nuclear attack subs could be sustained for the sustainment costs of a CSG, can 22 SSN's provide the same type, degree, and range of capabilities that a CSG does? I think most would agree with me that the answer can quickly be stated as a resounding, "no."

There are somethings which 22 additional SSN's could likely do much better than a CSG ever could, OTOH there are a whole host of capabilities which a CSG could perform that SSN's just could not touch. This makes a list of sustainment costs sort of irrelevant, because there can be no "apple to apples" comparison.

 

[Boagrius]

I will be honest and state that, at present, I am rather skeptical of the effectiveness of the DF-21D in a long-range, non-nuclear anti-shipping ballistic missile role.

Assuming some of the published information is reasonably accurate in terms of a range of 800+ n miles, Mach 10 speed, and so on, I see problems with both the OODA loop and the actual impact of the DF-21D.

Issues with the OODA are such that in order to effectively utilize DF-21D, sensors would need to be able to detect and track potential targets, and then have data links in place to cue DF-21D launchers which would be well over the horizon from the target(s). This would mean either having an asset like an MPA aircraft (which could be engaged/driven off by aircraft from a CSG), or else reliance upon some sort of long-ranged OTHR. There are issues with using OTHR as among other things they cannot really deliver target quality data, and also they can do SFA about determining what a contact is. Given the volume of shipping which transits the SCS on a daily basis, picking out which ship is a CVN, or which cluster of ships is a CSG would likely be a real problem. This in turn means that there would be difficulties in determining when a target is in range, and when to launch. Unless of course a decision was made, backed up by sufficient numbers of DF-21D's, to just fire upon every contact.

Now for the actual impact of a DF-21D, at least when fired from ~max range. My rough calculations have a flight time of ~7 minutes for around 800 n miles for a DF-21D. Now if a target vessel was steaming at 18 kts, that would mean the vessel would have moved ~2 n miles between the time of launch, and when the DF-21D would strike the original target location, assuming the CEP was completely on point. This in turn would require one or more of a few capabilities which AFAIK have yet to be documented, and in some cases would not make much sense for a ballistic missile to have.

Either there would need to be a system in place for an offboard sensor to track the targeted vessel and then use data links to relay target updates, or there would need to be a functional terminal guidance sensor aboard the ballistic missile/warhead able to provide detect and determine needed course corrections. The inbound missile or warhead would also need a sufficiently capable maneuvering ability during a terminal ballistic trajectory, in order to adjust the point of impact potentially by several km's, while literally on the fly. The other alternative would be the warhead would need to have a large area of effect. While this would certainly be possible if a nuclear warhead were to be used, I find have difficulty understanding how a conventional warhead, even one using sub-munitions, would be able to have an area of effect of 12+ sq. n miles or more.

For further food for thought, the range of an F-35C/JSM strike package can be ~770 n miles, assuming using internal fuel/weapons and a low-low-low flight path. A high-high-low flight path could extend that range out to ~970+ n miles. Using other standoff ordnance with a longer range, like the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, drop tanks, or air-to-air refueling, or some combination, could extend that range even further.

Please do not misunderstand me, I consider the possibility of anti-ship ballistic missiles a threat which needs to be considered and dealt with. However, I do not automatically consider ASBM's as being effective in creating "no-go" areas, at least not yet.

While I don't want to go on too much of a tangent, I do think the question of Chinese ASBM capability is very relevant in that it could have serious ramifications for the viability of USN CSG's as a power projection tool in the western Pacific if properly "fleshed out".

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

After doing a little more reading on the subject, it does seem as though the PRC intends to use its Yaogan series of satellites in combination with OTH radar to pinpoint USN CSGs and provide the DF21D with targeting data prior to launch and in-flight before its terminal dive:

Against a warship at 1,000 nautical miles, the DF-21D’s time of flight would be around 10 minutes. A nuclear aircraft carrier at 30 knots can cover five nautical miles in that time as well as change course. After 10 minutes, therefore, the carrier’s position could be anywhere within an area of 79 square nautical miles (or 269 square kilometers) centered on its position at the time the missile is launched. As a result, inflight updates of the warship’s position would almost certainly be needed even if the ASBM’s maneuverable reentry vehicle had terminal guidance. The PLA’s over-the-horizon radars could detect and track a carrier strike group well out in the western Pacific, but the long wavelengths of OTH radars would not provide the accuracy needed for target updates against a fast-moving naval combatant. Chinese military writings indicate that reconnaissance satellites would be needed to complete the strike, or at least to provide aim-point corrections until terminal guidance could take over. Making all this work in real time is, of course, not easy. At present, then, the DF-21D ASBM is at best an emerging component of the PLA’s A2/AD strategy, and it seems reasonable to assume that the U.S. Navy is already working on countermeasures to further complicate the already difficult task of hitting a maneuvering warship at sea at long ranges.

Nevertheless, the unmistakable intent behind China’s DF-21D, OTH radars, reconnaissance satellites, and associated battle networks is to force U.S. air and naval forces to operate over distances as far from China’s coast as 1,000 to 1,500 nm (1,500 nm being roughly the distance from China’s littoral to Guam). At the same time, the PLA’s investments in underground facilities for missile, aircraft, and naval forces have made Chinese military bases and naval ports extremely difficult targets even for “near zero miss” precision weapons. In the case of the Second Artillery Corps, starting in March 2008 China’s state-run CCTV (China Central Television) network revealed that from 1995 to 2010 the Chinese had added 2,500 kilometers of underground tunnel facilities for their “strategic” missile forces, thereby doubling China’s “Great Underground Wall” to some 5,000 kilometers.85 These developments promise to complicate traditional U.S. approaches to overseas power projection based predominately on access to relatively secure forward bases, short-range aircraft, and forward deployed naval forces. To the extent that PRC A2/AD capabilities can compel U.S. forces to base and operate initially over distances of 1,000 nm or greater, the tyranny of distance could substantially affect the intensity and volume of precision weapons that could be brought to bear. While air refueling will enable short-range aircraft to strike over distances of 1,000 nm or more, longer mission times inevitably reduce the number of sorties employing inexpensive PGMs that can be mounted per day or week. As for more expensive PGMs such as the Tactical Tomahawk, in a high-intensity conflict with a major power there is a significant risk that the Tactical Tomahawk inventories of Aegis surface combatants and submarines could be quickly exhausted. In the case of the PRC, neutralizing the missiles positioned in China’s “Great Underground Wall” would most likely require substantially larger quantities of PGMs than needed to achieve comparable results against the same number of missiles located out in the open or even protected by above-ground shelters.

https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Evolution-of-Precision-Strike-final-v15.pdf

It is worth noting that the PRC has also now revealed the newer DF26, and air-launched CH-AS-X-13, but have yet to conduct a test that successfully demonstrates the ability of any of these weapons to hit a moving target at sea. The likely dependence on ISR satellites to provide guidance to Chinese ASBM also begs the question of what the life expectancy of said satellites would be at the outset of hostilities. My guess is that US ASAT assets would be tasked with destroying them as a matter of priority, potentially neutering the threat.

 

[spoz]

I will be honest and state that, at present, I am rather skeptical of the effectiveness of the DF-21D in a long-range, non-nuclear anti-shipping ballistic missile role.

Assuming some of the published information is reasonably accurate in terms of a range of 800+ n miles, Mach 10 speed, and so on, I see problems with both the OODA loop and the actual impact of the DF-21D.

Issues with the OODA are such that in order to effectively utilize DF-21D, sensors would need to be able to detect and track potential targets, and then have data links in place to cue DF-21D launchers which would be well over the horizon from the target(s). This would mean either having an asset like an MPA aircraft (which could be engaged/driven off by aircraft from a CSG), or else reliance upon some sort of long-ranged OTHR. There are issues with using OTHR as among other things they cannot really deliver target quality data, and also they can do SFA about determining what a contact is. Given the volume of shipping which transits the SCS on a daily basis, picking out which ship is a CVN, or which cluster of ships is a CSG would likely be a real problem. This in turn means that there would be difficulties in determining when a target is in range, and when to launch. Unless of course a decision was made, backed up by sufficient numbers of DF-21D's, to just fire upon every contact.

Now for the actual impact of a DF-21D, at least when fired from ~max range. My rough calculations have a flight time of ~7 minutes for around 800 n miles for a DF-21D. Now if a target vessel was steaming at 18 kts, that would mean the vessel would have moved ~2 n miles between the time of launch, and when the DF-21D would strike the original target location, assuming the CEP was completely on point. This in turn would require one or more of a few capabilities which AFAIK have yet to be documented, and in some cases would not make much sense for a ballistic missile to have.

Either there would need to be a system in place for an offboard sensor to track the targeted vessel and then use data links to relay target updates, or there would need to be a functional terminal guidance sensor aboard the ballistic missile/warhead able to provide detect and determine needed course corrections. The inbound missile or warhead would also need a sufficiently capable maneuvering ability during a terminal ballistic trajectory, in order to adjust the point of impact potentially by several km's, while literally on the fly. The other alternative would be the warhead would need to have a large area of effect. While this would certainly be possible if a nuclear warhead were to be used, I find have difficulty understanding how a conventional warhead, even one using sub-munitions, would be able to have an area of effect of 12+ sq. n miles or more.

For further food for thought, the range of an F-35C/JSM strike package can be ~770 n miles, assuming using internal fuel/weapons and a low-low-low flight path. A high-high-low flight path could extend that range out to ~970+ n miles. Using other standoff ordnance with a longer range, like the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, drop tanks, or air-to-air refueling, or some combination, could extend that range even further.

Please do not misunderstand me, I consider the possibility of anti-ship ballistic missiles a threat which needs to be considered and dealt with. However, I do not automatically consider ASBM's as being effective in creating "no-go" areas, at least not yet.

To which I can only add, that of course the targeting problem, including that for any submunitions, would undoubtedly be increased both by deceptive formations and by active spoofing using EA resources.

ISAR targeting, which I am sure they would use, at least initially, has its own problems including latency.

 

[Feanor]

I will be honest and state that, at present, I am rather skeptical of the effectiveness of the DF-21D in a long-range, non-nuclear anti-shipping ballistic missile role.

Assuming some of the published information is reasonably accurate in terms of a range of 800+ n miles, Mach 10 speed, and so on, I see problems with both the OODA loop and the actual impact of the DF-21D.

Issues with the OODA are such that in order to effectively utilize DF-21D, sensors would need to be able to detect and track potential targets, and then have data links in place to cue DF-21D launchers which would be well over the horizon from the target(s). This would mean either having an asset like an MPA aircraft (which could be engaged/driven off by aircraft from a CSG), or else reliance upon some sort of long-ranged OTHR. There are issues with using OTHR as among other things they cannot really deliver target quality data, and also they can do SFA about determining what a contact is. Given the volume of shipping which transits the SCS on a daily basis, picking out which ship is a CVN, or which cluster of ships is a CSG would likely be a real problem. This in turn means that there would be difficulties in determining when a target is in range, and when to launch. Unless of course a decision was made, backed up by sufficient numbers of DF-21D's, to just fire upon every contact.

Now for the actual impact of a DF-21D, at least when fired from ~max range. My rough calculations have a flight time of ~7 minutes for around 800 n miles for a DF-21D. Now if a target vessel was steaming at 18 kts, that would mean the vessel would have moved ~2 n miles between the time of launch, and when the DF-21D would strike the original target location, assuming the CEP was completely on point. This in turn would require one or more of a few capabilities which AFAIK have yet to be documented, and in some cases would not make much sense for a ballistic missile to have.

Either there would need to be a system in place for an offboard sensor to track the targeted vessel and then use data links to relay target updates, or there would need to be a functional terminal guidance sensor aboard the ballistic missile/warhead able to provide detect and determine needed course corrections. The inbound missile or warhead would also need a sufficiently capable maneuvering ability during a terminal ballistic trajectory, in order to adjust the point of impact potentially by several km's, while literally on the fly. The other alternative would be the warhead would need to have a large area of effect. While this would certainly be possible if a nuclear warhead were to be used, I find have difficulty understanding how a conventional warhead, even one using sub-munitions, would be able to have an area of effect of 12+ sq. n miles or more.

For further food for thought, the range of an F-35C/JSM strike package can be ~770 n miles, assuming using internal fuel/weapons and a low-low-low flight path. A high-high-low flight path could extend that range out to ~970+ n miles. Using other standoff ordnance with a longer range, like the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, drop tanks, or air-to-air refueling, or some combination, could extend that range even further.

Please do not misunderstand me, I consider the possibility of anti-ship ballistic missiles a threat which needs to be considered and dealt with. However, I do not automatically consider ASBM's as being effective in creating "no-go" areas, at least not yet.

Not to detail the conversation entirely, but what about a modern Chinese equivalent to the Tselina system? Russia is certainly going that route with the Liana. Could they get a large ballistic missile close enough for the missile's built in sensors to kick in and acquire the target independently at that point?

EDIT: Boagrius beat me to it, it seems that what I describe is sort of what the Chinese are attempting to do. Given their replication of other aspects of Soviet/Russian military solutions this is not surprising.

 

[Boagrius]

Not to detail the conversation entirely, but what about a modern Chinese equivalent to the Tselina system? Russia is certainly going that route with the Liana. Could they get a large ballistic missile close enough for the missile's built in sensors to kick in and acquire the target independently at that point?

Yes, it appears that the Chinese analogue is the Yaogan series of ISR satellites

http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Yaogan-and-ASBM-January-2015-Report.pdf

To which I can only add, that of course the targeting problem, including that for any submunitions, would undoubtedly be increased both by deceptive formations and by active spoofing using EA resources.

I'm not sure how feasible it would be based on the altitude of Yaogan satellites and the size constraints of Mk41 VLS cells, but I wonder if an organic ASAT capability in USN CSGs might also form part of the antidote. IIRC there is precedent with the SM3 missile, as well as the air launched ASM-135.

 

[stevenyeadon]

At this talk about the costs, as well as alternatives, all seem rather divorced from reality as none of this seems to consider what US capability requirements are, and what vessels/TF's provide provide in terms of service to meet those capabilities.

Assuming the assertion on the sustainment cost is correct, and that 22 nuclear attack subs could be sustained for the sustainment costs of a CSG, can 22 SSN's provide the same type, degree, and range of capabilities that a CSG does? I think most would agree with me that the answer can quickly be stated as a resounding, "no."

There are somethings which 22 additional SSN's could likely do much better than a CSG ever could, OTOH there are a whole host of capabilities which a CSG could perform that SSN's just could not touch. This makes a list of sustainment costs sort of irrelevant, because there can be no "apple to apples" comparison.

I understand where you are coming from. In general, the 355 ship Navy envisioned by the USN comes no where near the capabilities the COCOMs want at their disposal. In essence this is all theory, including a discussion of trade offs for decreasing one set of important classes facing a shortage to get rid of a shortage of another.

I do think that the ASBM and hypersonic missile discussions are relevant, though. It shows CSGs may be vulnerable, and they may need less investment compared to other chess pieces. Still, isn't that the most basic discussion of our national defence moment?

 

[ASSAIL]

It does until it gets within DF21D range (840 nm) and then all bets are off. If things get hot between the US and the PRC, there is a significant chunk of the Pacific Ocean that will be denied to any CBG: the SCS, East China Sea, waters around Japan. Once the PRC move the DF21 to their illegal artificial islands in the SCS, they will push the CBGs further back. They are launched from mobile launchers, so hard to counter.

DF-21 (CSS-5) | Missile Threat

The Dongfeng-21(CSS-5) is a Chinese medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile.

missilethreat.csis.org

The range of the DF21D neuters a CVN because it can't deploy its strike weapon due to it being unable to get within range of any mainland PRC targets.

I have to disagree on the effectiveness of the SCS islands.
They will last less than a day if a hot situation arises, they are impossible to defend effectively when subjected to concentrated and overwhelming attack.
I think it’s a flawed CCP policy which is screwed more towards bullying the other SCS claimants vying for the regions resources rather than an effective weapon of war.