The potential timeline I had in mind for the idea would not start until it came time to start decommissioning the RAN's ANZAC-class frigates at the earliest, which would likely be in the mid to late 2020's.
An area where I lack the knowledge of is whether or not training in a classroom and/or ashore can provide all the needs for RAN crews, or if there is still measurable value in personnel going on training cruises. Relating to that is whether the RAN has (or will have) a surplus of berths that can be suitably filled by junior officers and sailors who lack some of the experience gained by time at sea. I am thinking of the sorts of berths like which would permit someone to gain a Watchkeeping certificate (or whatever it is called) or other relevant certifications and endorsements that some of the higher ranking or more critical positions aboard a vessel require. IIRC the RAN has had problems at times within the last decade or, in assembling a suitable ship's crew because there was too small a pool of personnel with the appropriate credentials to fill all the key roles when needed. Again, IIRC part of the reason for that problem was the some of the roles required credentials that could only be gained after receiving both the appropriate training and then having actual, practical experience and that at times the RAN had too few berths appropriate for personnel to get the required practical experience.
I believe the days of a full training squadron are over. In my day we had a converted carrier (Sydney), a Battle class destroyer (Anzac), a Type 15 (Queenborough) and in the West a River class frigate (Diamantina). All these ships provided much needed sea training for Ordinary Seamen, Midshipmen and engineers of all stripes.
The training was vitally important and all mentioned spent their first months at sea after completing shore based training and before they posted as rawboned additions to a fleet unit.
The Commonwealth navies’ Seaman Officer training was vastly different to the generalist training in the USN. In order to stand a watch In company an officer first had to complete a year at sea standing watch as either a Midshipman of the watch in larger ships or as Second Officer of the watch in an escort type unit.
On completion of that year they then sat a Fleet Board where, amongst other subjects, a 99% pass in Rule of the Road was mandatory.
A further 3 months of sub specialist training, AAW, ASW, Comms etc followed before a first posting as an Acting Sub Lieutenant (Ensign) to a fleet unit.
Then followed two years at sea as a Second Officer of the Watch during which time one had to gain an Ocean Navigation Certificate and By the end of the posting he must have obtained a Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate, Limited if the requisite 6 months “in company” time had not been achieved, Full if all boxes were ticked
The young Officer could then expect to be posted to a further two 2 year postings at sea before being considered for a Principal Warfare Officers Course.
By the time the officer had become the ships Weapons/Comms/CIC Officer and stand watches either on the Bridge or the CIC he had completed four or five years at sea standing watches.
I don’t think this could happen today as officers enter the fleet later, on completion of their degrees at ADFA although they do have intermittent sea time whilst there.
Further there are now high quality bridge simulators that can test a young officers acuity whilst standing a watch although it doesn’t test their navigation skills (the RAN does not have enlisted men fixing the ship, that’s the responsibility of the OOW usually carried out by the 2OOW under supervision.
It must have been difficult to qualify watchkeepers during the dark years of the frigate Navy as single ship steaming seemed to be the main activity with only the regular exercise in which to experience “in company” time.
I don’t wish to hark on the generalist versus specialist “SWO” differences but by way of illustration and with the caveat that I know the USN was stretched for manpower during the busy Westpac Vietnam era and many ROTC officers were at sea.
I was a very junior officer although not ON watch, on CVS 21 HMAS Melbourne when sh pe collided with the USS Frank E Evans where 74 USN personnel perished. My bridge experience was a total of two years and I was just about qualified to sharpen the chart pencils.
That was more time than the combined time of the two officers standing watch on the bridge of the Evans, both ROTC, the result was inevitable.
I submit this partly in response to your post but also in response to a number of essays and articles written in Proceedings and elsewhere discussing the challenges the USN SWO stream has had following the series of Incidents over the last year or so.
