read the white paper quote I posted recently, it is definately in there
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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peterAustralia
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On the need to replace the armidale class boats in the Australian Navy.
According to some the ideas is to use 'large ' ships in the 1500 to 2500 tonnes range. In my opinion this is not wise.
Firstly I recognise there is a need to have larger ships for longer range tasks, for fighting enemy ships etc. I guess you would call these corvettes. The issue is that a corvette is going to cost much much more to buy, to man and to operate that a patrol boat.
If the Armidale class is a fraction too small, then how about a replacement class of about 10 boats on 400 to 450 tonnes. This extra 100 to 150 tonnes would allow for a longer hullform with more speed, with more volume for fuel. Idea would be to keep weapons and payload much the same.
Just maybe it could have a small flight deck for handling helicopters (not a hanger or onboard helicopter) just the ability to land a small helo, and refuel it. See the Esmerelda class in Ecquador, they have a 600 tonne ship with SSM, SAM and a helo.
A bigger (longer) Armidale class would be cost effective, more comfortable, easier to maintain (less weapon systems) than a corvette. There are missions that a corvette is better at doing. But there are also many missions that a cheap, small craft is better at doing. Things like Port Security, defending oil platforms and gas rigs (having a presence) dealing with illegal fishing vessels, dealing with asylum seekers, going to aid of vessels in distress, interception of drug smugglers and just maybe small terrorist/pirate vessels (unlikely but not impossible )
A patrol boat would be much cheaper because first it is smaller, needs less fuel, needs less crew, does not require sophisticated systems. A patrol boat does not need torpedoes, 3D radar, sonar, SSM, a big gun, etc etc. Would anyone care to contrast the cost of the 250 tonne Armidale class boat with a 1500 tonne corvette. What is the cost ratio 1:4 , 1:7 or is it 1:10 . It would be interesting to know
Take a guess at 8:1 then 12 patrol boats or the cost of 1.5 corvettes. You could do a lot of good work with 12 patrol boats, much of it would be boring, low tech stuff, but still important and still worth doing.
According to some the ideas is to use 'large ' ships in the 1500 to 2500 tonnes range. In my opinion this is not wise.
Firstly I recognise there is a need to have larger ships for longer range tasks, for fighting enemy ships etc. I guess you would call these corvettes. The issue is that a corvette is going to cost much much more to buy, to man and to operate that a patrol boat.
If the Armidale class is a fraction too small, then how about a replacement class of about 10 boats on 400 to 450 tonnes. This extra 100 to 150 tonnes would allow for a longer hullform with more speed, with more volume for fuel. Idea would be to keep weapons and payload much the same.
Just maybe it could have a small flight deck for handling helicopters (not a hanger or onboard helicopter) just the ability to land a small helo, and refuel it. See the Esmerelda class in Ecquador, they have a 600 tonne ship with SSM, SAM and a helo.
A bigger (longer) Armidale class would be cost effective, more comfortable, easier to maintain (less weapon systems) than a corvette. There are missions that a corvette is better at doing. But there are also many missions that a cheap, small craft is better at doing. Things like Port Security, defending oil platforms and gas rigs (having a presence) dealing with illegal fishing vessels, dealing with asylum seekers, going to aid of vessels in distress, interception of drug smugglers and just maybe small terrorist/pirate vessels (unlikely but not impossible )
A patrol boat would be much cheaper because first it is smaller, needs less fuel, needs less crew, does not require sophisticated systems. A patrol boat does not need torpedoes, 3D radar, sonar, SSM, a big gun, etc etc. Would anyone care to contrast the cost of the 250 tonne Armidale class boat with a 1500 tonne corvette. What is the cost ratio 1:4 , 1:7 or is it 1:10 . It would be interesting to know
Take a guess at 8:1 then 12 patrol boats or the cost of 1.5 corvettes. You could do a lot of good work with 12 patrol boats, much of it would be boring, low tech stuff, but still important and still worth doing.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Not sure that would work, though perhaps Alexsa or another member with experience in ship design and/or operations could chime in.
For starters, a corvette generally refers to a warship of a certain size. It essentially means a smaller frigate, usually with a slightly lighter armament but otherwise capable of many of the same tasks as a frigate. They are usually armed for self-defence vs. aircraft, have some ASW capability via torpedoes, depth charges and possibly embarked heli, and also have a main gun ranging from ~57mm up to around 76mm. At least for western designs. They also frequently mount AShM. In terms of size, the are usually between 75m to 100m and range in displacement between 500 tons at the low end, to up around 2,000 tons for some of the larger ones. They are generally ocean-going, but due to the small size and compartively limited displacement they usually have shorter range then most frigates.
As I have said before, the Armidale seems to be a good patrol boat for where it operates, namely around the coast of northern Australia. Some of the reasons why it has been proposed to replace it with a 2,000 ton vessel is that the design itself is limited. A 60m, 270 ton vessel does not have the same ability to operate in rough sea as a significantly larger vessel. Given some of the areas in the Southern Ocean have 'interesting' weather, a vessel capability of handling large waves is something needed. A vessel that is only 60m in length and with short distance between the waterline and height of the deck just cannot safely operate waters that some other vessels can. Adding in that the class is so light just makes the matter that much worse. Even doubling the weight of an Armidale replacement, that leaves one with a vessel that has displacement comparable to that of the Huon MHC, still not an ocean-going vessel IMO.
By having a design in the 2,000 ton displacement range, it makes possible steel-hulled vessels that can be 80m to 100m in length. By choosing steel, that can make the vessel less expensive to both build and maintain, as well as allowing more 'give' or flex in the steel hull whereas an aluminum hull being potentially more brittle might be prone to cracks. Particularly if the hull itself were larger.
As for the difference in cost, for naval vessels it is not so much the size of the vessel where cost is from. After all, the saying for naval construction is that steel is cheap and air is free. The real source of cost in a naval vessel is the onboard systems like radars, shipboard electronics and weapon systems. A significant fitout can easily double the cost of the vessel.
I personally like the idea behind the OCV, as it will give the RAN additional surface vessels capable of patrolling areas where currently only the Oceanic Viking and the frigates currently can.
-Cheers
With New Zealand's Project Protector, their OPVs ran twice and a half the cost of the IPVs each.
OPV NZ$89,718 million
IPV NZ$35,784 million
peterAustralia
Member
Hi
Thanks for the above figures
To the two people that have responded. I think there is some logic in your argument. I was able to look up the IPV in wikipedia, and at 340 tonnes and $35 mil, it seems a creditable craft. (actually it looks a lot like the Australian patrol boat). The 1700 tonne OPV can only go 22 knots (according to wikipedia) . Maybe that is due to the hull form, and maybe a bit to do with engine power (diesel only). However it does seem to be true that steel is cheap and air is free.
If Australia built some OPV(s) say at 1900 tonnes, and say a bit finer and a bit faster than the NZ ships, I would have to worry about the desire to keep adding and adding equipment. I can recall at the time the Anzacs were to be low end and austere vessels. It seems they kept adding and adding equipment until they can out of margin.
I assume Australia would want a ship faster than 22 knots. so that hullform may need to be longer and need more power. So a fair figure might be $105 mil for an aussie ship (2008 prices) say 3 times that of a smaller boat. When you look at the NZ ship is funny to see just how little armament they carry a 25mm cannon is the max. I assume an Aussie ship would want some gas turbines to go faster. An aussie ship, they would insist on a 76mm gun an minimum.
I am pretty sure Australia would add all sorts of equipment, increasing and increasing the cost How much does a proper corvette cost at 1700 tonnes, at a guess 350 mil and up.
I still think there is a need for the smaller craft, for little things like protecting oil rigs, fisheries protection, border surveillance etc etc. As a guess, if a 340 tonne craft costs $35 mil, then a 450 tonne craft might cost $40 mil. Cost would not go up linear, as there is still only one radar needed, still only 2 engines,. still only 2 propellers etc etc.
For the southern ocean a smaller ship does not make too much sense.
About 15 years ago Navy magazine had an artists image of an Incat cat patrol boat. Had a 76mm gun up front and a helicopter hanger out back. I wonder how much an 80m cat costs to buy commercially. Then how much do you have to add to that to take it up to a military patrol boat standard.
StevoJH
The Bunker Group
Just for reference, a ship built to identical specification to the armidales except with the Aluminium replaced by steel would result in a hull weighing over twice the weight of Armidales Hull. Iron, which for this purpose can be considered to have an identical molecular weight as steel, has a molecular mass of 55.85g mol^-1 compared to the 26.98g mol^-1 of Aluminium.
So you double the weight by using steel construction, and you then add more weight by enlarging the ship to fit a helicopter landing deck and possibly a hanger. You are talking a ship the size of the RN River class minimum.
Stephen
So you double the weight by using steel construction, and you then add more weight by enlarging the ship to fit a helicopter landing deck and possibly a hanger. You are talking a ship the size of the RN River class minimum.
Stephen
I don't know about ship hulls, but I know that aluminium bike frames are more than half the weight of steel. Lighter, yes, but not half the weight. A given thickness of aluminium is less strong than the same thickness of steel.
Ah! Same applies to aluminium hulls. This page explains far better than I can. You do get a weight saving, but not 50%.
Ah! Same applies to aluminium hulls. This page explains far better than I can. You do get a weight saving, but not 50%.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
The other side of that though, is that a given thickness of aluminum requires less structural support than steel of sufficient thickness to provide the same strength does.
Getting a little ways away from the RAN, but this is why some aluminum-hulled APCs have greater interior volumes than steel-hulled APCs armoured to the same level or protection of essentially the same external dimensions.
As for the OCV... The basic premise behind it seems to be that of an OPV, that is capable of being re-roled into additional or alternate roles of MCM, hydrographic survey, etc. What is questionable in my mind, is what sort of modular configuration is to be used to achieve different configurations, as well as what the 'stock' vessel configuration is going to be, without including any modules.
As for Australia still having a need for small vessels, I agree, however that need does not necessarily have to be fufilled by the RAN. Customs operates 8 Bay-class patrol boats which served as the design basis for the Armidale-class. I would expect that other government agencies and departments also have vessels for harbour patrol, fisheries, etc.
I went looking for the specs on the Austal MRV that has occassionally been suggested. Apparently Austal has a few more ideas/designs located here.
I would be interested in peoples thoughts on some of the capabilities included in the Austal designs. My personal thoughts are that a steel-hulled, and at least partially steel superstructure would be a better choice. My other preferences are that the vessel be a monohull, as that can enable the vessel to operate safely in higher sea-states than some multi-hulls. The other is that a standard single or double or triple propeller system be used instead of highspeed waterjets. Austal being one of the best working with aluminum for maritime applications, as well as for multi-hull and highspeed vessels, it is understandable why their designs would be based upon those features.
My feeling is that for the OCV, high speed is less important than persistance and area/range of operations. Having the vessel be able to match the max speed of the Anzac-class ~26 kts IMO should be sufficient. Having the vessel be built to something like an HSC-standard would not.
For a 'stock' configuration, I would want a vessel of about 90m in length and 2,000 - 2,500 ton displace. The vessel would have navigation and an air/surface search radars, and possibly something like the CEA-Mount illuminator. Whether or not the illuminator was included would depend on just how high the 'high-end' fitout would be for the OCV. For self-protection, a pair of weapon stations like Typhoon, or perhaps even a pair of Phalanx CIWS positioned either fore & aft or port & starboard. There would be provision for launching at least one RHIB. Also, a helideck and hangar large enough to accomodate an NH-90 sized helicopter. I would also like to see some form of multi-purpose deck that can be re-configured depending on mission needs.
I would also like to see provision for the inclusion and use of containerized naval systems, either based upon those used in the USN LCS or the Danish Stanflex. This would potentially allow a vessel to rapidly change roles if and when needed, as well as allow combatant configurations.
-Cheers
peterAustralia
Member
To Todjaeger and others,
That link you gave is an interesting document, please accept my thanks for posting that. Some nice designs there. Funny how the MRV 90 has much shorter range than the MRV 86. I assume that the waterjets used on the 90 are more optimised for speed as opposed to the propellers on the 86. I also assume that with enough money Austal could work out something specific for you, (propellers on the 90 for example). I also assume if you want a MRV 90 and you want a longer range as well, and if you have enough money then the builder could add long range fuel tanks for you (money talks).
These two boats both seem nice and useful. Not sure if Australia would buy one, as they are intent on buying something much bigger. A single vessel to complement the larger ones would be nice, but then more ships would always be nice, unfortunately they cost money to purchase and to run. For a smaller navy they seem an ideal vessel, useful in so many differing tasks. The response to the Tsunami in Indonesia comes to mind.
going back to the smaller patrol boats for a second
I had another look at the smaller boats. The NZ boat is 55m, 340 tonnes, steel and works out at 29 mil in Australian dollars. The Aussie patrol boat is 57m, 270 tonnes, aluminium and about 26 mil dollars in 2004. Now taking into account inflation over time, and both cost roughly the same. I assume the NZ ship is steel because it is meant to work in bigger seas on average, and with metal fatigue and the loads therein the steel hull could be expected to last longer. The Aussie boat would mostly (not always) be used at the top end, where on average seas are much smoother, thus fatigue on the hull caused by waves could be expected to be less.
So both seem valid and smart solutions to differing problems.
Is 57m the ideal size for the Aussie patrol boat up North, assuming of course that it was to be complemented by a corvette sized craft? If it was too big then running costs could start to spiral. Seeing that the Armidale is larger than the Fremantle class, which is larger than the Attack class, has the Navy now got it right. Has it found the ideal size for a small patrol boat for the top end. I assume they have had many years of trial and error, can the Navy be trusted to get that right (the ideal size that is). If NZ is using a 55m boat in its seas, is a similar sized boat suitable in the North of Australia?
The 26 mil dollars seems a reasonable figure for the Aussie boat. According to wikipedia fourteen were completed. Just assume that in some time in the future these were replaced by ten small boats and ten big boats. Now the 260 million dollars for a theoretical ten small vessels seems a cost that the Australian defence budget could afford.
Add to this figure a fair bit of margin for inflation, and maybe some more margin for a theoretical larger size. If these boats would be best used by Navy, coastguard or customs am not sure. Do sailors like crewing on them. I guess they do not have the downside of being posted to the Persian Gulf for a year and not seeing their families. Just assume we have 10 small boats for say $400 mil. This could be a starting figure (not final).
Next we need say another ten or so at say 1700 tonnes. Of these ten some would be fitted out austerely as an offshore patrol boat, some would have sophisticated mine countermeasures, some would be fitted out as a corvette possibly. My guess is that 'the mine sweeper' boat (is MCM the proper name and mine sweeper out of fashion?) would be high tech. It may be that a 1700 tonne MCM might just cost almost $400 million each? How many of the big boats would be needed, assuming that they were complemented by ten small ones. Would ten corvette boats be a reasonable number? or a few more?
A little aside. I now see anti ship missiles use the notation AShM, it used to be SSM. When did that change? Obviously I must be out of the loop to have picked up the current jargon so late.
That link you gave is an interesting document, please accept my thanks for posting that. Some nice designs there. Funny how the MRV 90 has much shorter range than the MRV 86. I assume that the waterjets used on the 90 are more optimised for speed as opposed to the propellers on the 86. I also assume that with enough money Austal could work out something specific for you, (propellers on the 90 for example). I also assume if you want a MRV 90 and you want a longer range as well, and if you have enough money then the builder could add long range fuel tanks for you (money talks).
These two boats both seem nice and useful. Not sure if Australia would buy one, as they are intent on buying something much bigger. A single vessel to complement the larger ones would be nice, but then more ships would always be nice, unfortunately they cost money to purchase and to run. For a smaller navy they seem an ideal vessel, useful in so many differing tasks. The response to the Tsunami in Indonesia comes to mind.
going back to the smaller patrol boats for a second
I had another look at the smaller boats. The NZ boat is 55m, 340 tonnes, steel and works out at 29 mil in Australian dollars. The Aussie patrol boat is 57m, 270 tonnes, aluminium and about 26 mil dollars in 2004. Now taking into account inflation over time, and both cost roughly the same. I assume the NZ ship is steel because it is meant to work in bigger seas on average, and with metal fatigue and the loads therein the steel hull could be expected to last longer. The Aussie boat would mostly (not always) be used at the top end, where on average seas are much smoother, thus fatigue on the hull caused by waves could be expected to be less.
So both seem valid and smart solutions to differing problems.
Is 57m the ideal size for the Aussie patrol boat up North, assuming of course that it was to be complemented by a corvette sized craft? If it was too big then running costs could start to spiral. Seeing that the Armidale is larger than the Fremantle class, which is larger than the Attack class, has the Navy now got it right. Has it found the ideal size for a small patrol boat for the top end. I assume they have had many years of trial and error, can the Navy be trusted to get that right (the ideal size that is). If NZ is using a 55m boat in its seas, is a similar sized boat suitable in the North of Australia?
The 26 mil dollars seems a reasonable figure for the Aussie boat. According to wikipedia fourteen were completed. Just assume that in some time in the future these were replaced by ten small boats and ten big boats. Now the 260 million dollars for a theoretical ten small vessels seems a cost that the Australian defence budget could afford.
Add to this figure a fair bit of margin for inflation, and maybe some more margin for a theoretical larger size. If these boats would be best used by Navy, coastguard or customs am not sure. Do sailors like crewing on them. I guess they do not have the downside of being posted to the Persian Gulf for a year and not seeing their families. Just assume we have 10 small boats for say $400 mil. This could be a starting figure (not final).
Next we need say another ten or so at say 1700 tonnes. Of these ten some would be fitted out austerely as an offshore patrol boat, some would have sophisticated mine countermeasures, some would be fitted out as a corvette possibly. My guess is that 'the mine sweeper' boat (is MCM the proper name and mine sweeper out of fashion?) would be high tech. It may be that a 1700 tonne MCM might just cost almost $400 million each? How many of the big boats would be needed, assuming that they were complemented by ten small ones. Would ten corvette boats be a reasonable number? or a few more?
A little aside. I now see anti ship missiles use the notation AShM, it used to be SSM. When did that change? Obviously I must be out of the loop to have picked up the current jargon so late.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
With regards to the jargon...
Yes, minesweeper tends not to be used anymore. MCM, or mine countermeasures, is used instead. This is due to the fact that the use of sweeps, be they magnetic, mechanical, etc. is one method of clearing mines, but not the only one used currently. Mine clearance is often using divers and ROVs or remotely operated vehicles, basically a UUV or unmanned underwater vehicle.
Yes, AShM does stand for anti-ship missile, SSM is still used for a surface to surface missile. AShM is used because it denotes a certain type of target for the missile, and because it is not always surface-launched, but the target always is surface shipping.
Hope this helps.
-Cheers
Yes, minesweeper tends not to be used anymore. MCM, or mine countermeasures, is used instead. This is due to the fact that the use of sweeps, be they magnetic, mechanical, etc. is one method of clearing mines, but not the only one used currently. Mine clearance is often using divers and ROVs or remotely operated vehicles, basically a UUV or unmanned underwater vehicle.
Yes, AShM does stand for anti-ship missile, SSM is still used for a surface to surface missile. AShM is used because it denotes a certain type of target for the missile, and because it is not always surface-launched, but the target always is surface shipping.
Hope this helps.
-Cheers
Actually, a lot of Western countries tend to not use minesweepers at all any more, and use only single-role minehunters. "MCM" is a joint label for minesweeping and minehunting, and can mean both either type, or both types of operation together.
The only recent MCM vessels (designed and built after the end of the Cold War) that still do sweeping that i can think of offhand is the Swedish Landsort and Styrsö classes, the Canadian Kingstons, and the French Antares class specifically built for the "Brest Break-Out" role.
The only recent MCM vessels (designed and built after the end of the Cold War) that still do sweeping that i can think of offhand is the Swedish Landsort and Styrsö classes, the Canadian Kingstons, and the French Antares class specifically built for the "Brest Break-Out" role.
Looking at the schedule of major RAN projects
I guess the desicions to expect in the near future are the intial concept design for the future submarine and the maritime warfare helicopter.
Any thoughts on the likely options for these?
- Future Submarine has an initial design concept in FY2009-10 to FY2010-11
- Maritime combat Helicopter (24 new Anti-Submarine Warfare/Anti-Surface Warfare Helicopters): First Pass Approval FY 2009-10 to FY 2010-11
- OPV scheduled First Pass Approval FY 2012-13 to FY 2014-15
- LCH scheduled First Pass Approval: FY 2012-13 to FY 2014-15
- Maritime Operational Support Capability.(Success replacement) 2016+
- Strategic Sealift: 2019+
- Future Frigate 2019+
I guess the desicions to expect in the near future are the intial concept design for the future submarine and the maritime warfare helicopter.
Any thoughts on the likely options for these?
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
A this point, it would seem that the Maritime Combat Helicopter choices revolve around either some version of the NFH-90, or a new version of the Seahawk, most likely the MH-60R.
My personal preference at this stage would be for the RAN to go with the MH-60R, or some Australianized version of it.
My preferences for are because I like the capabilities it is supposed to have, as well as the level of integration. Having a co-pilot that can assist the WSO with mission taskings because the information is available in the co-pilot's seat when they are not needed for flying IMO is a nice feature. Combining the sensors and systems that had previously been used in two different Seahawk versions into one helicopter, along with improvements to those systems, should allow a RAN FAA helicopter to provide the vessel(s) it operates with a greater level of support.
Other areas which I think makes the MH-60R a better choice for the RAN is the fact that there are already currently ~16 S-70B (-2, -9?) Seahawks in service within the RAN. This means that there is already familiarity within the fleet for operating and handling them, as well as an existing support base for the airframe. The RAN might even be able to have the existing airframes re-manufactured to the MH-60R (for re-manufacture incidentally) standard, with orders placed for however many new aircraft needed to reach the desired numbers of Maritime Combat helicopters.
The next and final areas where I think the MH-60R makes a better choice for the RAN, is that the programme is already well underway for the USN, with the first operational deployment scheduled for this year. By going with a MOTS design in service with the USN, the RAN can potentially tap into the existing developmet and support chain that the USN has and is setting up. Secondly, having entered service and been deployed, there less exposure to programme risk, as occurred with the ill-fated SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite. Since the design is in operational service with the USN, it might be possible for the RAN to acquire sufficient numbers to meet the helicopter needs of the RAN, if the USN is willing to give up or accept later production slots for their order.
The areas where I see the MH-60R not being the ideal choice it otherwise are two-fold. The first is that the AFG did have a helicopter rationalization plan, to reduce the total # of different designs to ease the support burden across the different services. As part of this, both Army Black Hawks and RAN Seahawks were to be phased out of service. The area item about the Seahawk is that the design itself is somewhat older and smaller, which means that as an aircraft, it is not as capable as the NFH-90 might be in terms of payload, unrefueled range and loiter time.
The pros for an Australian NFH-90 are that the helicopter airframe itself is newer, larger and lighter for its size than the Seahawk. This gives it the ability to carry greater amounts of stores over potentially longer distances before needing to bre refueled. Secondly, the airframe itself will be in common with the MRH-90 in service, thus allowing continuation of the planned helicopter rationalization. Lastly, the helicopter might be able to be constructed here at the same facilities where the MRH-90's are being constructed.
IMO the different marks against the RAN choosing the NFH-90 are as follows. AFAIK, initial delivery is not scheduled until some time this year, with IOC expected some time around 2011, which means the NFH-90 would not be available to immediate order and entry into service. The NFH-90 electronics and mission systems are oriented towards European systems, which is not necessarily the direction the RAN is going in terms of munitions, therefore the RAN might suffer extra risks and costs incorporating the desired munitions. Additionally, it appears that the NFH-90 production run will be smaller in total than the MH-60R, which means both a greater exposure to programme risk and cost. Lastly, it has not been stated (at least in a source I have) what sort of electronics and and mission systems the NFH-90 will have. It might emerge geared for ASW ops, but not ASuW...
My final thought on any future Maritime Combat helicopter is that the RAN/ADF should get started on this sooner, rather than later. At present, there are ~16 naval helicopters in service within the RAN, for use aboard 12 frigates. If loaded to capacity, those frigates could deploy with all the Seahawks the RAN has. What this means is that if something were to occur, the RAN would either deploy with every helicotper in inventory, regardless of what their operational status was (doing a work-up, being overhauled, etc) or not all frigates would be equipped with their helicopter capacity. If the Seasprites had entered service, then the FAA would have a total of ~27 naval helicopters, nearly twice the current inventory. The longer the purchase or replacement is delayed, the greater the chances the comparatively low helicopter inventory will be a problem.
-Cheers
That is a very comprehensive comment, there is a lot of very interesting information there
what are the main weapons and sensor capabilities of the MH-60R and the NFH?
how do the surface strike capabilities of these systems compare?
what are these systems likely to cost? The DCP has budgeted Very High> $1500m
It will be several years before these are in service
- First Pass Approval FY 2009-10 to FY 2010-11
- Year-of-Decision FY 2010-11 to FY 2011-12
- Initial Operating Capability 2014 to 2016
the background information from the 2009 defence capability plan
what are the main weapons and sensor capabilities of the MH-60R and the NFH?
how do the surface strike capabilities of these systems compare?
what are these systems likely to cost? The DCP has budgeted Very High> $1500m
It will be several years before these are in service
- First Pass Approval FY 2009-10 to FY 2010-11
- Year-of-Decision FY 2010-11 to FY 2011-12
- Initial Operating Capability 2014 to 2016
the background information from the 2009 defence capability plan
Here's a link that provides some more info.
Rational to rationalise? Australia's future naval combat helicopters revisited by Andrew Davies
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
A good read in that some not so obvious points are examined.
rb
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Sorry about the book... I tend to do that.
I have some idea what the capabilities of the MH-60R will be. Unfortunately I cannot say the same for the NFH-90. Part of this is just the fact that the MH-60R is further along, and the other part is that there seems to be slightly different variants of the NFH-90 in terms of avionics fitout. This naturally obscures the issue somewhat.
From an article I read last year in AW&ST on the MH-60R, it is to include both sonobuoys as well as a dipping sonar, coupled with an improved system for detecting and analyzing sonar returns. For ASW weaponry, it will use the lightweight torpedoes int he Mk 46/50/54 family IIRC.
For surface detection, the APS-147 radar which can detect and track 100+ target that are on the surface or airbourne. IIRC it can also apparently take a radar 'picture' of a target, which might assist in identification. There will also be IR systems, ESM, and several self defence systems onboard. AFAIK, the primary ASuW weapon will be versions of the Hellfire AGM which are configured for use vs. FAC. Other, larger missiles like the Penguin AShM having apparently not chosen due to their size, they are large enough that a helicopter can only carry a limited number (1-2 usually) with a warhead size overly large for smallcraft, but too little range for safe use against a warship.
From what is available, the NFH-90 will have similar sorts of systems. The question then becomes how well will those systems function and be integrated together, relative to the performance of the MH-60R mission systems. The only real differences I noticed between the two is that the NFH-90 can apparently have a secondary role of air-to-air, armed with AAM, and that the radar and system chosen for the MH-90R can detect and track airborne targets, potentially acting as a helibourne AEW of sorts. My personal feeling is that if a naval helicopter is engaging other aircraft, then something is wrong, but that might just be me.
-Cheers
What is aircraft?
UAV's? Given the enviroment in 10 years time I think it may be a wise decision to have something that can shoot down some sort of survellience drone or some hostile/annoying little UAV which could be inserted into the battlespace from the water. I don't think its intended to engage high threat level fixed/rotary winged craft (attack helicopters and fighter planes).
We could always do with more capability.
UAV's? Given the enviroment in 10 years time I think it may be a wise decision to have something that can shoot down some sort of survellience drone or some hostile/annoying little UAV which could be inserted into the battlespace from the water. I don't think its intended to engage high threat level fixed/rotary winged craft (attack helicopters and fighter planes).
We could always do with more capability.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
My feeling is that if it is something small and annoying, but not threatening enough to have a fighter or shipboard SAM shoot down, then have the helicopter use either a GPMG or HMG to shoot it down. If, OTOH it is something that poses a threat, either directly due to being armed, or because of who/what might be receiving recon and telemetry, then it is something worth using a dedicated air defence capability.
The other thing which comes to mind is that any extra equipment weight which is carried that does not contribute to the helicopter in its primary roles, detracts from them. The question then becomes what value does a given capability have, relative to its impact on the primary role? IMO carriage of 1-2 VSHORAD with a range of perhaps 8 km does not add significantly to a naval helicopter's ability to search large areas of water for surface and sub-surface threats and respond to them.
-Cheers
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I read through the article, it is interesting, though I feel that the author either missed, or perhaps ignored, the current naval helicopter situation the RAN is facing.
The basic gist I took from the article was that the author favoured a RAN selection of the NFH-90 as a future naval helicopter, but due to there being a need as a 'matter of urgency' to make the selection in the 2013-2014 timeframe.
The article does not mention at all that the current naval helicopter force consists of ~16 S-70B-2 Seahawks which have been in service for ~20 years. Or that prior to the cancellation of the SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite order, the planned naval helicopter inventory was to have totaled 27 aircraft, one primarily configured for ASW, the other for ASuW. I can well understand why a replacement if felt necessary. The current inventory, assuming the standard convention is followered where only one-third is ever available at any given time, only provides ~62% of the desired naval helicopter support. This does not even take into account the impact aging helicopters will have on availability, or how well they will perform their missions without upgrades to mission systems. Does the author of the policy paper truly feel that the RAN can safely operate with the number and type of naval helicopter it currently has for the next eight years or so?
Another area where I have questions on the validity of some points the article was making, is with regards to the MU-90 torpedoe. From what I understand, due to the problems and delays the RAN experienced in fielding the MU-90 torpedoes aboard the Anzac frigates, they were not included as part of the FFG-UP upgrade done on the Adelaides. Additionally, the Mk-54 is expected to be the LWT fielded by the Hobart class AWD. In short, apart from aboard the Anzacs, the MU-90 will not be seeing service in the ADF. This makes me question where the article seemed to indicate that chosing a Eurocentric equipment fitout was a better choice, particularly since the USN is the major navy that the RAN is most likely to be operating alongside.
Lastly, the assertion that by using a common airframe, the NFH-90 and MRH-90 will have a significant reduction in the support foot for those helicopters within the ADF. There are only two areas which IMO this holds true. The first is possibly is in flight training and qualifications where, assuming the two different variants perform similarly, it might reduce some flight training. I expect specialized training would still be required for the Navy pilots in order to qualify to land on a ship's helipad. The second is that if RAN and Army NH-90s are based together, then a common pool of technicians and some parts could potentially be used to maintain the airframes, engines and flight control surfaces. However, how often do RAN helicopters operate from land bases alongside Army helicopters? The other situation would arise if FAA and Army NH-90s were operating from the Canberra LHD's together. However, the RAN would still need to maintain its won parts and technician pool, as much of the NFH-90 deployments would be individual helicopters, crew and support parts and personnel embarked on the different destroyers and frigates.
As a question for the group, does anyone have knowledge of the author of the policy paper? Given that the article seems to be arguing for the NFH-90, with the suggestion that a decision on helicopter replacement be delayed until the NFH-90 has been in service for a year or more to allow a better assessment of risk, as well as ignoring the current helicopter availability issue which will only grow worse as time passes. Something just does not seem right to me about the policy analysis... I cannot quite tell what it is, but it almost seems like the facts provided were to support the conclusion, as opposed to a presentation of all the facts followed by a conclusion explaining how the available facts lead to whatever it was/is.
-Cheers
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