Sinking an Aircraft carrier

Status
Not open for further replies.

Transient

Member
1) air launched B-611. Talks have been that the new JH-7 variant is coming out with the ability to launch B-611. If there is ever a good evidence for ASBM, it would be JH-7 firing off B-611, because I can't think of any reason why JH-7 would carry a non-nuclear ground strike ballistic missile. Targeting is possible through JH-7 or KJ-200's radar. It will need escorts, but the launching can be done from more than 300 km out if the network or radars can correctly pick out a carrier group.
How thoughtful of the Chinese to provide a kh-22 equivalent threat that has been cracked decades ago.

2) the less threatening of YJ-83s. A regiment of JH-7A can probably carry 100 of these. Although not all will be aimed at the carrier. Other carriers would include your normal destroyers/frigates + 022s (they can probably carry 8 each).
The E-2D with its phased array radar would provide long range fire control quality sensor information to the fleet through CEC long before the threat has broken the horizon. A regiment of JH-7As would need to survive to launch range first. Their opposition would be Superhornets, and in future this task would be taken over by SM-6s.

3) the less talked about Chinese AGS, supposedly something is under development that can hit moving targets 300 km away. Still waiting to see some pictures so. This wouldn't be more threatening, but it's just a more cost effective solution.
Coming to a theater near us in 20X0?
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
The Sizzler is ``unique,'' the Defense Science Board, an independent agency within the Pentagon that provides assessments of major defense issues, said in an October 2005 report. Most anti-ship cruise missiles fly below the speed of sound and on a straight path, making them easier to track and target.
McQueary, in a March 16 e-mailed statement, said that ``to the best of our knowledge,'' the Navy hasn't started a test program or responded to the board's recommendations. ``The Navy may be reluctant to invest in development of a new target, given their other bills,'' he said. http://forums.military.com/eve/forum.../5670059811001
A set of alarmist articles, full of stuff that poorly translate to our context or are wrong on facts. Example:

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-163.html

Before that the MQM-8G Vandal was used, a conversion of the '60s RIM-8 Talos. Btw, note how similar it is to the supersonic cruise missiles we are discussing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-8_Talos

(Oh dear, I am talking cruise missiles and technology... well I know my place.:D))
 

tphuang

Super Moderator
How thoughtful of the Chinese to provide a kh-22 equivalent threat that has been cracked decades ago.
I wouldn't think something like Iskander would be as easy to intercept as soviet era AShM.
The E-2D with its phased array radar would provide long range fire control quality sensor information to the fleet through CEC long before the threat has broken the horizon. A regiment of JH-7As would need to survive to launch range first. Their opposition would be Superhornets, and in future this task would be taken over by SM-6s.
that's why I say escorts are needed. And frankly, no one at PLA are shaking at the thought of super hornets.
Coming to a theater near us in 20X0?
this along with the B-611 case, I'm following closely. Waiting for pictures in the next 3-5 years. The other one is the 092 SSGN, probably the three least talked about, but significant technological development for PLAN.
You can't do this kind of analysis through the prism of "we'll just sit back and launch a saturated attack of "nn" hundred missiles and overwhelm Aegis. Its ridiculous and simplistic and ignores all the requirements and fundamentals to even bring that notional competency to bear - let alone present it as a coherent battleplan revolving around the point of contact.
I was simply replying to a hypothetical question of what China/Russia could try at the moment.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
that's why I say escorts are needed. And frankly, no one at PLA are shaking at the thought of super hornets.
but that is the kind of analysis that is fundamentally flawed. you don't focus on the platform, you focus on what the platform provides to a system that responds and acts as a package.

I was simply replying to a hypothetical question of what China/Russia could try at the moment.
and I guess thats one reason why I loathe simple hypotheticals - as soon as I see some of the other comments about the lethality of launching supersonics from some fanciful compressive concentric attacking force my eyes start to roll to the back of my head in frustration and exasperation.

Seriously, some of the stuff being touted in here as ways to kill a carrier make you want to weep....

I'm not suggesting its one sided, I'm not presenting the CTF as unsinkable and "invincible": - but seriously, some of the stuff promoted is just abject nonsense and is completely devoid of comprehension of what the fleet and its assisting multipliers can bring to bear. The fact that there is a complete absence of discussion of what we already know a CTF can counter with, and what the publicly released "safe" saturation data is should give a clue as to how difficult it will be.

If the threat started to demonstrate Soviet capability across numbers of and mandatory minimums of capability - then the discussions start to represent some form of reality rather than some fanciful battle of the giants caught in a temporal flux where one side has now got a comprehensive attacking capability, and the defending side has elected to stifle and suspend all current capabilities and developments so that the attacker can catch up and threaten it in a meaningful persistent fashion.

The PLAN today could not take on the USN of 1989 - the USN of today has greater packaged sympathetic capability and throw today but with less than half the penant count. Her greatest deficiency has been ASW where every man and his dog decided that now that the Soviets were gone, it was an expensive luxury to continue to fund. The mindset for that started to change in 2004.

The Soviets estimated that even with all their compressive capability that they could at best kill 20-30% of the CBG's before the reality of reciprocal violence killed their opportunity to continue to threaten or apply meaningful force. They are the baseline to measure because they had real capability, they trained for it - day in, night out, they had a real blue water navy, they had Gorshkov, they had supersonic antishipping capability which could be applied with meaningful launch rates, they had the mass, they had fleet redundancy, they had sympathetic allies upon which they could utilise and extend land based air to apply further compression etc...

If you don't look at things with a degree of historical comprehension and apply it to contemporary constructs, then its an exercise in tactical onanism.
 
Last edited:

tphuang

Super Moderator
but that is the kind of analysis that is fundamentally flawed. you don't focus on the platform, you focus on what the platform provides to a system that responds and acts as a package.

and I guess thats one reason why I loathe simple hypotheticals - as soon as I see some of the other comments about the lethality of launching supersonics from some fanciful compressive concentric attacking force my eyes start to roll to the back of my head in frustration and exasperation.

Seriously, some of the stuff being touted in here as ways to kill a carrier make you want to weep....

I'm not suggesting its one sided, I'm not presenting the CTF as unsinkable and "invincible": - but seriously, some of the stuff promoted is just abject nonsense and is completely devoid of comprehension of what the fleet and its assisting multipliers can bring to bear. The fact that there is a complete absence of discussion of what we already know a CTF can counter with, and what the publicly released "safe" saturation data is should give a clue as to how difficult it will be.

If the threat started to demonstrate Soviet capability across numbers of and mandatory minimums of capability - then the discussions start to represent some form of reality rather than some fanciful battle of the giants caught in a temporal flux where one side has now got a comprehensive attacking capability, and the defending side has elected to stifle and suspend all current capabilities and developments so that the attacker can catch up and threaten it in a meaningful persistent fashion.

The PLAN today could not take on the USN of 1989 - the USN of today has greater packaged sympathetic capability and throw today but with less than half the penant count. Her greatest deficiency has been ASW where every man and his dog decided that now that the Soviets were gone, it was an expensive luxury to continue to fund. The mindset for that started to change in 2004.

The Soviets estimated that even with all their compressive capability that they could at best kill 20-30% of the CBG's before the reality of reciprocal violence killed their opportunity to continue to threaten or apply meaningful force. They are the baseline to measure because they had real capability, they trained for it - day in, night out, they had a real blue water navy, they had Gorshkov, they had supersonic antishipping capability which could be applied with meaningful launch rates, they had the mass, they had fleet redundancy, they had sympathetic allies upon which they could utilise and extend land based air to apply further compression etc...

If you don't look at things with a degree of historical comprehension and apply it to contemporary constructs, then its an exercise in tactical onanism.
well, I think a lot of the stuff talked about are based on an extremely optimistic scenario where for example the present day PLAN has received adequate training with their new platforms and that they are reasonably close to their home bases where they can get supplied and such. Also, they are close enough to the air bases where they can get adequate air support from surveillance platforms, fighters and bombers. And also, they are an early point in the conflict where their air bases, supply depot and such are still operational. I guess it's just saying that if they are really prepared and in an optimal position, what kind of attack strategies they could try.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
well, I think a lot of the stuff talked about are based on an extremely optimistic scenario where for example the present day PLAN has received adequate training with their new platforms and that they are reasonably close to their home bases where they can get supplied and such. Also, they are close enough to the air bases where they can get adequate air support from surveillance platforms, fighters and bombers. And also, they are an early point in the conflict where their air bases, supply depot and such are still operational. I guess it's just saying that if they are really prepared and in an optimal position, what kind of attack strategies they could try.

I guess thats what I'm obliquely trying to indicate here. I guess my patience runs thin when I see comments which to me inidcate a lack of considered thought and are primarily based on lots of fast bang and lots of volume. eg It's a variation of the notion of swarming to overwhelm the defences.

can a carrier be mission compromised? yes
can a carrier be killed? yes

at that point my view is that you start at the maximum defensive capability (because that's inherently autonomous) against the realistic attacking capability.

it's also, location, location, location.

but, as soon as I see anything that talks about swarming "xx type" missiles to defeat a layered integrated defence and sensory network - then I just switch off as it's already stepped into fantasy land at the expense of considered and coherent thought.

The other thing that gets ignored here (apart from the actual defensive capability of a CTF) is that there are substantial Ewarfare elements involved, there is an overmatch in supporting sensor systems, there is an issue of fluid intelligence and intelligence management etc.... its not just about missiles.

eg. The US has more military satellites in space than any other combination of nations put together. She has redundancy across numerous parameters.

In the land of the blind, the one eyed man is still king, and unless you blind both eyes, then the US is still king. The rhetorical question then becomes, a nation electing to attack a USN CTF must also make an effort to render it blind deaf and dumb, and that means trying to render satellite constellations blind deaf and dumb.
- which nation can do this?
- which nation is willing to launch ASATBM's and run the risk of the US seeing vollied shots as the start of a first strike?
- which nation is capable of killing deep space satellite systems (none). There is a vast difference between killing an obsolete satellite on a predicted decaying path than to killing satellites out of reach and which are sympathetic to other constellations.

The dumbest thing I've seen this year is the hype attached to the shootdown of that satellite on a known decaying orbit. It's generated a life of its own and has not been subjected to any meaningful pause or analysis in some forums.

Similarly, the concepts espoused on killing a CTF have been just as defficient in considered thought.
 
Last edited:

AGRA

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
how difficult would something like this be? I'm just wondering this, because the same source that said the Song incident happened also claimed that Song was at the right place due to China's ISR rather than being informed which route Kitty Hawk was taking.
The various claims of SSKs taking down CVBGs in peacetime are of no real purpose in war. We have one modern example of determined attacks against a CVBG by what should be considered a competent SSK operator with a few good boats. This was the ARA against the RN in the Falklands. The ARA Type 209s ran up against a defence that doesn't exsist in peacetime - dropping of warshot torpedos. The RN didn't sink any ARA boats but they forced them down and away from the CVBGs and probably killed quite a few whales. But they had the mission win and the Argies the mission defeat (if not loss of the combat units).
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The various claims of SSKs taking down CVBGs in peacetime are of no real purpose in war.
Exactly. As much as its nice to argue about the effeciveness of a sub in penetrating the screens in peacetime - they are fundamentally useless in translating to effective capability.

Training runs are partial prosecutions - for a reason
A peacetime footing is vastly different to a wartime escalation where the layers of defence will be activated as there is a notional threat to deter or kill.

eg, the russians can overfly a USN CV or CVN as much as they like in peacetime as its not a declared area. If it was a declared area, then the supporting assets including skimmers and CAP would be sheperding everything away within strike range.

When some quote overflights or perimeter breeches as indications of capability or examples of tactical indolence, then there really is a selective comprehension of how those events can and will occur.

People need to understand that peacetime footings are completely different from wartime footings. Even wartime footings are graded to immediate threat levels.
 

Firehorse

Banned Member
I am not sure if this has been mentioned but perhaps the different approach could be taken, obviously this would not work if you trying for a early knock out punch but in a sustained conflict why bother sinking the Carrier, sink the oilers and ammunition ships that must resupply it, obviously CVN's don't need fuel but the aircraft do. ..the amount of fuel a Carrier Airwings goes through on sustained combat ops but I can't imagine supplies lasting for more than a week? Happy to be corrected.
To summarise go for the support, it certainly will not have nearly the same amount of layered defence then the CBG becomes a floating hangar.
Just a thought.
Cheers
Yes, it's already been suggested on Sinodef. forum. Those airwings consume tons of fuel & ammunition. Depending on their sorties rate, range to targets, and availability of land based tanker support (in a conflict, those will become a fair game), those essentials may last from only a few days to (and I'm stretching) maximum 2 weeks.
Imagine this scenario:
The year is 2012, Taiwan & PRC heat up their rhetoric amid continuing steps toward formal independence, and the PLA has more muscle;
In the course of less than 12 hr. the PLAN SSBNs are conducting BMs firings with dummy warheads from Mid-PAC & Phillipine Sea (across Taiwan), S. China Sea (across Indochina) to ranges in W.China; and also to 320mi off Pearl Harbor, HI, and
270mi off San Diego, CA, and into the Gulf of Alaska (traditional patrol area of USN SSBNs); S. Indian Ocean (across India) & Mid-Atlantic (across Africa, Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf, Iran & Pakistan also to ranges in W.China & into middle of the Florida Strait, & 250mi off Norfolk, VA; shoots down 2 more of their SATs from the same boomers; the PLA does 2 ASATs from mobile launchers in Central & NE China and fires an ICBM from Inner Mongolia across the Pacific to a spot 370 mi South of the Galapagos Islands; from Yunnan an IRBM is launched to 300mi south of Diego Garcia (across Burma), and an aging sattelite is moved to hit & kill 1 more; PLAAF/NAF conducts long range patrols & exercises near Okinawa, Guam, Malaysia, Burma, Arabian Sea (from Pakistan), Red Sea (from Sudan) & Singapore with
H-6s, J-11s, Su-30s & AWACSes; IRBMs/CMs/AShMs are shot from shore, ships & subs around Taiwan; while the PLAN CBG (ex-Varyag) is at sea, south of Taiwan, and near the outer entrance to the Luzon Strait.

Now, how far would a CTF, if deployed, stay away from trouble? Will this sabre rattling mission kill it?
 
Last edited:

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Now, how far would a CTF, if deployed, stay away from trouble? Will this sabre rattling mission kill it?
You're launching ballistic missiles.

If I was China then the last thing on my mind would be how the CTF's will react.
 

Firehorse

Banned Member
Why? They would announce test launches and their impact zones ahead of time, so there would be no surprises to anyone. Those SATs & radars the US has will confirm the impact areas after they are in the air!
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Why? They would announce test launches and their impact zones ahead of time, so there would be no surprises to anyone. Those SATs & radars the US has will confirm the impact areas after they are in the air!
You think it will work, so that's all that matters in here.

This is going from the sublime to the ridiculous and basically ignores so many of the basics.

However, feel free to discuss it as much as you like.
 

AegisFC

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The other thing that gets ignored here (apart from the actual defensive capability of a CTF) is that there are substantial Ewarfare elements involved, there is an overmatch in supporting sensor systems, there is an issue of fluid intelligence and intelligence management etc.... its not just about missiles.
Agreed. The DDG's and CG's alone have decent jamming capibilities along with all the nasty goodies that can be launched out of the chaff launchers and Nulka. Then when you add the EA-6 and the Growler to the CTF any attacker is going to be facing an electronic mess on top of the active defenses. Insurmountable? No, but extremely hard to crack? Yes.
 

tphuang

Super Moderator
Agreed. The DDG's and CG's alone have decent jamming capibilities along with all the nasty goodies that can be launched out of the chaff launchers and Nulka. Then when you add the EA-6 and the Growler to the CTF any attacker is going to be facing an electronic mess on top of the active defenses. Insurmountable? No, but extremely hard to crack? Yes.
well, the attacker could also be coming with EW planes + anti-radiation-drones amongst other things. It's not just the defense that has additional counter measures.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Having been reading this thread with interest, some thoughts and observations have occurred to me.

For those who wonder why (or have complained about) the scenario almost always being the sinking of a USN carrier, that is because roughly half of all aircraft carriers (approximately 22 active worldwide) begin with their names with USS. Also the US carriers are amongst the most active in terms of operations, as opposed to carrier ops conducted by other navies such as Brazil and Thailand. By way of example, IIRC the Thai CVS carrier Chakri Naruebt is used more as a royal yacht and does not usually put out to sea with its full air group of six Harriers and six Seahawks.

In terms of methods suggested, so far a number have been mentioned which can sink a carrier, however none seem likely to do so. It seems that what GF and others have mentioned about factors that need to be considered when engaging a USN CBG/CTF has not been fully realized.

As I see it, the following events need to occur (more of less in order) to successfully sink/mission kill a US carrier or its associated Task Force/Battlegroup.

First the attacking force needs to get data on the location of the CBG of sufficient quality to allow it to be targeted, with the type and level of quality dependent on what method(s) will be used to actually conduct the attack. Additionally, when the data is gathered, it needs to be done in a manner in which either the US is ignorant of or unable to do anything about.

Secondly, the attacking force needs to get into the proper position to launch the attack. The requirements on the position would similarly to the above be dependent on what the method(s) of attack would be (eg AShM, AShBM, mine warfare, torpedoes, etc).

Thirdly, while the attacking force is being positioned, the ISR resources of the US need to be either destroyed, neutralized or evaded sufficiently so that US defences cannot prevent the attack.

Fourth, the attack needs to be actually carried out, in the face of potential
US reprisals.

Of the four overall items mentioned, the last two seem to be the most disregarded.

In terms of the US ISR resources, not just those of the CBG are of concerns. Rather the whole range of US government ISR, covering land, air, sea, undersea and space-based assets need to foiled in one manner or another. Given the capabilities of the various ISR systems and wide range of methods that covers, particularly when compared to other nations, that is a very difficult task. To illustrate what I mean consider the following.

Some nation decides to carry out an attack on a USN CBG and then starts drawing up plans to do so. As a result of normal comm intercepts, the US learns of the country's plan to launch an attack. As a result, the US changes the composition of the CBG, or the location, or the vector to give the US favourable results, or just conducts a premptive action of some sort to deny the hostile country an opportunity or the capability to attack. Alternately, the US might notice the movement or massing of forces that could conceivably carry out an attack on a CBG or other valuable target and the US could again respond or prempt accordingly.

Regarding the last item, it must be remembered that such an attack would not occur in a vacuum. If the US was not already at war with the country launching such an attack, they immediately would be. Then the attacking country could fall under attack from the full range of US military capabilities. Given that the USAF seems to have the ability to hit targets anywhere in the world pretty much at will, that is a potentially enormous disincentive to trying to sink a US carrier. On the other hand, if the US was already in a state of war with the attacking country, then there would be degradation on the part of the attacking country in capability to carry out the first three parts mentioned above needed to launch the attack.

I would suggest that the USN, long an operator of carriers, has experience in what is needed to keep the vessels safe. Similarly, the US has a general edge over other nations in terms of technology. This, coupled with the tactics and practices developed over time and through experience would make an effective attack a difficult prospect. I would further suggest before recommendations are made on weapons used or deployment methods, consideration be given to how the US ISR apparatus could be successfully bypassed since if that is not achieved the attack would likely fail before it even began.

-Cheers
 

KGB

New Member
Or in other words, the USN just has too many resources to make any possible weaknesses exploitable in a meaningful sense. My impression is that, from jutland through the battle of the atlantic, to the pacific war with japan, Goliaths eventually beat Davids. Except Tsushima perhaps.
 

Transient

Member
Quote: Originally Posted by AegisFC
Agreed. The DDG's and CG's alone have decent jamming capibilities along with all the nasty goodies that can be launched out of the chaff launchers and Nulka. Then when you add the EA-6 and the Growler to the CTF any attacker is going to be facing an electronic mess on top of the active defenses. Insurmountable? No, but extremely hard to crack? Yes.

well, the attacker could also be coming with EW planes + anti-radiation-drones amongst other things. It's not just the defense that has additional counter measures.
When you keep adding up all the things needed to penetrate the defenses of a CSG, do take a while to think about the practical demands of planning and coordinating the vast strike armada you are theoretically assembling. And all the while the situation is dynamic, with CSG location and disposition changing, which imposes a very strict time limit on the planning process. I love how anti-carrier enthusiasts like to 'stack the pile' with assets. The solution is always 'more'. They never stop to think, 'is it doable within the constraints of time, C&C capability, track holding capability'?
 

tphuang

Super Moderator
When you keep adding up all the things needed to penetrate the defenses of a CSG, do take a while to think about the practical demands of planning and coordinating the vast strike armada you are theoretically assembling. And all the while the situation is dynamic, with CSG location and disposition changing, which imposes a very strict time limit on the planning process. I love how anti-carrier enthusiasts like to 'stack the pile' with assets. The solution is always 'more'. They never stop to think, 'is it doable within the constraints of time, C&C capability, track holding capability'?
If they are getting air cover, having such assets is not a problem, since the same airbases that have AEWC&C planes also have EW planes. And it's simply nonsense to believe that an air force with surveillance planes don't train them with attack aircrafts and fighter jets.
 

Transient

Member
If they are getting air cover, having such assets is not a problem, since the same airbases that have AEWC&C planes also have EW planes. And it's simply nonsense to believe that an air force with surveillance planes don't train them with attack aircrafts and fighter jets.
And to plan the strike, ready the planes, launch, form up and transit to launch coordinates takes time. The more packages required, the more time is needed in each of the phases above. Which requires that the CSG be tracked during this time. What assets are available for the tracking? A few MPAs. Which are going to be happily left alone by the USN? And what anti-radiation drones? Ever bothered to check the speed and range of the Harpies? Say again - these anti-carrier exercises inevitably become 'list the inventory' games when one doesn't pause to think through the processes and limitations involved.
 

Firehorse

Banned Member
Another way to mission kill CSG/CTF is to prevent them from going overseas in the 1st place. Just send your own SSGNs & carriers (you better have those!) to striking distances from Hawaii, and US East & West Coasts. Remeber what happened just after 9/11/01? A carrier was sent to NY harbor to reassure the public & help with CAPs, while many other USN ships sailed out just in case. As for the forward deployed CV (soon to be CVN-73) in Japan, send them off Japan's East coast. Also, to delay the arrival of CSGs to the Arabian Sea, Suez canal, Gibraltar & Singapore straits can be sabotaged and/or targeted. By the time the normal traffic is resumed through those, the situation may be more favorable to the other side.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top