Part 2 of 2: Providing context on Operation Protective Edge
5. The targeting of an individual insurgent that must be acquired and successfully attacked (exploited, captured, or killed) for the success of the commander's mission under the F3EAD targeting process takes into consideration the risk of collateral damage. However, beyond the F3EAD or Attack the Network, Michael Carl Haas writing for the
National Interest has noted:-
"First, intelligence gathering is never comprehensive; its depth and scope are limited by the assumptions and the resources that flow into it. It finds what it is looking for—some of it, anyway—and seldom uncovers that which is not expected to be there.
Secondly, the collection of high-quality, actionable intelligence will not keep pace with a high-tempo operation’s voracious appetite for new targets. As the initial supply of preplanned strike options dries up, the attacker faces steeply diminishing returns and less elegant approaches must be relied upon to sustain the momentum.
Third, the value of the prewar intelligence picture depreciates sharply once the fighting is joined. Competent enemies seldom behave as anticipated, and they tend to have an ace or two up their sleeves."
6. The IDF said that the militants fired a third of the 10,000 rockets they were estimated, of which 3,356 were launched against Israel and another 356 at its ground forces operating inside the Gaza Strip. The IDF said they had destroyed another third of the rockets before they could be launched. The statistics also show that the rocket fire was significantly less intense during 'Protective Edge' than 'Pillar of Defence'. The eight-day Operation Pillar of Defence saw an average of 188 rocket launches a day, a figure that dropped to 128 during 29 days of Operation Protective Edge. IDF's July to August 2014 ground incursion into Gaza serves three objectives:-
(i) to weaken Hamas and its capabilities, in particular, to significantly reduce its rocket arsenal to a more manageable level;
(ii) to protect Israeli citizens from rocket and missile attacks (so that the Iron Dome retains its core strategic function - to provide Israel with the option to selectively respond to Hamas' rocket attacks); and
(iii) to dismantle a network of terror tunnels which extend from the Gaza Strip into Israel (providing security from attack at the short to medium term).
7. Israeli leaders say that Operation Protective Edge targets rocket launchers, Hamas leaders and other symbols and institutions of the Gaza-based regime. Due to the F3EAD and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) processes, they say the focus is shifted to the subterranean labyrinth supporting command centers, storage sites and staging grounds for cross-border assaults. Instant military history is always dangerous and inaccurate. This is particularly true when one goes from an effort to describe the fighting to trying to draw lessons from uncertain and contradictory information. Having warned of the dangers of trying to draw lessons from instant military history, from my perspective, there are four key differences thus far:-
One of the defining differences between Cast Lead and Protective Edge is the degree of IDF effort invested in searching and destroying Hamas' tunnel infrastructure, storage sites and staging grounds. The tunnel threat from the Gaza Strip has revealed the limitations of air strikes. Much of the ground forces’ efforts in Gaza are concentrated underground, as the tunnels have shown that there is still a need for “low-tech” tactics. The tunnels do not require “sophisticated and unmanned equipment,” as in many cases low-tech bulldozers get the job done. See this video on IDF Forces Find & Destroy Terror Tunnel In Gaza Mosque:
IDF Forces Find & Destroy Terror Tunnel In Gaza Mosque - YouTube
The second difference is that this time round, the tunnels on Egypt's side of the border have been largely shut down, which has an impact on Hamas' ability to resupply even at a rudimentary level - in other words, they using up their war reserve stockpile (with little or no hope of resupply until hostilities end). That being the case, it is not in IDF interest to bring Operation Protective Edge to a premature end, despite the casualties, as this time round, they can aim to hit Hamas much harder in the hope of reaching a tipping point in ground morale. And if the IDF can destroy enough of Hamas' tunnel infrastructure, storage sites and staging grounds, they can reduce the risk to their communities that are close to the Gaza border. That means the normal goal of minimizing IDF casualties, takes a back seat to actively seeking out entrances and exits of Hamas' extensive tunnel infrastructure. There is alot of hard fighting in unforgiving urban terrain. See this POV Footage of Special Forces Storming Building in Gaza:
POV Footage of Special Forces Storming Building in Gaza - YouTube
The third difference is that once tunnels are detected, the mission becomes a combined arms operation involving infantry, combat engineers, and special explosive-ordnance disposal teams - which is very labour and time intensive, to keep the site secure until the tunnel is destroyed. To secure the site, where the tunnel clearing and the various underground demolition teams are working, the IDF needs to maintain a security bubble, part of that bubble is provided by troops on the ground, assisted by artillery and air support; which would explain the much heavier use of artillery this time round. In Operation Protective Edge, IDF forces are staying in Gaza, at specific locations for long, extended periods of time, which exposes them to counter attacks - which is a complicating risk factor. Suppressible fire support and armour operations are necessary tools used by troops providing the security bubble to keep Hamas' counter attacks at bay while the underground demolition teams are working. However, this is not without its downfalls and risks, especially if the security bubble is breached, as was indeed the case in the latest development, where
Second Lieutenant Hadar Goldin, 23, was seized during a ceasefire in Gaza.
The fourth difference is Hamas' lack of success with killing IDF armoured vehicles equipped with an active protection system (APS). In the case of the Merkava Mark IV, integration of the Trophy APS has eliminated anti-tank missiles as a threat. The system includes an F/G Band fire-control radar with four flat-panel antennas mounted on the vehicle, with a 360-degree field of view. When a weapon is fired at the vehicle, the internal computer uses the signal from the incoming weapon and calculates an approach vector. Once the incoming weapon is fully classified, the launchers fire the neutralizing agents, which are usually small metal pellets. The system is designed to have a very small kill zone, so as not to endanger troops adjacent to the protected vehicle. The system is designed to work against all types of anti-tank missiles and rockets, including handheld weapons such as rocket propelled grenades. The system can simultaneously engage several threats arriving from different directions, is effective on stationary or moving platforms, and is effective against both short and long-range threats. Newer versions of the system include a reload feature for multiple firings. The system is equipped with several sensors and a search radar with four flat-panel antennas, to create a hemispheric protected zone around the tank, to intercept and destroy incoming threats. See this video on the Trophy APS:
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems - Trophy APS For Heavy, Medium & Light Vehicles [720p] - YouTube
8. Although the IDF’s Chief Rabbi Rafi Peretz had not yet formally confirmed the death of Hadar Goldin, it seemed clear from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s press conference on
2 August 2014 that he did not anticipate anything but bad news about the fate of the Givati Brigade officer. Netanyahu said he empathized with the Goldin family, and that “The State of Israel will continue to do its utmost to bring home its MIAs.” A major IDF operation had searched for Goldin, kidnapped in a Hamas attack near Rafah on Friday morning. But late Saturday night, two hours after Netanyahu had spoken, a committee headed by Peretz established, on the basis of “findings in the field,” that Goldin was dead, and designated him a fallen soldier whose place of burial is unknown. By beginning to withdraw troops from Gaza, without entering negotiations over a ceasefire, the prime minister is aiming to deny Hamas an immediate concrete achievement.
9. Beyond the EU and the US, leaders from as far away as Indonesia, have spoken about their concerns about the humanitarian crisis that arose from the latest round of fighting. With regard to the difficulties in getting a cease fire,
Jacob Stoil has noted the following with regard to Hamas:-
"Hamas’ reasons for not accepting a ceasefire are largely unchanged since its rejection of the Egyptian ceasefire proposal earlier this month, as I discussed in a
previous article at War on the Rocks. For Hamas, a ceasefire must at the very least see Egypt reopen the Gaza border to trade and cease interference with Hamas’ ability to import weapons and financial resources. Failure to achieve these concessions may jeopardize Hamas’ ability to maintain its power in Gaza and perhaps its role as a major player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, as the conflict continues, Hamas needs an even bigger payoff to justify the war to the population of Gaza. This at least in part explains Hamas’ recent insistence that all its conditions including the release of prisoners be met before any ceasefire can take place. The needs of Israel and Hamas have become so zero sum that envisioning a mutually acceptable ceasefire package is difficult.
The situation in Egypt further complicates any effort to make a lasting ceasefire. Egypt has its own needs and objectives that a ceasefire must address. In practice, Hamas’ ceasefire demands require concessions from both Israel and Egypt."
In 2012, the ceasefire that ended Operation Pillar of Defense called for “opening the crossings [into Gaza] and facilitating the movement of people and transfer of goods, and refraining from restricting residents’ free movement.” This time, Netanyahu is not sending a team to Cairo to discuss a ceasefire with Hamas at all. Hamas deliberately breached Friday’s UN- and US-brokered 72-hour truce, he said, with the “pre-planned” attack in which Goldin and two others were killed. Why bother trying to negotiate another deal with a terrorist group that cannot be trusted?
10. Well meaning external observers have hoped that the agreement of 23 April 2014 between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to form a unity government suggested a pragmatic move towards political and diplomatic solutions, including to its relationship with Israel. There are two additional aspects to consider:-
One, external observers hope against hope that working with the PLO was a means by which Hamas could retain relevance, improve conditions and deliver key services in Gaza. However, in view of the depressing history of the region and looking at Hamas' track record, I am not optimistic of the outcome of the 23 April 2014 agreement or the current attempts at a ceasefire with Israel.
Two,
with regard to Israel’s strategic interests, the cost of granting concessions to the people living in Gaza is less than the cost of not granting them. Yes, if Gaza’s borders are opened, its people will celebrate. Yes, they might applaud Hamas, and they might conclude that belligerence works. But if the borders are not opened, the people might further radicalize. The irony is that Hamas and its violent inclinations might gain more support from a continued blockade than from its relaxation.
Israel’s military response may deliver temporary security by reducing the number of Hamas rockets and weakening its capabilities and the tunnels in the short term and mid term; however, in the long term, a military strategy without understanding the conditions in Gaza will not get Israel what it wants. There is also an impact from the IDF offensive in Gaza on Palestinians in the West Bank. The longer this conflict drags, the more Hamas will try to use the clashes to inspire a third intifada, which will weaken the PLO in the West Bank.